Anglin v. State

¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia

¶2 Decided: September 21, 2021

¶3 S21A0845. ANGLIN v. THE STATE.

¶4 PETERSON, Justice.

¶5 Daniel Anglin appeals his convictions for malice murder and

¶6other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Chad Ruark. 1

¶7Anglin argues that the trial evidence was insufficient to support his

¶8convictions; the trial court erred in handling an untimely disclosure

¶9that someone else purportedly confessed to killing Ruark; trial

¶10counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a lay witness’s

¶11 1 Ruark went missing sometime around February 24, 2016, and his body was found on March 8, 2016. In February 2017, an Oconee County grand jury indicted Anglin for malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. On November 3, 2017, a jury found Anglin guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Anglin to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and a five-year consecutive term for the firearm offense; the remaining counts were vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes. Anglin filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Anglin timely appealed; his case was docketed to this Court’s April 2021 term and argued before this Court on August 25, 2021. scientific conclusions; and the cumulative effect of these errors

¶12prejudiced him. We affirm because the evidence was sufficient to

¶13authorize a jury to conclude that Anglin was guilty; Anglin has not

¶14shown that the untimely disclosure prejudiced him; trial counsel

¶15was not ineffective for failing to object to the witness’s testimony

¶16because it was not based on scientific training or other specialized

¶17knowledge; and there are no errors to consider cumulatively.

¶18 Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the

¶19trial evidence showed the following. Daniel Anglin and Chad Ruark

¶20worked together in construction, and Anglin was married to Ruark’s

¶21sister Elizabeth. Anglin abused and sold prescription pain pills.

¶22Anglin was concerned that his wife would kick him out of the house

¶23if she ever found out about his illegal drug activity. On February 21,

¶242016, Anglin and Ruark exchanged text messages about money, and

¶25Anglin told Ruark that his wife overheard him talking so “she

¶26knows” and he was now “screwed all the way around.” Ruark

¶27responded that Anglin had hurt his sister, he was “still waiting on

¶28that thousand,” and Anglin left Ruark no choice but to tell her about

¶29 2 Anglin’s drug activity.

¶30 On February 26, Ruark failed to show up to collect his pay for

¶31a construction project he had completed a few days earlier with his

¶32brother, Joseph Ruark. Because Ruark failed to show up and had

¶33not responded to Joseph’s recent calls and text messages, Joseph

¶34reported Ruark as missing to the Oconee County Sheriff’s Office.

¶35Joseph and a deputy went to Ruark’s home that night. There were

¶36no signs of forced entry or anything unusual other than the presence

¶37of Ruark’s dress boots, which he usually wore whenever he left the

¶38house. The deputy spoke to Anglin around this time, who told him

¶39that Ruark said he was going to Florida to do a construction job.

¶40Anglin said the same thing to Joseph, adding that Ruark left

¶41because he “didn’t feel right” at home and wanted to work in Florida.

¶42 On February 28, a private investigator organized a search

¶43party, which included Anglin, to look for Ruark near his house. Just

¶44before the search began, Joseph and Ruark’s ex-wife, Amanda

¶45Ashley, received a text message from an unknown number, claiming

¶46to be Ruark. The text said that Ruark had found a new place to live

¶47 3 where he did not feel like an “outcast” and that he would “be in touch

¶48in a few weeks.” Just as he had told Joseph, Anglin told Ashley that

¶49Ruark said he was going to Florida to do construction work. Ashley

¶50told Anglin that his story was “bulls**t,” and neither she nor Joseph

¶51believed that Ruark sent the text. According to Joseph and Ashley,

¶52Ruark loved his two young children and would not have left without

¶53an explanation. Ashley also explained that the wording of the text

¶54was not how Ruark spoke or texted, and that she had never heard

¶55him use the word “outcast” or complain about his relationship with

¶56his family.

¶57 During the search, volunteers were paired up and given a

¶58specific area to cover. Anglin and his partner were directed to focus

¶59on an area behind the house, but instead of doing so, Anglin

¶60searched an area along the fence line, acted “weird” and “nervous,”

¶61and told his search partner to look somewhere else. One of the

¶62volunteers found a letter that Ruark purportedly had written to his

¶63children, but the investigator believed it was a “fresh writing.”

