Hughes v. State

¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia

¶2 Decided: July 7, 2021

¶3 S21A0730. HUGHES v. THE STATE.

¶4 BOGGS, Presiding Justice.

¶5 Appellant Re’Dayon Hughes challenges his 2019 convictions

¶6for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting

¶7death of Dre’Landon Brown. 1 Appellant contends that the trial court

¶8erred by admitting evidence that he vandalized Marjorie Reed’s car,

¶9 1 Brown was killed on November 23, 2017. On February 12, 2018, a Forsyth County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault of Dre’Landon, and aggravated assault of Jaymareion Brown. On July 10, 2018, Appellant filed a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution. A hearing on the motion was held on October 12, 2018, and the trial court denied the motion in an order entered on October 25, 2018. At a trial from January 7 to 11 and 14, 2019, the jury found Appellant not guilty of malice murder but guilty of the remaining counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison for felony murder and 20 years concurrently for the aggravated assault of Jaymareion. The aggravated assault of Dre’Landon merged with the felony murder count. On January 28, 2019, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel on September 17, 2019 and October 14, 2019. After a hearing on November 18, 2019, the trial court denied the motion for new trial as amended in an order filed on December 14, 2020. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, the case was docketed in this Court for the April 2021 term, and oral argument was heard May 18, 2021. that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to question Appellant

¶10about alleged prior difficulties with Dre’Landon and for failing to

¶11object to the admission of other prior difficulties evidence, that the

¶12cumulative prejudice of these errors requires a new trial, and that

¶13the trial court erroneously considered Appellant’s failure to retreat

¶14in denying his pretrial motion for immunity. We affirm.

¶15 The evidence presented at trial showed the following. On

¶16November 23, 2017, Appellant shot and killed Dre’Landon as

¶17Appellant fled the Brown family home. Appellant admitted to

¶18shooting Dre’Landon but claimed that it was done in self-defense

¶19because Dre’Landon was chasing him down the stairs of the Brown

¶20family home with a gun.

¶21 Earlier that evening, Appellant sneaked into the home of Reed

¶22and her teenage grandchildren — Marjorie Brown, Absolom Brown,

¶23Dre’Landon, and Jaymareion Brown — to meet with Marjorie, who

¶24had recently given birth to Appellant’s child. Appellant was carrying

¶25a loaded gun and a backpack with a few rounds of loose ammunition.

¶26Reed had banned Appellant from her home and from contact with

¶27 2 Marjorie, who was herself barred from contact with Appellant under

¶28court order.

¶29 After Jaymareion and Dre’Landon saw a photo on social media

¶30of Appellant, Marjorie, and their child in what looked like Marjorie’s

¶31bedroom, the two brothers confronted Marjorie at her bedroom door.

¶32When she denied that Appellant was in the room, Jaymareion

¶33pushed into the room with Dre’Landon following behind. Not seeing

¶34Appellant in the room, Jaymareion opened the closet door to find

¶35Appellant hiding inside. Appellant then pointed a gun at

¶36Jaymareion, who exclaimed, “So you’re going to bring a gun into our

¶37house.” When Appellant did not respond, Jaymareion said, “Bro, just

¶38leave.” Appellant pointed his gun at both brothers, who remained

¶39still, as he first exited the closet and then the room.

¶40 Seconds later, as Appellant proceeded downstairs, Dre’Landon

¶41left Marjorie’s room and followed Appellant down the stairs. When

¶42Appellant reached the bottom of the stairs, rather than go out the

¶43nearby front door, Appellant stopped, turned around, and shot

¶44Dre’Landon twice in the chest and once more as he fell. Meanwhile,

¶45 3 Jaymareion left the bedroom and went straight down the stairs.

¶46When he reached the final step, he heard gunshots and ran back up

¶47the stairs. Appellant fled out the back door and hid in some nearby

¶48bushes.

¶49 Jaymareion ran back down the stairs to find Dre’Landon

¶50bleeding on the floor. Jaymareion attempted to stop the bleeding and

¶51called the police. Jaymareion saw no gun near his brother.

