¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: June 21, 2021
¶3 S21A0267. HOOD v. THE STATE.
¶4 LAGRUA, Justice.
¶5 Appellant Jamie Donnell Hood appeals his 2015 convictions on
¶6a total of 36 counts charging him with murder, aggravated assault,
¶7kidnapping, carjacking, and other offenses. The charges arose from
¶8the December 2010 shooting death of Kenneth Omari Wray and a
¶9series of crimes in March 2011 that resulted in the death of Athens-
¶10Clarke County Police Officer Elmer Christian. With regard to his
¶11convictions for the Wray murder, Appellant contends that (1) the
¶12State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10
¶13LE2d 215) (1963), by failing to disclose material impeachment
¶14evidence with regard to a key State’s witness; (2) the trial court
¶15erred by failing to give a jury instruction on the necessity of
¶16corroborating a confession; and (3) the cumulative harm of these two errors requires reversal. With regard to his convictions for the
¶17murder of Officer Christian, Appellant contends that the trial court
¶18erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury on the defense of delusional
¶19compulsion and (2) admitting testimony from a responding officer
¶20about images of Officer Christian’s family he saw on the on-board
¶21laptop computer in Officer Christian’s patrol car. We discern no
¶22reversible error, so we affirm. 1
¶23 1 Appellant was indicted by a Clarke County grand jury in June 2011, and was subsequently re-indicted in March 2014, on a total of 70 counts, which included malice murder (2 counts); felony murder (4 counts); attempted murder (1 count); aggravated assault upon a peace officer (3 counts); aggravated assault (15 counts); armed robbery (2 counts); kidnapping with bodily injury (1 count); kidnapping (11 counts); false imprisonment (10 counts); hijacking a motor vehicle (2 counts); burglary (1 count); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (2 counts); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of a crime (15 counts); and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime (1 count). The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty for the murders of Wray and Christian. Approximately 15 months before trial, Appellant sought leave to represent himself. Following a hearing in accordance with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (95 SCt 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975), the trial court granted Appellant’s motion, and Appellant represented himself at trial, with attorneys from the Capital Defender’s Office acting as standby counsel. Appellant’s jury trial commenced in June 2015. After nearly a month, at the conclusion of the guilt-innocence phase, the jury found Appellant guilty on 36 of the 70 counts, including all counts associated with the shootings of Wray and Christian. These counts included, as to Wray, malice murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, one count of firearm possession by a convicted felon, and one count of firearm possession during the commission of a crime; as to Christian, the counts
¶24 2 The evidence at trial 2 showed that Appellant was involved in
¶25the drug trade and had been supplying an associate, Kenyatta
¶26Campbell, with marijuana from a third party in Atlanta. At some
¶27included malice murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated assault upon a peace officer with a deadly weapon, one count of firearm possession by a convicted felon, and one count of firearm possession during the commission of a crime. In the penalty phase, the jury declined to impose a death sentence and recommended sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder of Christian and life with parole for the murder of Wray. On July 24, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the jury’s recommendations and, with regard to the remaining offenses, Appellant was sentenced to three additional consecutive terms of life without parole plus 300 consecutive years in prison. On August 12, 2015, after the appointment of appellate counsel, Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended in September 2019 and January 2020. A hearing on the motion was held on January 29, 2020. Shortly thereafter, Appellant filed a Motion to Reopen the evidence, seeking to supplement the record with new evidence in support of his Brady claim. On April 29, 2020, the trial court entered an order granting in part the Motion to Reopen the evidence, permitting the admission of certain documents into the record, and denying the motion for new trial. On May 22, 2020, Appellant filed a notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2020. Appellant initially requested oral argument but later withdrew that request, and the appeal was thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 Because Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
¶28support his convictions, and because this case involves an assessment of the harm of alleged trial court error, we present the evidence as jurors reasonably would have viewed it, rather than in the light most favorable to the verdicts. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 399 (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (announcing that this Court will no longer routinely consider sufficiency sua sponte in nondeath penalty cases); Hampton v. State, 308 Ga. 797, 802 (2) (843 SE2d 542) (2020) (“In determining whether an error was harmless, we review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)). 3 point before the crimes, Campbell began bypassing Appellant by
¶29purchasing directly from the source, angering Appellant.
¶30 On the evening of December 28, 2010, Wray, an associate of
¶31Campbell, was shot outside the Athens home Wray shared with his
¶32mother, Ruby Jordan. Jordan testified that on the night of the
¶33shooting, she was dozing in her bedroom when she heard a knock or
¶34slam on the door and then another loud noise and her son calling for
¶35her. She then heard what sounded like firecrackers. Jordan peeked
¶36out the door and saw someone run from her driveway and, believing
¶37it was Wray, returned to her bedroom. A few minutes later, a friend
¶38of Wray came to the door, looking for Wray, and then saw him lying
¶39in the driveway.
