¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: September 8, 2021
¶3 S21A0811. LOGAN v. THE STATE.
¶4 BOGGS, Presiding Justice.
¶5 Appellant Carl Garland Logan challenges his 2017 convictions
¶6for malice murder and possession of a knife during the commission
¶7of a crime in connection with the stabbing and beating death of
¶8Anthony Glenn Olivet. Appellant’s sole enumeration of error is that
¶9the trial court violated his constitutional rights to confront his
¶10accusers by preventing him from playing for the jury certain audio-
¶11recorded statements that a prosecution witness made to law
¶12enforcement officers to impeach the witness on cross-examination.
¶13However, the record does not support this claim. Accordingly, we
¶14affirm. 1
¶15 1Olivet was killed sometime on the night of March 18 or early morning of March 19, 2012. On October 8, 2013, a Richmond County grand jury indicted 1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following.
¶16Appellant is from Danville, Virginia. On February 26, 2012, he went
¶17to a house in Danville to exchange drugs for sex. When the woman
¶18he started to have sex with said that she could not continue, he got
¶19Appellant for malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime. On August 21, 2017, at the outset of trial, Appellant waived his right to counsel, instead electing to represent himself. The trial court directed attorney Kelly Williamson, Appellant’s appointed counsel, to serve as Appellant’s standby counsel throughout the trial. On August 24, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges, and the court sentenced him to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and a consecutive term of five years for the knife possession charge; the felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. On September 7, Appellant filed a pro se motion for new trial. On September 20, Williamson filed both an entry of appearance as post-sentencing counsel for Appellant and another motion for new trial. On April 4, 2018, attorney Robert Beckwith filed a notice of substitution of counsel. On March 21, 2019, Beckwith filed an amended motion for new trial, and on April 2, Beckwith filed another amended motion for new trial. Appellant was incarcerated in Texas on unrelated charges, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion by videoconference. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 9.2 (A) (12) (authorizing superior courts to conduct “[p]ostsentencing proceedings in criminal cases” by videoconference). On May 23, the court entered an order denying the new trial motion. Beckwith filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was initially docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2019. See Case No. S20A0389. However, Beckwith then filed a motion to remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on Appellant’s request that Beckwith be removed as counsel and that Appellant be permitted to pursue his appeal pro se. On November 18, 2019, this Court entered an order granting the remand motion. On July 14, 2020, the trial court held a hearing by videoconference on Appellant’s request to represent himself on appeal. On July 16, the court entered an order finding that Appellant had not waived his right to counsel on appeal and directing Beckwith to continue representing Appellant. Beckwith then filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was re-docketed in this Court for the April 2021 term and submitted for decision on the briefs. 2 angry, retrieved a knife from the kitchen, and stabbed her in the
¶20back. He also threatened to kill the woman, and she fled. Appellant
¶21then attacked the woman’s roommate with a steak knife, stabbing
¶22her twice in the abdomen before plunging the knife so hard into her
¶23temple that the handle broke off and the blade had to be surgically
¶24removed from her face.
¶25 Two weeks later, Appellant’s brother told him that Appellant’s
¶26name had come up in connection with the stabbings, and Appellant
¶27decided to flee to Augusta, Georgia, where his older cousin Alvin
¶28Coleman lived. Soon after Appellant arrived in Augusta, he went to
¶29a convenience store with Coleman and met Coleman’s friend Olivet,
¶30who was panhandling outside. Olivet was known in the community
¶31as a peaceful and likeable person who was beset by both physical
¶32and mental disabilities. A local pastor and school superintendent,
¶33Joseph Boulineau, had previously helped Olivet get an apartment,
¶34and Appellant began staying there with Olivet.
¶35 On Sunday evening, March 18, Coleman took Olivet to get
¶36something to eat, and Olivet said that he was not getting along with
¶37 3 Appellant, because Appellant was “trying to take over his
¶38household” and overcharging him for cocaine. Appellant was still at
¶39Olivet’s apartment when Coleman took Olivet home. Coleman was
¶40disturbed by his conversation with Olivet and discussed it with his
¶41wife, and later that same night, Coleman drove back to Olivet’s
¶42apartment. On the way to Olivet’s apartment, Coleman saw
¶43Appellant walking down the road in the opposite direction.
