¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: May 17, 2021
¶3 S21A0070. BONNER v. THE STATE.
¶4 BETHEL, Justice.
¶5 Lernard Bonner 1 appeals his conviction for felony murder in
¶6connection with the shooting death of Lekeshia Moses. 2 Bonner
¶7contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
¶8and that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on
¶9accident. We affirm.
¶10 1 Although Bonner’s name appears as “Leonard Bonner” on the Notice of Appeal, this appears to be a misspelling, as both the indictment and Bonner’s brief refer to him as “Lernard Bonner.” 2 The crimes occurred on July 1, 2016. In November 2017, a Muscogee
¶11County grand jury indicted Bonner for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. At a jury trial in April 2018, Bonner was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Bonner to life in prison for felony murder. The trial court vacated the involuntary manslaughter count and merged the aggravated assault count with the felony murder count. On May 4, 2018, Bonner filed a motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel on January 15, 2020. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended, on February 7, 2020, and Bonner filed a timely notice of appeal on February 17, 2020. This case was docketed in this Court to the term commencing in December 2020 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
¶12evidence presented at trial showed the following. In the summer of
¶132016, Moses was staying at her friend Sakima Grier’s apartment to
¶14help Grier care for her three children. Bonner, who was in a
¶15relationship with Moses and knew Grier, went to visit Moses at the
¶16apartment on the night of June 30.
¶17 The next morning, Grier woke up to get her children ready for
¶18daycare. Grier walked down the hall to her son’s room where Moses
¶19and Bonner were staying to talk to them about their plans for the
¶20day. During their conversation, Grier saw Bonner sitting on the edge
¶21of the bed holding a revolver. Grier told Bonner that she did not
¶22allow guns in the house because her young son would pick things up
¶23and play with them. Grier told Bonner to get rid of the gun.
¶24 Bonner complained that he was tired. He then dumped all of
¶25the bullets out of the revolver into his hand, placed the bullets on
¶26the windowsill, and put the revolver under his pillow. Grier left and
¶27returned to her room. Grier’s four-year-old daughter, who referred
¶28 2 to Moses as “Auntie” and to Bonner by his nickname, “Baby,” went
¶29into the room with Moses and Bonner.
¶30 A few minutes after returning to her room, Grier heard a
¶31sound. Moments later, Grier’s daughter ran out of the room where
¶32Moses and Bonner were staying saying, “Baby shot my auntie. Baby
¶33shot my auntie.” Grier put her children in the master bedroom and
¶34went back out into the hallway. Bonner exited the bedroom into the
¶35hallway and grabbed Grier, stating, “I ain’t tried to. It was an
¶36accident. I’m sorry.” Grier entered the room where the couple had
¶37been staying and saw Moses lying in bed bleeding from her jaw.
¶38Bonner left the apartment. Grier called 911 and did not see Bonner
¶39after she placed the call. Grier also noticed that the bullets Bonner
¶40had previously placed on the windowsill were gone.3
¶41 Moses was later pronounced dead at the hospital. Other than
¶42some markings from medical intervention on the body, as well as the
¶43gunshot wound to the left side of her jaw, there were no wounds
¶44 3 Witnesses testified that Bonner and Moses generally had a “good” and “playful” relationship, and that the two were heard laughing and talking moments before the shooting. 3 found on Moses’s body. The medical examiner confirmed that the
¶45gunshot wound was fatal.
¶46 There was no sign of a struggle in the bedroom. Police officers
¶47recovered an unspent Winchester brand .38-caliber Special bullet
¶48from under the bed in the bedroom. Bonner, who was not at the
¶49scene when the police arrived, turned himself in on July 2. No gun
¶50was ever recovered.
¶51 At trial, a firearms examiner testified that another .38-caliber
¶52bullet was recovered during Moses’s autopsy. That bullet was tested
¶53and found to be consistent with having been fired from a revolver.