¶40 The friend, Billy Howington, testified that he had arranged to
¶41buy marijuana from Wray on the night of December 28. Shortly
¶42before arriving at Wray’s home, he texted Wray that he was
¶43approaching. When Howington arrived, he parked his car in front
¶44of the house and waited for Wray to come out. Wray did not appear
¶45and did not return Howington’s texts or calls. Finally, Howington
¶46 4 went to the door, and as he was talking to Jordan he realized Wray
¶47was lying in the driveway.
¶48 A neighbor of Jordan, Mike Barnett, came outside after
¶49hearing a loud noise from the direction of Jordan’s home and saw
¶50Wray’s body in the driveway. As he was dialing 911, Barnett was
¶51approached by a police officer patrolling nearby, and emergency
¶52responders were dispatched. Wray had sustained multiple gunshot
¶53wounds, including one through his neck, and died after being
¶54transported to the hospital.
¶55 At the scene, investigators recovered six .40-caliber shell
¶56casings. Interviews with Howington and another neighbor indicated
¶57that the shooter was a black male. Appellant was not identified as
¶58a suspect at the time.
¶59 Some three months later, on March 22, 2011, Judon Brooks, an
¶60associate of Wray and Campbell, went to Appellant’s home to inspect
¶61some marijuana. Brooks testified that, shortly after he arrived,
¶62Appellant and three masked men with firearms surrounded him,
¶63and one of the men began tying him up with zip ties. Appellant
¶64 5 demanded that Brooks tell him Campbell’s whereabouts. When
¶65Brooks replied that he did not know, Appellant brandished a knife
¶66and threatened to kill him. The men put duct tape over Brooks’
¶67mouth, covered his face, and put him in the trunk of Appellant’s car.
¶68Appellant drove away with Brooks in the trunk. After managing to
¶69break his hands free, Brooks opened the trunk latch and escaped
¶70when the car came to a stop. An acquaintance of Brooks who
¶71happened to be driving in the same vicinity saw him in the street
¶72seeking help and summoned him to his car. Brooks called 911, and
¶73a “be on the lookout” notice (BOLO) was issued for Appellant.
¶74 In the meantime, Appellant had abandoned his car and called
¶75his brother, Matthew Hood, to pick him up. Athens-Clarke County
¶76Police Officer Tony Howard testified that he was patrolling the area
¶77in response to the BOLO. He recognized Matthew driving and
¶78flagged him down. When Matthew stopped, Officer Howard saw a
¶79man he recognized as Appellant exit Matthew’s car and run towards
¶80the driver’s side of Officer Howard’s patrol car. Officer Howard
¶81grabbed Appellant through his open window, but Appellant broke
¶82 6 free, then turned and shot Officer Howard in the face and the back.
¶83The responding EMT testified that when he arrived on the scene,
¶84Officer Howard’s gun was still in the holster on his belt.
¶85 Appellant continued running and came upon Officer
¶86Christian’s patrol car. Two witnesses saw Appellant run past the
¶87car and shoot twice through the driver’s side window. Officer
¶88Christian, who at the time was talking on his phone, was struck by
¶89both bullets. By the time emergency responders arrived, Officer
¶90Christian was deceased.
¶91 Continuing to run, Appellant approached a stopped car, in
¶92which Deborah Lumpkin was sitting. Lumpkin testified that
¶93Appellant, who was armed with a gun, got in the passenger seat and
¶94told her that he was running from the police and needed her to drive.
¶95She complied. After a short time, Appellant, whom Lumpkin
¶96described as calm and focused, instructed her to stop and get out.
¶97Appellant drove off and later abandoned the car, continuing his
¶98escape on foot.
¶99 The manhunt for Appellant proceeded into the following day
¶100 7 and night. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on March 24, Appellant went
¶101to the home of Darius Lanier, a longtime acquaintance, who supplied
¶102Appellant with food and clothing. Lanier testified that, during
¶103Appellant’s time at his home, Appellant admitted to shooting the
¶104two police officers. Appellant also told Lanier that he had killed
¶105Wray because Wray would not tell him where he could find
¶106Campbell. Appellant left at around 4:00 a.m. Later that morning,
¶107Lanier reported Appellant’s visit to his probation officer, who
¶108contacted the police.
