311 So. 2d 190 - State v. Webb’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The sole point on appeal is whether or not the crime of receiving and concealing stolen property under Fla.Stat. § 811.16 is a ‘continuing offense’ or whether or not the statute of limitations of two years as provided in Fla.Stat. § 932.465(2) begins to run on May 12, 1970, when Dexter installed the radio equipment on the premises of the radio station with the full knowledge of Webb at that time that the equipment was stolen. “We hold that the crime of receiving and concealing stolen property is not a continuing offense and that the statute of limitations begins to run when the crime is complete, to wit: when the property is received and concealed with the knowledge that the same is stolen.” 311 So. 2d. at 191 .”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Duncan v. State · Duncan v. State

2. ““The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity. For these reasons and others, we have stated before ‘the principle that criminal limitations statutes are “to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose,” United States v. Scharton, 285 US 518, 522 , 76 L Ed 917, 919 , 52 S Ct 416 (1932).' United States v Habig, 390 US 222, 227 , 19 L Ed 2d 1055, 1059 , 88 S Ct 926 (1968). We have also said that ‘[sjtatutes of limitations normally begin to run when the crime is complete.' Pendergast v United States, 317 US 412, 418 , 87 L Ed 368, 372 , 63 S Ct 268 (1943); see United States v Irvine, 98 US 450, 452 , 25 L Ed 193, 194 , (1879). And Congress has declared a policy that the statute of limitations should not be extended ‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law.’ 18 USC § 3282 . These principles indicate that the doctrine of continuing offenses should be applied in only limited circumstances since, as the Co”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Duncan v. State

3. ““I dissent. I accept, of course, Toussie v. United States, supra, as good law and refer specifically to that portion of the opinion therein quoted above, and italicized in part in the majority opinion, viz.: ‘[Well recognized principles indicating that the doctrine of continuing offenses should be applied in only limited circumstances] ... do not mean that a particular offense should never be construed as a continuing one. They do, however, require that such a result should not be reached unless the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one. ’ (Italics added.) I would emphasize, however, that portion thereof which I have immediately hereinabove italicized relating to the nature of the crime involved. That is to say, I think that if the very essence of the crime charged is concealment, as here, the legislature ‘must assuredly have intended’ that the crime is a continuing one until discovery is made. Otherwise, as in this very case, for example, it would be a boon to the ‘fencing’ business; and a buyer of known stolen goods need only carefully conceal them for two years after which he would be home free. The failure of the legislature expressly to declare a continuing offense may be logically explained, I think, by the fact that the statute, i. e., § 811.16, supra, also proscribes the buying and receiving of stolen ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Duncan v. State