Flood v. State

¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia

¶2 Decided: June 21, 2021

¶3 S21A0025. FLOOD v. THE STATE.

¶4 LAGRUA, Justice.

¶5 Appellant Annette Collins Flood was convicted of felony

¶6murder and a knife offense in connection with the stabbing death of

¶7Bobby Burns, her longtime boyfriend. Appellant contends that the

¶8evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for felony

¶9murder. She also raises three separate enumerations of error

¶10regarding the jury instructions provided at her trial and contends

¶11that these instructional errors combined to prejudice her. Finally,

¶12Appellant contends that the State improperly placed her character

¶13at issue during closing argument. Appellant seeks a new trial, but

¶14for the reasons stated below, we affirm. 1

¶15 1The crimes occurred on April 21, 2016. On July 27, 2017, a Chatham County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder,  1. (a) Construed in the light most favorable to the jury’s

¶16verdicts, the evidence presented at trial showed that Appellant and

¶17Burns had been seeing each other on and off for about 18 years. At

¶18the time of the crimes, the two had been living together for a little

¶19over a year in a boarding house where the tenants rented individual

¶20bedrooms and had shared access to the bathroom and common

¶21areas. Burns and Appellant shared a bedroom on the second level

¶22of the boarding house that contained a mini-refrigerator and other

¶23kitchen items, including utensils and kitchen knives.

¶24 Appellant had a history of being controlling in the relationship

¶25and had physically struck Burns on more than one occasion. In the

¶26months before the crimes, Burns and Appellant had been getting

¶27aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. At a trial in July 2018, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges except malice murder. The trial court then sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for felony murder and five consecutive years for the knife possession charge. The aggravated assault charge merged for sentencing purposes. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on August 16, 2018, which she amended on May 30, 2019, and August 13, 2019. Following a hearing on August 13, 2019, the trial court denied the amended motion for new trial on June 9, 2020. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 18, 2020, and the case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2020 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 into loud verbal arguments in their bedroom that were overheard by

¶28other tenants. On January 26, 2016, three months prior to Burns’s

¶29stabbing, Burns allegedly prevented Appellant from leaving the

¶30bedroom by blocking the door. Appellant called the police, who

¶31concluded that the incident was a mere verbal altercation. In her

¶32statement to police after the January incident, Appellant stated that

¶33Burns had never put his hands on her. Other witnesses testified

¶34that the two often fought about Burns’s drug and alcohol use and

¶35Appellant’s infidelity. According to Appellant, animosity in the

¶36relationship had escalated to the point that Appellant wanted to

¶37leave Burns.

¶38 On the day of the stabbing, Appellant was with her infant

¶39grandchild, playing cards at the boarding house with another

¶40tenant, Terry Moore. Burns returned from work around 5:00 p.m.,

¶41and he, Appellant, and Appellant’s grandchild went to their

¶42bedroom. Burns left the bedroom shortly thereafter. At some point,

¶43Appellant went to bed.

¶44 Around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., Burns returned to the house. He was

¶45 3 drunk. Burns asked if Appellant was upset with him. According to

¶46Appellant, before she had a chance to respond, Burns pushed her

¶47head back, pushed her a second time, and came toward her with a

¶48raised hand, at which point Appellant reached behind her, grabbed

¶49a boning knife off the table, and stabbed Burns. Appellant then left

¶50the bedroom with her grandchild but did not call 911 or request help.

¶51 According to Moore, she often overheard Appellant and Burns

¶52arguing, and on the night of the stabbing, Moore awoke to a loud

¶53argument between the couple, which eventually quieted down until

¶543:00 or 4:00 a.m. when Appellant came to speak with her. Appellant

¶55told Moore that she was leaving the house with her grandchild.

¶56Appellant made no mention of Burns or anything about their

¶57altercation. Moore went back to sleep, went to work the next day,

¶58and upon returning home, encountered Appellant’s daughter (and

¶59the mother of Appellant’s grandchild), Khadijah Flood (hereinafter

¶60“Khadijah”), near Appellant’s bedroom, hysterical and crying.