¶109 After leaving Lanier’s home, Appellant found his way to the
¶110Athens subdivision of Creekstone, where he gained entry into the
¶111home of Chayandre Bess and Mandrell Hull, also acquaintances of
¶112Appellant. Bess’s 13-year-old cousin, who was living with Bess and
¶113Hull at the time, testified that, as she prepared to leave for school
¶114on the morning of March 24, Appellant approached her outside the
¶115home, brandished a gun, and ordered her to let him inside. Bess,
¶116Hull, and others in the home testified that Appellant forced them
¶117into a single room, then barricaded them in the home and held them
¶118 8 hostage until the following evening, when he surrendered to the
¶119police. 3
¶120 During his time in the Creekstone home, Appellant made
¶121several incriminating statements about the murder of Wray,
¶122kidnapping of Brooks, and shootings of Officers Howard and
¶123Christian. These witnesses testified that Appellant said he had shot
¶124Wray when Wray would not tell him where Campbell lived and that
¶125Appellant described specifically how Wray had called for his mother
¶126before being killed. 4 Appellant also told these witnesses that he had
¶127 3 Appellant’s conduct in gaining entry to the home and in remaining there until his surrender was the subject of numerous counts in the indictment (31 in total) charging Appellant with burglary, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and aggravated assault. Several of the purported hostages were acquaintances of Appellant and knew Brooks, Campbell, and Wray. There was testimony that some of these purported hostages were permitted to leave the home for specific purposes, under threat of harm to the others if they went to the police or did not return, and that some of them had arrived at the home after Appellant. There was also testimony that Appellant slept for some period of time while in the home and that Appellant snorted cocaine and smoked marijuana with some of the purported hostages during the episode. Appellant testified that he was allowed in the home without any coercion and that he asked the home’s occupants to help him surrender to the police so they could claim the $50,000 in reward money being offered for his capture. Appellant was ultimately acquitted on all of the counts related to his conduct at the Creekstone home. 4 In cross-examining several of the Creekstone witnesses, Appellant
¶128attempted to establish that they were motivated to implicate him in the
¶129 9 kidnapped Brooks for the same reason and had intended to kill him
¶130as well. Appellant also said that, while he was sorry for killing
¶131Officer Christian, he was glad he had shot Officer Howard, with
¶132whom he had a history of ill will. In reference to the gun he used to
¶133shoot Officers Howard and Christian, Appellant remarked, “[I]f you
¶134think this one’s pretty, you should have see[n] the one I killed Omari
¶135[Wray] with.” Many of Appellant’s statements about the crimes
¶136were surreptitiously recorded by one of the Creekstone witnesses,
¶137Quintin Riden, and the recordings were played for the jury at trial.5
¶138 Also while at the home, Appellant had phone conversations
¶139unsolved Wray murder by the desire to avoid possible prosecution for harboring a fugitive or to avert suspicions that some of them may have assisted Appellant in the abduction of Brooks. In his cross-examination of one of these witnesses, Appellant elicited that the witness had not told the police in her interview immediately after Appellant’s surrender that he had admitted to the Wray murder, and he asked whether she felt “any type retaliation that [she] might be put in jail for harboring a fugitive.” She responded that she had not, but she admitted that investigators “may have” asked about their participation in the Brooks kidnapping. 5 In his cross-examination of Riden, Appellant repeatedly asked Riden
¶140whether, after telling investigators about these recordings, he had initially refused to hand over his cell phone to investigators, to which Riden replied that he did not remember. Riden also admitted on cross-examination that investigators asked him whether he had participated in the Brooks kidnapping. 10 with both Brooks and Campbell. Brooks testified that Appellant told
¶141him, “B**ch, you better be lucky you got away. . . . I was going to kill
¶142your b**ch a** just like I did your boy”; Brooks believed Appellant’s
¶143statement was a reference to Wray’s murder. In Appellant’s
¶144conversation with Campbell, which Riden overheard and testified
¶145about, Appellant told Campbell that the reason he killed Wray was
¶146“because yo’ b**ch a** was hiding out. You got [Wray] killed because
¶147I couldn’t find you.”
¶148 Shortly after his surrender on March 25, Appellant was
¶149interviewed by investigators and admitted that he had shot Officers
¶150Howard and Christian. He wrote a letter of apology to Officer
¶151Christian’s family, telling them that “I just seen [Christian] at the
¶152wrong time in the wrong situation.” The video recording of
¶153Appellant’s interview was played for the jury, and the letter was
¶154read aloud at trial.
¶155 The State also offered audio recordings of two police interviews
¶156with Lanier, both of which were played for the jury. In the first
¶157interview, conducted on March 24, 2011, Lanier told the detective
¶158 11 that Appellant admitted he had shot two police officers and hijacked
¶159a woman’s car and said he wanted to kill Campbell before he turned
¶160himself in. Lanier also told the detective that Appellant said he had
¶161killed Wray. In the second interview, conducted in April 2011,
¶162Lanier again stated that Appellant admitted to killing the officers
¶163and to killing Wray; that Appellant said he had gotten rid of the gun
¶164with which he had killed Wray; and that he had killed Wray because
¶165Wray would not reveal Campbell’s whereabouts.
¶166 The State also offered testimony from a GBI firearms examiner
¶167that a .40-caliber shell casing, found in a search of Appellant’s car,
¶168was fired from the same gun as that used to shoot Wray. Additional
¶169testimony established that Wray had been shot seven times, but that
¶170only six shell casings were recovered from the scene. The firearms
¶171examiner also testified that the gun used to kill Wray was not the
¶172same gun used in the police shootings.