¶44 At Olivet’s apartment, Coleman knocked on the door and the
¶45window, but there was no response. Coleman drove back the way he
¶46came, picked up Appellant, and asked him what had happened with
¶47Olivet. Appellant said that nothing had happened with Olivet but
¶48that he had decided to leave Augusta. Coleman thought that was a
¶49good idea and drove Appellant to the bus station downtown, where
¶50Appellant bought a ticket back to Danville using a fake name.
¶51 On Monday, March 19, Boulineau went to Olivet’s apartment
¶52in the late morning to check on him and found Olivet lying dead on
¶53the floor underneath a quilt with an 11-inch kitchen knife sticking
¶54out of his throat. Boulineau immediately left the apartment, called
¶55 4 911, and waited for the authorities. In addition to the knife sticking
¶56out of Olivet’s throat, responding officers recovered a bloody wooden
¶57two-by-four lying on the floor near Olivet’s body. Coleman drove up
¶58as officers were processing the scene. After interviewing Coleman
¶59and confirming aspects of his account, law enforcement officers
¶60identified Appellant as a possible suspect but were unable to locate
¶61him.
¶62 The medical examiner found multiple stab wounds to Olivet’s
¶63neck and chest, as well as several injuries to the back of Olivet’s
¶64head and neck that were consistent with his having been repeatedly
¶65bludgeoned with a two-by-four. A fingerprint in the blood on the two-
¶66by-four was later matched to Appellant.
¶67 When Appellant left Augusta, he made his way to Texas, where
¶68he was arrested within weeks on unrelated charges and imprisoned.
¶69Following Appellant’s indictment in October 2013, a warrant was
¶70issued for Appellant’s arrest, and Georgia initiated the process of
¶71extradition. In October 2015, Appellant sent a letter to the District
¶72Attorney’s office stating that he “stab[bed] a man to death in
¶73 5 Augusta.” In February 2016, Appellant sent another letter to the
¶74District Attorney’s office, this time writing, “I am let[t]ing you know
¶75I . . . stab[b]ed to death Anthony Glenn Olivet.”
¶76 2. Appellant’s sole enumeration of error is that the trial
¶77court violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers by
¶78preventing him from impeaching Coleman on cross-examination
¶79with certain statements from Coleman’s audio-recorded interviews
¶80with law enforcement officers that Appellant asserts were
¶81inconsistent with Coleman’s trial testimony. Specifically, Appellant
¶82contends that the court prevented him from playing for the jury the
¶83following two statements that Coleman made, referring to
¶84Appellant: (1) “That’s my cousin. . . . His dad’s name is Carl Logan,
¶85from Virginia”; and (2) “He went in [a convenience store] and got
¶86something. He don’t drink, he don’t smoke or nothing, so he went in
¶87there and got him[self] something to eat.”
¶88 On the first day of trial, Appellant informed the court that he
¶89wanted to represent himself instead of having his appointed counsel,
¶90Kelly Williamson, represent him. The court warned Appellant of the
¶91 6 dangers of self-representation, including that if Appellant
¶92represented himself, he would be “expected to follow all the rules of
¶93law, all the rules of criminal procedure, rules of evidence, [and] rules
¶94related to the presentation of evidence,” even if Appellant did not
¶95know those rules. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46
¶96(95 SCt 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975) (“The right of self-representation
¶97is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a
¶98license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and
¶99substantive law.”). At the end of an extensive colloquy, the court
¶100found that Appellant had made a knowing, intelligent, and
¶101voluntary waiver of his right to counsel and had instead chosen to
¶102represent himself at trial. The court then appointed Williamson to
¶103serve as standby counsel for Appellant, to which Appellant said that
¶104he had no objection. See id. (“Of course, a State may – even over
¶105objection by the accused – appoint a ‘standby counsel’ to aid the
¶106accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available
¶107to represent the accused in the event that termination of the
¶108defendant’s self-representation is necessary.”).