¶61 Appellant returned the grandchild to Khadijah early in the

¶62morning after leaving the boarding house. Later in the day,

¶63 4 Khadijah called Appellant about retrieving a stroller and some

¶64diapers left at the boarding house. When Khadijah arrived at the

¶65boarding house around 4:00 p.m., a tenant let her in, and she

¶66proceeded to Appellant’s bedroom. Khadijah knocked, but there was

¶67no answer. She opened the unlocked door and saw Burns’s body on

¶68the bed. Khadijah ran outside and called her mother. Appellant

¶69sounded normal on the phone until Khadijah told her about Burns,

¶70at which point Appellant became hysterical.

¶71 Burns’s autopsy revealed a three-inch stab wound in the upper

¶72left chest and shoulder area. The medical examiner testified that

¶73Burns would have bled profusely from this stab wound. The

¶74examiner also found alcohol and cocaine in Burns’s system and

¶75determined that the chest wound was the cause of Burns’s death.

¶76 Appellant testified at trial. Her testimony largely centered

¶77around her claim of self-defense.

¶78 (b) Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to

¶79support her conviction for felony murder and instead supports a

¶80verdict of not guilty based on a theory of self-defense and that the

¶81 5 evidence is wholly consistent with her testimony that she lacked

¶82intent to kill or commit violent injury to Burns but was merely

¶83acting in self-defense. Appellant asserts that she grabbed an object

¶84to defend herself from Burns’s attack and then left the room not

¶85knowing that he was seriously injured. Appellant further asserts

¶86that the State did not produce evidence contradicting this claim. At

¶87most, Appellant argues, the evidence supported a finding of

¶88voluntary manslaughter. 2 See OCGA § 16-5-2 (a).

¶89 When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of

¶90constitutional due process, “the relevant question is whether, after

¶91viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

¶92any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

¶93the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S.

¶94304, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (emphasis

¶95omitted). Reconciling inconsistencies in testimony and determining

¶96witness credibility are left to the province of the jury. See Williams

¶97 2 We note that the jury was instructed on voluntary manslaughter, but we do not address if the evidence required that instruction. 6 v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 478 (I) (807 SE2d 350) (2017). Here, the record

¶98is replete with evidence that would authorize a jury to find

¶99Appellant guilty of felony murder. Appellant and Burns were in a

¶100turbulent relationship for approximately 18 years, during which

¶101they argued about substance abuse and infidelity. Burns was

¶102described as quiet, laid-back, and rarely violent toward Appellant,

¶103except for Appellant’s account of one incident in January of 2016.

¶104Appellant was described as the aggressor in the relationship and as

¶105being controlling of Burns. Furthermore, Appellant admitted to

¶106stabbing Burns with a boning knife, and when detectives

¶107interviewed Appellant two days after the incident, she had no marks

¶108or injuries consistent with defending herself in a fight. She stated

¶109that she did not see much blood after stabbing Burns, but the

¶110medical examiner’s testimony was that Burns would have been

¶111bleeding profusely from the type of stab wound that Appellant

¶112inflicted. In addition, after the stabbing, Appellant neither called

¶113911 nor sought any assistance; she only told another tenant that she

¶114was leaving the house, without mentioning she had stabbed Burns.

¶115 7 Finally, during Appellant’s phone call with her daughter, she made

¶116no mention of the previous night’s stabbing.

¶117 Moreover, questions as to the existence of a justification

¶118defense are for a jury to decide, and given the evidence discussed

¶119above, the jury was free to decide whether Appellant acted in self-

¶120defense, and whether the alleged self-defense was warranted. See

¶121Dent v. State, 303 Ga. 110, 113 (1) (810 SE2d 527) (2018) (“It is a

¶122jury question as to whether [a showing of self-defense] has been

¶123made, and therefore, whether a defendant’s claim of self-defense

¶124should be accepted.”). In light of the evidence presented at trial, we

¶125conclude that the jury was authorized to reject Appellant’s self-

¶126defense claim and find her guilty of felony murder. See Robinson v.

¶127State, 283 Ga. 229, 230 (1) (657 SE2d 822) (2008) (“[T]he jury was

¶128free to reject the claim that [the appellant] stabbed the victim in self

¶129defense” and find the appellant guilty of felony murder.)