¶173 Appellant testified in his own defense. He maintained that he
¶174was not involved in Wray’s murder and told the jury that the shell
¶175casing found in his car was the vestige of an armed robbery of which
¶176 12 he had been a victim, in which the assailant’s gun had discharged in
¶177his car during their struggle. Appellant also claimed that the Brooks
¶178kidnapping incident was actually initiated by Brooks, when Brooks
¶179showed up at his house with two men, threatening to kill him.
¶180Appellant claimed it was only in response that he and his associates
¶181tied Brooks up and drove away with him. Appellant testified further
¶182that, when he was fleeing after the Brooks kidnapping and
¶183encountered Officers Howard and Christian, he heard the voice of
¶184his deceased brother – who had been killed by a police officer –
¶185telling him, “Don’t let them do you like they done me.” Appellant
¶186testified that he continued running “out of fear. I’m running trying
¶187to get away. I’m running not to kill. I’m running to get away from
¶188them. They fixing to kill me, man.”
¶189 1. In his first enumeration of error, Appellant contends that
¶190the State violated his due process rights by failing to disclose
¶191material impeachment evidence relating to Riden, the witness from
¶192the Creekstone home who recorded Appellant’s statements. See
¶193Brady, 373 U. S. at 87 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of
¶194 13 evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
¶195where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment[.]”);
¶196see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 153 (92 SCt 763, 31
¶197LE2d 104) (1972) (impeachment evidence affecting reliability of
¶198witness testimony falls within the Brady rule). Appellant claims
¶199that this violation requires the reversal of his convictions related to
¶200Wray’s murder.
¶201 Riden testified at trial about having been summoned to the
¶202Creekstone home on March 24 by his friend, Hull, “to make a drug
¶203transaction.” According to Riden, he and his young son arrived at
¶204the home to find Appellant, whom he knew through his sister and
¶205cousin, holding Hull, Bess, and others hostage; Riden and his son
¶206thus became hostages as well. Riden testified about statements
¶207Appellant made regarding the shootings of the officers, the murder
¶208of Wray, and the kidnapping of Brooks. Specifically, Riden testified
¶209that Appellant said he was sorry he had killed Officer Christian;
¶210that he wished he had killed Officer Howard instead; and that “the
¶211reason he did all this [was] because Judon [Brooks] and Ken
¶212 14 Campbell . . . . went behind his back and started dealing with
¶213somebody that he was dealing with on the drug level.” With regard
¶214to Wray’s murder, Riden testified that Appellant said he went to
¶215Wray’s mother’s house and
¶216 ran up on Omari [Wray] and tell him, “Tell me where Ken at.” Omari refused to tell him where Ken was . . . so he said he shot him. Omari started screaming, making noises, and he shot him again. He said he seen Omari’s mama coming out to the door, and he didn’t want to shoot the old lady, but if she did, he would have shot her, too. And then he just fled.
¶217Riden also testified about overhearing Appellant’s phone
¶218conversation with Campbell, in which Appellant told Campbell he
¶219was the reason Wray had been killed. Riden then testified about
¶220using his cell phone to secretly record Appellant making admissions
¶221about killing Wray. After authenticating the recordings, Riden
¶222testified as they were played for the jury, providing context and
¶223clarifying portions of the recordings that were difficult to
¶224understand.
¶225 At the beginning of Riden’s direct testimony, the prosecutor
¶226elicited that Riden was at the time under indictment on federal
¶227 15 charges. Riden testified that he had pled guilty to cocaine
¶228distribution, was awaiting sentencing, and faced a sentence in the
¶229range of 84 to 105 months. The State tendered a certified copy of
¶230Riden’s indictment, filed in May 2014, charging him with two counts
¶231of cocaine distribution, one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine
¶232with the intent to distribute, and one count of possession of a firearm
¶233during a drug trafficking crime. 6 The State also tendered a certified
¶234copy of Riden’s September 2014 plea agreement, in which Riden
¶235agreed to plead guilty to one of the cocaine distribution charges and
¶236to cooperate fully with law enforcement by giving complete and
¶237truthful statements regarding the federal charges and “any and all
¶238criminal violations about which [he] has knowledge or information.”
¶239Under the agreement, the prosecutor would consider such
¶240cooperation, if “completed prior to sentencing,” in determining
¶241whether a downward departure from the advisory sentencing range
¶242would be recommended. Also included among the State’s exhibits
¶243 6 Riden also testified that he was “originally arrested,” before going into federal custody, for cocaine possession, firearm possession by a felon, and a parole violation; there was no follow-up questioning regarding these charges. 16 were two motions to continue sentencing, from December 2014 and
¶244June 2015, respectively, citing “ongoing matters that need to be
¶245resolved prior to sentencing.” On cross-examination, Riden denied
¶246that his trial testimony was in any way related to his federal
¶247sentencing and testified that he was motivated to testify because
¶248Appellant held him and his family hostage.
