J-S40014-23
2024 PA Super 59
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DARREN LAWRENCE :
:
Appellant : No. 2486 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 9, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-15-CR0000869-2020
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2024
Appellant Darren Lawrence appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction of one count of rape of a child, ten counts of
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) with a child, five counts of
aggravated indecent assault of a child, and one count each of indecent assault
of a person less than thirteen years of age, endangering the welfare of children
(EWOC), and sexual abuse of children-photographing, videotaping, depicting
on computer or filming sexual acts.1 On appeal, Appellant raises multiple
claims concerning the hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion in limine, the
sufficiency of the evidence, his designation as a sexually violent predator
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(c), 3123(b), 3125(b), 3126(a)(7), 4304(a)(1), and
6312(b), respectively.
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(SVP), the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, and the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:
On February 21, 2020, Detective James Ciliberto of the Chester
County Detectives Office received a report of suspected child
abuse, otherwise referred to as a “CY104 report” or “Childline,”
involving [A.R.] and [] Appellant. Detective Ciliberto contacted
[A.R.] immediately and arranged for an interview on the same
day. During the interview, [A.R.] advised Detective Ciliberto that
Appellant sexually abused her from the age of nine (9) to
approximately twelve (12) years old. She informed Detective
Ciliberto she previously reported abuse when she was about
eighteen (18) or nineteen (19) years old and why she did not
move forward at the time. Detective Ciliberto later confirmed
[A.R.’s] statement of making a previous report as she had been
interviewed by retired [Pennsylvania] State Trooper Todd Hershey
when she was fourteen (14) years old.
[Trooper Hershey] testified at trial regarding his investigation
following a 2014 Childline report filed by [] Caryn Malatesta. Ms.
Malatesta, a mental health professional in the Avon Grove school
system, testified at trial she met [A.R.] on the recommendation of
a teacher due to “whatever transpired in that conversation. [A.R.]
revealed to Ms. Malatesta she had been sexually abused for
several years. Although [A.R.] willingly disclosed, for the first
time the past abuses she suffered, [A.R.] did not provide Ms.
Malatesta her abuser’s full name.
After receiving a report of suspected sexual abuse, Trooper
Hershey contacted [J.R., A.R.’s] mother, and set up a time to
conduct an interview of [A.R.] at the Pennsylvania State Police
Barracks in Avondale, PA (Troop J). As a highly trained and
experienced interviewer of child victims of abuse, Trooper Hershey
found [A.R.] to be hesitant, impatient, anxious, and frustrated
during their interview. Upon conclusion of [A.R.’s] interview,
Trooper Hershey spoke with [J.R.] and [A.R.] regarding the next
steps in the investigation, namely the need for a more detailed
forensic interview. However, [A.R.] failed to continue cooperating
with the investigation and Trooper Hershey closed the
investigation for reporting purposes.
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At twenty-two (22) years old, [A.R.] finally disclosed the
prolonged abuses she previously attempted to disclose were
perpetrated by Appellant. [A.R.] indicated she chose to come
forward due to her mother, [J.R.], having a conversation with
Appellant’s adopted daughter, [D.L. J.R.] inquired of [D.L.] of
possible abuse against her as well as disclosing alleged abuses
against [A.R.] At her interview, [A.R.] stated she performed oral
sex on [] Appellant approximately fifty (50) times during the three
(3) year period of abuse. Appellant performed oral sex on her
“pretty often.” Appellant photographed her nude. Appellant
digitally penetrated her vagina and anus. Appellant attempted to
insert his penis into her vagina. [A.R.] specifically indicated
Appellant performed these acts at her mother’s home, Appellant’s
home, Appellant’s neighbor’s home, and other various locations
within Chester County, Pennsylvania.
During the interview, at Detective Ciliberto’s direction, [A.R.]
provided her phone and consented to a digital download of its
contents. Detective Ciliberto then received approval for a
“consensual intercept” to be performed that night between [A.R.]
and Appellant. The “intercept” was executed that evening
between [A.R.] and Appellant to confirm or learn additional
information.
Although Appellant did not provide any meaningful information
and was unwilling to continue the conversation over the phone,
Appellant later agreed to an in-person meeting which occurred on
February 28, 2020. [A.R.] agreed to and did wear a “wire” to
record the conversation between herself and Appellant which
occurred on February 28, 2020. During the conversation,
Appellant made several incriminating statements ultimately
leading to his arrest and subsequent prosecution.
…
On September 22, 2021, after three days of trial, the jury found
Appellant [] guilty of nineteen (19) offenses stemming from
sexual abuse which occurred between 2008 and 2012 when [A.R.]
was between nine (9) and twelve (12) years of age. During the
trial, the Commonwealth established the incidents occurred in
multiple locations in Chester County, Pennsylvania, including
Appellant’s home, [A.R.’s] home, and Appellant’s vehicle, over the
course of approximately three (3) plus years.