¶130(punctuation omitted)). Accordingly, this contention lacks merit.

¶131 2. Appellant raises three separate arguments regarding the

¶132jury instructions provided at trial: first, that the sequence of the jury

¶133 8 charges was improper; second, that the trial court incorrectly

¶134instructed the jury when the jury sought clarification of the jury

¶135charges; and third, that the trial court failed to give pattern charges

¶136on the legal relationship between a felony and felony murder.

¶137Appellant also contends that the cumulative prejudice from these

¶138errors requires a new trial.

¶139 Appellant failed to make a timely objection to each alleged

¶140instructional error; therefore, our review of the jury charges is

¶141limited to a plain error analysis. See Solomon v. State, 293 Ga. 605,

¶142606-607 (2) (748 SE2d 865) (2013) (citing OCGA § 17-8-58 (b)). To

¶143establish plain error:

¶144 First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

¶145 9  proceedings.

¶146Leeks v. State, 303 Ga. 104, 108 (3) (810 SE2d 536) (2018) (citation

¶147and punctuation omitted). We need not analyze the other elements

¶148of the plain error test if the appellant fails to establish any one of

¶149them. See State v. Herrera-Bustamante, 304 Ga. 259, 264 (2) (b) (818

¶150SE2d 552) (2018).

¶151 (a) First, Appellant alleges that the trial court incorrectly

¶152instructed jurors regarding the order in which they should consider

¶153the murder and voluntary manslaughter offenses in violation of

¶154Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 867 (2) (414 SE2d 463) (1992), which

¶155holds that, where the evidence would authorize a charge on

¶156voluntary manslaughter, a sequential charge is improper if it

¶157requires the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter only if it has

¶158considered and found the defendant not guilty of malice murder and

¶159felony murder. “The jury should be admonished that if it finds

¶160provocation and passion with respect to the act which caused the

¶161killing, it could not find felony murder, but would be authorized to

¶162find voluntary manslaughter.” Id. at 867 n.3.

¶163 10  During the jury instructions, the trial court defined malice

¶164murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. Thereafter, the

¶165trial court gave the following instruction:

¶166 After considering all the evidence, before you would be authorized to return a verdict of guilty of malice or felony murder, you must first determine whether mitigating circumstances, if any, would cause the offense to be reduced to voluntary manslaughter.

¶167The court then went on to instruct the jury on the definition of

¶168voluntary manslaughter and provocation.

¶169 After about ten minutes of deliberations, the jury sent a note

¶170to the trial judge that read, “The jury requests a copy of a description

¶171of the charges.” The jury returned to the courtroom, and the jurors

¶172clarified that one member requested “the definition of the law of the

¶173charges.” In response, the trial court orally reinstructed the jury in

¶174open court on the definitions of malice murder, felony murder,

¶175aggravated assault, and the knife possession charge. The court then

¶176orally gave the mitigating-circumstances instruction quoted above,

¶177followed by the voluntary manslaughter instruction.

¶178 The trial court asked if the oral recharge was helpful, and the

¶179 11 foreperson requested that the court send a written copy of the

¶180definitions of the charged crimes for the jurors to view. The court

¶181asked if there were any objections to providing these written

¶182charges, and defense counsel requested that the court send the

¶183entire set of jury instructions with the jury. The jury then returned

¶184to deliberations with a paper copy of the complete jury instructions,

¶185including the definitions of the crimes with which Appellant was

¶186charged and the mitigating-circumstances instruction.

¶187 Appellant argues that the trial court’s instructions created

¶188ambiguity about the order in which the jury should have considered

¶189the various homicide charges. Citing Ortiz v. State, 291 Ga. 3, 5 (2)

¶190(727 SE2d 103) (2012), Appellant argues that the trial court should

¶191have first instructed the jury as to the elements of malice murder,

¶192felony murder, aggravated assault, and voluntary manslaughter,

¶193and then instructed the jury to determine whether mitigating

¶194circumstances would reduce the crime to voluntary manslaughter.

¶195Appellant contends that the mitigating-circumstances instruction

¶196was given prior to the charge on the elements of voluntary

¶197 12 manslaughter, misleading the jury into thinking that it must first

¶198acquit the Appellant of either form of murder before it could consider

¶199voluntary manslaughter.