¶249 In the course of preparing Appellant’s motion for new trial,
¶250appellate counsel learned that, at Riden’s sentencing approximately
¶251one month after the conclusion of Appellant’s trial, Riden was
¶252sentenced to 25 months in prison plus three years of supervised
¶253release. As reflected in the transcript from the federal sentencing
¶254hearing, 7 the prosecutor moved for a downward departure based on
¶255Riden’s “significant” cooperation in Appellant’s case; the trial judge
¶256noted that Riden’s cooperation in Appellant’s case was “far beyond
¶257what [he] normally s[aw]” and told Riden that, for this reason, he
¶258had decided to “substantially reduce[ ] the sentence.”
¶259 7This transcript was admitted in the record by the trial court’s partial grant of Appellant’s Motion to Reopen. See footnote 1, above. 17 In the course of investigating the resolution of Riden’s federal
¶260charges, appellate counsel also discovered that, at the time of trial,
¶261Riden had for more than a year been facing felony charges in
¶262Athens-Clarke County for cocaine possession and other crimes.8
¶263There had been no mention of these state-level charges at trial, and
¶264the State does not dispute that it never made Appellant aware of
¶265these charges. Documents from the record in that proceeding reflect
¶266that, in September 2015, these charges were nolle prossed pursuant
¶267to a motion filed by the State, which cited both Riden’s recent federal
¶268sentencing and his assistance to the State in Appellant’s case.
¶269 Appellant contends that the dismissal of Riden’s state-level
¶270charges and the leniency in his federal sentencing, both of which
¶271were explicitly tied to his cooperation in Appellant’s case, are
¶272evidence of express agreements Riden made with the State and with
¶273federal prosecutors, which the State was obligated to have disclosed
¶274 8In Appellant’s brief here, his counsel represent that they discovered the existence of these charges “by chance alone,” while investigating the federal charges. Documents from the record in Riden’s state prosecution were admitted in the record here as part of the trial court’s partial grant of the Motion to Reopen. 18 to Appellant under Brady and Giglio. Appellant contends that these
¶275agreements significantly undercut Riden’s credibility by exposing
¶276strong incentives for him to assist the State in its prosecution of
¶277Appellant and that, because of the significance of Riden’s testimony,
¶278Appellant’s inability to use this evidence to impeach Riden deprived
¶279him of due process under Brady and Giglio.
¶280 It is well settled that
¶281 “[t]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. at 87. This includes the suppression of impeachment evidence that may be used to challenge the credibility of a witness. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154-155 (92 SCt 763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972).
¶282State v. Thomas, Case No. S21A0324, 2021 WL 1724970, at *5-6 (3)
¶283(decided May 3, 2021) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the State is
¶284obligated to reveal any agreement, even an informal one, with a
¶285witness regarding criminal charges pending against the witness.
¶286See id. at *6 (3). To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must show
¶287that
¶288 19 the State possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; [the] defendant did not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
¶289Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). Accord Schofield v. Palmer,
¶290279 Ga. 848, 852 (2) (621 SE2d 726) (2005). On appeal, a trial court’s
¶291factual findings on a Brady claim are reviewed under a clearly
¶292erroneous standard, and its application of the law to the facts is
¶293reviewed de novo. See Thomas, 2021 WL 1724970, at *6 (3).
¶294 Here, in considering Appellant’s motion for new trial, the trial
¶295court assumed for the sake of argument that the evidence
¶296established that Riden had made deals to testify against Appellant
¶297with both the State and federal prosecutors and that such deals were
¶298suppressed by the State. Even assuming those facts to be true, the
¶299trial court held that Appellant had failed to establish a reasonable
¶300probability that, had this evidence been made available to
¶301Appellant, the outcome of his trial would have been different. In the
¶302trial court’s view, Appellant was unable to establish the
¶303 20 “materiality” of the suppressed evidence because of the quantum
¶304and strength of the other evidence against Appellant, independent
¶305of Riden’s testimony. We agree with the trial court.
¶306 In order to show materiality, a defendant need not show that
¶307he would have been acquitted had the suppressed evidence been
¶308disclosed; rather, he need only show that the suppression of the
¶309evidence “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”
¶310Schofield, 279 Ga. at 852-853 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶311In determining materiality, the court must examine the suppressed
¶312evidence in the context of the entire record. See Turner v. United
¶313States, __ U. S. __ (II) (A) (137 SCt 1885, 1893, 198 LE2d 443) (2017).
¶314Thus, we have held that the materiality element was established
¶315where the suppressed evidence would have impeached the testimony
¶316of the only witness who testified that the defendant confessed. See
¶317Danforth v. Chapman, 297 Ga. 29, 30-32 (2) (771 SE2d 886) (2015).
