¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: June 21, 2021
¶3 S21A0289. HUFFMAN v. THE STATE.
¶4 ELLINGTON, Justice.
¶5 A Forsyth County jury found Frank Huffman guilty of felony
¶6murder in connection with the shooting death of James Tanner
¶7Conrad (“Tanner”).1 On appeal, Huffman claims that the trial court
¶8erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law
¶9enforcement officers by finding that he freely and voluntarily waived
¶10his Miranda 2 rights. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.
¶11 1 On July 14, 2015, a Forsyth County grand jury indicted Huffman for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 3). At a jury trial held in September 2016, Huffman was found guilty of Counts 2 and 3 and not guilty of Count 1. The trial court sentenced Huffman to serve life in prison for felony murder (Count 2). Count 3 merged with Count 2. Huffman filed a motion for new trial on October 19, 2016, which he amended on February 6, 2020. The trial court denied the motion for new trial as amended on April 14, 2020. Huffman filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2020 and submitted for decision on the briefs.
¶12 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). The evidence at trial showed that Huffman lived in his Forsyth
¶13County home with his girlfriend, Sherry Conrad, and her adult son,
¶14Tanner. On January 7, 2015, Tanner, Conrad, and Huffman drank
¶15liquor together. Huffman became agitated, Conrad testified, when
¶16Tanner used “cussing” language in front of her. After Tanner went
¶17to bed, Conrad and Huffman sat in their recliners in the living room.
¶18Conrad next recalled waking up and hearing Tanner calling her
¶19name.
¶20 Conrad testified that after waking up she saw blood on the
¶21floor and heard Huffman say, “look at my nose, he broke my nose.”
¶22Tanner started cleaning up the blood. Meanwhile, Huffman went to
¶23the master bedroom and returned with a gun. Conrad heard a loud
¶24sound and saw smoke, and she turned and saw that Tanner had
¶25been shot in his back left shoulder. Conrad took the gun from
¶26Huffman, called 911, and reported that Huffman had shot Tanner.
¶27 Deputies with the Forsyth County Sheriff’s office responded to
¶28the scene, where they found Huffman sitting in a chair with a wound
¶29on his face. After summoning an ambulance for Tanner, deputies
¶30 2 handcuffed Huffman and took him to a police station for
¶31questioning. Tanner died shortly after reaching the hospital. In a
¶32video-recorded interview, Huffman told the interviewing detective
¶33that he shot Tanner.
¶34 Huffman filed a pretrial motion to suppress the statements he
¶35made during the custodial interview on the grounds that the
¶36statements were not freely and voluntarily given, and that he did
¶37not understand or was not informed of his rights under Miranda.
¶38The trial court held a pretrial Jackson-Denno 3 hearing to consider
¶39Huffman’s motion to suppress. In pertinent part, the detective who
¶40questioned Huffman testified at the hearing as follows. He advised
¶41Huffman of his Miranda rights by reading those rights to him from
¶42a form. Another officer brought a cup of coffee into the room while
¶43the detective was reading the Miranda rights to Huffman, and the
¶44detective told Huffman that he had a right to drink coffee. The
¶45detective did not have Huffman sign the form because “it was on
¶46video.” The detective described Huffman as having “looked rough,”
¶47 3 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 3 with a crooked nose and a bloody shirt and pants, consistent with
¶48having been in a fight. The detective did not ask Huffman if he
¶49needed medical attention, nor did he recall whether any officers
¶50assisting him asked Huffman if he needed medical attention.
¶51Huffman told the detective that he had been drinking, and the
¶52detective discerned that Huffman’s speech was slurred, he smelled
¶53strongly of alcohol, and he “appeared impaired.” However, Huffman
¶54appeared to understand why he was there, understood the questions
¶55asked of him, and answered appropriately as if he understood what
¶56was asked. During the course of the interview, Huffman did not
¶57invoke his right to remain silent or his right to an attorney.
¶58Huffman did not testify at the Jackson-Denno hearing.
¶59 In addition to the detective’s testimony, the trial court
¶60reviewed the video recording of Huffman’s interview. The trial court
¶61entered a written order denying the motion to suppress. In that
¶62order, the trial court noted that the video showed that Huffman was
¶63“slightly bloody about his head, [had] blood on his shirt, and . . .