¶52 While Jaymareion tended to his brother’s wounds, Marjorie

¶53went out the front door to look for Appellant. Upon finding him, she

¶54agreed to grab their child, get the keys to the family car, and leave

¶55with him. She went back inside, took the child, and brought him to

¶56Appellant. She then returned to the house to pack her things, but

¶57Reed stopped her from leaving until the police arrived.

¶58 By the time the police arrived, Dre’Landon was dead. The

¶59police found and arrested Appellant one block from the house. In

¶60searching the home for Appellant’s firearm, the police found a few

¶61rounds of loose ammunition in the backpack Appellant had left

¶62inside Marjorie’s closet. A specialized canine unit also searched the

¶63 4 premises for the missing firearm and located it near an air

¶64conditioning unit at an adjoining house. No other working gun was

¶65ever found. 2 According to the autopsy, there was no soot on

¶66Dre’Landon’s skin, indicating that he was shot from a distance of at

¶67least three feet away.

¶68 A series of confrontations had occurred between Appellant and

¶69various members of Dre’Landon’s family in the months leading up

¶70to the shooting death of Dre’Landon. Initially, Dre’Landon’s family

¶71had lived in Roswell, where Appellant and Marjorie met at school

¶72and started dating. According to Reed, Marjorie’s behavior started

¶73to change when she began dating Appellant. She began running

¶74away with Appellant and started drinking, using drugs, and

¶75breaking into and sleeping in abandoned places. Reed also heard

¶76that Appellant had “beat up” Marjorie. These events led Reed to

¶77prohibit the two teenagers from seeing each other, including barring

¶78Appellant from her home.

¶79 2 Upon searching the house, the police found a revolver in the first floor front hall closet. It looked like it had been pieced together, was missing the trigger and half of its frame, and was incapable of firing. 5  Appellant’s relationship with Marjorie continued, however,

¶80generating rumors at school that the two were engaging in sexual

¶81activity. Absolom and Jaymareion each confronted Appellant

¶82separately at school over the rumors and his derogatory sexual

¶83comments about Marjorie. During the interaction with Jaymareion

¶84at school, Appellant became angry and the two boys began

¶85threatening each other. A teacher separated them before a fight

¶86broke out.

¶87 Sometime later, while walking down a trail behind the family

¶88home, Absolom saw Appellant with another unidentified person.

¶89Absolom told Appellant to wait, went home, and returned with

¶90Jaymareion and Dre’Landon. Absolom noticed that Appellant

¶91appeared to be holding an AR-15-style rifle. Absolom, scared, began

¶92to move away before realizing the rifle was only a BB gun. The

¶93unknown person with Appellant then approached the three brothers

¶94and asked whether Absolom wanted to fight. Jaymareion interjected

¶95that no one would fight his brother without also fighting him.

¶96Appellant then threatened to kill the brothers.

¶97 6  During yet another incident, Jaymareion and Dre’Landon

¶98caught Appellant inside of their home and punched him. They then

¶99ushered Appellant outside and reminded him that he was not

¶100allowed in the family home.

¶101 At some point, Reed invited Appellant to talk with her. Reed

¶102made it clear to Appellant that he was not allowed in the family

¶103home. Immediately following this discussion, Reed found her car

¶104vandalized: all four tires had been slashed and the windshield

¶105broken. Appellant admitted to Marjorie that he had vandalized

¶106Reed’s car; Marjorie told the rest of the family.

¶107 Finally, in the summer of 2017, to give Marjorie “a clean break

¶108away from all that badness” in Roswell, Reed moved the family to a

¶109new home in Forsyth County. In November 2017, Marjorie gave

¶110birth to Appellant’s child. After the move to Forsyth County, Reed

¶111once again prohibited Appellant from being in the family home and

¶112told Marjorie not to tell Appellant their new address. Marjorie,

¶113however, told Appellant the new address and continued her

¶114relationship with him.