¶318Likewise, evidence was material where it would have undercut the
¶319credibility of the only witness who “provided full insight into” the
¶320alleged motive for the crime, and whose testimony “[was] not
¶321 21 duplicated elsewhere in the record.” Byrd v. Owen, 272 Ga. 807, 811
¶322(1) (536 SE2d 736) (2000). See also Thomas, 2021 WL 1724970, at
¶323*8-9 (3) (c) (materiality was shown where suppressed evidence
¶324would have impeached a witness whose testimony was highly
¶325corroborative of that of the defendant’s accomplice, whose testimony
¶326was significantly impeached). On the other hand, where there is
¶327strong evidentiary support for the defendant’s conviction apart from
¶328the testimony of the witness whose credibility would have been
¶329affected by the suppressed evidence, materiality may not be
¶330established. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 292-296 (IV) (119
¶331SCt 1936, 144 LE2d 286) (1999).
¶332 Here, we note first that the jury was apprised of the fact that
¶333Riden had pled guilty to his federal charges, that his plea agreement
¶334required him to cooperate in other criminal cases about which he
¶335had knowledge, and that the prosecution was obligated to consider
¶336such cooperation in its sentencing recommendations. Thus, while
¶337the full scope of Riden’s possible incentives to cooperate with the
¶338State was not made known to the jury, the jury was nonetheless
¶339 22 aware that there was reason to regard his testimony with
¶340skepticism. See Rhodes v. State, 299 Ga. 367, 369-370 (2) (788 SE2d
¶341359) (2016) (materiality lacking where jury did not know about
¶342specific terms of witnesses’ plea deals but was made aware of their
¶343guilty pleas).
¶344 Moreover, although Riden’s testimony was undeniably helpful
¶345to the State, it was largely cumulative of other evidence. First, the
¶346jury heard the recordings of Appellant’s own statement in which he
¶347discussed the Wray murder. While it is true that these recordings
¶348were made by Riden, they were made prior to, and shared with
¶349investigators in the immediate aftermath of, Appellant’s surrender
¶350in March 2011, years before Riden was charged in either the federal
¶351or the state case. In addition to Appellant’s own statement, there
¶352was testimony from six of the Creekstone witnesses – not including
¶353Riden – about Appellant’s admissions about Wray’s murder.
¶354Though all six of these witnesses were relatives of Riden, 9 there were
¶355 9 Specifically, these witnesses included Riden’s wife, his mother-in-law and her husband, his sister-in-law and brother-in-law, and his wife’s niece. 23 additional witnesses, not associated with the Creekstone home and
¶356not related to Riden, who also testified that Appellant made
¶357incriminating statements about Wray’s murder. Specifically, Lanier
¶358testified that Appellant confessed to killing Wray, and Brooks
¶359testified that he understood Appellant’s statement about “killing
¶360[his] boy” to be a reference to Wray’s murder. All of the accounts of
¶361Appellant’s incriminating statements were consistent in describing
¶362his motive for the killing, and some included details about the
¶363murder – such as the description of Wray calling for his mother –
¶364that were consistent with Wray’s mother’s testimony. 10 Finally, the
¶365ballistics evidence strongly supported the conclusion that Appellant
¶366was responsible for Wray’s murder, because the .40-caliber cartridge
¶367casing found in Appellant’s car was confirmed to have been fired
¶368from the gun that killed Wray, and, although Wray was shot seven
¶369times, only six cartridge casings were recovered at the scene.
¶370 10In addition, at least two witnesses testified that Appellant said he had gotten rid of the gun he used in Wray’s murder, which was consistent with the firearm examiner’s testimony that Wray had been killed with a different gun than that used in the shootings of the officers. 24 In summary, examining the purportedly suppressed evidence
¶371in the context of the entire record, we conclude that there is not a
¶372reasonable probability that the jury would have reached any
¶373different verdict had it been aware of Riden’s state-level charges or
¶374any additional information regarding any formal or informal
¶375agreements between Riden and either the State or federal
¶376prosecutors. The jury was already aware of Riden’s possible motive
¶377to assist the State in order to gain favor with federal prosecutors,
¶378and the alleged additional impeachment material would not have
¶379been likely to make a significant impact on the jury, particularly in
¶380light of the many witnesses who gave testimony similar to Riden’s
¶381and the independent evidence of Appellant’s guilt. Accordingly,
¶382Appellant’s Brady claim is without merit.
¶383 2. Appellant next contends that the trial court committed plain
¶384error by failing to instruct the jury on the statutory requirement
¶385that a confession must be corroborated to support a conviction. See
¶386OCGA § 24-8-823 (“A confession alone, uncorroborated by any other
¶387evidence, shall not justify a conviction.”). Appellant contends that,
¶388 25 because his confessions were critical to the State’s case with regard
¶389to Wray’s murder, the trial court’s failure to give a confession-
¶390corroboration instruction constitutes plain error. We disagree.
