¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: August 10, 2021
¶3 S21A0709. THORNTON v. THE STATE.
¶4 PETERSON, Justice.
¶5 William Denzel Thornton appeals his convictions for malice
¶6murder, armed robbery, and possession of a knife during the
¶7commission of a felony in connection with the stabbing death of
¶8Jullisa Cooke.1 Thornton argues that the evidence was insufficient
¶9to support his armed robbery conviction; the trial court made
¶10evidentiary errors by admitting a 911 call and testimony regarding
¶11 1 The crimes occurred on January 10, 2017. In February 2017, a Carroll County grand jury indicted Thornton for malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated battery, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. At a March 2018 trial, a jury found Thornton guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Thornton to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, a concurrent life sentence for armed robbery, and a five-year consecutive term for the knife-possession charge; the remaining counts were vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes. Thornton filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Thornton’s motion for new trial. Thornton timely appealed; his case was docketed to this Court’s April 2021 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. bloodstain pattern analysis; and the trial court erred in denying his
¶12request for a continuance, made during trial, so he could attempt to
¶13access potentially exculpatory evidence on Cooke’s Facebook
¶14account. We affirm because the evidence was sufficient for the jury
¶15to conclude that Thornton was guilty of armed robbery; the trial
¶16court’s evidentiary errors, if any, were harmless; and Thornton has
¶17failed to establish that the trial court erred in denying his request
¶18for a continuance.
¶19 Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
¶20trial evidence showed the following. In January 2017, Cooke was
¶21living with her aunt and uncle, Gail and Kimani Kimathi, in Carroll
¶22County. Thornton lived with Eddie and Courtney Ford. In early
¶23January, Cooke and Thornton broke up after dating for most of 2016.
¶24Prior to breaking up, Thornton had become upset because Cooke’s
¶25ex-boyfriend, Trey, had contacted her, and Thornton believed Cooke
¶26was encouraging Trey to call her. Trey had been physically abusive
¶27toward Cooke when they dated a few years prior.
¶28 Thornton asked Cooke to resume their relationship, but she
¶29 2 refused and thereafter blocked Thornton from being able to call or
¶30text her. Thornton sent Gail text messages in an attempt to talk to
¶31Cooke. Gail responded that Cooke said that she did not want
¶32Thornton calling her. Cooke confided in Gail that Thornton had been
¶33abusive during their relationship.
¶34 On the morning of January 10, 2017, several neighbors saw a
¶35white, older-model Mercedes car with body damage parked in the
¶36street near Cooke’s house. Thornton drove such a car, and the body
¶37damage on the car observed that morning was consistent with body
¶38damage on Thornton’s car. One neighbor, Lynette Daniel, saw
¶39Thornton ringing Daniel’s doorbell several times, at one point
¶40jumping up and down. She also saw him wearing a tan or beige
¶41hooded sweatshirt and carrying something in his hands while
¶42walking between her home and the Kimathi residence. Daniel called
¶43Cooke to let her know that Thornton was outside and appeared to be
¶44agitated. Cooke replied that she was rushing to get to work and
¶45would talk to Thornton once she got outside.
¶46 Cooke’s sister, who lived next door with Daniel, also heard the
¶47 3 doorbell ring and saw Thornton’s white Mercedes parked outside.
¶48Cooke’s sister said that the car was gone by 8:05 a.m. Around this
¶49time, Thornton called Eddie to ask if Eddie was home, and Thornton
¶50returned home sometime later that morning.
¶51 Around 9:00 a.m., Kimani was leaving his house for work when
¶52he saw an envelope on the ground near the driver’s side of Cooke’s
¶53car. After he bent down to see if anything else had blown under the
¶54car, he saw Cooke slumped over in her car and blood spattered on
¶55the inside of the passenger’s side door. Kimani called 911.
¶56Meanwhile, Daniel looked for a pulse and found no signs of life from
¶57Cooke. An autopsy revealed that Cooke had been stabbed 55 times,
¶58and that stab wounds penetrated multiple organs, leading to her
¶59death.
