¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: May 3, 2021
¶3 S21A0383. MOON v. THE STATE.
¶4 WARREN, Justice.
¶5 Sergio Moon was tried by a Walton County jury and convicted
¶6of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting
¶7death of Linda Flint, the great-grandmother of his children. 1 On
¶8 1 Flint was killed on June 13, 2018. On January 25, 2019, a Walton County grand jury indicted Moon, charging him with malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and cruelty to children in the first degree. Moon was tried in February 2019. The jury found Moon guilty of felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, but found him not guilty of the remaining counts. The trial court sentenced Moon to life in prison for felony murder and a consecutive five-year term for possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. The conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon merged for purposes of sentencing. Moon filed a timely motion for new trial on February 12, 2019, and amended it through new counsel on December 19, 2019. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions, both original and as amended, on August 21, 2020. Moon timely appealed, and the case was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2020 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. appeal, Moon argues that the trial court erred when it denied his
¶9request to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter; the
¶10evidence presented at trial did not show that Moon’s felonious
¶11conduct was “inherently dangerous,” and as a result, his felonious
¶12conduct could not serve as a predicate for felony murder; the
¶13prosecutor made an improper argument at closing; and the evidence
¶14was insufficient to support his felony murder conviction. Seeing no
¶15error, we affirm.
¶16 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
¶17evidence presented at trial showed the following. Moon lived in an
¶18apartment with Kendra Porter and their three children. Porter’s
¶19grandmother, Flint, was staying in the apartment temporarily. On
¶20June 13, 2018, Moon was inside the apartment, smoking marijuana
¶21and “chilling” with Porter and her cousins, Delvin and Jonrunte
¶22Smith, who lived next door. Later that day, UPS delivered a
¶23package for Moon containing a bore sight—a bullet-shaped device
¶24that fits into a gun’s chamber and shines a laser out of the barrel
¶25when struck by the firing pin. Moon, a convicted felon, sat down at
¶26 2 the kitchen table and began trying to fit the bore sight into his .40-
¶27caliber handgun. At one point, the laser was pointed at Flint’s head,
¶28and both Porter and Flint told Moon to stop playing with the gun.
¶29 As Moon continued manipulating the gun and bore sight, the
¶30gun discharged and a bullet struck Flint in the head and killed her.
¶31At the moment of the shooting, Flint was near the sink preparing
¶32food, Porter’s minor daughter was next to Flint, and the two Smith
¶33brothers were sitting at the table with Moon. Porter and another of
¶34her children were elsewhere in the apartment. When Porter came
¶35toward the kitchen after she heard the gunshot, Moon approached
¶36her, dropped to his knees, and said he had “f***ed up.” After a police
¶37investigation, Moon was eventually arrested.
¶38 At trial, the State presented evidence that, shortly before Flint
¶39was shot, Moon had an argument with Flint about money that she
¶40owed him. The State also presented evidence that, after the
¶41shooting, Moon fled the scene and told others that he would kill them
¶42if they told anyone about how Flint died: “whoever tells going to get
¶43killed.” Police officers arrived at the scene after Moon had fled, and
¶44 3 Porter told them initially that someone broke into the house and
¶45shot Flint, though she later admitted that Moon “had shot her.”
¶46 Moon testified in his own defense, and his testimony was
¶47largely consistent with the evidence presented by the State. Among
¶48other things, Moon admitted that he was smoking marijuana on the
¶49day Flint was shot and that he was a convicted felon and knew he
¶50was “not supposed to have a gun.” He also admitted that the gun
¶51discharged as he was attempting to make the bore sight work.
¶52Specifically, Moon testified that when he first placed the bore sight
¶53into the chamber of his .40-caliber gun, it did not work properly, so
¶54he removed the bore sight and the gun’s magazine, which resulted
¶55in a live round being chambered. Moon suggested that he was trying
¶56to eject that live round when the gun discharged:
¶57 I took the clip back out because I know once you rack it again, a live round go in, but when you take the clip out, if you pull the slide back far enough, it gives two ways for the bullet to come. It can drop down through the handle or it can come out through the top part. And when I was pulling it back, it just went off.
¶58 2. Moon contends that the trial court erred when it refused to
¶59 4 give a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-
¶60included offense of malice murder or felony murder. Because an
¶61involuntary manslaughter instruction was not warranted, Moon’s
¶62argument fails. 2
¶63 Before trial, Moon filed a written request for a pattern jury
¶64instruction on involuntary manslaughter and a more specific
¶65pattern instruction on involuntary manslaughter predicated on the
¶66misdemeanor charge of reckless conduct. The trial court did not give
¶67the requested instructions, however, and Moon objected. The trial
¶68court explained its decision:
¶69 I did not give that intentionally. It was the Court’s determination that, based on the facts of this case, [there] was either no crime or there is the crime that is charged in Count 3 [felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon]. Therefore, there is no lesser-included in between there. . . .
¶70Later, in denying Moon’s motion for a new trial on this issue, the
¶71trial court concluded that
¶72 if [Moon] was guilty of reckless conduct as requested in [his] requested charge[,] then he was guilty of an
¶73 2Moon’s claim is moot as to the charges of malice murder and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault for which he was acquitted. 5 inherently dangerous act which would then provide the basis of the felony murder charge with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as alleged in count three of the indictment. Since such a charge would cause confusion to the jury, it was not error to not give [the involuntary manslaughter] requested jury instruction.
¶74 Involuntary manslaughter is defined in OCGA § 16-5-3 (a) as
¶75“caus[ing] the death of another human being without any intention
¶76to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony.”
¶77(Emphasis supplied). “[A] charge on involuntary manslaughter
¶78should be given, upon a proper request, when there is slight evidence
¶79to support it.” Cash v. State, 297 Ga. 859, 863-864 (778 SE2d 785)
¶80(2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). Conversely, where
¶81evidence presented at trial shows “the commission of [a] completed
¶82offense . . . or the commission of no offense, the trial court is not
¶83required to charge the jury on a lesser included offense.” Id. at 864
¶84(citation and punctuation omitted).
¶85 Here, by admitting to being a felon and possessing a gun, Moon
¶86admitted to committing an unlawful act that was a felony. See
¶87OCGA § 16-11-131 (b) (felon in possession of a gun is a felony
¶88 6 offense). And that felony precluded any instruction on involuntary
¶89manslaughter as a matter of law. See Finley v. State, 286 Ga. 47,
¶9049-50 (685 SE2d 258) (2009) (holding that the trial court did not err
¶91when it denied the defendant’s requested involuntary manslaughter
¶92jury instruction because the evidence at trial “did not reflect that
¶93the killing resulted from an act other than a felony, given [the
¶94defendant’s] status as a convicted felon and his admission that he
¶95possessed a gun, however briefly”). See also Mayweather v. State,
¶96254 Ga. 660, 661 (333 SE2d 597) (1985) (“Where an act that causes
¶97a death is a felony, a requested charge on felony grade involuntary
¶98manslaughter is properly denied.”). Given that Flint’s shooting
¶99indisputably occurred as a result of Moon committing a felony—i.e.,
¶100possession of a gun by a convicted felon—the trial court did not err
¶101by refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. 3
¶102 3 Moon focuses his argument on two cases, Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557, 559 (651 SE2d 661) (2007), and Seabolt v. Norris, 298 Ga. 583, 586 (783 SE2d 913) (2016), in which we held that the trial court should have given an involuntary manslaughter instruction. His reliance on these decisions is unavailing because unlike Moon, the defendants in Manzano and Norris were not found guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. This distinction
¶103 7 3. Analogizing the facts of his case to Ford v. State, 262 Ga.
¶104602, 602 (423 SE2d 255) (1992), Moon contends that the evidence
¶105presented at trial did not show that his “status offense” of possession
¶106of a firearm by a convicted felon was “inherently dangerous” such
¶107that it could serve as a predicate offense for felony murder. We
¶108conclude that Moon’s contention lacks merit.
¶109 Under Georgia’s felony murder statute, “[a] person commits
¶110the offense of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or she
¶111causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice.”
