Schmude v. Sheahan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The federal courts possess certain inherent powers, “‘which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.’ ” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Crunch) 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812)); see also Dale M. ex rel. Alice M. v. Board of Education, 282 F.3d 984, 985-86 (7th Cir.2002) (“Courts have a broad power, deemed ‘inherent’ in the sense that its existence does not depend on an explicit grant of power in a statute or other formal enactment, to regulate the conduct of the lawyers who practice before them.”). The federal courts “ ‘are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204, 227, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)). A federal court also “ ‘has the power to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.’ ” Id. (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 529, 531, 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824)). As part of the power to control the conduct of attorneys appearing before it, “ ‘a federal court has the inherent power to sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process,’ ” U.S. v. Johnson, 327 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Barnhill v. United States, 11 F.3d 1360, 1367 (7th Cir.1993)), and to “ ‘prevent unprofessional conduct by those attorneys who are practicing before them ..., including ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 318 F. Supp. 2d 606 - Schmude v. Sheahan

2. “COURT:. One of the issues the Court must deal with before deciding to lift the stay is who it is who will represent the defendants in this case, the individual defendants Spatz, Pultz and Koscianski. Three attorneys have asked this Court to appoint them Special Assistant State’s Attorneys pursuant to some Illinois statute. And I have some doubts about the applicability of that statute to this situation. But I am going to ask that the plaintiffs and all counsel brief this issue of the applicability of the Illinois statute, which counsel suggests applies here. But beyond that, if the Court does have the obligation or the discretion to appoint counsel as Special Assistant State’s Attorneys, I will be candid with you and tell you that it is not likely that the Court would appoint any attorney who has previous experience with the State’s Attorneys office. And each of the movants here who are asking to be appointed attorneys, Special Assistant State’s Attorneys, in their curricula vita or résumé make a point of saying that they were in that office at some point in time or for some extended period of time. And I will take this position initially, without ruling on it today, that it would be better to start, if at all, with attorneys who have not had experience in that office because of the particular relationship between the Sheriff and the State’s Attorney’s Office, given the background in this case, which involves the recent criminal prosecution. So the first issue is whether that”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 318 F. Supp. 2d 606 - Schmude v. Sheahan

3. “In sum, the Rule to Show Cause alleged that counsel had willfully disobeyed established statutory and case law authority and the court’s orders by improperly seeking to become court-appointed counsel and obtaining numerous awards of attorney fees in the Circuit Court of Cook County after the cause of action had been removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and where it remains pending. Further, the Rule to Show Cause alleged that counsels’ conduct exhibited a lack of candor toward the court. The allegedly sanctionable conduct involved one simple matter — circumventing the federal court’s removal jurisdiction. In the Rule, the court reiterated the procedural history of the case, detailing the allegedly sanctionable conduct of counsel. In section IV of the Rule, styled “Grounds Underlying Possible Impropriety by Attorneys Appearing Before the Court,” the court framed the issues for counsel to address. First, the court discussed the well-settled law regarding removal of a case from state court to federal court, stating that after removal any further orders of the state court are considered coram non judice, or without jurisdiction. Second, the court discussed the court’s authority and jurisdiction in regard to awards of attorney fees in cases that are pending before it, stating that this court was best suited to determine the issue of attorney appointments and fees and that such review was justified by the court’s inherent right to super”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 318 F. Supp. 2d 606 - Schmude v. Sheahan