¶60 While police officers were on the scene, Daniel received two
¶61video calls from Cooke’s cell phone. Police realized that Cooke’s
¶62phone was missing and directed Daniel not to answer the calls; the
¶63police believed Cooke’s killer had the phone and feared the killer
¶64would realize the police had been called and destroy the phone,
¶65 4 ending any ability to locate it. Police officers then went to the
¶66townhome complex where Thornton was residing to search for
¶67Cooke’s cell phone. Police officers began looking inside dumpsters
¶68outside the complex, called the phone, and heard Cooke’s cell phone
¶69vibrate from inside a trash bag.
¶70 The officers retrieved the cell phone, which had a shattered
¶71screen, and also found inside the trash bag a gray hooded sweatshirt
¶72with a large amount of blood on it, gray sweatpants, a pair of bloody
¶73gloves, a knife with blood on the blade, and paper towels. A DNA
¶74analysis revealed the presence of Cooke’s DNA on the knife, the
¶75gloves, and the sweatshirt. Cooke’s stab wounds were consistent
¶76with being stabbed with the recovered knife. Courtney testified that
¶77the recovered sweatshirt, which had buttons at the top, was similar
¶78to the type of sweatshirt Thornton wore. The pair of gloves were the
¶79type issued to Thornton by his employer. Additionally, the paper
¶80towels found in the trash bag had a pattern consistent with the kind
¶81found inside Thornton’s residence.
¶82 5 1. Thornton does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
¶83related to his murder or knife-possession convictions, but he does
¶84argue that the evidence was insufficient to support his armed
¶85robbery conviction. Thornton was charged with taking Cooke’s cell
¶86phone by the use of a knife, and he argues that there was no evidence
¶87showing when or how Thornton obtained the cell phone, meaning
¶88there were various possibilities as to how he came to possess the
¶89phone that did not involve armed robbery. We disagree because the
¶90jury was entitled to reject these other possibilities and find him
¶91guilty of armed robbery.
¶92 When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of
¶93federal due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
¶94States Constitution, the proper standard of review is whether a
¶95rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
¶96reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt
¶972781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Under that standard, we view the
¶98evidence in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with deference
¶99to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the
¶100 6 evidence.” Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013)
¶101(citation and punctuation omitted).
¶102 Under Georgia law, “[a] person commits the offense of armed
¶103robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes property
¶104of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by
¶105use of an offensive weapon[.]” OCGA § 16-8-41 (a). To convict
¶106Thornton, the State had to prove that his use of the knife occurred
¶107prior to or contemporaneously with the taking of Cooke’s cell phone.
¶108See Bates v. State, 293 Ga. 855, 857 (2) (750 SE2d 323) (2013); Fox
¶109v. State, 289 Ga. 34, 36 (1) (b) (709 SE2d 202) (2011).
¶110 Because there is no direct evidence that Thornton committed
¶111the armed robbery, to sustain his conviction based on circumstantial
¶112evidence, the evidence must be “consistent with the hypothesis of
¶113guilt” and “exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of
¶114the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. But not every hypothesis
¶115is reasonable, and it is for the jury to determine whether an
¶116alternative hypothesis is reasonable. See Johnson v. State, 307 Ga.
¶11744, 48 (2) (834 SE2d 83) (2019). Where the jury is authorized to find
¶118 7 the evidence sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save
¶119that of the accused’s guilt, this Court “will not disturb that finding
¶120unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.” Id.
¶121 The evidence was sufficient for the jury to have found that
¶122Thornton had a knife and that he used the knife to take Cooke’s cell
¶123phone away from her before killing her, or that he took the phone
¶124right after killing her. Under either scenario, Thornton would be
¶125guilty of armed robbery. See Johnson, 307 Ga. at 49 (2) (b)
¶126(defendant would be guilty of armed robbery if he took victim’s
¶127property after brandishing weapon); Bates, 293 Ga. at 857 (2) (“It is
¶128well-settled that a defendant commits a robbery if he kills the victim
¶129first and then takes the victim’s property.” (citation and punctuation
¶130omitted)). Thornton argues that the evidence did not exclude other
¶131reasonable theories that he did not commit armed robbery. But the
¶132jury was entitled to reject Thornton’s hypotheses as unreasonable.