¶64 The sheriff’s office later learned that the suspicious text

¶65 4 message was sent from a cell phone purchased at a Family Dollar

¶66store. A cashier from the store identified Anglin as the person who

¶67had purchased the cell phone. Anglin agreed to talk to the sheriff’s

¶68office and, during an interview, admitted buying the phone and

¶69sending the text message. When asked where Ruark was, Anglin

¶70said he did not know. Upon leaving the sheriff’s office, Anglin saw

¶71his wife, Elizabeth, who was waiting to be interviewed. She asked,

¶72“What have you gotten me into?” Anglin replied, “Nothing, as long

¶73as you say I was at the Walmart.”

¶74 After Elizabeth was informed that Anglin admitted sending

¶75the text message, she confronted him about it. He would not answer

¶76any of her questions and merely replied, “The only thing I can say is

¶77I’m sorry.” The next day, Anglin left home, saying he was going to

¶78clear his name and find Ruark. On March 6, Anglin asked his

¶79brother to take him to a remote area where he intended to stay for a

¶80few days. Anglin told his brother that he had bought a handgun for

¶81Ruark. Evidence showed that Anglin bought an RG 23-model .22-

¶82caliber handgun on February 24, a few days before Ruark went

¶83 5 missing, and bank records showed unusual activity in Anglin’s bank

¶84account around this time.

¶85 On March 8, the sheriff’s office conducted a canine search of

¶86Ruark’s property. During the search, a neighbor stopped by to report

¶87seeing a black truck at the property early in the week Ruark went

¶88missing. Anglin drove a black Chevrolet S-10 truck at the time.

¶89Searching the property, the canine unit found a hidden grave with

¶90Ruark’s body inside. The grave was in the area Anglin had

¶91“searched” on his own and steered his search partner away from

¶92during the February 28 search. Ruark’s cause of death was

¶93determined to be .22-caliber gunshot wounds to the back of the head

¶94and neck.

¶95 After discovering Ruark’s body, deputies again interviewed

¶96Anglin. After being told that Ruark’s body was found and that he

¶97had been shot with a .22-caliber gun, Anglin said there was no way

¶98he could have killed Ruark, stating repeatedly that he did not know

¶99what happened. Anglin acknowledged that the evidence of guilt was

¶100pointing towards him, but said that if he killed Ruark, he did not

¶101 6 know how he did it. Anglin said that he had a dream in which Ruark

¶102was walking in front of him and then fell to the ground.

¶103 Anglin was arrested following the interview. Deputies

¶104searched his home and found several .22-caliber bullets and a flat

¶105shovel hidden under a small addition to the house. Deputies also

¶106collected samples of dried mud found on the shovel and compared

¶107them to soil samples taken from Anglin’s property and from the

¶108gravesite. Soil samples recovered from the shovel were inconsistent

¶109with the soil from Anglin’s property, but matched the soil samples

¶110taken from the gravesite.

¶111 1. Anglin argues that the evidence was insufficient to support

¶112his convictions because it was circumstantial and the inferences the

¶113State sought to draw from the evidence were tenuous. He points out

¶114that no one testified about seeing him and Ruark ever argue and

¶115contends that the State’s theory that he killed Ruark to keep Ruark

¶116from telling Elizabeth that Anglin abused and sold drugs was

¶117unbelievable because she testified at trial that she already knew

¶118that Anglin was selling pills.

¶119 7  When we consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,

¶120we review whether the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in

¶121the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, was sufficient to

¶122authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

¶123doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v.

¶124Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); State

¶125v. Holmes, 304 Ga. 524, 527 (1) (820 SE2d 26) (2018). We do not

¶126reweigh the evidence but defer to the jury’s assessment of the weight

¶127and credibility of the evidence, leaving it to the jury to resolve

¶128conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. See Williamson v. State,

¶129305 Ga. 889, 891 (1) (827 SE2d 857) (2019). “Although the State is

¶130required to prove its case with competent evidence, there is no

¶131requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of

¶132evidence.” Jackson v. State, 307 Ga. 770, 772 (838 SE2d 246) (2020)

¶133(citation and punctuation omitted).