¶109 7 During Appellant’s cross-examination of Coleman, the
¶110following exchange occurred:
¶111 Q. So when you was investigated by the investigator, you don’t remember saying to the investigator that, “Carl Logan don’t smoke or drink or do drugs”? A. No, sir, I don’t quite remember. I don’t remember saying that. Q. That’s what you said. I’m just asking you do you remember. A. I said I don’t remember.
¶112The lead prosecutor interjected, “Your Honor, if he’s going to
¶113impeach the witness, he needs to show some proof of it.” The court
¶114told Appellant:
¶115 If you want to present him with a copy of that statement that you’re referencing, you can. But right now, I think this question has been asked and answered unless you want to go there and show him a copy of what he said, whatever you allege he said; okay?
¶116Appellant replied, “It’s on . . . the CD that the investigator had.” The
¶117court asked if it was an “audio-recorded statement,” and when
¶118Appellant said that it was, the court excused the jury.
¶119 The court asked Appellant if he was alleging that a recording
¶120existed of a statement that Coleman made to law enforcement
¶121 8 officers, and Appellant said, “Yeah.” The court then asked Appellant
¶122if he was alleging that in that statement, Coleman said “that he had
¶123never seen you [i.e., Appellant] drink or smoke or use drugs;
¶124something like that?” Appellant replied, “Yes. He [i.e., Coleman]
¶125said he knows I didn’t smoke or drink. He says that he knows I was
¶126his cousin. He says a lot of different things he’s not saying now . . . .”
¶127 The court asked Williamson if she had a copy of the statements
¶128that Appellant was talking about. Williamson said that there were
¶129two disks of interviews of Coleman, which she handed up to the court
¶130at the court’s request. The court asked Appellant which of the CDs
¶131contained the statements that he wanted to play for the jury or
¶132whether he wanted to play statements from both disks, and
¶133Appellant answered, “I don’t know.” The court asked Appellant if he
¶134knew which officer was conducting the interview or interviews in
¶135which Coleman made the statements, and Appellant replied, “No, I
¶136don’t know which one it was.” The court tried unsuccessfully to get
¶137assistance from the lead prosecutor, but he was not aware of the
¶138statements that Appellant referenced, although he could not say
¶139 9 that the statements did not exist. The court confirmed with
¶140Appellant that he recalled hearing the statements on the CDs. The
¶141court then said that it did not mind asking Williamson “as stand-by
¶142counsel and basically as an officer of the court” to make copies of the
¶143specific statements that Appellant wanted to play for the jury, but
¶144that the court did not know “where to start looking.”
¶145 At that point, the discussion veered off onto other topics until
¶146the court brought it back to the CDs by asking Appellant, “So what
¶147is it that you are wanting off of these disks that you think is an
¶148inconsistent statement with what he [i.e., Coleman] testified to here
¶149today?” Appellant said, among other things, that Coleman told
¶150officers that he knew that Appellant was his cousin before Appellant
¶151came to Augusta. The court then called a brief recess.
¶152 When the recess ended, the court said to Appellant:
¶153 [Y]ou may recall that when you elected to proceed without counsel today, I told you that you were going to be held to the same standard as counsel would be held to. What I would hold your lawyer to, your – your stand-by lawyer who was preparing for your trial, was if she believed there was an inconsistent statement that she wanted to impeach a witness with, it would be expected of her that
¶154 10 she would know where that statement is, which disk, which witness, approximately what time. Those are the kind of things that lawyers do. I have no problem if you want to consult with her to see if she knows where it is, if it is. If you do not want to, that’s 100 percent your choice, but you can ask him [i.e., Coleman], “Isn’t it true you told the officer this and that,” but at some point you have to accept his answer and not tell him in response, “Well, you told investigator whatever these words.” At some point, you’ve got to accept his answer unless you’re going to impeach him with extrinsic evidence, which means like playing a tape or confronting him with a statement that he made.
¶155Appellant said, “That’s my intentions because it’s on those CDs,” and
¶156the court replied, “Okay. Well, where? I mean I’ve asked you twice
¶157and you said you don’t know which statement. You don’t know which
¶158investigator, you don’t know what time stamp, you don’t know even
¶159approximately where in the statement it is.” Appellant complained
¶160that he “only heard those disks one time” while he was “doing [his]
¶161work to prepare for trial.”
¶162 The court told Appellant that he could consult with Williamson
¶163if he wanted to, but that otherwise the court was going to sustain
¶164the State’s objection in the jury’s presence. The court reiterated that
¶165for Appellant not to accept Coleman’s answer to his question,
¶166 11 Appellant would “have to do something to impeach him,” and in
¶167order to do that with the CDs, Appellant would have to “know at
¶168least which disk we need to talk about and . . . approximately where
¶169. . . the comment” is.
¶170 The court asked Appellant if he had consulted with Williamson
¶171on this issue and asked her where on the disks the statements he
¶172wanted to play were, and Appellant said that he had but did not get
¶173a response. The court said:
¶174 All right. Well, I am going to return these [CDs] to . . . stand-by counsel. I will sustain the objection. If you want – again, if you wanted to ask anything of your stand-by counsel, I would allow it. But at some point, you’re going to be held to the same standard as – as lawyers would be.
¶175The court asked Appellant if he wanted to talk to Williamson to see
¶176if she knew where the statements were, and Appellant said to
¶177Williamson, “Do you know where it’s at?” Appellant then conferred
¶178with Williamson, after which the court had the jury brought back
¶179into the courtroom.
¶180 The court announced to the jury, “I’m going to sustain that
¶181objection made by the State.” Appellant then asked Coleman several
¶182 12 additional questions but did not attempt to introduce into evidence
¶183any part of Coleman’s recorded interviews. After redirect
¶184examination by the State, Appellant again questioned Coleman.
¶185Again, he made no attempt to introduce any recorded statements to
¶186impeach Coleman’s testimony. Notably, on direct examination,
¶187Coleman referred to Appellant as his “cousin” and as “part of my
¶188family,” and on redirect examination, after noting that Appellant
¶189“made a big point about you saying that you never saw him do drugs
¶190around the time of the murder,” the lead prosecutor asked Coleman
¶191directly if he saw Appellant do drugs around the time of the murder.
¶192Coleman answered, “No.”
¶193 As the recitation above shows, it is not true that the trial court
¶194prevented Appellant from using Coleman’s audio-recorded
¶195statements to law enforcement officers to impeach Coleman’s trial
¶196testimony on cross-examination. To the contrary, the court patiently
¶197explained to Appellant more than once what he needed to do in order
¶198to properly introduce Coleman’s prior statements so that Appellant
¶199could play them for the jury. The court then encouraged Appellant
¶200 13 to consult with his standby counsel, and after doing so, Appellant
¶201made no further attempt to introduce Coleman’s prior statements
¶202for impeachment. Thus, the factual premise of Appellant’s sole
¶203enumeration of error is contradicted by the record.
¶204 Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
¶205requiring Appellant to follow the proper procedure to introduce
¶206Coleman’s prior statements. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. See
¶207also Funes v. State, 289 Ga. 793, 797-798 (716 SE2d 183) (2011)
¶208(finding no abuse of the trial court’s broad discretion to determine
¶209the scope of cross-examination where the court admonished defense
¶210counsel that he was not using a prior statement properly and invited
¶211counsel to proceed by the rules but counsel then moved on to other
¶212questions); Nicely v. State, 291 Ga. 788, 796 (733 SE2d 715) (2012)
¶213(noting that trial courts have “‘wide latitude . . . to impose
¶214reasonable limits on cross-examination’” about matters that are
¶215“‘only marginally relevant’” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, this
¶216claim lacks merit.
¶217 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶218 14