¶133 Thornton first argues that Cooke could have handed the
¶134assailant her phone voluntarily and that an altercation ensued after
¶135the assailant looked at her phone. But the evidence supports a
¶136 8 finding that Thornton was carrying a knife at the time he
¶137encountered Cooke outside her home. On the morning of Cooke’s
¶138death, Daniel saw Thornton carrying something in his hands and
¶139walking in an agitated manner. When Daniel called Cooke to tell her
¶140about Thornton’s presence, Cooke said she was in a rush to get to
¶141work. According to Cooke’s aunt, Cooke had been refusing
¶142Thornton’s calls and asked that he not call her anymore. This
¶143evidence shows that Cooke wanted nothing to do with Thornton, and
¶144that the jury was authorized to conclude that she would not have
¶145voluntarily handed her phone over to Thornton, as he suggests.
¶146 Thornton next argues that, even if Cooke did not hand over the
¶147phone voluntarily, the evidence could have supported a finding that
¶148he took the phone by force without displaying the knife. But
¶149Thornton was described as being in an agitated state while lurking
¶150outside of Cooke’s house before she went outside. Because, as
¶151described above, the evidence showed that Thornton was carrying
¶152something during the time he was in an agitated state, the jury was
¶153entitled to find that Thornton was carrying a knife and that it was
¶154 9 very unlikely that he put the weapon away before encountering
¶155Cooke given his agitated state.
¶156 Thornton lastly argues that the State failed to prove that he
¶157intended to commit the armed robbery. The State could prove intent
¶158based on all of the circumstances connected to the offense, and it was
¶159the jury’s responsibility to determine whether the State met its
¶160burden. See OCGA § 16-2-6 (“A person will not be presumed to act
¶161with criminal intention but the trier of facts may find such intention
¶162upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all
¶163other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is
¶164prosecuted.”); see also Thomas v. State, 320 Ga. App. 101, 104 (2)
¶165(739 SE2d 417) (2013) (“The presence or lack of criminal intent is for
¶166the jury to decide based on the facts and circumstances proven at
¶167trial.”). The jury was authorized based on all of the evidence to
¶168conclude that Thornton had the intent to rob Cooke and find him
¶169guilty of armed robbery.
¶170 2. Thornton argues that the trial court erred by admitting into
¶171evidence a recording of Kimani’s 911 call and testimony from a GBI
¶172 10 agent regarding bloodstain pattern analysis. We need not decide
¶173whether the trial court erred in admitting the evidence, because any
¶174such error was harmless.
¶175 Erroneous evidentiary rulings warrant reversal only if the
¶176error was harmful. See Moore v. State, 307 Ga. 290, 293 (2) (835
¶177SE2d 610) (2019). For nonconstitutional rulings like those at issue
¶178here, the test for determining whether an error was harmless is
¶179whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the
¶180verdict. See Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 431-432 (2) (d) (788 SE2d
¶181433) (2016). In conducting that analysis, we review the record de
¶182novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors
¶183to have done. See id. at 432 (2) (d).
¶184 As to the 911 call, Thornton argues that the recording did not
¶185have any probative value because Kimani already testified about the
¶186substance of his 911 call and the recording was presented only to
¶187show Kimani’s grief, which Thornton argues served only to inflame
¶188the jury’s passions. But as Thornton concedes, the 911 call was
¶189largely cumulative of Kimani’s testimony. And the evidence of
¶190 11 Thornton’s guilt was very strong. Thornton was seen outside Cooke’s
¶191residence on the morning of her death, and a bloody knife, a bloody
¶192hooded sweatshirt similar to the type he wore, and bloody gloves of
¶193the kind his employer furnished to its employees, all of which tested
¶194positive for the presence of Cooke’s DNA, were found together with
¶195Cooke’s cell phone in a trash bag outside Thornton’s residence
¶196shortly after Cooke’s murder. Given this strong evidence and the
¶197cumulative nature of the 911 call, which Thornton notes fails to
¶198show any of the circumstances of the killing, it is highly probable
¶199that the error did not contribute to the verdicts. See Virger v. State,
¶200305 Ga. 281, 294 (7) (a) (824 SE2d 346) (2019) (the admission of
¶201other-acts evidence was harmless where it was cumulative of other
¶202evidence and the evidence of guilt was strong); see also Anglin v.