¶134 “The fact that the evidence of guilt was circumstantial does not

¶135render it insufficient.” Brown v. State, 304 Ga. 435, 437 (1) (819

¶136SE2d 14) (2018). But, as a matter of Georgia statutory law, “[t]o

¶137 8 warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts

¶138shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall

¶139exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of

¶140the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. “Not every hypothesis is reasonable,

¶141however,” and it is for the jury to determine whether an alternative

¶142hypothesis passes muster. Brown, 304 Ga. at 437 (1); Johnson v.

¶143State, 307 Ga. 44, 48 (2) (834 SE2d 83) (2019). Where the jury is

¶144authorized to find the evidence sufficient to exclude every

¶145reasonable hypothesis except of the accused’s guilt, this Court will

¶146not disturb that finding unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.

¶147See Brown, 304 Ga. at 437 (1).

¶148 The evidence here satisfied this standard. Days before Ruark

¶149was reported missing, he exchanged text messages with Anglin

¶150about money. When Anglin said he was “screwed all the way around”

¶151if his wife found out about his drug activities, Ruark replied that

¶152Anglin left him no choice but to tell her. Around the time Ruark went

¶153missing, a witness saw a black truck near Ruark’s home. Anglin

¶154drove a black Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck. Shortly before Ruark’s

¶155 9 disappearance, Anglin bought a .22-caliber revolver that could have

¶156fired the two bullets recovered from Ruark’s body.

¶157 Anglin claimed he bought the gun for Ruark’s supposed trip to

¶158Florida, and also that Ruark was moving to Florida because he felt

¶159like an outcast, a claim that Ruark’s brother and ex-wife did not find

¶160credible. Anglin admitted that he sent a text message to them on the

¶161day of a search for Ruark, claiming to be the missing man. During

¶162that search, Anglin acted nervous when appearing to look through

¶163the area where Ruark’s body was later found. Soil samples recovered

¶164from the shovel found at Anglin’s house were inconsistent with the

¶165soil at his own property, but were indistinguishable from the soil

¶166samples taken near the gravesite. The above evidence was sufficient

¶167under Jackson and sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that

¶168this evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of

¶169Anglin’s guilt and, therefore, to find him guilty of the crimes for

¶170which he was convicted under OCGA § 24-14-6.

¶171 2. Anglin argues that the trial court erred in its handling of an

¶172untimely disclosure of purported Brady material. See Brady v.

¶173 10 Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963). Although

¶174some of the facts surrounding the belated disclosure are troubling,

¶175Anglin’s failure to show prejudice from the trial court’s rulings is

¶176fatal to his claim.

¶177 On the morning of opening statements, Anglin’s trial counsel

¶178announced that the prior evening, the prosecutor had told him that

¶179then-Oconee County Sheriff Scott Berry had received information

¶180that someone else had confessed to killing Ruark. Trial counsel said

¶181that, given the late hour he received this information and his focus

¶182on preparing for trial, he did not have a chance to contact the sheriff.

¶183Trial counsel asked for a one-day continuance to do so. 2 The trial

¶184court denied this motion, saying that trial counsel would still have

¶185opportunities to follow up with Sheriff Berry.

¶186 2 Defense counsel stated:

¶187 Judge, in light of the information that I was provided yesterday evening, I’m still not exactly clear as to what happened between Sheriff Berry and the individuals that were telling him things. I have not been able to talk to Sheriff Berry. . . . But word of someone else admitting to this crime seems like it would be pretty relevant to the issue at hand. And I would like to know a little bit more about it before opening statements so that I can give the jury what I expect the evidence to be. 11  Three days later, on the final day of the trial, Anglin called

¶188Sheriff Berry to testify. Trial counsel said that the two had not yet

¶189had a chance to talk, although he had given Sheriff Berry his phone

¶190number, but he was going to call Sheriff Berry to testify anyway.

¶191Because the State objected to possible hearsay, Sheriff Berry was

¶192first questioned outside the presence of the jury. He said that about

¶193two months before the trial, he received a phone call from a woman,

¶194Christy Houseman, who said that her ex-boyfriend, Daniel Hale,

¶195believed that the sheriff’s office had “the wrong man in custody.”

¶196Daniel Hale is the brother of James Hale, a sheriff’s office

¶197investigator captain who investigated this case. At the time, Anglin

¶198was the only person jailed for the murder. The trial court ruled that

¶199Houseman’s statements to Sherriff Berry were inadmissible

¶200hearsay, but allowed Anglin to ask Sheriff Berry in front of the jury

¶201whether he gave any information to Investigator Hale about any

¶202admissions.