¶200 However, the trial court instructed the jury to consider

¶201mitigation first, and the jury verdict form listed the homicide

¶202charges in the proper order. With respect to the homicide counts,

¶203the prepared verdict form read as follows:

¶204 JURY VERDICT

¶205 COUNTS ONE, TWO AND THREE: HOMICIDE

¶206 (Select one Verdict Only)

¶207 ___ We the jury find the Defendant NOT GUILTY

¶208 or

¶209 ___ We the jury find the Defendant GUILTY of the lesser included offense of Voluntary Manslaughter

¶210 or

¶211 ___ We the jury find the Defendant GUILTY of Malice Murder

¶212 or

¶213 ___ We the jury find the Defendant GUILTY of Felony

¶214 13  Murder

¶215At the end of the jury’s deliberations, the foreperson checked only

¶216the fourth and final option, indicating that the jury found Appellant

¶217guilty of felony murder.

¶218 We conclude that the verdict form – together with the jury

¶219charge and recharge – allowed for the jury’s proper consideration of

¶220the murder charges. “A preprinted verdict form is treated as part of

¶221the jury instructions which are read and considered as a whole in

¶222determining whether there is [instructional] error.” Rowland v.

¶223State, 306 Ga. 59, 68 (6) (829 SE2d 81) (2019) (citations and

¶224punctuation omitted). There is no exact formula that trial courts

¶225must follow, “so long as the charge as a whole ensures that the jury

¶226will consider whether evidence of provocation and passion might

¶227authorize a verdict of voluntary manslaughter.” Elvie v. State, 289

¶228Ga. 779, 781 (2) (716 SE2d 170) (2011) (citation and punctuation

¶229omitted). Taken together, the jury instructions did not violate our

¶230holding in Edge because the jury was properly admonished to

¶231consider mitigating evidence in both oral and written instructions.

¶232 14 These instructions were not erroneous. Because there is no error,

¶233much less plain error, this claim fails.

¶234 (b) Next, Appellant argues that the trial court gave an

¶235inadequate explanation when the jury asked about the different

¶236forms of homicide. We see no error. During deliberations, the jury

¶237sent a note to the trial court stating: “We have one juror who believes

¶238the defendant is guilty of malice murder. The other eleven jurors

¶239are willing to settle on a lesser charge of felony murder or

¶240involuntary [sic] manslaughter.” (Emphasis in original.) The trial

¶241court addressed this concern through the following colloquy in open

¶242court:

¶243 COURT: I want to emphasize to you, as you know, once again, whatever your decision is, it has to be unanimous. If there is to be a decision, all twelve of you must freely and voluntarily agree to it. But felony murder and malice murder are both murder. Felony murder is not a lesser offense than malice murder. As you’ll recall, they were written on the board and they were written at the same level.[3] They are murder. The lesser-included offense is voluntary manslaughter as that has been defined to you. Does that help any?

¶244 3 The court seems to be referring to statements made during closing argument, where an attorney used a board to demonstrate the relationship between the crimes. 15  FOREPERSON: Yes, sir.

¶245 Appellant did not object to the trial court’s statement.

¶246Appellant now argues that this instruction was unclear and

¶247incorrect because the court failed to explain which offenses the jury

¶248should consider and how they should be considered, and failed to

¶249distinguish between the required intent for malice and felony

¶250murder. We disagree.

¶251 “A trial court has a duty to recharge the jury on issues for

¶252which the jury requests a recharge.” Barnes v. State, 305 Ga. 18, 23

¶253(3) (823 SE2d 302) (2019) (quoting Sharpe v. State, 288 Ga. 565, 569

¶254(6) (707 SE2d 338) (2011)). Here, the jury’s note indicated confusion

¶255about the relationship between malice murder, felony murder, and

¶256manslaughter. This confusion was evident by the fact that the jury’s

¶257note indicated that it was considering involuntary manslaughter,

¶258which was not one of the indicted charges, and that the jury called

¶259felony murder a “lesser charge” than malice murder. In response,

¶260the trial court clarified that felony murder and malice murder were

¶261both forms of murder, and that felony murder is not a lesser offense

¶262 16 than malice murder. The court further stated that voluntary

¶263manslaughter is a lesser-included offense. This was a correct

¶264statement of law. Furthermore, the foreperson indicated that the

¶265trial court’s recharge assisted the jury in its understanding. Defense

¶266counsel raised no objection to this course of action. Given the

¶267demonstrated confusion by the jury, the trial court’s response was

¶268not an abuse of discretion. See Dozier v. State, 306 Ga. 29, 32 (3)