¶391 It is undisputed that Appellant neither requested a confession-
¶392corroboration instruction nor objected to the jury instructions as
¶393given at trial and that, thus, appellate review of this claim is limited
¶394to plain error only. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). To establish plain error,
¶395 [the appellant] must demonstrate that the instructional error was not affirmatively waived, was obvious beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Satisfying all four prongs of this standard is difficult, as it should be.
¶396Clarke v. State, 308 Ga. 630, 637 (5) (842 SE2d 863) (2020) (citation
¶397and punctuation omitted). “The Court need not analyze all elements
¶398of the plain-error test when the appellant fails to establish one of
¶399them.” Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 194 (12) (a) (850 SE2d 110) (2020).
¶400 Here, Appellant has failed to establish that the omission of the
¶401confession-corroboration instruction likely affected the outcome of
¶402the proceedings. Appellant confessed to Wray’s murder not only to
¶403 26 the many Creekstone witnesses but also to Lanier, and he made an
¶404admission to Brooks by referring to killing Brooks’ “boy.” See
¶405Sheffield v. State, 281 Ga. 33, 34 (1) (635 SE2d 776) (2006)
¶406(distinguishing confessions, where entire criminal act is admitted,
¶407from admissions, where less than all the “facts entering into the
¶408criminal act” are admitted). In addition, as noted above, various
¶409facets of Appellant’s confessions were corroborated by other
¶410evidence; there was a clear motive for Appellant to commit the
¶411murder; and the ballistics evidence was highly suggestive of
¶412Appellant’s involvement in Wray’s murder. Because Appellant
¶413made multiple confessions to different witnesses, which
¶414corroborated each other, and there was ample evidence
¶415corroborating the confessions, we conclude that it is unlikely that
¶416the absence of the confession-corroboration instruction affected the
¶417outcome of Appellant’s trial. See Clarke, 308 Ga. at 637 (5) (no plain
¶418error in trial court’s failure to give confession-corroboration
¶419instruction, where there was ample corroborative evidence); English
¶420v. State, 300 Ga. 471, 474-475 (2) (796 SE2d 258) (2017) (same).
¶421 27 3. Appellant next contends that the Court should evaluate
¶422cumulative prejudice, in accordance with State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10
¶423(838 SE2d 808) (2020), to examine the combined prejudicial effect of
¶424the “errors” alleged in the above two enumerations. See id. at 17 (1)
¶425(holding that appellate courts must “consider collectively the
¶426prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors, along with the
¶427prejudice caused by any deficient performance of counsel” – at least
¶428where those errors and deficiencies involve evidentiary issues).
¶429Specifically, Appellant contends that the cumulative effect of the
¶430State’s suppression of evidence regarding Riden’s state and federal
¶431criminal proceedings and the trial court’s error in failing to give the
¶432confession-corroboration instruction was sufficiently prejudicial to
¶433entitle him to a new trial. We disagree.
¶434 While the cumulative prejudice rule as announced in Lane has
¶435so far been applied only to evidentiary error, we have noted the
¶436possibility of extending cumulative prejudice to other types of
¶437defects in trial proceedings. See Lane, 308 Ga. at 17-18 (1)
¶438(suggesting that such a possibility could be considered in a future
¶439 28 case). We have also noted the potential difficulty in applying
¶440cumulative prejudice where the various defects are subject to
¶441different standards of appellate review. See Finney v. State, __ Ga.
¶442__ (3) (a) (855 SE2d 578, 589) (2021). Here, the materiality standard
¶443for a Brady violation (reasonable probability of a different outcome
¶444at trial) is similar to the plain error standard of review (error likely
¶445affected the outcome). See Lane, 308 Ga. at 21 (4) n.12 (noting that
¶446standard for plain error review equates to prejudice standard for
¶447ineffective assistance); Harris v. State, 309 Ga. 599, 607 (2) (b) (847
¶448SE2d 563) (2020) (noting that prejudice standard for ineffective
¶449assistance is rooted in Brady’s materiality standard). Even
¶450assuming, however, that a Brady violation and an instructional
¶451error are appropriately assessed as part of a cumulative prejudice
¶452analysis, we see no cumulative prejudice here. Given the quantum
¶453and strength of the evidence, independent of Riden’s testimony and
¶454corroborative of any single confession Appellant made, we conclude
¶455that it is not reasonably probable or likely that the combination of
¶456 29 the Brady violation and the omitted jury instruction 11 affected the
¶457verdicts against Appellant as to Wray’s murder. See Allen v. State,
¶458310 Ga. 411, 417-418 (4) (851 SE2d 541) (2020) (no cumulative
¶459prejudice given strong evidence of defendant’s guilt).
