¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: September 8, 2021
¶3 S21A1171. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
¶4 ELLINGTON, Justice.
¶5 A DeKalb County jury found Leon Williams guilty of malice
¶6murder, terroristic threats, and three counts of cruelty to children
¶7in connection with the drowning death of his ten-year-old son,
¶8Kentae Williams (“Kentae”). 1 Williams contends that the evidence
¶9 1 Kentae drowned on April 28, 2017. In connection with Kentae’s death, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Williams on September 14, 2017, for malice murder (Count 1); felony murder based on cruelty to children, as alleged in Count 3 (Count 2); three counts of cruelty to children in the first degree (Counts 3-5); and making terroristic threats (Count 6). Williams’s trial commenced on July 9, 2018, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. On August 3, 2018, the trial court sentenced Williams to life in prison without parole for malice murder, to a twenty year prison term for each count of cruelty to children, and to a five year prison term for terroristic threats. The sentences are to be served consecutively. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. Williams filed a timely motion for a new trial on August 31, 2018, which he amended on March 11, 2020. The trial court held a hearing on Williams’s amended motion on March 13, 2020, and denied it on April 8, 2020. Williams filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal on February 15, 2021, which was granted the following day. Williams filed a notice of appeal on February 26, 2021, and this case was docketed to the August 2021 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. He also
¶10argues that one of his three convictions for cruelty to children must
¶11be vacated because it merged with his malice murder conviction. For
¶12the following reasons, we affirm.
¶13 Kentae, a child with autism and special needs, spent most of
¶14his life in foster care. Williams began providing care for Kentae in
¶15June 2016, and he adopted the child on November 19, 2016. During
¶16the week of April 24, 2017, Williams attended a work conference.
¶17While Williams was away, his mother stayed in Williams’s
¶18apartment and cared for Kentae.
¶19 During the morning of Thursday, April 27, one of Williams’s
¶20fellow conference attendees observed Williams as he talked on the
¶21phone. She testified that Williams was visibly upset. He repeatedly
¶22said: “I’m going to show him. My son thinks he’s funny. I’m going to
¶23show him.” Williams was upset that his son was misbehaving at
¶24school. The conference ended the following day.
¶25 Between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. on April 28, Williams’s
¶26neighbors saw Williams walking with Kentae toward their DeKalb
¶27 2 County apartment. Neighbors described Williams’s demeanor as
¶28“aggressive,” “tense,” and “furious.” They saw Williams holding
¶29Kentae by the neck. The neighbors testified that, as Williams passed
¶30by them with the child in tow, he complained that Kentae had kicked
¶31his teacher and used obscene language. Williams told Kentae twice
¶32that he was “going to die tonight.” He also said “I’m going to beat
¶33him up. I’m going to kill him.” The neighbors observed that Kentae
¶34appeared terrified. The child held a bag with a belt in it, and one of
¶35the neighbors asked: “You have him holding his own butt whipping?”
¶36Williams said “yes,” explaining that he had just bought the belt. One
¶37neighbor testified that she found the exchange so disturbing that
¶38she considered calling the police.
¶39 Williams’s mother testified that, as she sat in the living room
¶40watching television, she saw Williams and Kentae enter the
¶41apartment. She heard Williams tell Kentae to go upstairs and take
¶42a bath. Shortly thereafter, she heard a cry, and she went upstairs to
¶43investigate. Kentae, who was sobbing, was standing up in a tub
¶44filled with about six inches of water. Williams sat next to the child.
¶45 3 Williams’s mother assumed that Kentae did not want to take a bath,
¶46so she went back downstairs to watch television. Later, Williams
¶47called out to his mother, asking her to come upstairs. When she got
¶48upstairs, she saw Kentae lying on his bedroom floor, near the door
¶49to the bathroom. Williams was giving the child CPR.
¶50 Williams’s mother called 911 at 8:18 p.m. When first
¶51responders arrived at 8:27 p.m., Williams was in the upstairs
¶52bedroom attempting to revive Kentae with chest compressions. A
¶53paramedic testified that she continued CPR in the ambulance, but
¶54Kentae had no pulse. It was difficult to intubate Kentae because his
¶55mouth was clenched tightly and he had water in his trachea and
¶56lungs. Efforts to revive him with epinephrine failed. The paramedic
¶57noticed bruising on Kentae’s head, torso, and arms. Also, the skin on
¶58the top of Kentae’s feet was peeling and beginning to slough away.
