¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: June 21, 2021
¶3 S21A0941. GILLIAM v. THE STATE.
¶4 MCMILLIAN, Justice.
¶5 In 2005, Kelvin Gilliam was jointly tried with Frederick Terrell
¶6and Michael Stinchcomb on an indictment charging them with one
¶7count of murder, one count of felony murder, multiple counts of
¶8aggravated assault, and related firearms charges. The jury found
¶9only Terrell guilty of murder, among other charges, but found
¶10Gilliam and Stinchcomb guilty of multiple counts of aggravated
¶11assault. The trial court sentenced Gilliam to serve a total of ten
¶12years in prison, and Gilliam timely filed a motion for new trial. For
¶13reasons that are not apparent from the record, that motion
¶14languished for years, until Gilliam filed an amended motion for new
¶15trial in May 2019, adopting all of the grounds set out in Terrell’s
¶16amended motion for new trial. The trial court denied Terrell’s and Gilliam’s motions, and both defendants filed a timely notice of
¶17appeal directed to this Court. Because we do not have jurisdiction
¶18over Gilliam’s appeal, however, we must transfer this case to the
¶19Court of Appeals.
¶20 This Court’s jurisdiction “is fixed by the Georgia Constitution
¶21and the statutory law.” Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 177 (3) (a) (829
¶22SE2d 348) (2019). “It is not only the right but the duty of a reviewing
¶23or appellate court to raise the question of its jurisdiction in all cases
¶24in which there may be any doubt as to the existence of such
¶25jurisdiction.” Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793, 796 (40 SE 857) (1902).
¶26 Gilliam concedes that his convictions for aggravated assault do
¶27not invoke this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See Ga. Const. of 1983,
¶28Art. VI, Sec. VI, Pars. II and III. Instead, citing Morrison v.
¶29Morrison, 284 Ga. 112 (663 SE2d 714) (2008), Gilliam asserts that,
¶30because Terrell’s appeal from his murder conviction would fall
¶31within this Court’s jurisdiction, this Court should also extend
¶32jurisdiction to his appeal “to foster judicial economy.” We
¶33acknowledge that this Court has previously expressed a willingness
¶34 2 to retain jurisdiction of certain appeals in the interest of judicial
¶35economy, see id. at 112 (despite questioning jurisdiction, retaining
¶36appeal for purposes of “judicial economy”), and we now address this
¶37anomaly in our jurisprudence.
¶38 It appears that this Court first invoked judicial economy as a
¶39basis for subject matter jurisdiction in Beauchamp v. Knight, 261
¶40Ga. 608, 610 n.1 (409 SE2d 208) (1991), in which we expressly noted
¶41that the appeal was not an equity case, but nonetheless retained the
¶42appeal for “reasons of judicial economy.” Since then, we have
¶43occasionally expanded this concept to other appeals squarely outside
¶44our jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nowlin v. Davis, 278 Ga. 240, 240 n.1 (599
¶45SE2d 128) (2004) (“[D]espite the trial court’s discussion of equitable
¶46principles in its second order and its grant of an equitable remedy,
¶47this appeal is not an equity case within our appellate jurisdiction. In
¶48the interest of judicial economy, however, we will resolve the appeal
¶49on its merits.”).
¶50 Because “[q]uestions pertaining to [this Court’s] jurisdiction
¶51cannot be sidestepped or pretermitted, as they go to the threshold
¶52 3 question of whether [this Court] has the authority to decide the
¶53merits of the case[,]” Duke, 306 Ga. at 181 (3) (b), we must now
¶54consider whether to retain Gilliam’s appeal and whether this line of
¶55cases was rightly decided. As we have recently noted, “[w]hile, in
¶56some cases, the interests of judicial economy may not be served
¶57when a reversible error is addressed by appellate courts only after
¶58the entry of a final judgment, that is not a problem this Court is
¶59empowered to remedy.” Id. at 179 (3) (a). Here, the only basis for this
¶60Court to exercise jurisdiction over Gilliam’s appeal would be to serve
¶61the interest of judicial economy, but Gilliam points to no statute or
¶62constitutional provision authorizing this Court to exercise
¶63jurisdiction on that basis. None of the cases in which this Court has
¶64exercised jurisdiction in the interest of judicial economy has
¶65identified the basis of our authority to do so; in those cases we
¶66pretermitted the jurisdictional question or actually recognized that
¶67there was no basis for jurisdiction. Based on our independent
¶68review, we discern no statutory or constitutional basis for invoking
¶69this Court’s jurisdiction solely in the interest of judicial economy.
¶70 4 Thus, we conclude that this line of cases was not rightly decided.
¶71 However, we must now address whether considerations of
¶72stare decisis nonetheless weigh in favor of retaining judicial
¶73economy as a basis for exercising this Court’s jurisdiction. Under the
¶74doctrine of stare decisis, we generally stand by our prior decisions to
¶75“promote[] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
¶76development of legal principles, foster[] reliance on judicial
¶77decisions, and contribute[] to the actual and perceived integrity of
¶78the judicial process.” State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 123 (2) (829 SE2d
¶79367) (2019) (citation omitted). However, stare decisis “is not an
¶80inexorable command[,]” and “[i]n reconsidering our prior decisions,
¶81we must balance the importance of having the question decided
¶82against the importance of having it decided right.” Id. (citation
¶83omitted; emphasis in original). In making this determination, we
¶84consider “the age of precedent, the reliance interests at stake, the
¶85workability of the decision, and, most importantly, the soundness of
¶86its reasoning.” Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 244-45 (2) (c) (iv) (806
¶87SE2d 505) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶88 5 We begin by noting that it is well settled that stare decisis
¶89applies with the least force to constitutional precedents. See Ga.
¶90Dept. of Nat. Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294
¶91Ga. 593, 601 (2) (755 SE2d 184) (2014). We have explained the
¶92reason for this approach: “it is much harder for the democratic
¶93process to correct or alter our interpretation of the Constitution than
¶94our interpretation of a statute or regulation.” Id. (citation omitted).
¶95But even in constitutional cases,
¶96 [t]his doesn’t mean that we disregard stare decisis altogether . . . ; what it actually means is that the . . . soundness of reasoning [factor] becomes even more critical. The more wrong a prior precedent got the Constitution, the less room there is for the other factors to preserve it.
¶97Olevik, 302 Ga. at 245 (2) (c) (iv) (punctuation omitted).
¶98 Here, the soundness factor weighs heavily in favor of
¶99overruling cases in which this Court has ignored the constitutional
¶100parameters of its jurisdiction without any significant analysis. See
¶101Olevik, 302 Ga. at 244 (2) (c) (iii) (lack of analysis and summary
¶102conclusion supported overruling cases); State v. Hudson, 293 Ga.
¶103 6 656, 661 (748 SE2d 910) (2013) (overruling holding that contained
¶104no analysis). And none of the remaining factors support retaining
¶105judicial economy as a basis for jurisdiction. The earliest case was
¶106decided 30 years ago, and we have overruled decisions older than
¶107that. See, e.g., Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) (796 SE2d 261)
¶108(2017) (overruling 45-year-old precedent); Hudson, 293 Ga. at 661
¶109(overruling 38-year-old precedent). And these “judicial economy”
¶110cases created no reliance interest of the sort normally given weight
¶111in stare decisis analysis. See, e.g., Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 641
¶112(5) (b) (774 SE2d 624) (2015) (substantial reliance interests are most
¶113common in contract and property cases where parties may have
¶114acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order to conduct
¶115transactions). Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction based solely on
¶116notions of judicial economy has no concrete standards, such that
¶117neither litigants nor the Court of Appeals have been able to predict
¶118when this Court will exercise such jurisdiction. We believe it is thus
¶119more workable for both litigants and appellate courts to apply clear
¶120jurisdictional rules as set out in our Constitution and statutes,
¶121 7 which do not depend on whether this Court believes that deciding a
¶122particular case is more expedient than transferring the case.1 Cf.
¶123Duke, 306 Ga. at 185-86 (4) (noting significant workability problems
¶124presented when a court has no means of predicting when a case may
¶125be snatched from its docket).
¶126 In sum, stare decisis factors weigh in favor of overruling these
¶127precedents. Accordingly, we disapprove the following cases to the
¶128extent that they purported to exercise this Court’s jurisdiction based
¶129solely on judicial economy: Morrison, 284 Ga. at 112 (“Pretermitting
¶130whether jurisdiction is proper in this Court, we have retained this
¶131appeal for reasons of judicial economy.”); Nowlin, 278 Ga. at 240 n.1;
¶132Gates v. Gates, 277 Ga. 175, 176 (1) (587 SE2d 32) (2003) (“We
¶133conclude, therefore, that jurisdiction over this case lies in the Court
¶134of Appeals. Nevertheless, we retain the case in the interests of
¶135 1 We also note that we have not retained a case based on “judicial economy” in over a decade, and in fact have transferred or returned several cases to the Court of Appeals invoking “judicial economy” in unpublished orders since that time. See, e.g., McDaniel-Ivey v. A&S Repairs & Remodeling, Case No. S19A0109 (Sept. 24, 2018) (returning appeal to Court of Appeals in part because “judicial economy is not a proper basis for this Court’s jurisdiction”). 8 judicial economy, and will decide the tort immunity question which
¶136we posed upon granting this interlocutory appeal.”); Bush v. State,
¶137273 Ga. 861, 861 n.1 (548 SE2d 302) (2001) (“Although we would
¶138ordinarily transfer to the Court of Appeals a case in which the issue
¶139on which our jurisdiction was predicated was not ripe for decision,
¶140we deem it appropriate under the circumstances of this case to
¶141retain jurisdiction as a matter of judicial economy.”); Glynn County
¶142Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Haller, 273 Ga. 649, 649 (1) (543 SE2d 699)
¶143(2001) (“Since the grant of equitable relief is merely ancillary to the
¶144legal issue, this appeal is not an equity case within our appellate
¶145jurisdiction. In the interest of judicial economy, however, we will
¶146resolve the legal issues raised on appeal.”); Little v. City of
¶147Lawrenceville, 272 Ga. 340, 340 (528 SE2d 515) (2000) (“Although it
¶148now appears that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case,
¶149we have retained it for reasons of judicial economy.”); Flint Elec.
¶150Membership Corp. v. Barrow, 271 Ga. 636, 636 n.1 (523 SE2d 10)
¶151(1999) (“Although this Court is without original appellate
¶152jurisdiction in this case, we take jurisdiction of it in the interest of
¶153 9 judicial economy.”); Douglas v. Wages, 271 Ga. 616, 617 n.2 (523
¶154SE2d 330) (1999) (“Despite our lack of initial appellate jurisdiction,
¶155we have addressed the merits of appellants’ appeal in the interest of
¶156judicial economy.”); Parker v. Peaceful Valley Property Owners Assn.,
¶157271 Ga. 325, 325 n.1 (519 SE2d 440) (1999) (“Although our
¶158jurisdiction in this restrictive covenant case is questionable . . . , we
¶159retain this appeal in the interest of judicial economy.”); Akins v.
¶160Couch, 271 Ga. 276, 277 n.1 (518 SE2d 674) (1999) (“The Court of
¶161Appeals of Georgia generally exercises jurisdiction over similar
¶162cases that seek rescission and damages. Nevertheless, because the
¶163parties have submitted briefs and have had oral argument before
¶164this Court, in the interests of judicial economy, we will retain the
¶165case.”); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 270 Ga. 461, 461 (510 SE2d 810) (1999)
¶166(“We now hold that . . . jurisdiction lies in the Court of Appeals of
¶167Georgia. For reasons of judicial economy, we address the merits and
¶168reverse . . . .”); Cline v. McMullan, 263 Ga. 321, 321 n.1 (431 SE2d
¶169368) (1993) (“Jurisdiction of this case lies in the Court of Appeals,
¶170but this court elected to hear this appeal in the interest of judicial
¶171 10 economy.”); Beauchamp, 261 Ga. at 610 (2) n.1 (“We did not transfer
¶172this case back to the Court of Appeals for reasons of judicial economy
¶173and in order to reaffirm our earlier holdings that declare such
¶174appeals to be beyond our appellate jurisdiction.”).
¶175 Because appeals of convictions for aggravated assault do not
¶176fall within the scope of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, see
¶177Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Pars. II and III; OCGA § 15-3-
¶1783.1, we transfer this appeal to the Court of Appeals.
¶179 Appeal transferred to the Court of Appeals. All the Justices concur.
¶180 11