¶269(829 SE2d 131) (2019) (no abuse of discretion where the trial court

¶270discerned that the jury was confused about a legal theory, the trial

¶271court correctly recharged the jury, and there was nothing indicating

¶272that the jury had an erroneous impression of the law after the

¶273recharge).

¶274 “As a general matter . . . , where [a request for a recharge has

¶275not] been made, the need, breadth, and formation of additional jury

¶276instructions are left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”

¶277Barnes, 305 Ga. at 23 (3). The trial court correctly noted that the

¶278jury was giving the court “information on how [it stood] with regard

¶279to certain charges,” and the court offered guidance that was a correct

¶280 17 statement of the law in response. Therefore, we conclude that the

¶281trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury. We

¶282therefore discern no plain error, and this enumeration fails.

¶283 (c) Next, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to give a

¶284jury instruction requested by both the State and Appellant. We

¶285identify no plain error.

¶286 Both parties made written requests to the court to include

¶287Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions – Criminal 2.10.30,

¶288which is the pattern jury instruction outlining the relationship

¶289between a felony murder and the underlying felony. 4 During its

¶290 4 The pertinent portion of this instruction states:

¶291 The homicide must have been done in carrying out the [felony] and not collateral to it. It is not enough that the homicide occurred soon or presently after the felony was attempted or committed. (There must be such a legal relationship between the homicide and the felony so as to cause you to find that the homicide occurred before the felony was at an end or before any attempt to avoid conviction or arrest for the felony.) The felony must have a legal relationship to the homicide, be at least concurrent with it in part, and be a part of it in an actual and material sense. A homicide is committed in the carrying out of a felony when it is committed by the accused while engaged in the performance of any act required for the full execution of the felony.

¶292 18 initial oral charge to the jury, the trial court gave only the definition

¶293of felony murder as laid out in Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury

¶294Instructions – Criminal 2.10.20, Felony Murder; Defined. 5 It did not

¶295give Pattern Jury Instruction 2.10.30 orally in either the initial oral

¶296charge or the oral recharge, but later, upon request by the jury, sent

¶297a written copy of this instruction with the jury into deliberations,

¶298along with all of the other jury instructions in the case.

¶299 Appellant contends that both 2.10.20 and 2.10.30 must be

¶300provided to illustrate the relationship between the death and the

¶301underlying felony. See Ware v. State, 305 Ga. 457, 458-459 (2) (826

¶302SE2d 56) (2019). Further, Appellant argues that the omitted jury

¶303instruction harmed her because “the jury cannot be presumed to

¶304have utilized the written charge to correct the erroneous oral charge

¶305given directly by the judge, with the written charge given as a

¶306supplement.” Instead, Appellant argues, “the jury should have been

¶307 5 This instruction states: “[a] person (also) commits the crime of murder when, in the commission of a felony, that person causes the death of another human being (with or without malice). Under the laws of Georgia (name offense) is a felony and is defined as follows . . . .” 19 given the full definition of felony murder to ensure there was no

¶308confusion on the issue of its applicability to the facts in the case at

¶309bar.”

¶310 Pretermitting any error in the omission of the underlying

¶311felony instruction in the oral charges, we conclude that the omission

¶312of the jury instruction was harmless. Here, the instruction that was

¶313omitted from the oral charge – but provided to the jury in written

¶314form – was about the relationship between Burns’s death and the

¶315predicate felony. Given that the predicate felony was aggravated

¶316assault by stabbing, and the stabbing indisputably caused Burns’s

¶317death, it is difficult to see how including the underlying felony

¶318instruction during the oral charges would have likely caused a

¶319different outcome in Appellant’s trial. Therefore, Appellant has

¶320failed to meet her burden of proving plain error, and this

¶321enumeration fails.