¶112OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). Although the text of the statute “does not by its
¶113terms limit the type of felony that may qualify as a predicate for
¶114felony murder,” Shivers v. State, 286 Ga. 422, 425 (688 SE2d 622)
¶115(2010) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially), this Court has
¶116nonetheless held that “dangerousness is a prerequisite to the
¶117inclusion of a felony as an underlying felony under the felony murder
¶118is critical because, unlike Moon’s conduct, the conduct at issue in Manzano and Norris did not definitively constitute a felony.
¶119 8 statute of this state,” Ford, 262 Ga. at 602.4 In Ford, a convicted
¶120felon accidentally discharged a pistol while unloading it inside a
¶121house. See id. The bullet went through the floor and into the
¶122basement apartment where it struck and killed the victim, but there
¶123was “no evidence that at the time of the shooting [the defendant]
¶124was aware of the existence of the apartment or of [the victim’s]
¶125presence in it.” Id. The defendant was convicted of felony murder
¶126predicated on a felon-in-possession charge, but this Court reversed
¶127the felony murder conviction because “the status felony was neither
¶128inherently dangerous nor life-threatening under the circumstances
¶129of th[at] homicide.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
¶130 Contrary to his claim on appeal, the facts of Moon’s case are
¶131not analogous to those in Ford. Unlike in Ford—where the
¶132defendant was unloading a gun and the record contained no
¶133evidence that he was aware of the victim’s presence in an apartment
¶134 4 Some Justices on this Court have doubts about the correctness of the statutory analysis that led to that holding. But we need not decide in this case whether Ford should be reconsidered because, as discussed below, Moon is guilty of felony murder even under Ford’s narrow interpretation of OCGA § 16- 5-1 (c). 9 below him—the record here shows that Moon manipulated a loaded
¶135handgun in close proximity to other people in the same room,
¶136including a child; pointed the gun at Flint’s head at some point
¶137before she was shot; continued manipulating the gun after
¶138repeatedly being told to stop; and admittedly engaged in this
¶139conduct after smoking marijuana. We have no trouble concluding
¶140that, based on the facts of this case, Moon’s conduct in possessing
¶141the gun while being a convicted felon was inherently dangerous. See
¶142Shivers, 286 Ga. at 424 (in determining whether a felony is
¶143“inherently dangerous” under Ford, “a court does not consider the
¶144elements of the felony in the abstract, but instead considers the
¶145circumstances under which the felony was committed”) (citation and
¶146punctuation omitted). Accordingly, because the conduct that
¶147proximately caused Flint’s death satisfies both the textual definition
¶148of felony murder under OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) and this Court’s
¶149interpretation of felony murder in Ford, Moon’s claim fails.
¶150 4. Moon contends that the prosecutor made an improper
¶151closing argument that “reasonably could have changed the result of
¶152 10 the trial.” Specifically, Moon claims that the prosecutor argued that
¶153it was inherently dangerous for him to be handling a weapon simply
¶154because he was a convicted felon. Moon’s contention fails because it
¶155was not preserved for appellate review: he did not object to the
¶156State’s closing argument at trial, and we do not review unpreserved
¶157challenges to closing arguments in non-death penalty cases, even for
¶158plain error. See Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 328 (781 SE2d 772)
¶159(2016) (“[B]ecause Gates did not object to the prosecutor’s argument
¶160at trial, he has waived review of these arguments on appeal, as the
¶161alleged errors here based on improper remarks during closing
¶162argument are not subject to review on appeal for plain error.”).
¶163 5. Moon also argues that the evidence presented at trial was
¶164not sufficient to support his conviction for felony murder.
¶165Specifically, Moon argues that the State failed to prove beyond a
¶166reasonable doubt that he acted in a “dangerous manner per se or
¶167that his conduct was inherently dangerous.” This argument,
¶168however, is substantively identical to Moon’s argument that his
¶169possession of a firearm as a convicted felon was not inherently
¶170 11 dangerous and therefore could not serve as a predicate for his felony
¶171murder conviction. For the reasons outlined in Division 3, the
¶172evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable
¶173to the verdicts, was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find
¶174Moon guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he
¶175was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (99
¶176SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
¶177 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶178 12