Davis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(b) Remand for sentence or new trial; limitations on increases in sentences.—If an appellate court remands a criminal case to a lower court in order that the lower court may pronounce the proper judgment or sentence, or conduct a new trial, and if there is a conviction following this new trial, the lower court may impose any sentence authorized by law to be imposed as punishment for the offense. However, it may not impose a sentence more severe than the sentence previously imposed for the offense unless: (1) The reasons for the increased sentence affirmatively appear; (2) The reasons are based upon additional objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant; and (3) The factual data upon which the increased sentence is based appears as part of the record.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 133 Md. App. 325 - Dixon v. State · 204 Md. App. 593 - COLKLEY & FIELDS v. State

2. “[T]o assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal. 15”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dixon v. State

3. ““[T]he very threat inherent in the existence of such a punitive policy would, with respect to those still in prison, serve to ‘chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.’ [Citations omitted.] [S]ince the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 76 Md. App. 731 - Coley v. State