¶115 7  1. Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his

¶116motion in limine and admitting testimony that Appellant vandalized

¶117Reed’s car. In denying the motion in limine, the trial court explained

¶118that the testimony was appropriate prior difficulties evidence and

¶119that it explained the relationships and circumstances leading to the

¶120charges in this case. Appellant argues that the evidence was

¶121inadmissible because it was neither intrinsic to the charged offenses

¶122nor evidence of prior difficulties between Appellant and the victims

¶123under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). We disagree.

¶124 Evidence is intrinsic when it pertains “to the chain of events

¶125explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime,” and is

¶126admissible so long as it is “linked in time and circumstances with

¶127the charged crime, . . . forms an integral and natural part of an

¶128account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the

¶129crime for the jury[.]” Heade v. State, Case No. S21A0409, 2021 WL

¶1302518631, at *4 (decided June 21, 2021) (citation and punctuation

¶131omitted). “There is no bright-line rule regarding how close in time

¶132evidence must be to the charged offenses, or requiring evidence to

¶133 8 pertain directly to the victims of the charged offenses, for that

¶134evidence to be admitted properly as intrinsic evidence.” Id. (citation

¶135and punctuation omitted). “We review a trial court’s ruling

¶136admitting evidence as intrinsic for an abuse of discretion.” Id.

¶137(citation and punctuation omitted).

¶138 Here, the evidence that Appellant vandalized Reed’s car was a

¶139part of the chain of events leading to the charged crimes. Occurring

¶140amidst a series of escalating threats and acts of violence by

¶141Appellant and members of Dre’Landon’s family, it showed the

¶142tension in the relationship between the persons involved in this

¶143case, was a precipitating cause for the family’s relocation from

¶144Roswell to Forsyth County, and explained, in part, why Appellant

¶145was not permitted in Reed’s home the night of the shooting. When

¶146considered in light of the other evidence in this case, we cannot

¶147conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that

¶148the evidence that Appellant vandalized Reed’s car was reasonably

¶149necessary to complete the story for the jury and was therefore

¶150intrinsic evidence. See Clark v. State, 306 Ga. 367, 374 (829 SE2d

¶151 9 306) (2019) (concluding that evidence was intrinsic in part because

¶152it explained why appellant was not welcome in the victim’s home).

¶153 Of course, intrinsic evidence may be “excluded if its probative

¶154value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

¶155confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations

¶156of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative

¶157evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). “In reviewing issues under

¶158Rule 403, we look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its

¶159admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its

¶160undue prejudicial impact.” Heade, 2021 WL 2518631, at *5 (citation

¶161and punctuation omitted).

¶162 As explained above, Appellant’s vandalism of Reed’s car was

¶163probative in explaining the context of the charged crimes and the

¶164increasingly hostile relationship between Appellant and Reed and

¶165members of her family. The trial court was within its discretion to

¶166determine that the prejudicial impact of this act was not unfair and

¶167did not substantially outweigh its probative value. Appellant,

¶168therefore, has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion

¶169 10 in admitting the evidence.

¶170 2. Appellant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

¶171assistance for failing to elicit testimony at trial that Dre’Landon had

¶172a gun during a prior incident involving Appellant and for failing to

¶173object to several pieces of testimony regarding the numerous prior

¶174conflicts between Appellant and members of Dre’Landon’s family.

¶175We disagree.

¶176 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

¶177Appellant must show both that his trial counsel’s performance was

¶178deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland

¶179v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

¶180(1984). An appellant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test,

¶181and if he fails as to one prong, “it is not incumbent upon this Court

¶182to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (770

¶183SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). To establish

¶184deficient performance, an appellant “must overcome the strong

¶185presumption that his . . . counsel’s conduct falls within the broad

¶186range of reasonable professional conduct and show that his counsel

¶187 11 performed in an objectively unreasonable way” in light of all the

¶188circumstances and prevailing norms. Id. (citation and punctuation

¶189omitted). To establish prejudice, an appellant must show that “there

¶190is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

¶191errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

¶192Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In reviewing either component of the

¶193inquiry, all factual findings by the trial court will be affirmed unless

¶194clearly erroneous. See Smith, 296 Ga. at 733.

¶195 (a) Appellant asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

¶196assistance by failing to introduce evidence at trial that Appellant

¶197was assaulted by Dre’Landon with a gun in a prior incident. At the

¶198pretrial hearing on Appellant’s motion for immunity, Appellant

¶199testified that eight months prior to the shooting of Dre’Landon,

¶200Dre’Landon drove past Appellant and pointed a gun at him, placing

¶201him in fear of being shot. Trial counsel, however, did not elicit this

¶202same testimony at trial. Appellant argues that this failure was not

¶203only constitutionally deficient but also was prejudicial because the

¶204critical issue in the case was whether Dre’Landon had a gun, putting

¶205 12 Appellant in reasonable fear for his life when he shot Dre’Landon.

¶206 Even assuming trial counsel’s failure to elicit this testimony at

¶207trial was deficient, Appellant has failed to show prejudice. Although

¶208the testimony, had it been elicited at trial, may have shown that

¶209Dre’Landon had access to a gun eight months earlier, the evidence

¶210was very strong that only Appellant had a gun on the night

¶211Dre’Landon was shot: no one ever saw Dre’Landon with a gun, and

¶212Appellant’s gun was the only useable one found at the scene, which

¶213was searched by the police with a canine unit trained to detect guns.

¶214See Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708, 714 (854 SE2d 523) (2021)

¶215(concluding that exclusion of testimony was harmless where

¶216evidence of guilt was “very strong”). Further, the testimony would

¶217have shown merely another in a long list of incidents of prior threats

¶218or violent acts between Appellant and members of Dre’Landon’s

¶219family leading up to the shooting. See Byers v. State, __ Ga. __ (857

¶220SE2d 447, 451) (2021) (concluding that exclusion of testimony was

¶221harmless where it was essentially cumulative of other evidence).

¶222Appellant has therefore failed to show that the outcome of the trial

¶223 13 probably would have been different absent trial counsel’s failure to

¶224elicit testimony regarding this prior incident. See, e.g., Swann v.

¶225State, 310 Ga. 175, 178 (850 SE2d 137) (2020) (denying an ineffective

¶226assistance of counsel claim for failure to offer evidence because

¶227appellant failed to show prejudice).

¶228 (b) Appellant further claims that his trial counsel was

¶229constitutionally deficient for failing to object to several pieces of

¶230testimony regarding the numerous prior incidents of conflict

¶231between Appellant and members of Dre’Landon’s family.

¶232Specifically, Appellant argues that trial counsel should have

¶233objected to the following: (1) Reed’s testimony regarding why her

¶234family left Roswell; (2) her testimony that Appellant beat Marjorie;

¶235(3) Absolom’s and Jaymareion’s testimony regarding Appellant’s

¶236sexually derogatory comments about Marjorie; (4) and Absolom’s

¶237and Jaymareion’s testimony about the incident on the trail involving

¶238Appellant and a BB gun.

¶239 Appellant has failed to prove that his trial counsel acted

¶240deficiently in choosing not to object to this testimony. “Reasonable

¶241 14 trial strategy and tactics do not amount to ineffective assistance of

¶242counsel.” Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 860, 866 (849 SE2d 191) (2020)

¶243(citation and punctuation omitted). “[M]erely arguing that there is

¶244another, or even a better, way for counsel to have performed” is not

¶245enough. Id. at 867 (citation and punctuation omitted).