¶203 When the jury returned, Anglin asked Sheriff Berry about

¶204whether there were any admissions in the case. Sheriff Berry

¶205 12 described a conversation “related about hearing that somebody had

¶206heard that there had been an admission.” But the trial court

¶207prohibited Anglin from inquiring further into the substance of any

¶208conversations. Sheriff Berry also testified that the person he spoke

¶209to was Houseman and admitted that he did not document either his

¶210conversation with her or his follow-up discussion with Investigator

¶211Hale.

¶212 Anglin also called Investigator Hale, who was likewise first

¶213questioned outside the presence of the jury. Investigator Hale said

¶214that Sheriff Berry had told him that Houseman had called Daniel’s

¶215ex-wife Kim Thomas to let her know that Daniel had admitted to

¶216killing Ruark, and then Thomas called the sheriff. Whereas Sheriff

¶217Berry said the conversation with Investigator Hale happened about

¶218two months prior to trial, Investigator Hale said that it was only

¶219about three weeks before trial. Investigator Hale said that he did

¶220not disclose this information to the district attorney’s office until the

¶221first day of trial, explaining that although “there wasn’t a lot for me

¶222going on” around the time he talked to Sheriff Berry, the weeks after

¶223 13 he “got busy,” including his assisting with seven death

¶224investigations.

¶225 Investigator Hale then testified before the jury that Sheriff

¶226Berry gave him some information about Daniel, that Houseman and

¶227Thomas were mentioned in their conversation, and that he had not

¶228attempted to contact Thomas and did not have the opportunity to

¶229interview Houseman. Investigator Hale admitted that Daniel and

¶230Ruark had once been close friends, but said they went their separate

¶231ways because Daniel was a “bad influence.” Investigator Hale talked

¶232to his brother briefly at the time Ruark went missing, but neither

¶233he nor anyone else with the sheriff’s office formally interviewed

¶234Daniel, attempted to search his house, or tried to obtain his phone

¶235records. Although Investigator Hale alluded to his brother being the

¶236subject of a conversation with Sheriff Berry, he made no reference

¶237to Daniel’s purported admission that he killed Ruark. In closing

¶238arguments, trial counsel noted that some information came out that

¶239Daniel had admitted killing Ruark, observed that the sheriff’s office

¶240did not document this information or investigate the claim in any

¶241 14 way, and questioned the motives of Investigator Hale in not

¶242disclosing the information about his brother sooner.

¶243 At the hearing on his motion for new trial, Anglin submitted

¶244additional evidence in support of his Brady argument. A defense

¶245investigator testified that Houseman reported that Daniel admitted

¶246killing Ruark because the “devil made him do it.” The defense

¶247investigator testified that Houseman believed Daniel was under the

¶248influence of drugs or alcohol when he made the statement, and that

¶249he later said he was joking. Appellate counsel for Anglin also

¶250proffered that she spoke to Thomas, who said she received

¶251information from Houseman and spoke to Sheriff Berry about it, but

¶252that he told her not to get involved.

¶253 In responding to the State’s argument that this evidence still

¶254presented multiple hearsay problems, appellate counsel argued that

¶255he did not need to present Houseman’s and Thomas’s actual

¶256testimony because he was not trying to show that Daniel had

¶257committed the crime. Instead, appellate counsel said he was trying

¶258to show that the sheriff’s office conducted a “shoddy investigation”

¶259 15 by failing to document or follow up on information that someone else

¶260“allegedly confessed.” Trial counsel testified at the motion for new

¶261trial hearing that, had Daniel Hale’s purported admissions been

¶262timely disclosed, he would have been able to investigate them

¶263adequately and use them in Anglin’s defense to attack the

¶264thoroughness of the investigation. The State called Daniel to testify,

¶265and he denied killing Ruark or ever telling anyone that he had.

¶266 On appeal, Anglin argues that the trial court erred in failing to

¶267grant his request for a continuance so that he could investigate the

¶268untimely disclosure, that the untimely disclosure violated Brady,

¶269and that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from asking Sheriff

¶270Berry and Investigator Hale about Daniel’s statements.

¶271 (a) The trial court’s denial of a continuance

¶272 Anglin argues that the trial court erred in denying his request

¶273for a one-day continuance so that he could investigate the belatedly

¶274disclosed evidence before opening statements.