¶59The paramedic noticed that Kentae’s blood was pooling toward his
¶60back and his feet were starting to stiffen, as if rigor mortis had
¶61begun to set in, which typically happens about two hours after
¶62death. On the way to the hospital, Williams told the paramedic that
¶63 4 he had left Kentae in the bathroom to change clothes, and that when
¶64he returned to help him bathe, Kentae was unresponsive. According
¶65to the paramedic, Williams repeatedly complained that “DFCS isn’t
¶66going to give me another kid now.” Once at the hospital, a doctor
¶67pronounced Kentae dead. Several people told Williams to stay at the
¶68hospital, but he left.
¶69 Kentae’s death was determined to be a homicide caused by
¶70drowning. The emergency room doctor noted that Kentae’s body
¶71temperature upon arrival at the hospital was about 102 degrees,
¶72warmer than it should have been, which was consistent with his
¶73body being left in a warm bath for an extended period of time. The
¶74medical examiner testified that Kentae’s treatment records
¶75indicated that rigor mortis had begun to set in when the paramedics
¶76arrived, which meant that he had probably been dead for
¶77approximately two hours.
¶78 Both the emergency room doctor and the medical examiner
¶79noticed that Kentae had blisters from recent second degree burns on
¶80the tops of his feet, but not on the soles of his feet. He had circular
¶81 5 bruises on his calves, which the medical examiner testified could
¶82have been caused by someone grasping Kentae’s calves in order to
¶83hold his feet under the hot water spigot, which could also explain
¶84why the burns were only to the tops of his feet. Kentae also had a
¶85recent deep bruise on his shoulder, which was consistent with
¶86someone forcefully pressing him under the water. The medical
¶87examiner testified that it would have taken about two to three
¶88minutes to drown the child. Additionally, Kentae had recent,
¶89extensive, and deep bruising and a pattern of marks on his body
¶90consistent with being struck repeatedly by a belt and a belt buckle.
¶91The police collected seven belts from Williams’s apartment. While in
¶92the apartment, they noticed that the tub’s cold-water knob was
¶93missing.
¶94 Williams was arrested a few hours after Kentae was
¶95pronounced dead. Williams spoke with a detective shortly after his
¶96arrest, and his recorded custodial interview was played for the jury.
¶97Williams first said that, when he got back from the conference on
¶98Friday, he picked Kentae up from school, went to a Family Dollar
¶99 6 store, and encountered neighbors on the way home. He told Kentae
¶100to take a bath when they returned to the apartment. Williams said
¶101he walked out of the bathroom around 8:15 p.m. to change clothes,
¶102and when he came back about five minutes later, he found Kentae
¶103lying on his side in the tub, unresponsive. After Williams gave his
¶104account, the investigator ended the interview.
¶105 Moments later, Williams asked to continue the interview, and
¶106the detective agreed. Williams admitted turning the hot water on
¶107and running it over Kentae’s feet, but claimed that he turned it off
¶108when the child complained that it was too hot. Williams admitted
¶109that the bruising on Kentae’s body was the result of his striking the
¶110child five times with a belt. He also admitted holding Kentae down
¶111underwater, twice. Williams explained that Kentae was
¶112“swimming,” and that he twice pushed him down under the water
¶113for 30 to 45 seconds, which he acknowledged was too long, and that
¶114his actions could have caused Kentae’s death. Williams also
¶115admitted to making a “joke” to his neighbors that he was going to
¶116kill Kentae that night.
¶117 7 1. Williams contends that the State’s evidence was insufficient
¶118to support his convictions by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. With
¶119respect to his conviction for murder, Williams also argues that the
¶120State’s evidence was entirely circumstantial and failed to exclude
¶121every other reasonable hypothesis save that of his guilt. For the
¶122following reasons, these contentions are without merit.
¶123 When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
¶124as a matter of constitutional due process, this Court views all of the
¶125evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts
¶126and asks whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
¶127defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which
¶128he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III)
¶129(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Even assuming that the
¶130evidence presented on the offense of murder was wholly
¶131circumstantial, as Williams argues, to sustain the conviction as a
¶132matter of Georgia statutory law,
¶133 the proven facts had to be consistent with the hypothesis of his guilt and exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of his guilt. Not every hypothesis is reasonable, and
¶134 8 the evidence does not have to exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis; it need rule out only those that are reasonable. The reasonableness of an alternative hypothesis raised by a defendant is a question principally for the jury, and when the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the accused’s guilt, this Court will not disturb that finding unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.
¶135(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cochran v. State, 305 Ga. 827,
¶136829 (1) (828 SE2d 338) (2019). See also OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant
¶137a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not
¶138only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude
¶139every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the
¶140accused.”).
¶141 (a) Malice murder. Williams contends that the State’s evidence
¶142failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed malice
¶143murder by drowning Kentae.2 He also argues that the evidence
¶144supports two other possibilities: that Kentae’s death was either an
¶145accident or a suicide. We disagree.