¶203State, 302 Ga. 333, 336 (2) (806 SE2d 573) (2017) (the erroneous
¶204admission of hearsay evidence is harmless where “substantial,
¶205cumulative, legally admissible evidence of the same fact is
¶206introduced”).
¶207 12 As to the bloodstain pattern analysis evidence, the disputed
¶208testimony concerned a GBI agent’s opinion as to how a certain
¶209bloodstain was formed. But this evidence had little, if any,
¶210prejudicial impact. There was no dispute that Cooke was stabbed
¶211numerous times, resulting in multiple bloodstains. The GBI agent’s
¶212analysis of the bloodstain at issue did not provide any evidence of
¶213Thornton’s guilt. Given that the complained of evidence did not
¶214implicate Thornton, the jury was aware that Cooke’s multiple
¶215stabbings would have caused several bloodstains, and the evidence
¶216of Thornton’s guilt was strong, any error in admitting the GBI
¶217agent’s testimony about the bloodstain pattern analysis was
¶218harmless. See Robinson v. State, 308 Ga. 543, 550 (2) (b) (i) (842
¶219SE2d 54) (2020) (admission of video recording of arrest was
¶220harmless where the jury was aware that the defendant had been
¶221arrested and the evidence of guilt was strong).2
¶222 2 Thornton makes no argument that all the evidentiary errors we assume today, though individually harmless, nevertheless harmed him when considered cumulatively, and no such cumulative prejudice is apparent to us on this record. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 18 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (“[A]
¶223 13 3. Thornton argues that the trial court erred in denying his
¶224request for a continuance so he could access Cooke’s Facebook
¶225account. Thornton has not shown that the trial court abused its
¶226discretion.
¶227 Prior to trial, the State obtained a data extraction of Cooke’s
¶228cell phone and provided extracted information ⸺ text messages and
¶229call logs ⸺ to Thornton, but the defense complained at trial that the
¶230extraction did not produce information from applications like
¶231Facebook. After Cooke’s cell phone was tendered into evidence at
¶232trial, defense counsel asked that the phone be connected to the
¶233internet so that he could access Cooke’s Facebook application, based
¶234on Thornton’s belief that the application contained evidence of abuse
¶235and threats from Cooke’s ex-boyfriends. Defense counsel said he
¶236believed there was “potentially Brady[ 3] material” in Cooke’s
¶237Facebook application because Thornton had seen Cooke’s Facebook
¶238defendant who wishes to take advantage of the [cumulative error rule] should explain to the reviewing court just how he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of multiple errors.”). 3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963).
¶239 14 content before, although counsel conceded that there might not be
¶240any exculpatory evidence. Defense counsel stated that he was
¶241unable to access that information through other means, because
¶242Thornton did not have access to Facebook while incarcerated, and
¶243counsel had not attempted to access Cooke’s phone previously
¶244because the cell phone was damaged when police initially recovered
¶245it, and he was unaware that the State had since repaired it. The
¶246State argued that Thornton would have to follow a legal process to
¶247obtain permission to access information on Cooke’s Facebook
¶248account, noting that the State would typically send Facebook a letter
¶249to preserve information and then seek a search warrant to get access
¶250to a user’s account.
¶251 Based on the State’s representations, and a review of federal
¶252statutes pertaining to accessing digitally-stored information, the
¶253trial court denied Thornton’s request to use Cooke’s cell phone to
¶254access the Facebook application, concluding that for Brady
¶255purposes, Thornton had knowledge of the information he was
¶256 15 seeking. Thornton then asked for a continuance to subpoena the
¶257Facebook records, which the court denied.
¶258 Thornton now argues on appeal that the trial court erred in
¶259denying his request for a continuance, stating that he should have
¶260been given an opportunity to collect more information through
¶261Facebook on “Trey,” Cooke’s ex-boyfriend who previously abused
¶262her, and present evidence that he could have used to cross-examine
¶263witnesses. He argues that the trial court’s denial amounted to a
¶264Brady violation.
¶265 A trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying a
¶266motion for continuance. See OCGA § 17-8-22. A party making a
¶267request for a continuance must show due diligence. See OCGA § 17-
¶2688-20. We will not disturb a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for
¶269continuance without a clear showing that the court abused its broad
¶270discretion. See Phoenix v. State, 304 Ga. 785, 788 (2) (822 SE2d 195)
¶271(2018). And for Thornton to show that he was entitled to a new trial
¶272based upon the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance,
¶273he must show that he was harmed by that denial. See id.
¶274 16 Thornton has not shown that the trial court abused its
¶275discretion or that he was harmed by the court’s ruling. In arguing
¶276for access to Cooke’s cell phone, Thornton stated that he had seen
¶277threatening messages from Cooke’s ex-boyfriend Trey on Cooke’s
¶278Facebook account. Although Thornton claimed that he (and defense
¶279counsel) attempted to access those records, he does not explain why
¶280the method he claimed he needed a continuance to pursue ⸺
¶281subpoenaing the records ⸺ was unavailable to him prior to trial,
¶282precluding his ability to show that he was diligent in accessing
¶283information on Cooke’s Facebook account.
¶284 Moreover, Thornton has not shown harm from the denial of the
¶285requested continuance. Thornton conceded several times that the
¶286purportedly threatening Facebook messages might not even be
¶287stored in Cooke’s Facebook account. Thornton never provided any
¶288evidence to support his claim that Cooke’s Facebook account
¶289contained Brady material. At the motion for new trial hearing,
¶290Thornton merely restated arguments from trial but did not present
¶291any evidence or otherwise substantiate his claim that Cooke’s
¶292 17 Facebook account actually contained relevant Brady material. The
¶293jury already heard that Trey had physically abused Cooke when
¶294they dated, so Thornton had available evidence with which to argue
¶295that someone else could have committed the crimes. Although he
¶296argues that accessing the Facebook information would have allowed
¶297him to cross-examine witnesses, he does not identify what witnesses
¶298he could have cross-examined more thoroughly or explain how the
¶299cross-examination he did conduct was inadequate.4
¶300 By failing to substantiate his claim that Cooke’s Facebook
¶301account had Brady material and by failing to specify how that
¶302material would have mattered, Thornton’s claim of harm is nothing
¶303but conjecture, and “mere speculation and conjecture that harm
¶304occurred is not enough to show harmful error.” Wainwright v. State,
¶305305 Ga. 63, 67-68 (2) (823 SE2d 749) (2019). Because Thornton only
¶306speculates that he was harmed, and there was strong evidence of
¶307 4To the extent he alludes to his cross-examination of Gail, who testified that Cooke confided in her that Trey had physically abused her, Gail testified that she did not recall whether Cooke told her that Thornton had been upset because Trey had physically threatened Cooke prior to her death. 18 Thornton’s guilt, this claim of error fails. See id. (defendant failed to
¶308show harm from trial court’s denial of a continuance to wait for lead
¶309counsel’s arrival where defendant pointed to no error in co-counsel’s
¶310performance during lead counsel’s absence or deficiency in lead
¶311counsel’s performance based on his absence); Phoenix, 304 Ga. at
¶312788-789 (2) (defendant failed to show harm from denial of
¶313continuance to obtain expert to evaluate certain evidence when the
¶314evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no showing of
¶315how expert’s testimony would have benefitted his defense).
¶316 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., not participating.
¶317 19