¶275 A trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying a

¶276motion for continuance. See OCGA § 17-8-22. We will not disturb a

¶277 16 trial court’s decision without a clear showing that it abused this

¶278discretion. See Phoenix v. State, 304 Ga. 785, 788 (2) (822 SE2d 195)

¶279(2018). A defendant must show that he was harmed by the denial of

¶280a request for a continuance in order to be entitled to a new trial. See

¶281id.

¶282 Anglin has failed to show harm. He asked only for a one-day

¶283continuance to interview Sheriff Berry. Three days after being

¶284denied that request, he still had not done so, stating that he planned

¶285to call him to testify anyway. As discussed below, Anglin elicited

¶286evidence from Sheriff Berry that he used in his defense, and because

¶287Anglin never showed that he could present admissible evidence to

¶288support his defense, Anglin fails to show how the lack of additional

¶289time harmed him. As a result, this claim fails.

¶290 (b) Brady claim

¶291 To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must show that

¶292 (1) the State possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) the defendant did not possess the favorable evidence and could not obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) the State suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) had the evidence been

¶293 17  disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different.

¶294Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 852 (621 SE2d 726) (2005). To

¶295establish the fourth prong, often referred to as materiality, a

¶296defendant does not need to show that he necessarily would have

¶297been acquitted, but only that the State’s “evidentiary suppression

¶298undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Kyles v. Whitley,

¶299514 U.S. 419, 434 (115 SCt 1555, 131 LE2d 490) (1995) (citation and

¶300punctuation omitted). “Inadmissible evidence may be material

¶301under Brady if it could have led to the discovery of material

¶302admissible evidence.” Jones v. Medlin, 302 Ga. 555, 560 (2) (807

¶303SE2d 849) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

¶304 In the case of an untimely disclosure, a defendant must show

¶305that an “earlier disclosure would have benefited the defense and

¶306that the delayed disclosure deprived him of a fair trial.” Dennard v.

¶307State, 263 Ga. 453, 454 (4) (435 SE2d 26) (1993), overruled on other

¶308grounds by Sanders v. State, 281 Ga. 36, 37 (1) (635 SE2d 772)

¶309(2006).

¶310 18  Whether a disclosure at trial is timely enough to satisfy Brady depends on the extent to which the delay in disclosing the exculpatory evidence deprived the defense of a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the pertinent witness at trial, whether earlier disclosure would have benefited the defense, and whether the delay deprived the accused of a fair trial or materially prejudiced his defense.

¶311In the Matter of Lee, 301 Ga. 74, 78 (799 SE2d 766) (2017).

¶312 Anglin has not demonstrated how earlier disclosure would

¶313have benefited him. He concedes that the evidence contained

¶314multiple layers of hearsay ⸺ a statement from Daniel that was

¶315passed through one or two people before reaching Sheriff Berry, and

¶316then to Investigator Hale and to the district attorney before being

¶317communicated to his trial counsel. Such hearsay evidence can be

¶318material under Brady as long as Anglin can show that it would have

¶319led to the discovery of admissible evidence. But he has failed to do

¶320so.

¶321 Anglin argues that, had he been given the information sooner,

¶322he would have been able to “interview the pertinent witnesses . . .

¶323and secure their presence at trial,” but he did not even secure

¶324 19 Houseman’s or Thomas’s presence at the motion for new trial

¶325hearing. Even if either of them could have attended his trial, Anglin

¶326has not demonstrated that their testimony regarding Daniel’s

¶327confession would have been admissible. Anglin argues that their

¶328testimony could have been admitted as a statement against Daniel’s

¶329interest, but for such statement to be admissible, Daniel would have

¶330had to be unavailable at trial. See OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (3) (a

¶331statement against interest “shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule

¶332if the declarant is unavailable as a witness”). Given that Daniel

¶333testified at the motion for new trial hearing, and Anglin points to

¶334nothing else regarding his unavailability at trial, he has not met this

¶335threshold requirement.

¶336 Anglin also argues that the hearsay statements could have

¶337been admissible under the residual hearsay exception in OCGA § 24-

¶3388-807 (“Rule 807”), because Daniel’s confession was a statement

¶339against interest that had a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness.

