Jones v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1988
Citation profile
117 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 117 later decisions — most recently October 2020 · most notably Montgomery County v. Buckman (1994), Jones v. State (1994)
117 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Lodowski v. State · In Re Arnold M. · Parojinog v. State · 66 Wis. 2d 33 - Theriault v. State · McIntyre v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 117 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“We recognize, of course, that great care must be taken to assure that statements made to the police by juveniles are voluntary before being permitted in evidence. McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 617 , 526 A.2d 30 (1987). Our cases have held that the age of a juvenile, in itself, will not render a confession involuntary; rather, we have applied the totality of the circumstances test in determining the validity of a juvenile’s waiver of constitutional rights and the traditional voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession. Id. at 620 , 526 A.2d 30 . The absence of a parent or guardian at the juvenile’s interrogation is an important factor in determining volun-tariness, although the lack of access to parents prior to interrogation does not automatically make a juvenile’s statement inadmissible.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“Manifestly, therefore, some children were excluded from the protective ambit of the Act. Who these children would be, if not those expressly removed from juvenile court jurisdiction by § 3-804, is opaque at best. We think a more natural interpretation of § 3-802(a)(l) would find in it a recognition by the legislature that some children are not in a position to benefit from the Act’s special treatment, and that among these children are those, as here, expressly removed from juvenile court jurisdiction. Thus, to extend the parental notification requirements of § 3-814(b) to an individual charged with offenses beyond the juvenile court’s jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the stated purposes of the Juvenile Causes Act.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“If a law enforcement officer takes a child into custody he shall immediately notify, or cause to be notified, the child’s parents.... After making every reasonable effort to give notice, the law enforcement officer shall with all reasonable speed: (1) Release the child to his parents, ... upon their written promise to bring the child before the court when requested by the court, and such security for the child’s appearance as the court may reasonably require, unless his placement in detention or shelter care is permitted and appears required by § 3-815; or (2) Deliver the child to the court or a place of detention or shelter care designated by the court.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.