On October 7, 2021, after being found guilty, the trial court
entered an order directing the State Sexual Offender Assessment
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Board (“SOAB”) to perform an assessment of Appellant to
determine if he meets the criteria to be statutorily classified as a
[SVP]. On November 30, 2021, the trial court entered an order
for a pre-sentence investigation. The Commonwealth filed a
memorandum in support of sentencing on July 27, 2022 and
Appellant filed a memorandum in support of motion for judgment
of acquittal on August 2, 2022.
A [SVP] assessment hearing was held on August 3, 2022 and
sentencing followed. During the SVP hearing, Dr. Bruce Mapes
testified on behalf of the Commonwealth as an expert in the field
of sexual offender assessment and treatment and Dr. Christopher
Lorah testified on behalf of Appellant as an expert in the field of
forensic psychology. After hearing both experts and argument of
counsel, the trial court declared Appellant [to be a] SVP and
proceeded to sentencing. During sentencing, Appellant presented
the following character witnesses: Anna Guy (Appellant’s
significant other) and [D.L.] (Appellant’s adopted daughter).
Appellant also presented a mitigation package for the [trial
court’s] consideration. The Commonwealth presented the
following character witnesses: [J.R. (A.R.’s] mother), [L.M.
(A.R.’s] foster mother), and A.R. (victim).
Appellant was re-sentenced on August 9, 2022 due to an error on
the sentencing sheet. [The trial court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate term of forty-two to eighty-six years’ incarceration.]
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider on August
12, 2022 and the trial court denied his motion on September 12,
2022. On September 30, 2022, Appellant filed the present appeal
and was ordered to file a statement of errors complained of on
appeal on October 4, 2022 and he filed his statement of errors on
October 25, 2022.
Trial Ct. Op., 12/30/22, at 3-7 (some formatting altered, quotation marks,
footnotes, and citations omitted). The trial court subsequently filed an opinion
addressing Appellant’s claims.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether [Appellant] was deprived of his right to be present at
a critical stage of trial, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
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Article I Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, for a
hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to admit
other acts evidence?
2. Whether the [trial court] erred in granting the Commonwealth’s
motion in limine to admit [Appellant’s] prior convictions for tax
fraud from 2001?
3. Whether the [trial court] erred in granting the Commonwealth’s
motion in limine to admit other[] acts evidence of a sexual
encounter between [Appellant] and the victim that occurred at
Six Flags Great Adventure?
4. Whether the trial court erred in failing to provide the jury with
an immediate and complete limiting instruction as to the
purpose of the evidence of the prior sexual encounter at Six
Flags Great Adventure, and the limiting instruction provided in
the jury charge was defective?
5. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain [Appellant’s]
convictions for ten counts of IDSI where there was only
testimony to support, at most, five to seven counts?
6. Whether the [trial court] erred in declaring [Appellant] a[] SVP
with no factual basis to make that determination when
[Appellant] had over ten years of non-detection, and there was
only evidence of his abuse against a single victim?
7. Whether the [trial court] erred in overruling [] Appellant’s
objections to the Commonwealth’s line of hypothetical
questioning of Dr. Lorah after the Commonwealth conceived of
hypotheticals and then attributed them to another expert
without any basis?
8. Whether the [trial court’s] sentence was an exercise of
discretion for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will[?]
The [trial court] remarked at sentencing that there should be
no volume discounts for such crimes evidencing a bias against
and ill-will toward Appellant?
9. Whether the [trial court’s] sentence double counted the
aggravating factors included in the sentencing guidelines to
impose a sentence that was an upward departure from the
aggravated range?
10. Whether [the trial court] imposed a de facto life sentence
on [Appellant] and did not adequately account for [Appellant’s]
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mitigating factors and his advanced age at the time of
sentencing[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.
Motion in Limine
In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it
held a hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion in limine outside of Appellant’s
presence. Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant argues that the motions hearing
was a critical stage of the criminal proceedings and that therefore, the trial
court’s decision to conduct the hearing in Appellant’s absence constitutes
reversible error. Id. at 9.
The Commonwealth responds that Appellant waived this issue by failing
to preserve it for appellate review. Commonwealth’s Brief at 11-12.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure mandate that “[i]ssues
not raised before the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Commonwealth v. Wallace,
289 A.3d 894, 908 (Pa. 2023).
In the instant case, the record reflects that on September 20, 2021, the
trial court held a hearing to address the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to
admit evidence of Appellant’s 2001 conviction for tax fraud. At the beginning
of the hearing, the trial court noted Appellant’s absence. N.T. Hr’g, 9/20/21,
at 3. Appellant’s attorney requested a brief recess so that he could attempt
to reach Appellant by telephone. Id. The trial court denied the request and
stated: “Let’s start with the motions in limine and then we can go from there.”