¶54The firearms examiner further testified that there are two types of
¶55revolvers: single-action and double-action. A single-action revolver
¶56requires the hammer to be physically pulled back in order to fire and
¶57has a three-pound trigger weight. A double-action does not require
¶58the hammer to be physically pulled back, but requires seven to ten
¶59pounds of pressure to pull the trigger, and the trigger has to be
¶60pulled back farther and held back in order for the hammer to fall
¶61forward and cause the gun to fire. Thus, the revolver used to shoot
¶62 4 Moses either required force to pull the hammer back as a separate
¶63preparatory act before firing, or it required a greater degree of force
¶64against the trigger to both draw the hammer and discharge the
¶65weapon.
¶66 Grier also testified that the gun she saw Bonner holding was
¶67rusty. The firearms examiner testified that while a revolver’s rusty
¶68condition could impact its functionality or internal safeties, the rust
¶69would not increase the likelihood of the gun firing accidentally. If
¶70anything, rust could cause the gun to not work at all.
¶71 2. Bonner argues that the evidence presented at his trial was
¶72legally insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed
¶73to prove that he possessed the requisite intent to commit the offense
¶74of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which was the
¶75predicate offense for his felony murder conviction. See Holliman v.
¶76State, 257 Ga. 209, 210 (1) (356 SE2d 886) (1987) (“Felony murder .
¶77. . require[s] that the defendant possess the requisite criminal intent
¶78to commit the underlying felony.”). We disagree.
¶79 5 OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) provides that “[a] person commits the offense
¶80of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the
¶81death of another human being irrespective of malice.” OCGA § 16-5-
¶8221 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person commits the offense
¶83of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly
¶84weapon[.]” This offense requires proof of an underlying assault,
¶85which can be shown by evidence of the defendant’s attempt to inflict
¶86a violent injury upon another or intent to do an act that places
¶87another in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury. See
¶88OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (defining assault); see also Guyse v. State, 286
¶89Ga. 574, 576-577 (2) (690 SE2d 406) (2010).
¶90 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of
¶91constitutional due process, this Court views the evidence in the light
¶92most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier
¶93of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
¶94a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III)
¶95(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Any conflicts in the evidence
¶96 6 are resolved by the jury. See Walker v. State, 296 Ga. 161, 163 (1)
¶97(766 SE2d 28) (2014).
¶98 When viewed in this light, the evidence presented at trial and
¶99summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to
¶100conclude that Bonner intended to commit an assault against Moses
¶101using a deadly weapon (the revolver) and that Moses died as the
¶102result of being shot by Bonner. Bonner admitted to Grier that he
¶103shot Moses, although he immediately claimed that it was an
¶104accident. However, expert testimony from a firearms examiner
¶105established that the type of gun used to shoot Moses either required
¶106force to pull the hammer back as a separate preparatory act before
¶107firing or required a greater degree of force against the trigger to both
¶108draw the hammer back and discharge the weapon. Bonner fled
¶109immediately following the shooting, and the police never recovered
¶110the gun. Moments before the shooting, Bonner had unloaded the
¶111bullets from his gun and placed them on the windowsill after Grier
¶112asked him not to have a gun in the apartment, but the bullets were
¶113gone from the windowsill after the shooting. From this evidence, the
¶114 7 jury could reasonably infer that Bonner reloaded the gun and then
¶115shot Moses. Accordingly, the jury was free to reject Bonner’s
¶116statement to Grier that the shooting was “an accident.” See Eberhart
¶117v. State, 307 Ga. 254, 262 (2) (a) (835 SE2d 192) (2019). The evidence
¶118was thus sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Bonner
¶119committed an aggravated assault against Moses with a deadly
¶120weapon resulting in Moses’s death, as charged in the indictment.
¶121Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support Bonner’s
¶122conviction for felony murder predicated on the aggravated assault.
¶123See Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B); see also Vega v. State, 285
¶124Ga. 32, 33 (1) (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“’It was for the jury to
¶125determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any
¶126conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’” (citation omitted));
¶127Atkins v. State, 310 Ga. 246, 248-249 (1) (850 SE2d 103) (2020).
¶128Therefore, this enumeration fails.
¶129 3. Bonner next argues that the trial court erred in failing to
¶130instruct the jury on accident. We disagree.
