J-A25027-23
2024 PA Super 49
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM SCHOFIELD :
:
Appellant : No. 1389 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-04-CR-0001620-2020
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: MARCH 19, 2024
William Schofield appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after
a jury found him guilty of multiple sex offenses. He challenges the trial court’s
denial of his motion to exclude expert testimony from the forensic interviewer
and claims that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Upon
review, we affirm.
This case arises out of the sexual assault of a seven-year-old girl, N.B.,
by Schofield, her father. For the first six years of N.B.’s life, Schofield had a
minimal relationship with her. In the year leading up to the assault, Schofield
started having contact with N.B. once a week, usually by phone.
On April 28, 2020, Schofield contacted N.B.’s mother and asked if N.B.
could have a sleepover at his house; she agreed. N.B. spent the night at her
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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father’s for the first time. Schofield’s girlfriend and her daughter were also
there. Schofield slept in the bedroom with his daughter that night.
A couple weeks later, N.B. had extreme vaginal discomfort. Her mother
attributed it to laundry detergent, fabric sheets, or improper hygiene. On June
26, 2020, N.B. told her cousin that Schofield had sexually assaulted her when
she stayed overnight at his house. N.B.’s mother took her to the hospital
where testing revealed that she had chlamydia.
Schofield was arrested and charged with multiple offenses.
Prior to trial, Schofield filed a motion in limine to exclude the expert
testimony of Jo Ellen Bowman, a forensic interviewer in the field of child sexual
assault victim behavior. The Commonwealth indicated that it intended to
present Bowman at trial to give her opinion regarding the dynamics that may
impact the disclosure of abuse and child reporting behaviors. Schofield argued
that her testimony was not sufficiently scientifically supported and did not
satisfy the Frye1 standard. Therefore, he claimed that Bowman should not be
permitted to testify. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Schofield’s
motion.
On January 10, 2022, Schofield’s case proceeded to trial. The jury
deadlocked, and the court declared a mistrial. Two counts against Schofield
were dismissed at that time.
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1 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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The case was retried on May 13, 2022. The jury convicted Schofield on
the remaining counts including statutory sexual assault (victim under 16 and
perpetrator 11 years older), rape of a child, involuntary sexual intercourse
with a child, unlawful contact with a minor, incest of a minor--complainant
under 13, aggravated indecent assault--complainant under 13, indecent
assault of person less than 13, and endangering the welfare of a child--parent
or guardian.2 The court sentenced Schofield to an aggregate sentence of 21-
42 years’ incarceration, with a consecutive 3 year term of probation. Schofield
filed a post-sentence motion, which the court denied.3
Schofield filed this timely appeal. Schofield and the trial court complied
with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
Schofield raises three issues for our review:
1. Was it error to deny [Schofield’s] pretrial motion in limine
regarding the testimony of the Commonwealth's expert witness Jo
Ellen Bowman?
2. Was it error to deny [Schofield’s] motion for new trial based
upon the weight of the evidence?
3. Did the lower court err cumulatively?
Schofield’s Brief at 3 (excessive capitalization omitted).
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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1(b), 3121(c), 3121(d), 6318(a)(1), 4202(b)(1),
3125(a)(7), 3126(a)(7), and 4304(a).
3Schofield requested additional time to file a supplemental post-sentence
motion, which the court granted, but did not file one.
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In his first issue, Schofield claims that the trial court erred in two
respects when it denied his motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony
of Bowman.4 First, Schofield maintains that the court erred in determining
that Bowman’s proposed testimony satisfied Frye because her conclusions,
rather than the methodology used to reach those conclusions, were widely
accepted. Schofield’s Brief at 21. Second, Schofield maintains that the court
erred when it stated that did not set forth “articulable grounds to believe that
an expert witness had not applied accepted scientific methodology in a
conventional fashion in reaching his or her conclusions.” Id. at 17. Schofield
contends that Bowman’s testimony failed to satisfy Frye and should not have
been admitted. Additionally, Schofield argues that the admission of this
evidence was not harmless error. Id. at 22-23. We disagree.
This Court reviews the denial of a motion in limine to preclude the
admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.
Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2018). The “[a]dmission of
evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed
only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.”
Commonwealth v. Tyson,
119 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth
v. Hoover,
107 A.3d 723, 729 (Pa. 2014) (noting that an appellate court
applies an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the denial
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4 We have reordered these arguments for ease of disposition.
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of a motion in limine). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied,
or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record,
discretion is abused.” Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 772-73 (Pa.
2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Expert testimony is permitted in all trials “when it involves explanations
and inferences not within the range of ordinary training[,] knowledge,
intelligence and experience.” Id. at 788. Expert testimony is governed
generally by Rule 702 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. 5
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5 Rule 702, entitled “Testimony by Expert Witnesses,” provides as follows:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson;
(b) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue; and
(c) the expert's methodology is generally accepted in the relevant
field.
Pa.R.E. 702.
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To determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, Pennsylvania
employs the Frye standard, which is incorporated into Rule 702.6 Grady v.
Frito–Lay Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Pa. 2003). Frye permits novel
scientific evidence to be admitted at trial “if the methodology that underlies
the evidence has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.”
Walker,
92 A.3d at 789 (citation omitted).
In seeking to exclude scientific evidence, that party has the burden to
first demonstrate that the expert's testimony is based on novel scientific
evidence. Scientific evidence is “novel” when “there is a legitimate dispute
regarding the reliability of the expert's conclusions.” Commonwealth v.