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Id. Appellant’s attorney responded: “We can do that, that’s fine. Certainly.”
Id. see also Appellant’s Brief at 8. Throughout the remainder of the hearing,
Appellant’s attorney did not raise an objection to conducting the hearing in
Appellant’s absence. N.T. Hr’g, 9/20/21, at 3-15. Based on this record, we
conclude that Appellant failed to object and raise this issue before the trial
court; therefore, he has waived this issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a);
Wallace, 289 A.3d at 908.
Appellant’s Prior Tax Fraud Conviction
In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when
it permitted the Commonwealth to impeach his credibility with evidence of his
convictions for tax fraud from 2001. Appellant’s Brief at 11. Specifically,
Appellant argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider alternative
measures “to admit [] Appellant’s prior employment into evidence” without
his “prejudicial” retirement from the Pennsylvania State Police, thereby
abusing its discretion. Id. at 15.
It is well settled that our standard of review of a trial court’s evidentiary
rulings is abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 265 A.3d 290,
297 (Pa. 2021). This Court has defined abuse of discretion as “not merely an
error of judgment, but [] rather the overriding or misapplication of the law or
the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,
prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.”
Commonwealth v. Santos,
176 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence permit the admission of evidence of
a conviction of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, commonly
referred to as crimen falsi offenses, for the sole purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness. Pa.R.E. 609(a); see also Commonwealth v.
Washington, 269 A.3d 1255, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc). Generally,
Rule 609 limits such evidence to convictions that occurred within the previous
ten years prior to the witness’s testimony. Pa.R.E. 609(b). Rule 609,
however, permits evidence of a conviction of a crimen falsi offense outside of
the ten-year lookback period if the probative value of the evidence
“substantially outweighs its prejudicial effects” and “the proponent gives an
adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party
has a fair opportunity to contest its use.” Pa.R.E. 609(b)(1)-(2).
This Court set forth the following factors that a trial court must consider
when determining whether to admit evidence of a conviction from outside the
ten-year lookback period:
1) the degree to which the commission of the prior offense
reflects upon the veracity of the defendant-witness; 2) the
likelihood, in view of the nature and extent of the prior record,
that it would have a greater tendency to smear the character
of the defendant and suggest a propensity to commit the crime
for which he stands charged, rather than provide a legitimate
reason for discrediting him as an untruthful person; 3) the age
and circumstances of the defendant; 4) the strength of the
prosecution's case and the prosecution’s need to resort to this
evidence as compared with the availability to the defense of
other witnesses through which its version of the events
surrounding the incident can be presented; and 5) the
existence of alternative means of attacking the defendant's
credibility.
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Commonwealth v. Palo, 24 A.3d 1050, 1056 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing
Commonwealth v. Randall,
528 A.2d 1326, 1328 (Pa. 1987) (citation
omitted)).
The trial court reached the following conclusion:
[The trial] court found the probative value substantially
outweighed its prejudicial effect. Further, Appellant received
adequate notice of the Commonwealth’s intent to use the prior
convictions as evidence. [The trial] court found, if Appellant chose
to testify during trial, the prior convictions and Appellant’s
subsequent termination from the state police would be relevant
and admissible rebuttal evidence. Initially, the trial court intended
to exclude the prior conviction, however, upon hearing the facts,
agreed that it was part of the Commonwealth’s case theory and
inevitable. Further, allowing the prior offense evidence to be
offered in the event Appellant testified enabled the jury to fully
consider the facts and circumstances surrounding Appellant’s
termination. Without this evidence, the Commonwealth
undoubtedly would have been prejudiced.
Although the exact factors were not placed on the record, it is
clear the factors set forth in Rule 609 and Randall were satisfied.
First, Appellant’s prior crimes, tax fraud and conspiracy to commit
tax fraud, directly reflect upon Appellant’s honesty and veracity
as a potential witness. Second, the prior crimes do not tend to
show that Appellant had a propensity to commit the crimes for
which he was charged. To the contrary, Appellant’s prior
convictions were non-violent crimes with no identifiable victim,
whereas here, Appellant’s crimes directly relate to the sexual
abuse of a single, minor victim [for whom he was entrusted to
care]. Furthermore, Appellant committed these offenses after
previously serving as a state trooper tasked with upholding the
law. Allowing the Commonwealth to offer Appellant’s prior
conviction as rebuttal evidence necessarily provided the jury a
complete perspective.