¶460 4. Appellant contends that the trial court committed plain
¶461error by failing to give a jury instruction on the defense of delusional
¶462compulsion. Claiming that his only plausible defense as to the
¶463shootings of Officers Howard and Christian was a delusional
¶464compulsion insanity defense, Appellant contends that the trial court
¶465was required to instruct the jury on this defense despite the fact that
¶466he did not request such an instruction. We disagree, because there
¶467was not even slight evidence to support such an instruction.
¶468 To establish an insanity defense based on delusional
¶469compulsion, a defendant must show that
¶470 at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the [defendant], because of mental disease, injury, or congenital deficiency, acted as he did because of
¶471 11While we did not expressly conclude that the State violated its duties under Brady nor that there was clear error in the trial court’s omission of the confession-corroboration instruction, we assume the existence of both defects for purposes of this analysis. 30 a delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime.
¶472OCGA § 16-3-3. In addition, we have held that this defense is
¶473available only if Appellant “was compelled by [his] delusion to act in
¶474a manner that would have been lawful and right if the facts had been
¶475as he imagined them to be.” Choisnet v. State, 295 Ga. 568, 571 (2)
¶476(761 SE2d 322) (2014) (punctuation and citation omitted).
¶477 Here, Appellant’s claim of entitlement to a delusional
¶478compulsion instruction stems solely from his testimony that he shot
¶479Officers Howard and Christian in response to hearing the voice of
¶480his deceased brother urging him not to let the officers “do you like
¶481they done me.” But Appellant has failed to offer any evidence – or
¶482any claim, for that matter – that at the time of the crimes he suffered
¶483from any “mental disease, injury, or congenital deficiency” as
¶484required by OCGA § 16-3-3. Moreover, Appellant himself
¶485acknowledges that, even if his alleged delusion caused him to believe
¶486he was acting in self-defense, his conduct in shooting the officers
¶487would not have been “lawful and right” because he was at the time
¶488 31 fleeing to avoid capture for the kidnapping of Brooks. See OCGA §
¶48916-3-21 (b) (2) (“A person is not justified in using force [in self-
¶490defense] if he . . . [is] fleeing after the commission or attempted
¶491commission of a felony[.]”). Accordingly, Appellant has failed to
¶492establish any error, much less any plain error, in the trial court’s
¶493failure to give a delusional compulsion insanity instruction.
¶494 5. Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by
¶495admitting testimony from a GBI agent about images of Officer
¶496Christian’s family that were visible on the screen of the on-board
¶497laptop computer in Officer Christian’s patrol car. During the State’s
¶498case, GBI Special Agent Jeff Roesler testified about responding to
¶499the scene of Officer Christian’s murder and was questioned at length
¶500about the numerous photographs he took during his crime scene
¶501investigation. Among these photographs were those depicting
¶502Officer Christian’s patrol car, some of which showed the monitor of
¶503an on-board laptop computer docked near the car’s center console.
¶504Agent Roesler testified that during his inspection he noticed the
¶505laptop screensaver scrolling through various images, and, when
¶506 32 asked specifically whether any of those images showed Officer
¶507Christian’s family, he responded affirmatively. Though Appellant
¶508objected to this testimony on grounds of relevance and prejudice, the
¶509State argued that the photographs showed “what was going on in
¶510[Officer Christian’s] car at the time he was shot” and thus were
¶511relevant to disproving justification by showing that the car was not
¶512in motion at the time of the shooting. The trial court overruled
¶513Appellant’s objections and allowed the testimony. Upon further
¶514questioning, Agent Roesler testified about “a photograph of a child
¶515by himself, and then another child, and . . . a family photograph, and
¶516. . . other photos coming across as well.”
¶517 Pretermitting whether this testimony was properly admitted,
¶518any possible error in the admission of this testimony was harmless
¶519in light of the overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt as to the
¶520murder of Officer Christian. Appellant admits that he intentionally
¶521shot Officer Christian and, while expressing remorse, he has offered
¶522neither argument nor evidence that this shooting was justified.
¶523Thus, it is highly probable that any error in admitting the testimony
¶524 33 in question “did not contribute to the verdict.” Peoples v. State, 295
¶525Ga. 44, 55 (4) (c) (757 SE2d 646) (2014) (citation omitted) (reciting
¶526standard for nonconstitutional harmless error). See also Puckett v.
¶527State, 303 Ga. 719, 721 (2) (814 SE2d 726) (2018) (any error in
¶528admission of photograph was harmless because evidence of
¶529appellant’s guilt was overwhelming). In addition, similar testimony
¶530about these images of Officer Christian’s family was given by
¶531another law enforcement officer, with no objection by Appellant.
¶532Thus, to the extent Agent Roesler’s testimony was improperly
¶533admitted, it was cumulative of other unobjected-to testimony and
¶534any error in its admission was therefore harmless. See Rutledge v.
¶535State, 298 Ga. 37, 40 (2) (779 SE2d 275) (2015) (because challenged
¶536testimony was cumulative of properly admitted evidence, any error
¶537in admitting it was harmless).
¶538 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶539 34