¶322 (d) Appellant argues that these three alleged errors

¶323cumulatively prejudiced her and that she is entitled to a new trial.

¶324“To establish cumulative error[, Appellant] must show that (1) at

¶325 20 least two errors were committed in the course of the trial; [and] (2)

¶326considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors

¶327so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied [Appellant] a

¶328fundamentally fair trial.” State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) (838 SE2d

¶329808) (2020). However, when reviewing a claim of cumulative

¶330prejudice, “we evaluate only the effects of matters determined to be

¶331error rather than the cumulative effect of non-errors.” Scott v. State,

¶332309 Ga. 764, 771 (3) (d) (848 SE2d 448) (2020). Even assuming –

¶333without deciding – that Lane applies to instructional errors,

¶334Appellant has failed to show more than one error with respect to the

¶335jury charges that would provide this Court with a basis for

¶336evaluating cumulative effect. This argument fails.

¶337 3. Finally, Appellant asserts that the trial court improperly

¶338admitted character evidence when the prosecutor stated during

¶339closing arguments that Appellant used drugs, thereby putting

¶340Appellant’s character at issue. For the reasons explained below, we

¶341conclude that the trial court committed no error, and even if the trial

¶342court had committed error by allowing the State to raise the

¶343 21 inference that Appellant was a drug user, any such error was

¶344harmless.

¶345 During closing argument, the following discussion occurred in

¶346front of the jury:

¶347 PROSECUTOR: The Defense, during the course of the evidence yesterday and during closing today, has tried to create a narrative for you that’s just not true. What they want you to believe is that this woman is a woman who has been battered and beaten for years and that she finally just had to defend herself or snapped that that’s what was going on here. That Bobby Burns was a horrible mean man who was abusive to her. And the evidence just—it doesn’t support that. It just doesn’t. The truth is both of these people drank. Both of them used drugs. DEFENSE: Judge, there’s no evidence of that. COURT: Sustained. Jury, disregard. PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, may I respond? COURT: You can respond. PROSECUTOR: The—the defendant, in her own statement to the police officer said that she drank, too. And there has been evidence from her and her daughter about her own drug use. COURT: You are correct, in a past tense. PROSECUTOR: Actually, her daughter, in her interview with the detective, said she was concerned about her mother’s own current drug use. DEFENSE: Judge, that did not come out before the jury. PROSECUTOR: And I impeached her with that. COURT: I agree. Move on. PROSECUTOR: May I talk about the drinking that she

¶348 22  admitted that in her interview? COURT: To the extent that she admitted it, yes. PROSECUTOR: Thank you. You heard her, in her interview, talk about the fact that she drank, too. So this is not Bobby as some horrible drinking, drug-using, abusive person. Substance abuse was something that went on with both of them.

¶349 OCGA § 17-8-75 provides:

¶350 Where counsel in the hearing of the jury makes statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the prosecuting attorney is the offender.

¶351Prosecutors generally have wide latitude in remarks made during

¶352closing statements, and the trial court determines these boundaries.

¶353See Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 885 (2) (725 SE2d 305) (2012). And

¶354within these boundaries, a prosecutor may argue reasonable

¶355inferences from the evidence, including any that address the

¶356credibility of witnesses. See id. During Khadijah’s testimony earlier

¶357in the trial, the prosecutor asked, “Did you know your mother used

¶358drugs?” Khadijah responded, “When I was a child, yes.” Thus,

¶359 23 Appellant’s past drug use had already been brought up as evidence.

¶360 Furthermore, as soon as the prosecutor said in her closing

¶361argument that Appellant used drugs, defense counsel objected. The

¶362trial court immediately intervened and instructed the jury to

¶363disregard the prosecutor’s statement, and the defendant raised no

¶364further objection to any implication that Appellant used drugs.

¶365Moreover, any error in instructing the jury to disregard the

¶366comment was harmless, given that evidence of Appellant’s past drug

¶367use was elicited without objection at trial and considering the

¶368substantial evidence of Appellant’s guilt. Accordingly, this

¶369enumeration of error fails.

¶370 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

¶371 24