¶146 2 “A person commits the offense of murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). 9 The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that
¶147Williams drowned Kentae with malicious intent. Williams told
¶148several people that Kentae was “going to die tonight.” He was so
¶149furious with Kentae for misbehaving at school that he beat the child
¶150and held his feet beneath scalding water. Williams also admitted
¶151that he pressed Kentae beneath the water twice for long periods of
¶152time. There is no evidence that anyone other than Williams was with
¶153Kentae when the child drowned. The medical examiner testified that
¶154some of the bruises Kentae sustained were consistent with someone
¶155forcefully holding him beneath the water. Kentae’s body was also in
¶156rigor mortis when the paramedics arrived, which supports an
¶157inference that Kentae died shortly after Williams started the child’s
¶158bath, sometime between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. Williams claimed,
¶159however, that Kentae was still alive at 8:00 p.m., shortly before
¶160Williams’s mother called 911. The jury could reasonably infer from
¶161that evidence that Williams delayed calling 911 and that he did so
¶162because he knew that he had killed Kentae and he was trying to
¶163conceal evidence of his guilt. See Whitehead v. State, 308 Ga. 825,
¶164 10 828 (1) (842 SE2d 816) (2020) (given the forensic and other evidence
¶165concerning how the crime occurred, the jury could reasonably infer
¶166that the defendant’s account was fabricated). Further, the medical
¶167examiner concluded that the manner of Kentae’s death was
¶168homicide.
¶169 Given the evidence in this case, the jury was not required to
¶170find that Williams’s alternate hypotheses about Kentae’s manner of
¶171death were reasonable. See, e.g., Guzman-Perez v. State, 310 Ga.
¶172573, 576-577 (1) (853 SE2d 76) (2020); Collett v. State, 305 Ga. 853,
¶173855-856 (1) (828 SE2d 362) (2019). Instead, the jury was authorized
¶174to infer that Williams attempted to conceal the manner of Kentae’s
¶175death and initially lied to the paramedics and police because he had
¶176committed the murder. See Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 887, 888 (1) (734
¶177SE2d 41) (2012) (criminal intent is a question for the factfinder, and
¶178can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct before, during, and
¶179after the commission of the crimes). Accordingly, the evidence was
¶180sufficient to support Williams’s murder conviction.
¶181 (b) Cruelty to children. Williams argues that the evidence does
¶182 11 not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offenses
¶183of cruelty to children in the first degree by drowning Kentae (Count
¶1843), by holding Kentae’s feet under hot water (Count 4), or by
¶185whipping Kentae with a belt (Count 5).3 We disagree.
¶186 As to Count 3, Williams admitted that he held Kentae beneath
¶187the water twice for prolonged periods, and the evidence, as
¶188recounted in Division 1 (a), supports the jury’s finding that Williams
¶189drowned Kentae with malicious intent. As to Count 4, Williams
¶190argues that, given his testimony that he turned the water off as soon
¶191as Kentae complained that it was too hot, he accidentally instead of
¶192 3 “Any person commits the offense of cruelty to children in the first degree when such person maliciously causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.” OCGA § 16-5-70 (b). Further, [f]or purposes of this Code section, malice in the legal sense[] imports the absence of all elements of justification or excuse and the presence of an actual intent to cause the particular harm produced, or the wanton and wilful doing of an act with an awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result. Intention may be manifest[ed] by the circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense. Intent [is] a question of fact to be determined upon consideration of words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted. (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Stokes v. State, 204 Ga. App. 586, 587-588 (2) (420 SE2d 84) (1992). 12 maliciously injured the child. The jury was authorized to disbelieve
¶193Williams and rely, instead, on the medical examiner’s testimony
¶194that Kentae’s injuries – second degree burns to the top of his feet
¶195and bruises to his calves – were consistent with a person holding the
¶196child’s feet under hot water long enough for them to blister. And,
¶197with respect to Count 5, Williams argues his whipping Kentae was
¶198neither malicious nor excessive; rather, it was appropriate
¶199discipline. The evidence, however, authorized the jury to conclude
¶200not only that Williams struck Kentae hard enough with a belt and
¶201belt buckle to cause significant bruises, but also that Williams had
¶202Kentae carry the instrument of his punishment while being
¶203subjected to death threats.