¶64admitted to drinking prior in the evening.” The trial court found that
¶65 4 the detective gave Huffman a cup of coffee when he read Huffman
¶66the Miranda rights, adding that Huffman had “the right to drink
¶67coffee.” The court assessed that “[t]hroughout the course of the
¶68interview, [Huffman] coherently answered questions regarding the
¶69events of the evening and described his relationship with the
¶70victim.” The court found that Huffman was properly advised of his
¶71Miranda rights, and that he understood those rights and did not
¶72invoke them. The court also found that Huffman gave his
¶73statements freely and voluntarily.
¶74 In its order denying Huffman’s motion for new trial, the trial
¶75court rejected Huffman’s argument that he was not adequately
¶76advised of his Miranda rights and that the court therefore erred in
¶77denying his motion to suppress. The court affirmed that upon
¶78“considering the totality of the circumstances, the State met its
¶79burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
¶80[Huffman’s] statements were freely and voluntarily given after a
¶81knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.”
¶82 On appeal, Huffman claims that the trial court erred in
¶83 5 denying his motion to suppress by finding that he freely and
¶84voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 4 More specifically, Huffman
¶85claims that the trial court did not apply an “adequate analysis of the
¶86totality of circumstances” in determining the admissibility of his
¶87statements. As to those circumstances, Huffman argues that the
¶88interviewing detective did not obtain a signed Miranda waiver form
¶89and failed to ask him if he understood those rights or consented to
¶90speaking with the detective. Huffman argues that the detective was
¶91aware that he had been drinking and smelled of alcohol, and that he
¶92was impaired and slurred his speech. The detective also knew,
¶93Huffman asserts, that his nose was crooked and there was blood on
¶94his pants and shirt, but did not ask him if he needed medical
¶95attention. Huffman maintains that the detective “devalued” the
¶96importance of informing him of his Miranda rights when he said
¶97“you have the right to drink coffee” in the midst of reciting the
¶98 4Huffman does not challenge the admission of his statement on the ground that it was involuntary under the more general due process standard, and so we do not reach that issue. See Dozier v. State, 306 Ga. 29, 36 (4) (c) (829 SE2d 131) (2019). 6 Miranda rights. Huffman also asserts that he was not familiar with
¶99the criminal process.
¶100 “To use a defendant’s custodial statements in its case-in-chief,
¶101the State must show that the defendant was advised of his Miranda
¶102rights and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived
¶103them.” Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 400 (5) (b) (850 SE2d 41)
¶104(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). A trial court, in assessing
¶105whether a defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary,
¶106knowing, and intelligent, “must consider the totality of the
¶107circumstances to determine whether the defendant’s waiver was
¶108free of intimidation and coercion and whether the waiver was made
¶109with a full awareness of both the nature of the rights being
¶110abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon them.”
¶111Wells v. State, 307 Ga. 773, 776 (2) (838 SE2d 242) (2020) (citation
¶112and punctuation omitted). An appellate court generally reviews a
¶113trial court’s factual findings and determinations of credibility for
¶114clear error; however, “where controlling facts are not in dispute,
¶115such as those facts discernible from a videotape, our review is de
¶116 7 novo.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶117 The interview video shows that, before reading the advisory of
¶118the four rights on the Miranda form, the detective caught Huffman’s
¶119attention by picking up the form and saying, “I’m going to go ahead
¶120and do this real quick. Then we’ll talk.” In response, Huffman leaned
¶121in toward the detective and watched the detective’s face attentively
¶122while he read from the form. Huffman looked away from the
¶123detective briefly when the other officer entered the interview room
¶124with the coffee Huffman had requested and the detective said he had
¶125a right to drink coffee. Once the officer set the coffee on the table,
¶126Huffman again leaned in toward the detective and watched the
¶127detective’s face while he completed reading the form. Huffman did
¶128not express any confusion, verbally or in his facial expression, and
¶129did not ask for any repetition or clarification of what the detective
¶130had just advised him. The detective initiated the interrogation by
¶131asking, “That being said, what happened to your nose? Is it broken,
¶132or is it normally that way?” Huffman did not invoke his right to
¶133silence or ask for an attorney, and he expressed no hesitation in
¶134 8 responding to the detective with a narrative about the day’s events.
