Olsen’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

46 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 106 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]his court ... review[s] summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity questions differently from other summary judgment decisions because of the purposes behind qualified immunity. When a § 1983 defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity on summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that 1) the official violated a constitutional ... right; and 2) the constitutional ... right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred. First, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? If so, we ... ask whether the right was clearly established. If the plaintiff does not satisfy either portion of the two-pronged test, the Court must grant the defendant qualified immunity. If the plaintiff indeed demonstrates that the official violated a clearly established constitutional ... right, then the burden shifts back to the defendant, who must prove that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In the end, therefore, the defendant still bears the normal summary judgment burden of showing that no material facts remain in dispute that would defeat the qualified immunity defense.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ortlieb v. Howery · Witmer v. Powell

2. “[T]his deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied “when the municipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously and deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir.1998). Although a single incident generally will not give rise to liability, Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 , 105 S.Ct. 2427 , 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985), “deliberate indifference may be found absent a pattern of unconstitutional behavior if a violation of federal rights is a ‘highly predictable’ or ‘plainly obvious’ consequence of a municipality’s action.” Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307 (internal citations omitted). The official position must operate as the “moving force” behind the violation, and the plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct causal link” between the action and the right violation. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 399 , 117 S.Ct. 1382 , 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 416 F. Supp. 2d 1098 - MacArthur v. San Juan County · 543 F. App'x 841 - duBois v. Payne County Board of County Commissioners

3. “A police officer violates an arrestee’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free of excessive force during an arrest if the officer’s arresting actions were not “ ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [him].” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2001). This court assesses the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” acknowledging that the officer may be “forced to make split-second judgments” in certain difficult circumstances. Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1131 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-397 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 ). This reasonableness standard — which is “clearly established” for the purposes of § 1983 actions, Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1552 (10th Cir.1995) — implores the court to consider factors including the alleged crime’s severity, the degree of potential threat that the suspect poses to an officer’s safety and to others’ safety, and the suspect’s efforts to resist or evade arrest. Medina, 252 F.3d at 1131 . Because the reasonableness inquiry overlaps with the qualified immunity analysis, “a qualified immunity defense [is] of less value when raised in defense of an excessive force claim.” Id. (citing Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 718 (10th Cir.1991)). Whether an officer acted reasonably in using deadly forc”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 289 F. Supp. 2d 1269 - Eberle v. City of Newton · 443 F. Supp. 2d 1222 - Reindl v. CITY OF LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS