¶1In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶2 Decided: October 19, 2021
¶3 S21G0226. THE STATE v. STANFORD.
¶4 PETERSON, Justice.
¶5 The State challenges the suspension of part of Antwon
¶6Stanford’s recidivist burglary sentence. The trial court and the
¶7Court of Appeals concluded that the suspension was authorized by
¶8OCGA § 17-10-7 (a), part of the general recidivist statute, as
¶9interpreted by our decision in Goldberg v. State, 282 Ga. 542 (651
¶10SE2d 667) (2007). But Goldberg decided only the right length of
¶11recidivist burglary sentences, not whether they can be suspended for
¶12offenders like Stanford. OCGA § 16-7-1 (d), part of the burglary
¶13statute, plainly says they cannot, and that statute controls this case.
¶14Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand
¶15the case with direction.
¶16 The parties do not dispute the description of the relevant facts given by the Court of Appeals. See State v. Stanford, 356 Ga. App.
¶17594, 594 (848 SE2d 465) (2020). Stanford entered a non-negotiated
¶18guilty plea to one count of first-degree burglary. He had eight prior
¶19felony convictions, five of them for burglary. The State sought
¶20recidivist sentencing under OCGA §§ 16-7-1 and 17-10-7 (a) and (c).1
¶21The trial court sentenced Stanford to 25 years in prison, but
¶22suspended the final 20 years of that sentence. The State
¶23unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration as to the suspended
¶24portion, then appealed to the Court of Appeals. See id.
¶25 There, the State argued that OCGA § 16-7-1 (d) prohibited the
¶26trial court from suspending any portion of the burglary sentence.
¶27See Stanford, 356 Ga. App. at 594-595. But the Court of Appeals
¶28held that our decision in Goldberg dictated otherwise. It concluded
¶29that Goldberg “plainly and broadly announced that when a
¶30defendant is being prosecuted for burglary and is a habitual felon,
¶31as Stanford is, then the recidivist provisions in OCGA § 17-10-7
¶32 1 The Court of Appeals resolved the subsection (c) issue in the State’s favor. See Stanford, 356 Ga. App. at 596. Stanford did not seek certiorari as to this holding. 2 apply rather than the specific recidivist provisions in the burglary
¶33statute.” Stanford, 356 Ga. App. at 595-596 (citing Goldberg, 282 Ga.
¶34at 547).
¶35 We granted certiorari and now reverse. We begin with a brief
¶36explanation of the two statutes at issue, then explain why our
¶37decision in Goldberg does not apply here. We conclude that the
¶38relevant statute deprived the trial court of its normal discretion to
¶39suspend recidivist sentences.
¶40 The dispute here concerns the relationship between parts of
¶41OCGA §§ 16-7-1 and 17-10-7. The first statute defines burglary and
¶42sets forth its punishments. It contains a recidivist sentencing
¶43provision dictating that a defendant receive a prison sentence of “not
¶44less than five nor more than 25 years” for a third or subsequent
¶45burglary conviction. OCGA § 16-7-1 (b). It also restricts the
¶46sentences available to four-time recidivist burglars like Stanford,
¶47providing that “imposition of sentence shall not be suspended,
¶48probated, deferred, or withheld.” OCGA § 16-7-1 (d).
¶49 As for the second statute, it governs sentencing for recidivist
¶50 3 felons in general. As relevant here, it requires that an offender with
¶51one or more prior felony convictions not for a “serious violent felony”
¶52“be sentenced to undergo the longest period of time prescribed for
¶53the punishment of the subsequent offense[.]” OCGA § 17-10-7 (a).
¶54But it qualifies this requirement by granting judges some discretion
¶55over how much of the sentence has to be served in custody: “unless
¶56otherwise provided by law, the trial judge may . . . probate or
¶57suspend the maximum sentence[.]” Id. Of course, the “unless” part
¶58of that provision is a key to understanding OCGA § 17-10-7 (a)’s
¶59relationship with the wider statutory universe. So is OCGA § 17-10-
¶607 (e), which says the general recidivist statute is “supplemental to”
¶61⸺ not preempting or deferring to, but coequally with ⸺ “other
¶62provisions relating to recidivous offenders.”
¶63 Based on this language, and the background canon of in pari
¶64materia by which we construe related statutes to be compatible with
¶65each other, we have held that the general recidivist statute should
¶66be read harmoniously with other recidivism provisions. See
¶67Goldberg, 282 Ga. at 544, 546-547. Where possible, each should be
¶68 4 given effect when “applicable according to its terms.” Id. at 545
¶69(explaining how certain provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7 are
¶70“supplemental” to other recidivism provisions). In Goldberg, we
¶71specifically considered the relationship between OCGA § 17-10-7
¶72(a)’s requirement that recidivist felons be given maximally long
¶73sentences and one part of OCGA § 16-7-1 that, at the time,2
¶74authorized sentences of between five and 20 years for three-time
¶75burglars. See Goldberg, 282 Ga. at 543. We held that these laws
¶76could be harmonized by giving a recidivist who had only burglary
¶77convictions “the benefit of the trial court’s sentencing discretion” as
¶78to length under OCGA § 16-7-1, but requiring a recidivist with a mix
¶79of burglary and other felony convictions to be given the longest
¶80possible sentence under OCGA § 17-10-7 (a). Goldberg, 282 Ga. at
¶81547. Our decision was based partly on the absence of any language
¶82in one statute preventing the other’s application. See id. at 546.
¶83 Goldberg harmonized the two statutes insofar as the length of
¶84 2 This was changed in 2012. See the next footnote for more discussion of the statutory history. 5 sentences is concerned. But it did not decide the question before us
¶85today. It did not address the bar OCGA § 16-7-1 (d) imposes on
¶86suspended sentences for defendants like Stanford, who have four or
¶87more burglary convictions, nor the deference OCGA § 17-10-7 (a)
¶88affords to other laws limiting the suspension of sentences. It was
¶89simply silent as to these two points. It is true that when Goldberg
¶90was decided, both burglary sentence length and sentence suspension
¶91were addressed in a single statutory subsection. See OCGA § 16-7-1
¶92(b) (2006).3 And it is true that we mentioned in passing Goldberg’s
¶93 3 As mentioned in the preceding footnote, the burglary statute was heavily revised in 2012. See Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 4-4. Of particular note, the four-time-recidivist sentencing provision was separated out as subsection (d). But neither this nor the other changes materially altered the substance of the statutory text relevant to this case, and thus do not affect this case’s outcome. Of course, when statutory amendments do materially alter text that this Court has previously interpreted, our pre-amendment precedent no longer binds lower courts to the extent the amendments change the meaning of the text. See Pritchard v. State, 224 Ga. 776, 780 (164 SE2d 808) (1968) (“Since the statute authorizing directed verdicts in existence at the time the Sutton case was decided has been repealed, . . . [Sutton] is no longer controlling authority.”), abrogated by statute as recognized by Bowen v. State, 239 Ga. 517, 517 (1977). This principle is an exception to the general rule that lower courts must follow this Court’s precedent until we overrule it, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI; such a statutory change essentially represents the General Assembly’s abrogation of our previous decision. We leave it to future cases to determine if and how the 2012 amendments limit the reach of Goldberg’s specific holding. 6 own suspended sentence in our factual recitation. See Goldberg, 282
¶94Ga. at 543. But — as Stanford rightly acknowledges — our precedent
¶95makes it clear that “[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record,
¶96neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not
¶97to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute
¶98precedents.” Wolfe v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 300 Ga. 223,
¶99231 (2) (d) (794 SE2d 85) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted
¶100omitted). Because Goldberg did not consider — much less decide —
¶101whether the partial suspension of Goldberg’s sentence was lawful,
¶102that part of the opinion is not a holding on that point.
¶103 Turning back to the statutory provisions at issue in this case,
¶104we conclude that they plainly forbid suspending any part of
¶105Stanford’s sentence. OCGA § 17-10-7 (a)’s authorization of
¶106suspended sentences is expressly limited by any restrictions
¶107imposed by other laws. And OCGA § 16-7-1 (d) prohibits suspended
¶108sentences for defendants with four or more burglary convictions. The
¶109latter provision, then, controls ⸺ not in spite of OCGA § 17-10-7 (a),
¶110but squarely within the qualification found therein. Compare
¶111 7 Goldberg, 282 Ga. at 546 (basing holding partly on “the absence of
¶112language in OCGA § 16-7-1 . . . blocking application of . . . OCGA
¶113§ 17-10-7”).4
¶114 OCGA § 16-7-1 (d) bars suspension of Stanford’s sentence, so
¶115the sentence the trial court imposed was void. See, e.g., Philmore v.
¶116State, 300 Ga. 558, 558 (796 SE2d 652) (2017) (“[A] sentence which
¶117is not allowed by law is void[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶118Neither OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) nor Goldberg says otherwise. We
¶119therefore reverse the Court of Appeals’ conclusion to the contrary.
¶120We leave it for the trial court to exercise its discretion either to
¶121resentence Stanford entirely or merely to strike the suspension and
¶122leave the remainder of Stanford’s sentence in place. See Parrott v.
¶123State, ___ Ga. ___ (3) (Case No. S21A0753, decided Oct. 5, 2021).
¶124 Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.
¶125 4 Because there is no statutory ambiguity, the rule of lenity does not apply. See State v. Nankervis, 295 Ga. 406, 409 (761 SE2d 1) (2014) (“[T]he rule of lenity comes into play only to resolve ambiguities[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 8