¶246 Here, at the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel

¶247explained his trial strategy. He sought to show that Appellant was

¶248a loving and interested father who was at Reed’s home for peaceful

¶249purposes and that the shooting would never have occurred but for

¶250the aggression of Dre’Landon. The prior confrontations and

¶251incidences of violence between Appellant and members of

¶252Dre’Landon’s family supported the defense’s theory that the bad

¶253blood between the parties contributed to Appellant’s reasonable fear

¶254of them, which in turn supported his claim of self-defense. Given

¶255trial counsel’s “founded, reasonable belief that [Appellant] was best

¶256served by using this evidence to his advantage instead of objecting

¶257to it, counsel’s decision amounted to reasonable trial strategy that

¶258does not constitute deficient performance.” Griffin, 309 Ga. at 867.

¶259 15  Further, as to Reed’s comment that Appellant had beaten

¶260Marjorie, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that trial

¶261counsel’s failure to object was reasonable trial strategy. When asked

¶262at trial whether Reed moved her family out of Roswell because of

¶263Appellant, Reed explained:

¶264 Well, it was mainly because of her being involved with him because she was running off, she was staying with him. They were at a hotel there in Roswell. And I even went to that person and asked them to let me know if they find her. Then I was informed that she had been beat up by him.

¶265The prosecutor immediately stopped Reed saying, “I don’t want to

¶266go into any of that, okay,” redirecting her to identify whether

¶267Appellant was the person she had just explained Marjorie was

¶268running off with.

¶269 At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel explained

¶270that he did not object to Reed’s comment because Reed had been

¶271promptly stopped and redirected by the prosecutor and that he

¶272believed it best not to object to this off-hand comment so as to not

¶273draw further attention to it. Appellant has failed to show that this

¶274 16 was an unreasonable strategic decision that constituted deficient

¶275performance. See Durham v. State, 292 Ga. 239, 242 (734 SE2d 377)

¶276(2012) (concluding that trial counsel was not deficient for

¶277intentionally failing to object to brief, harmful testimony so as not

¶278to draw attention to it). Accordingly, Appellant has failed to

¶279demonstrate that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

¶280 3. Appellant claims that the harm of the alleged cumulative

¶281errors by the trial court and trial counsel must be assessed under

¶282State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17-18 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). As explained

¶283above, however, there are not multiple errors from which to assess

¶284cumulative harm. See Cox v. State, 306 Ga. 736, 743 (832 SE2d 354)

¶285(2019) (“[W]e evaluate only the effects of matters determined to be

¶286error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors.” (citation and

¶287punctuation omitted)).

¶288 4. Finally, Appellant argues that the case must be remanded

¶289for reconsideration of his motion for immunity because the trial

¶290court wrongly considered his duty and failure to retreat as a ground

¶291for denying him immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. We disagree.

¶292 17  “A person is justified in threatening or using force against

¶293another when and to the extent that he . . . reasonably believes that

¶294such threat or force is necessary to defend himself . . . against such

¶295other’s imminent use of unlawful force[.]” OCGA § 16-3-21 (a).

¶296Likewise, a person is justified in using deadly force only if he

¶297“reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or

¶298great bodily injury to himself[.]” Id. In defending himself, he “has no

¶299duty to retreat and has the right to stand his . . . ground and use

¶300force as provided in [OCGA § 16-3-21], including deadly force.”

¶301OCGA § 16-3-23.1. If his use of force falls within these parameters,

¶302he “shall be immune from criminal prosecution.” OCGA § 16-3-24.2.

¶303 To avoid trial, a defendant bears the burden of proof to show

¶304that he is entitled to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence.

¶305See Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 413 (667 SE2d 605) (2008). On

¶306appeal, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial

¶307court’s ruling, and the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility

¶308determinations are accepted if there is any evidence to support

¶309them. See Hipp v. State, 293 Ga. 415, 418 (746 SE2d 95) (2013).

¶310 18  Here, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion for

¶311immunity, weighed two competing versions of events, and

¶312determined that Appellant was not entitled to immunity. At the

¶313hearing, Appellant testified that after the Brown brothers became

¶314suspicious that Appellant was in the house, the Brown brothers

¶315loudly threatened Appellant as they stormed down the hall and

¶316forced their way into Marjorie’s room before discovering Appellant

¶317in the closet. When Appellant pointed his gun at the Brown brothers,

¶318Jaymareion told Appellant to put down the gun and fight. Then

¶319Dre’Landon informed Appellant that he was not the only one with a

¶320gun and left the room. Appellant then ran down the stairs and tried

¶321to go out the front door but could not get it unlocked. He heard

¶322Dre’Landon running down the stairs and saw him raise a gun

¶323toward him so Appellant shot him in self-defense before fleeing out

¶324the back door.