¶135 Huffman need not have had experience with the justice system
¶136to understand what was said during the reading of his Miranda
¶137rights. “While familiarity with the criminal justice system, and thus
¶138with the Miranda warnings, may be one factor to consider in
¶139determining whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently
¶140waived his rights, such a determination depends on the totality of
¶141the circumstances.” Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 826 (1) (A) (2) (725
¶142SE2d 260) (2012) (citations omitted). Here, the detective’s reading
¶143of the Miranda warnings was not so rushed as to be unintelligible
¶144absent familiarity with Miranda. Cf. id. at 825 (1) (A) (2) (evidence
¶145supported trial court’s finding that Miranda warnings were read in
¶146such a “super-speed” manner that they were likely not intelligible
¶147without prior familiarity with Miranda). Although the detective told
¶148Huffman he had a “right” to drink coffee, he did so after Huffman
¶149had asked for coffee and while another officer was bringing the
¶150beverage, and so the detective’s comment was specific to those
¶151circumstances and could not be reasonably construed as more than
¶152 9 a poor attempt at humor. But even taken literally, the detective’s
¶153comment was not inconsistent with Huffman’s rights under
¶154Miranda. Cf. Williamson v. State, 305 Ga. 889, 893-894 (2) (827
¶155SE2d 857) (2019) (“A statement by an interrogating agent that
¶156contradicts the Miranda warnings is a circumstance that can
¶157indicate a suspect did not knowingly and intelligently waive his
¶158rights.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶159 Huffman had been drinking alcohol earlier in the evening, and
¶160there was blood along one side of his nose, which was visibly
¶161wounded, as well as blood on his shirt and pants. However, the
¶162detective testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing and at trial5 that
¶163Huffman understood why he was there, appeared to understand the
¶164questions that were asked, and answered them appropriately. Our
¶165review of the video recording of the interview does not show
¶166otherwise. Thus, notwithstanding that Huffman was impaired to
¶167 5An appellate court may consider all the evidence of record, and is not limited to the evidence adduced at a Jackson-Denno hearing, in determining the admissibility of a confession. See Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 404 (2) n.7 (738 SE2d 74) (2013). 10 some degree, “the [detective’s] testimony and the recorded interview
¶168indicate that . . . [Huffman’s] mind was nevertheless clear enough to
¶169make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights and to speak to
¶170the [detective] without an attorney.” Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. 59,
¶17164 (2) (829 SE2d 81) (2019).
¶172 Huffman did not sign a written waiver of his rights, but “a
¶173written waiver is not necessary where a suspect is orally advised of
¶174his or her rights and subsequently waives those rights through his
¶175or her responses.” Kidd v. State, 304 Ga. 543, 546 (3) (820 SE2d 46)
¶176(2018) (citations omitted). Nor did the detective ask for a verbal
¶177waiver of Huffman’s Miranda rights or a verbal acknowledgment
¶178that Huffman understood those rights. However, the trial court
¶179could conclude from the detective’s testimony and its own
¶180assessment of the interview recording—which accords with ours—
¶181that Huffman understood his Miranda rights. And Huffman waived
¶182his rights under Miranda when he understood those rights and then
¶183freely made his statements without invoking his right to remain
¶184silent and without requesting an attorney. See Berghuis v.
¶185 11 Thompkins, 560 U. S. 370, 388-389 (III) (D) (30 SCt 2250, 176 LE2d
¶1861098) (2010) (“[A] suspect who has received and understood the
¶187Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives
¶188the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the
¶189police.”).6 The trial court’s decision to admit Huffman’s statements
¶190was not clearly erroneous.
¶191 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶192 6 See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 373 (99 SCt 1755, 60 LE2d 286) (1979) (“An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.”); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 424 (3) (554 SE2d 458) (2001) (“Once Miranda warnings are given and a person in custody gives a statement to police without invoking his right to remain silent and without requesting an attorney, he has in effect waived his rights.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); United States v. Boon San Chong, 829 F2d 1572, 1574 (II) (11th Cir. 1987) (“In the absence of an express waiver, a waiver of [Miranda] rights can be implied from the actions and words of the person being questioned. For example, if after being advised of his rights an individual responds willingly to questions without requesting an attorney, waiver may be implied.” (citation omitted)). 12