Safka, 95 A.3d 304, 307 (Pa. Super. 2014) (emphasis added) (citation and
quotation omitted). A reasonably broad meaning should be ascribed to the
term “novel.” Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC,
44 A.3d 27, 53 (Pa. 2012). It
does not necessarily relate to the newness of the science or technology used
in developing the conclusions. Safka,
95 A.3d at 308.
Once it is established that the scientific evidence in question is novel,
the burden then shifts to the party offering the evidence. “[T]he proponent
of the scientific evidence must show that the expert's methodology has
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community despite the legitimate
dispute.” Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1091 (Pa. 2017);
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6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first adopted the Frye standard in
Commonwealth v. Topa,
369 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1977).
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Commonwealth v. Powell, 171 A.3d 294, 308 (Pa. Super. 2017) (explaining
the shift in burdens).
A trial court is not required to conduct a Frye hearing every time a party
seeks to introduce scientific evidence. “Rather, a hearing is warranted only
when the trial court has articulable grounds to believe that an expert
witness has not applied accepted scientific methodology in a conventional
fashion in reaching his or her conclusions.” Jacoby, 170 A.3d at 1091
(emphasis added).
Here, the trial court found that Schofield did not demonstrate that
Bowman’s conclusions were based on novel science. Schofield presented no
evidence, such as research or articles, to demonstrate that the foundation of
Bowman’s conclusions or the conclusions themselves were disputed or that
other schools of thought existed.7 N.T., 11/10/21, at 107-108. Instead,
Schofield focused on how various factors could impact Bowman’s conclusions,
which goes to the persuasiveness of her opinions, and the methodology
underlying Bowman’s intended testimony. Id. at 39, 41, 93-94. None of the
questions pertained to the validity of the science used to reach these
conclusions. Consequently, after Bowman testified, the court stated: “I can’t
find that there is any, that there is anything that legitimately disputes the
reliability of [Bowman’s] conclusions . . . .” N.T., 11/10/21, at 107-109.
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7 Based upon our review of the record, we observe that Bowman’s testimony
indicated the contrary. Id. at 60-61, 65-66.
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Additionally, the trial court cited Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d
594 (Pa. Super. 2018) in support of its determination. Trial Court Opinion,
1/31/23, at 36. In Cramer, the Commonwealth sought to present expert
testimony regarding victim behaviors and dynamics involving sexual assault
like the testimony in this case. The defendant filed a motion in limine claiming
that this testimony was based on “human behavioral sciences of psychology,
human development, and science,” and that the Commonwealth was required
to prove that such conclusions were based on generally accepted scientific
methodology in the relevant scientific community. The trial court denied the
defendant’s request for a Frye hearing. On appeal this Court affirmed,
concluding that the proposed expert testimony was not based on novel
scientific evidence.
For these reasons, Schofield failed to satisfy Frye’s threshold step of
establishing the expert’s testimony involved novel science. Therefore, the trial
court did not have “articulable grounds” to consider Bowman’s methodology.8
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Schofield’s motion in limine and admitting the expert testimony of
Bowman. Schofield’s first issue merits no relief.
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8 Notwithstanding this, the court found that Bowman’s methodology for
arriving at her conclusions was generally accepted in the relevant field. See
N.T., 11/10/21, at 109.
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In his second issue, Schofield claims that the trial court erred by denying
his motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. Specifically,
Schofield argues that the medical evidence showed that neither he, nor his
various sexual partners, had chlamydia during the relevant time frame.
According to Schofield, this evidence strongly disfavored any determination
that he was the one who gave N.B. chlamydia, and, therefore, the weight of
the evidence indicated he was not the one who assaulted N.B. Schofield’s
Brief at 23-24. Schofield, therefore, claims he is entitled to a new trial.
The trial court maintains that this issue is waived because Schofield only
claimed generally in his Rule 1925(b) statement that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence without specifying a reason. Trial Court Opinion,
1/31/23, at 25, 27. As such, the court claims the statement was too vague
to enable it to identify the issue raised on appeal and address it. Id. at 27.
We agree.
“[A] concise statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify
the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise
Statement at all.” Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686–87 (Pa.
Super. 2001). To preserve a challenge to either the sufficiency or weight of
the evidence on appeal, an appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement must state
with specificity the elements or verdicts for which the appellant alleges that
the evidence was insufficient or against the weight of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Juray,
275 A.3d 1037, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing
Commonwealth v. Freeman,
128 A.3d 1231, 1248-49 (Pa. Super. 2015)
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(finding waiver of appellant's weight challenge where the Pa.R.A.P. 1925
statement was too vague to permit the court to identify which verdicts were
contrary to the weight of the evidence, and the specific reasons why the
verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence)). This is so even where
the trial court issued an opinion addressing the substance of the claim.
Commonwealth v. Parrish, 224 A.3d 682, 700 (Pa. 2020).
Here, Schofield did not specify in his concise statement which of his
convictions he believed were against the weight of the evidence. Additionally,
he did not specify why the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
And, although the trial court addressed what it thought Schofield’s argument
was--issues relating to the credibility of N.B.--the court was unable to address
the specific issue Schofield raised on appeal regarding the medical evidence.
This is a clear example of why this rule must be strictly enforced. We,
therefore, find that this issue is waived. Schofield’s second issue warrants no
relief.
In his third issue, Schofield claims that, although the errors herein may
be considered harmless individually, the cumulative effect of these errors is
prejudicial. As we have concluded that the trial court did not err regarding
Schofield’s first issue and that Schofield waived his second issue, his third
issue likewise warrants no relief. See Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d
1, 56 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted) (“[N]o number of failed claims may
collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually.”).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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DATE: 03/19/2024
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