Lee v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

114 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 114 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Petitioner also contends that the search of his person that uncovered the money and the knife was illegal. Like the Supreme Court of Kentucky, we have no difficulty in upholding this search as incident to petitioner’s formal arrest. Once petitioner admitted ownership of the sizable quantity of drugs found in Cox’s purse, the police clearly had probable cause to place petitioner under arrest. Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.” (Emphasis supplied).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 155 Md. App. 353 - Conboy v. State · 78 Md. App. 471 - Anderson v. State

2. ““Although the police had probable cause to arrest when Baughman hefted the bag, Baughman first opened the bag, saw the gun and then told Straughan that the gun was there before the police made custodial arrests. These events occurred instantly, one after the other. Under these circumstances the fact that the search of the interior of the bag preceded the formal arrests does not prevent analyzing the search of the bag under principles governing searches incident to a valid arrest inasmuch as there was probable cause to support an arrest at the time of the search.” (Emphasis supplied).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 236 Md. App. 456 - Carter v. State · 78 Md. App. 471 - Anderson v. State

3. ““The determinative element in the balancing process here is that the police reasonably suspected that Lee and Hall were armed and dangerous. On one side of the scales the nature of the subject intrusion was substantial. Petitioners were ordered to lie on the ground and weapons, including shotguns, were pointed at them. On the other side of the scale is the governmental interest in effective crime detection and crime prevention. Petitioners not only were suspected of an earlier robbery and attempted murder but also of then carrying a concealed weapon. This is buttressed by the State’s interest in protecting the safety of the officers and the other persons on the basketball court, toward whom no suspicion had been directed. Further, the intrusion, though substantial in degree, was brief in duration. No more than two minutes elapsed from the time the officers moved in until petitioners were advised they were under arrest. The police located both suspects at the place where the informant said they would be. The problem was that, to get close enough to the suspects to investigate, one or more police officers would have to have made an approach across a parking lot or tennis courts or both, or from around surrounding buildings, and go onto the outdoor basketball court. It is extremely unlikely that one or more strangers in that high crime area could saunter up to the basketball court and be considered by the suspects as potential recruits for a pick up game. Yet, if the petitioners”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re David S.