¶340See Wilson v. State, 301 Ga. 83, 89 (2) (799 SE2d 757) (2017)

¶341(statements against interest generally have a sufficient guarantee

¶342 20 of trustworthiness to be admissible under Rule 807). But a sufficient

¶343guarantee of trustworthiness is not the only criteria for admitting

¶344evidence under Rule 807.3 Although the text of Rule 807 does not

¶345explicitly require a declarant to be unavailable to admit the

¶346declarant’s statement, the declarant’s availability “re-enters the

¶347analysis” because the rule requires “that the proponent use

¶348reasonable efforts to procure the most probative evidence on the

¶349points sought to be proved.” State v. Hamilton, 308 Ga. 116, 126 (4)

¶350(b) (839 SE2d 560) (2020). To admit the hearsay statements of

¶351Houseman and Thomas, Anglin would have to establish that their

¶352statements were “more probative on the point for which [they were]

¶353offered than any other evidence which [he] could have procured

¶354 3 Rule 807 provides that:

¶355 A statement not specifically covered by any law but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that: (1) The statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (2) The statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (3) The general purposes of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. 21 through reasonable efforts.” Id. at 126-127 (citation and punctuation

¶356omitted).

¶357 Anglin has not shown that he needed Houseman’s and

¶358Thomas’s statements to prove the point he says he wanted to make.

¶359At trial and at the hearing on his motion for new trial, Anglin argued

¶360that the evidence was needed to show that the investigation was

¶361“shoddy” and unreliable, and that he was not trying to prove the

¶362truth of the matter Houseman and Thomas asserted ⸺ that Daniel

¶363actually confessed to killing Ruark. 4 Despite his claims to the

¶364contrary, Anglin was able to present evidence to establish this point

¶365without getting into the substance of Houseman’s and Thomas’s

¶366statements. In his examination of Sheriff Berry and Investigator

¶367Hale, Anglin elicited testimony that the sheriff’s office had received

¶368some information about Daniel but that the sheriff’s office did not

¶369 4 If Anglin were trying to prove this point, Daniel’s testimony would be more probative than Houseman’s and Thomas’s statements. But, as discussed above, there is no showing that Daniel would have been unavailable at Anglin’s trial, so Rule 807 would still not allow the statements at issue. Anglin does not argue that Houseman’s or Thomas’s statements were admissible under any other exception to the hearsay rule. 22 document this or investigate the claimed admission. Based on this

¶370evidence, Anglin’s trial counsel highlighted to the jury in closing

¶371argument that the sheriff’s office’s investigation was inadequate,

¶372and questioned Investigator Hale’s motive for not disclosing the

¶373information sooner.

¶374 There is no merit to Anglin’s argument that the trial court

¶375erred in limiting his questioning of Sheriff Berry and Investigator

¶376Hale. The additional questioning sought by Anglin regarded

¶377inadmissible hearsay. Anglin presented evidence and arguments

¶378that he now claims he was prevented from presenting, but the jury

¶379was unmoved. Anglin presents nothing on appeal to show that an

¶380earlier disclosure would have made any difference. Therefore, he has

¶381failed to establish that the delayed disclosure materially prejudiced

¶382him or deprived him of a fair trial. See Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 593,

¶383596 (3), (740 SE2d 147) (2013) (when audio recording of interview

¶384was disclosed after voir dire but before any witnesses testified,

¶385Brady was not violated because the defendant did not show that an

¶386earlier disclosure would have benefited his defense or that the delay

¶387 23 deprived him of a fair trial); Young v. State, 290 Ga. 441, 443 (2) (721

¶388SE2d 839) (2012) (failure to disclose report that purportedly

¶389established the lead investigator’s reputation for falsifying reports

¶390and lying under oath did not amount to a Brady violation because

¶391the report was inadmissible hearsay that the defendant failed to

¶392show would have led to admissible evidence); Burgan v. State, 258

¶393Ga. 512, 513-514 (1) (371 SE2d 854) (1988) (Brady not violated by

¶394late disclosure of witness’s prior inconsistent statements where

¶395witness was extensively cross-examined about prior inconsistencies,

¶396earlier disclosure would not have benefited the defense, and the

¶397delay did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial or materially

¶398prejudice his defense).