¶325 Jaymareion and Reed testified and denied Appellant’s version

¶326of events. They explained that the brothers had not been loud and

¶327threatening, that Dre’Landon did not leave the room, mention a gun,

¶328 19 or have one, and that Appellant never attempted to flee through the

¶329front door and also could have exited out the back door without

¶330shooting Dre’Landon.

¶331 In its order, the trial court laid out this testimony and

¶332explained that although “prior difficulties” between Appellant and

¶333members of Dre’Landon’s family could have given Appellant “a

¶334reasonable fear of further violence . . . in general[,]” Appellant based

¶335“his need to shoot Dre’Landon on the fact that he could not get out

¶336of the front door, which gave Dre’Landon, armed with a gun, time to

¶337get downstairs and confront him.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial

¶338court then explained that Appellant was able to leave Marjorie’s

¶339room, that “[n]o gun was found” near Dre’Landon, and that it found

¶340Jaymareion’s and Reed’s testimony that Dre’Landon did not have a

¶341gun more credible than Appellant’s version of events. This led the

¶342trial court to conclude:

¶343 [Appellant] has not proved to the [c]ourt by a preponderance of the evidence that he could not open the front door and that he shot to defend himself from an armed person. The [c]ourt does not discount all of the testimony presented by [Appellant] in this case, but finds

¶344 20  that [Appellant] had placed himself in a position to exit [] Reed’s home without further violence and elected to shoot the unarmed victim anyway. Thus, while there is evidence supporting [Appellant’s] claim for self-defense, the [c]ourt finds that [Appellant] has not carried his burden of proof for the purpose of obtaining immunity.

¶345(Emphasis supplied.)

¶346 In summary, the trial court concluded that Appellant’s claim

¶347of self-defense was founded on his testimony that he was unable to

¶348escape the armed, pursuing Dre’Landon. However, given that

¶349Appellant was able to leave Marjorie’s room unharmed and that the

¶350trial court did not credit Appellant’s testimony that Dre’Landon had

¶351a gun, the trial court concluded that Appellant failed to prove that

¶352he was in reasonable apprehension of fear of imminent death or

¶353great bodily injury from Dre’Landon in order to justify his use of

¶354deadly force. Given these findings, the trial court was authorized to

¶355find that Appellant failed to carry his burden to prove that he was

¶356entitled to immunity. See, e.g., Arnold v. State, 302 Ga. 129, 132 n.6

¶357(805 SE2d 94) (2017) (concluding that the trial court’s decision to

¶358deny motion for immunity was “wholly supported by [the court’s]

¶359 21 findings”).

¶360 Appellant argues, however, that the trial court’s repeated

¶361references to his failure to retreat undermine its denial of his motion

¶362for immunity by showing that the court improperly relied on

¶363Appellant’s failure to retreat. Although OCGA § 16-3-23.1 “clearly

¶364provides that a person who is authorized to use force to defend

¶365himself is under no obligation to retreat, regardless of whether

¶366retreating may have been a more reasonable option,” Arnold, 302

¶367Ga. at 132 n.6, as we have concluded above, the evidence supported

¶368the trial court’s determination that Dre’Landon was unarmed and

¶369that Appellant was not authorized to use force to defend himself

¶370under the circumstances. See id. Therefore, the trial court’s

¶371references to Appellant’s failure to retreat did not prejudice him and

¶372provide no basis for reversing the denial of immunity. See id.

¶373 Judgment affirmed. Nahmias, C. J., and Peterson, Warren, Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, and LaGrua, JJ., concur.

¶374 22