Third, Appellant was an adult when he committed the prior tax
and fraud offenses and the instant sexual offenses he now
appeals. Moreover, as stated above, Appellant was a state trooper
charged with upholding the law when he committed his prior
offenses and when he initially met the minor victim. The fourth
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and fifth factors can be assessed together. In the case at hand,
the Commonwealth’s need to resort to this evidence and the lack
of alternative means of attacking [] Appellant’s character clearly
weigh in favor of admitting the prior offenses in rebuttal, if
Appellant testified. As argued by the Commonwealth, the
credibility of the victim and Appellant, if he chose to testify, were
the crux of the case.
Trial Ct. Op. at 12-13 (citations and footnote omitted).
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court. See DiStefano, 265 A.3d at 297. The record reflects that the
trial court was initially inclined to exclude evidence of Appellant’s tax fraud
conviction, but warned the parties that if Appellant referenced the fact that he
was a former Pennsylvania State Police trooper, then evidence of his tax fraud
convictions would be admissible. N.T. Hr’g, 9/20/21, at 9. Even though an
on-the-record analysis of the Randall factors did not take place, we cannot
conclude that the trial court committed reversible error, as the probative value
of the evidence of Appellant’s prior convictions outweighed the prejudicial
effect. See Pa.R.E. 609(b)(1). As noted by the trial court, Appellant’s prior
criminal history “directly reflect[s] upon [his] honesty and veracity as a
potential witness.” Trial Ct. Op. at 12. The trial court further concluded that
Appellant’s prior convictions—all of which related to tax fraud—would not
suggest that “Appellant had a propensity to commit the crimes for which he
was charged.” Id. The trial court also noted Appellant’s status as a former
Pennsylvania State Police trooper “charged with upholding the law when he
committed his prior offenses and when he met [A.R.]” Id. at 13. For the
reasons set forth by the trial court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, we find that
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Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue. See Randall, 528 A.2d at
1328; Palo,
24 A.3d at 1056.
Prior Bad Acts Evidence
Next, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it permitted the
Commonwealth to introduce evidence of a sexual encounter between
Appellant and A.R. which occurred at Six Flags Great Adventure (Six Flags) in
the State of New Jersey. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant argues that
admission of this evidence would only serve to “enrage the jury further and
serve to bias them against [Appellant] when they learned of another,
uncharged action.” Id. at 16. Further, Appellant contends that introduction
of this evidence was confusing to the jury and that the prejudicial value of the
evidence outweighed any probative value. Id.
The Commonwealth responds that Appellant’s attorney agreed to the
admission of the evidence at trial; therefore, this issue is waived on appeal.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 38.
Our review of the record confirms that Appellant’s attorney agreed to
the admissibility of the evidence at issue. Specifically, the record reflects the
following:
[Appellant’s counsel]: Judge, in light -- and I apologize. [The
assistant district attorney] and I had multiple conversations, and
e-mails, and text[s], all kinds of communication over the past
couple of weeks. I don’t recall, and forgive me if we talked about
it and I forgot, the limiting instruction being referenced, and if it
was, I apologize, but if there is a limiting instruction, Judge, I
would agree. So, I think for continuity sake for, frankly, both
sides, excising that audio recording will make things, I think, more
confusing for the jury. So, I think if [the assistant district
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attorney] and I will commit to agreeing on a limiting instruction, I
would not have an objection to number three[2] with that
provision, Judge. An[d] again, [], I’m sorry if we talked about
that or referenced that.
[The Commonwealth]: I don’t know that I previously referenced
a limiting instruction, but I would agree that it is appropriate under
the circumstances.
The Court: All right. Very good. That agreement is accepted.
[Appellant’s counsel]: We’ll work on that before the end,
certainly. Thank you.
N.T. Trial, 9/20/21, at 13.
As noted above, to preserve an issue for appellate review, an appellant
must first raise the issue before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Here,
because Appellant’s attorney agreed to the admission of evidence concerning
a sexual encounter between Appellant and A.R. at Six Flags, he cannot
challenge that ruling on appeal. See Wallace, 289 A.3d at 908 (reiterating
that issues must be preserved before the trial court and generally cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal). Accordingly, this issue is waived on
appeal.
Jury Instructions
In his next issue, Appellant raises a challenge to the trial court’s jury
instructions regarding the evidence of an alleged sexual encounter at Six
Flags. Specifically, Appellant states that the trial court did not provide a jury
____________________________________________
2 “Number 3” refers to a Commonwealth motion in limine in which the
Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence that one of the incidents of
alleged abuse occurred at [Six Flags]” in the State of New Jersey.
Commonwealth’s Motions in Limine, 9/17/21.
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instruction regarding this evidence at the time of the testimony; rather, the
trial court provided the jury with a limiting instruction as part of the final
charge to the jury. