Ellis v. State

¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia

¶2 Decided: August 10, 2021

¶3 S21A0780. ELLIS v. THE STATE.

¶4 ELLINGTON, Justice.

¶5 A Walker County jury found Robert William Ellis guilty of

¶6malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting

¶7death of Jeremy Little.1 Ellis contends the trial court erred by

¶8 1 The shooting occurred on March 8, 2017. A Walker County grand jury indicted Ellis on October 3, 2017, for malice murder, felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault (as to Little and Julie Woody), first degree criminal damage to property, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, two counts of criminal trespass, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Ellis’s trial commenced on June 4, 2018. The jury found him guilty on all counts except the aggravated assault of Woody. Instead, the jury found Ellis guilty of the lesser offense of pointing a gun at Woody. The trial court sentenced Ellis to life in prison without parole for malice murder. The court imposed concurrent 12-month sentences for pointing a gun at another and both counts of criminal trespass. The court also imposed the following sentences to run consecutive to the murder sentence: criminal damage to property (10 years), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (five years), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (five years). The court purportedly merged the remaining convictions, though the felony murder count was actually vacated by operation of law. See Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 53 (2) (766 SE2d 1) (2014). Ellis filed a motion for new trial on June 21, 2018, which he subsequently amended. Following a hearing held on July 19, 2019, the trial admitting into evidence his custodial statement, arguing that his

¶9statement was made while he was too intoxicated to waive his

¶10Miranda 2 rights. Ellis also contends that his trial counsel was

¶11ineffective because she did not object when a State’s witness testified

¶12about what a surveillance video allegedly showed, which Ellis

¶13argues invaded the province of the jury. For the following reasons,

¶14we discern no error and affirm the judgment of conviction.

¶15 The evidence presented at trial showed that, on March 8, 2017,

¶16Ellis shot and killed Little after Little had allegedly damaged Ellis’s

¶171966 Mustang. The shooting was captured on home surveillance

¶18video. Ellis did not deny shooting Little; rather, his defense at trial

¶19was that he struck Little with a gun when Little lunged at him with

¶20a knife, and that the gun went off accidentally, resulting in Little’s

¶21death. The shooting was preceded by a series of events that angered

¶22both Ellis and Little.

¶23court denied Ellis’s motion for a new trial. Ellis filed a notice of appeal on August 12, 2019, and this case was docketed to the April 2021 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

¶24 2  Amanda Jenkins testified that, on the afternoon before the

¶25shooting, she encountered Ellis sitting in his white pick-up truck

¶26near the home of a mutual friend. Jenkins asked Ellis to give her a

¶27ride to her father’s home, and he agreed. During the drive, Ellis

¶28showed Jenkins two different guns, and he complained that his

¶29drugs were missing and that whoever took them “was going to lose

¶30their life.” Ellis briefly stopped at a store to let Jenkins buy some

¶31cigarettes. While in the store, Jenkins saw her friend, Julie Woody,

¶32who was engaged to Little. When Ellis repeatedly called Jenkins on

¶33her cell phone, Jenkins left the store. When Woody finished

¶34shopping and walked out to the parking lot, she saw Jenkins sitting

¶35in the passenger seat of a white truck. When Woody walked toward

¶36the truck, Ellis, who was bent over outside of the truck, turned

¶37around abruptly and pointed a large handgun at her. Ellis told

¶38Woody not to walk up on him like that.

¶39 Afraid, Woody asked Jenkins if she would ride home with her

¶40in her truck, and Jenkins agreed. When the women arrived at

¶41Woody’s home, Little was there. Jenkins told Little that Ellis had

¶42 3 pointed a gun at Woody. Upon hearing Jenkins’s account of what

¶43had happened, Little got very upset and angry. He told Woody not

¶44to call the police, that he would “handle it.” Little gave Jenkins a

¶45ride home at about 6:40 p.m.

¶46 Around 7:30 p.m., Ellis called the police to report that someone

¶47had damaged his 1966 Ford Mustang. That evening, Ellis posted a

¶48status on Facebook that read, “Jeremy Little[,] I want you to know

¶49that [damaging my] ’66 Mustang’s windshield and cutting all four

¶50tires and running away was your biggest mistake in your life. I’m

¶51coming.” Then, in the comments section of the post, Ellis wrote that

¶52he was “pissed” and that Little was “stupid.”

¶53 Woody’s landlord, who lived next door to Woody, had

¶54surveillance cameras set up that pointed toward the front and back

¶55doors of Woody’s home. At 7:54 a.m. on March 8, the surveillance

¶56system recorded Ellis parking his white truck in front of Woody’s

¶57home. The video showed Ellis get out of his truck, repeatedly swing

¶58something at Little’s truck, throw something through the back

¶59window of the house, fire a gun into the back door, and then leave.

¶60 4 Woody woke when she heard gunshots and loud noises that sounded

¶61as if the “house was falling in.” Woody testified that, while she ran

¶62to check on her mother and brother, who slept in the front rooms of

¶63the house, Little ran outside. When he came back inside, he was

¶64angry, cursing, and saying that Ellis had just shot up the house and

¶65his truck.

¶66 After the morning’s events, Ellis posted on Facebook: “Hey

¶67[Little,] who must’ve been the stupidest fool ever lived knowing

¶68police [and] road blocks ain’t going stop me[.] . . . [C]ome back here

¶69you fool so I can have life instead of death by injection knowing you

¶70ain’t going to be [there] to see it.” He also wrote that he was “going

¶71to give [the emergency] room its next patient.”

¶72 At 1:16 p.m., while Woody and Little were resting in bed, Ellis

¶73returned to Woody’s home. He was armed with a handgun that he

¶74had purchased that morning. Woody noticed someone walk by

¶75outside her bedroom window, and Little went outside through the

¶76back door to investigate. The surveillance video showed Little

¶77emerging from his back door. Little stood motionless as Ellis

¶78 5 approached him and struck him in the head with a handgun and

¶79shot him in the face. Woody testified that, as she rose to follow Little

¶80outside, she heard a gunshot. Woody ran to the back door, where she

¶81found Little lying on the ground with a gunshot wound to his jaw.

¶82Ellis stood nearby with a gun in his hand. Ellis told Woody that he

¶83did not want to kill Little, then fled. Woody saw Little’s pocketknife

¶84lying open on his abdomen. She handed the knife to her mother, who

¶85had also come outside, and then Woody held Little until the

¶86paramedics arrived. Little died as a result of the gunshot wound.

¶87 An officer with the Rossville Police Department responded to

¶88Woody’s house. When he arrived, he found Woody, who was

¶89distraught, just outside the back door, holding Little. The officer

¶90secured the house for a detective, who arrived shortly thereafter.

¶91The detective observed that Woody’s house and Little’s truck had

¶92been damaged. Woody told the detective that Ellis shot Little. While

¶93the detective investigated the crime scene, the officer went to Ellis’s

¶94house, but Ellis wasn’t there. The officer observed that Ellis’s

¶95Mustang, which had been loaded onto a wrecker, had a broken

¶96 6 windshield and flat tires. After the officer photographed the

¶97Mustang, he drove to a nearby mobile home park, where Ellis had

¶98been seen, and arrested him.

¶99 After Ellis was arrested, the police took him to the Rossville

¶100Police Department, where he was read his Miranda rights and

¶101interviewed. The lead detective and an agent with the Georgia

¶102Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”) conducted the interview. During the

¶103video-recorded interview, Ellis admitted that he had purchased a

¶104handgun that morning, and that he intended to carry that handgun

¶105when he confronted Little for damaging his Mustang. He also

¶106admitted that he had damaged Little’s truck with a baseball bat,

¶107damaged the windows of Woody’s home, and kicked the back door.

¶108Ellis said that he encountered Little outside Woody’s home, and that

¶109Little swung a knife at him. Ellis said he reacted by hitting Little in

¶110the head with the gun, which he said accidentally discharged.

¶111 A GBI crime scene investigator testified that he processed the

¶112scene of the shooting. He recovered three spent .45-caliber shell

¶113casings from the front of the house, and two from the back. He saw

¶114 7 a footprint on Woody’s back door and noted that the door appeared

¶115to have cracked from a forceful kick. He also saw a small circular

¶116defect below the knob on the door that appeared to be a bullet hole.

¶117The investigator found a bullet behind the door. He also noted

¶118extensive damage to Little’s truck, and he found a baseball bat in

¶119the truck’s bed.

¶120 Ellis’s .45-caliber Hi-Point pistol was seized from his

¶121impounded truck and submitted to the GBI for ballistics testing,

¶122along with the shell casings recovered from the scene of the shooting.

¶123A GBI firearms examiner determined that the five shell casings

¶124collected from the scene were fired from Ellis’s pistol. The firearms

¶125examiner testified that the pistol had four separate safety

¶126mechanisms. His forensic tests revealed that the pistol would not

¶127fire without pressure being applied to the trigger, and that the pistol

¶128and its safety mechanisms were functioning properly.

¶129 On March 9, the day after the shooting, a detention deputy

¶130with the Walker County Sheriff’s Office walked by Ellis’s cell. The

¶131deputy testified that Ellis told him that he “didn’t have a choice, he

¶132 8 had to kill” Little because Little had a knife.

¶133 A GBI medical examiner testified that Little had multiple

¶134injuries to his head. He had a laceration and patterned abrasions on

¶135his forehead that the examiner opined would have required “pretty

¶136significant force to split the skin and leave those marginal abrasions

¶137like a pattern.” Little also had a gunshot wound to his cheek with

¶138gunpowder residue and stippling around it, indicating that the

¶139weapon had been fired “within a few inches” of Little’s face.

¶140 1. Ellis contends that, because he was under the influence of

¶141drugs when the detective explained his Miranda rights at the

¶142beginning of his custodial interview, his purported waiver of those

¶143rights was not voluntary. Therefore, he argues, the trial court erred

¶144by admitting the video-recording of the interview and the detective’s

¶145testimony concerning statements Ellis made during the interview. 3

¶146As explained below, this claim of error is without merit.

¶147 3 Ellis does not challenge the admission of his statement on the ground that it was involuntary under the constitutional due process standard, and so we do not address that issue. See Dozier v. State, 306 Ga. 29, 36 (4) (c) (829 SE2d 131) (2019). 9  “To use a defendant’s custodial statements in its case-in-chief,

¶148the State must show that the defendant was advised of his Miranda

¶149rights and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived

¶150them.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hinkson v. State, 310

¶151Ga. 388, 400 (5) (b) (850 SE2d 41) (2020). A trial court, in assessing

¶152whether a defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary,

¶153knowing, and intelligent, “must consider the totality of the

¶154circumstances to determine whether the defendant’s waiver was

¶155free of intimidation and coercion and whether the waiver was made

¶156with a full awareness of both the nature of the rights being

¶157abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon them.”

¶158(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wells v. State, 307 Ga. 773, 776

¶159(2) (838 SE2d 242) (2020). An appellate court generally reviews a

¶160trial court’s factual findings and determinations of credibility for

¶161clear error; however, “where controlling facts are not in dispute,

¶162such as those facts discernible from a videotape, our review is de

¶163novo.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. Additionally,

¶164 the intoxication of the accused does not automatically

¶165 10  invalidate his or her waiver of Miranda rights. Intoxication, standing alone, does not render a statement inadmissible. If the evidence is sufficient to establish that the defendant’s statement was the product of rational intellect and free will, it may be admitted even if the defendant was intoxicated when he made the statement.

¶166(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. 59,

¶16764 (2) (829 SE2d 81) (2019).

¶168 Before trial, the trial court held a Jackson-Denno 4 hearing. The

¶169lead detective testified during the hearing, and the State provided

¶170the court with a transcript of the detective’s custodial interview with

¶171Ellis. The detective testified that he advised Ellis of his Miranda

¶172rights prior to interviewing him, and the video-recording of the

¶173interview shows the detective reading those rights to Ellis from a

¶174pre-printed form. The detective asked Ellis several times whether

¶175he understood the rights that he was waiving, and Ellis nodded and

¶176answered “yeah.” The detective also asked Ellis if he had any

¶177questions, and Ellis answered “no.” Ellis said that he wanted to

¶178explain what happened. He initialed each of the individual rights on

¶179 4 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 11 the form read to him, and he signed it at the bottom, indicating that

¶180he understood the rights he was waiving. The detective asked Ellis

¶181if he was using any drugs, and Ellis responded that he had “smoked

¶182a little pot and hit a bowl of meth” about an hour before his arrest.

¶183Ellis admitted that he smoked meth daily and used marijuana

¶184frequently.

¶185 The video-recording of the interview shows that Ellis was able

¶186to walk, stand, sit, speak, and answer questions without any

¶187apparent problem. He did not appear to be under the influence to

¶188the extent that he could not comprehend his rights or understand

¶189the consequences of their waiver. The detective testified that, based

¶190on his experience dealing with people who are under the influence

¶191of drugs, he was not concerned that Ellis’s drug use had impaired

¶192his decision to freely and voluntarily give a statement. During the

¶193interview, the detective sat just a few feet from Ellis and was able

¶194to observe him closely. Although Ellis was upset, agitated, and

¶195displayed a few indicia of intoxication (like dilated pupils), the

¶196detective said that he and Ellis were able to communicate with each

¶197 12 other without any problem. The detective testified that Ellis gave

¶198answers that were coherent and responsive to his questions, and

¶199nothing on the video-recording contradicts the detective’s testimony.

¶200During the hour-long interview, Ellis recounted his side of the story.

¶201He told the detective that he retaliated against Little for damaging

¶202his car, that he bought a pistol that morning because he was afraid

¶203of what Little and unnamed others might do to him, and that he

¶204believed he was protecting himself from people who might “burn his

¶205house down.” The detective testified that many of the details of

¶206Ellis’s account were consistent with what his investigation had so

¶207far revealed. When the detective pressed Ellis on whether he had

¶208planned to shoot Little, Ellis became upset, stopped the interview,

¶209and demanded a lawyer. Ellis accused the detective of trying to

¶210make him angry so that he would say something incriminating. Ellis

¶211stood, faced the wall, and put his hands behind his back, inviting the

¶212detective to handcuff him. The detective ended the interview.

¶213 Although the evidence supports that Ellis was impaired to

¶214some degree, “the [detective’s] testimony and the recorded interview

¶215 13 indicate that . . . [Ellis’s] mind was nevertheless clear enough to

¶216make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights and to speak to

¶217the [detective] without an attorney.” Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. at 64

¶218(2). Under these circumstances, the trial court’s decision to admit

¶219Ellis’s custodial statements was not clearly erroneous. See id.

¶220 2. Ellis also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for

¶221failing to object when the detective testified about what the

¶222surveillance video allegedly showed, which Ellis argues invaded the

¶223province of the jury. Specifically, Ellis contends that his trial counsel

¶224should have objected when the detective narrated the surveillance

¶225video, identifying Ellis and giving a “play-by-play” of what the video

¶226purportedly showed Ellis and Little doing. As explained below, this

¶227claim of error is without merit.

¶228 To succeed on this claim, Ellis must demonstrate both that his

¶229trial counsel performed in a constitutionally deficient manner and

¶230that, absent counsel’s deficient performance, a reasonable

¶231probability exists that the outcome at trial would have been

¶232different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-695 (III)

¶233 14 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If he fails to satisfy either part

¶234of this test, we need not consider the other. See Richards v. State,

¶235306 Ga. 779, 781 (2) (833 SE2d 96) (2019). To prove deficient

¶236performance, Ellis must show that trial counsel performed “in an

¶237objectively unreasonable way, considering all of the circumstances

¶238and in light of prevailing professional norms.” (Citation and

¶239punctuation omitted.) Reyes v. State, 309 Ga. 660, 669 (3) (847 SE2d

¶240194) (2020). “A strong presumption exists that counsel’s conduct

¶241falls within the broad range of professional conduct.” (Citation and

¶242punctuation omitted.) Id. “Thus, deficiency cannot be demonstrated

¶243by merely arguing that there is another, or even a better, way for

¶244counsel to have performed.” Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 144 (3) (829

¶245SE2d 321) (2019). Further, “[t]rial tactics and strategy . . . are almost

¶246never adequate grounds for finding trial counsel ineffective unless

¶247they are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would

¶248have chosen them.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McNair v.

¶249State, 296 Ga. 181, 184 (2) (b) (766 SE2d 45) (2014). For example, it

¶250may be “a sound defense strategy to minimize objections in an effort

¶251 15 to show the jury that the defense had nothing to hide.” Hartsfield v.

¶252State, 294 Ga. 883, 889 (3) (b) (757 SE2d 90) (2014).

¶253 During the hearing on Ellis’s motion for a new trial, his trial

¶254counsel testified that, given the overwhelming evidence against

¶255Ellis, including the video and eyewitness testimony as well as Ellis’s

¶256own admissions, her theory of defense was that Ellis did not intend

¶257to shoot Little. She hoped to secure a conviction for involuntary

¶258manslaughter based on Ellis’s contention that the gun discharged

¶259when he struck Little with it during their confrontation.5 Counsel

¶260believed she had a strong chance of successfully attacking the intent

¶261element of malice murder by focusing on that portion of the

¶262surveillance video where Ellis appeared surprised when his gun

¶263went off as well as those portions of his custodial statement where

¶264he said that he did not plan to shoot Little; rather, he only wanted

¶265to “smack” him with the gun “to scare him.”

¶266 Counsel also testified that she chose not to object to the

¶267 5 Defense counsel requested, and the trial court gave, jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter and battery. Counsel did not ask for, and the court did not give, a jury instruction on self-defense. 16 detective’s narration of the video because it did not hurt the defense

¶268theory and because it was largely consistent with Ellis’s account of

¶269events. Counsel believed that the video showed not only Ellis’s

¶270surprise, but also his immediate remorse and fear. Counsel believed

¶271that any attempt to limit the detective’s testimony might make the

¶272jury think the defense was hiding something. It would also prevent

¶273her from eliciting during cross-examination similar narration from

¶274the detective that favored Ellis. The trial transcript shows that

¶275counsel indeed went through the surveillance video with the

¶276detective on cross-examination, highlighting those moments where

¶277Little is holding a knife and, given the quality of the recording, it is

¶278impossible to see Little’s facial expression, which Ellis had described

¶279during his custodial interview as menacing. Counsel also asked the

¶280detective leading questions that served to narrate the video, such as:

¶281“And what we could see there Mr. Ellis was doing was grabbing his

¶282head in astonishment about what happened, right?”

¶283 In ruling on Ellis’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the

¶284trial court found that identification was not a disputed issue in the

¶285 17 case. The court also concluded that counsel was not ineffective, and

¶286that it was a reasonable strategy for trial counsel not to object to the

¶287detective’s narration under the circumstances. We discern no error

¶288in the court’s ruling, and, based on the foregoing, the record shows

¶289that trial counsel’s decision not to object to the detective’s narration

¶290of the surveillance video was a matter of reasonable trial strategy.

¶291See Starks v. State, 283 Ga. 164, 167-168 (6) (b) (656 SE2d 518)

¶292(2008). Because Ellis cannot show that his trial counsel acted

¶293deficiently, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See

¶294Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 870 (2) (734 SE2d 876) (2012).

¶295 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., not participating.

¶296 18