¶204 This evidence was sufficient to support Williams’s convictions
¶205for cruelty to children beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury could
¶206infer from the evidence that Williams’s acts caused Kentae excessive
¶207physical and mental pain and that they were unreasonable and
¶208unjustified. The jury was charged on justification in the context of
¶209parental discipline, but it rejected that defense, which it was entitled
¶210 13 to do. See, e.g., Leslie v. State, 341 Ga. App. 731, 734 (802 SE2d 674)
¶211(2017) (it is for the jury to decide whether the defendant’s actions
¶212constituted reasonable parental discipline under the
¶213circumstances); Haji v. State, 331 Ga. App. 116, 119 (3) (769 SE2d
¶214811) (2015) (same). See also Goodson v. State, 305 Ga. 246, 248 (1)
¶215(b) (824 SE2d 371) (2019) (“Questions about the existence of
¶216justification are for the jury to resolve, and the jury may reject any
¶217evidence in support of a justification defense and accept evidence
¶218that [the act constituting the crime was not justified].” (citation
¶219omitted)).
¶220 (c) Terroristic threats. Williams contends that his statements
¶221that he was going to kill Kentae did not constitute the crime of
¶222making terrorist threats; rather, they were “poorly phrased”
¶223promises of discipline. We disagree.
¶224 “A person commits the offense of a terroristic threat when he
¶225or she threatens to commit any crime of violence . . . with the purpose
¶226of terrorizing another[,]” and “[n]o person shall be convicted under
¶227this subsection on the uncorroborated testimony of the party to
¶228 14 whom the threat is communicated.” OCGA § 16-11-37 (b). The
¶229indictment accused Williams of unlawfully threatening “a crime of
¶230violence” against Kentae “with the purpose of terrorizing” him with
¶231a threat “that suggested the death of said victim.” Accordingly, as
¶232indicted, the State was required to prove that (1) Williams had
¶233threatened Kentae with a violent crime that suggested his death,
¶234and (2) that he did so with the purpose of terrorizing the child. See
¶235Bryant v. State, 306 Ga. 687, 690 (1) (a) (832 SE2d 826) (2019);
¶236Martin v. State, 303 Ga. App. 117, 119 (1) (692 SE2d 741) (2010).
¶237“The crime of making terroristic threats focuses solely on the
¶238conduct of the accused and is completed when the threat is
¶239communicated to the victim with the intent to terrorize.” (Citation
¶240and punctuation omitted.) Clement v. State, 309 Ga. App. 376, 379
¶241(1) (710 SE2d 590) (2011).
¶242 The State presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find
¶243these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Witnesses heard
¶244Williams threaten to beat and to kill Kentae, telling the child that
¶245he was “going to die tonight.” Murder is, of course, a violent crime.
¶246 15 See OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). The jury could infer that the threats of
¶247violence were made to terrorize the child and that they were not
¶248merely poorly phrased promises of parental discipline given the
¶249following evidence: Kentae was a ten-year-old child; the threats
¶250were made in anger; witnesses testified that Kentae was, in fact,
¶251terrified; and one witness was so disturbed by the threats that she
¶252considered calling the police. Given this evidence, a rational trier of
¶253fact was entitled to find Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
¶254of the offense of making terroristic threats. See Clement, 309 Ga.
¶255App. at 381 (1) (b).
¶256 2. Contrary to Williams’s assertion, the trial court correctly
¶257sentenced Williams on his conviction for cruelty to children by
¶258drowning (Count 3). That conviction does not merge with Williams’s
¶259murder conviction because the two crimes contain mutually
¶260exclusive elements. See Linson v. State, 287 Ga. 881, 885-886 (4)
¶261(700 SE2d 394) (2010) (“[E]ach crime requires proof of at least one
¶262additional element which the other does not. . . . Furthermore, the
¶263crimes of malice murder and cruelty to children are not so closely
¶264 16 related that multiple convictions are prohibited under other
¶265provisions of OCGA §§ 16-1-6 and 16-1-7. Accordingly, even if the
¶266same conduct establishes the commission of both malice murder and
¶267cruelty to children, the two crimes do not merge.” (citations and
¶268punctuation omitted)); see also Vasquez v. State, 306 Ga. 216, 234-
¶269235 (4) (830 SE2d 143) (2019) (rejecting defendant’s argument that
¶270cruelty to children in the first degree should have merged with his
¶271malice murder conviction, citing Linson); Walker-Madden v. State,
¶272299 Ga. 32, 37 (3) (785 SE2d 879) (2016) (vacating sentencing order
¶273wherein defendant’s conviction for cruelty to children in the first
¶274degree was merged with malice murder, noting the counts do not
¶275merge); Collum v. State, 281 Ga. 719, 724 (6) (642 SE2d 640) (2007)
¶276(cruelty to children felonies did not merge with malice murder as a
¶277matter of law or fact).
¶278 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶279 17