¶1I concur in the result only. As evidenced in my dissent in Merriman v. Minter, 298 S.C. 110, 378 S.E. (2d) 441 (1989), I would find that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because it treats inmates in a disparate manner without a rational reason. The relevant classification for constitutional analysis should be “all prisoners,” and it is violative of the Constitution to single out a portion of that group for different treatment without a reasonable basis. The majority in Merrimandid not reach this issue; instead, they held that it was not properly before us. Here Mitchell has raised the issue and I would find the statute unconstitutional.
¶2I agree with the majority that the statute of limitations has run its course; however, I would reach this result by declaring that the tolling statute is unconstitutional as it applies to suits *412by prisoners. In the modern age, it is clear that prisoners sentenced for life, as well as prisoners sentenced to a term of years, have equal and unfettered access to the court system. For these reasons, I concur with the majority in result only.