Frye v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “When we closely examine the entire one-paragraph prejudice discussion in Dobbins , we are convinced that the Supreme Court actually applied the Hill standard in determining the prejudice prong of Dobbins’ ineffectiveness claim. The see- - ond to last sentence states: ‘It was not the sentence to be imposed that concerned Dobbins — it was his eligibility for sentence reduction as to any sentence that was imposed.’ Dobbins’ concern would apply to any sentence imposed under any guilty plea, even one pursuant to the .more, favorable plea agreement. While the opinion does not disclose whether or not Dobbins pleaded and proved that, but for the affirmative mis-advice of his plea counsel, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial, as required by Hill , the last sentence in the paragraph supports that he did so. In that sentence, the Court summarized its decision as: ‘His attorney’s affirmative misrepresentation as to his ability to challenge the sentence prejudiced Dobbins by causing him to plead guilty when he otherwise would not have done so. ’ This sentence clearly states that, but for the ineffectiveness of plea counsel, Dobbins would not have pleaded guilty. By implication, the only alternative to not pleading guilty is to go to trial. Thus, the Court applied the Hill standard without citation. As such, our holding in the case at bar is not contrary to Dobbins .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Berry v. State

2. “Hill thus acknowledges that the Strickland inquiry for “prejudice” necessarily . depends on the specific evidence and circumstances surrounding the claimed error. It follows, therefore, that the determinative factors for evaluating whether counsel’s ineffectiveness is prejudicial must be based on the specific facts and circumstances of the case. Reliance on Hill’s “template” that a defendant must contend that “but for” counsel’s ineffective assistance the defendant would have insisted on going to trial as determinative of whether a defendant can establish prejudice completely ignores Strickland’s looser emphasis on whether a defendant can establish “an adverse effect on the defense.” We conclude that though prejudice may, and often will, be established by a defendant’s showing that “but for” counsel’s ineffective assistance, the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial, this is not the only way prejudice can be established. According to Strickland, the test of prejudice is whether “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 358 (citations omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Berry v. State

3. “In this case, Dobbins was prejudiced because he rejected an offer to plead to a charge resulting in a 10-year sentence. If he had known he was not able to challenge the sentence, he would not have entered an open plea, but would have accepted the offer, which matched the lowest sentence he could have received under the open plea agreement. Moreover, the facts relating to Dobbins’ understanding of the plea and his agreement that no one had promised leniency for the plea are irrelevant. It was not the sentence to be imposed that concerned Dobbins — it was his eligibility for sentence reduction as to any sentence that was imposed. His attorney’s affirmative misrepresentation as to his ability to challenge the sentence prejudiced Dobbins by causing him to plead guilty when he otherwise would not have done so.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Berry v. State