¶399 3. Anglin argues that his trial counsel provided constitutionally

¶400ineffective assistance by failing to object to testimony by a GBI agent

¶401that, based on soil patterns, Ruark’s grave had been dug with a flat

¶402shovel. Anglin argues that this testimony amounted to expert

¶403testimony and that the agent had not been qualified as an expert in

¶404soil pattern analysis. In rejecting Anglin’s ineffectiveness claim, the

¶405 24 trial court found that the testimony was admissible under OCGA §

¶40624-7-701 (a) (“Rule 701 (a)”). We agree with the trial court on this

¶407point.

¶408 To prevail on his claim, Anglin must show both that his

¶409counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and that he

¶410was prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Strickland v.

¶411Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

¶412To establish deficient performance, Anglin must “overcome the

¶413strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide

¶414range of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel’s

¶415decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional

¶416judgment.” Mims v. State, 304 Ga. 851, 855 (2) (823 SE2d 325) (2019)

¶417(citation and punctuation omitted). “[D]ecisions regarding trial

¶418tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim

¶419only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent

¶420attorney would have followed such a course.” Richards v. State, 306

¶421Ga. 779, 781 (2) (833 SE2d 96) (2019) (citation and punctuation

¶422omitted). To demonstrate prejudice, Anglin must establish “a

¶423 25 reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

¶424the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

¶425probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

¶426outcome.” Mims, 304 Ga. at 855 (2) (citation and punctuation

¶427omitted). If Anglin fails to meet his burden in establishing one prong

¶428of the Strickland test, this is fatal to his claim. See Smith v. State,

¶429296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) (770 SE2d 610) (2015).

¶430 Rule 701 (a) provides that a lay witness may testify “in the form

¶431of opinions or inferences that are rationally based on the witness’s

¶432perception, helpful to a clear understanding of the determination of

¶433a fact in issue, and not based on scientific, technical, or other

¶434specialized knowledge.” Bullard v. State, 307 Ga. 482, 491 (4) (837

¶435SE2d 348) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). Anglin argues

¶436that Rule 701 (a) was not satisfied because the GBI agent’s

¶437testimony was based on scientific, technical, or other specialized

¶438knowledge. But the record does not support Anglin’s claim. The GBI

¶439agent testified about his observations of the grave site, and that its

¶440characteristics ⸺ sharp angles and flat, level surfaces in the soil ⸺

¶441 26 were more consistent with being dug by a flat shovel than a rounded

¶442one. The agent’s visual observations and conclusions drawn from

¶443those observations did not depend on “scientific, technical, or other

¶444specialized knowledge.” See Carter v. State, 310 Ga. 559, 564 (2) (a)

¶445(852 SE2d 542) (2020) (a GBI agent’s shoeprint analysis was a

¶446“basic” visual comparison that did not require specialized

¶447knowledge); see also United States v. Williams, 865 F3d 1328, 1342

¶448(11th Cir. 2017) (an “opinion relating to the appearance of persons

¶449or things, . . . size, weight, and distance are prototypical examples of

¶450the type of evidence contemplated by [Federal] Rule 701” (citation

¶451and punctuation omitted)).5 Trial counsel was therefore not deficient

¶452for failing to make a meritless objection. See Lord v. State, 304 Ga.

¶453532, 540 (7) (a) (820 SE2d 16) (2018).

¶454 4. Anglin argues that he is entitled to a new trial due to the

¶455cumulative prejudice caused by the trial court’s errors and his trial

¶456 5 Because OCGA § 24-7-701 (a) was modeled on Federal Rule of Evidence 701, we look to decisions of the federal appellate courts, especially the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, for guidance when considering the meaning of this Georgia evidence rule. See Bullard, 307 Ga. at 492 (4). 27 counsel’s ineffectiveness. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 13-14 (1)

¶457(838 SE2d 808) (2020). With the exception of Anglin’s argument

¶458regarding the denial of his motion for a continuance, we rejected

¶459every claim of trial court and trial counsel error. On Anglin’s claim

¶460that the court erred in denying his request for a continuance, we

¶461found that Anglin failed to show harm. And this assumed error,

¶462individually harmless, is insufficient to establish cumulative error.

¶463See Beck v. State, 310 Ga. 491, 499 (3) n.5 (852 SE2d 535) (2020)

¶464(cumulative prejudice analysis does not apply when there are not

¶465multiple errors to aggregate).

¶466 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

¶467 28