¶131 8 Under Georgia law, in order to warrant a jury instruction on
¶132the defense of “accident,” more must be shown than simply an
¶133unintended or undesirable outcome. There must also be evidence of
¶134an absence of criminal intent or negligence. See OCGA § 16-2-2 (“A
¶135person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by
¶136misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears there was no
¶137criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal
¶138negligence.”); see also Kellam v. State, 298 Ga. 520, 523 (2) (783
¶139SE2d 117) (2016) (“[I]n order to claim accident, it must be
¶140established a defendant acted without criminal intent, was not
¶141engaged in a criminal scheme, and was not criminally negligent, i.e.,
¶142did not act in a manner showing an utter disregard for the safety of
¶143others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby.”
¶144(citation and punctuation omitted)). The evidence justifying the
¶145accident defense instruction need only be “slight,” and “whether the
¶146evidence presented is sufficient to authorize a charge is a question
¶147of law.” Wilson v. State, 279 Ga. 104, 105 (2) (610 SE2d 66) (2005).
¶148 9 Immediately following the shooting, Bonner exclaimed to
¶149Grier, “I ain’t tried to. It was an accident.” In his brief on appeal,
¶150Bonner argues that these statements and other evidence about the
¶151shooting create the slight evidence needed to justify giving an
¶152instruction on accident. Conclusory “[c]laims by a defendant that he
¶153‘didn’t mean to do it’ and ‘it was an accident’ are insufficient without
¶154more to authorize a charge on accident.” Mills v. State, 287 Ga. 828,
¶155832 (4) (700 SE2d 544) (2010) (citing McDade v. State, 270 Ga. 654,
¶156656 (5) (513 SE2d 733) (1999)). Thus, there must be some other
¶157evidence showing that the shooting occurred in the “absence of a
¶158criminal scheme, undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence” to
¶159authorize a jury instruction on accident. OCGA § 16-2-2; see also
¶160Wainwright v. State, 305 Ga. 63, 71 (5) (a) (823 SE2d 749) (2019)
¶161(explaining that when the defendant acts with criminal intent or
¶162criminal negligence, a charge on accident is not warranted).
¶163 Other than Bonner’s conclusory statement to Grier, no other
¶164evidence at trial suggested that Bonner’s shooting of Moses was
¶165accidental. Bonner points to evidence that his gun was rusty, but
¶166 10 there was no evidence that the gun malfunctioned and fired
¶167accidentally as the result of rust. Moreover, the firearms examiner
¶168testified that rust could, at most, prevent a gun from firing (rather
¶169than causing it to fire accidentally).
¶170 Bonner also notes that there was evidence that he was tired on
¶171the morning of the shooting, that he and Moses had a “good” and
¶172“playful” relationship, and that they were heard laughing and
¶173talking moments before the shooting. However, such evidence gave
¶174no indication of how the shooting of Moses actually occurred. By
¶175contrast, the State presented evidence that Bonner had placed all of
¶176the bullets from his gun on the windowsill when he was confronted
¶177by Grier about having a gun in her apartment. He would thus have
¶178had to later reload at least one round of ammunition into his gun
¶179before shooting Moses. The evidence also showed that Moses was
¶180shot in the jaw and that, depending on the type of revolver he had,
¶181Bonner would have had to either pull the gun’s hammer back before
¶182firing or apply a greater degree of force to pull the trigger and fire.
¶183None of that evidence suggested that Bonner shot Moses
¶184 11 accidentally. To the contrary, such evidence suggests that Bonner
¶185acted with at least criminal negligence, which negates his ability to
¶186avail himself of the defense of accident. See New v. State, 260 Ga.
¶187441, 442 (1) (396 SE2d 486) (1990) (“[A]iming a gun at someone’s
¶188face is an utter disregard for the safety of that person and
¶189constitutes criminal negligence. Therefore, according to OCGA § 16-
¶1902-2, the defense of accident is inapplicable.”). Because an instruction
¶191on the law of accident was therefore not authorized by the evidence
¶192presented at trial, the trial court did not err by refusing to give it.
¶193See Campbell v. State, 263 Ga. 824, 825 (3) (440 SE2d 5) (1994)
¶194(“[U]nless there was evidence to authorize a finding that the fatal
¶195shot had been fired without any ‘criminal scheme or undertaking,
¶196intention, or criminal negligence’ on the part of appellant, the trial
¶197court correctly refused to give a charge on the defense of accident.”).
¶198Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails.
¶199 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶200 12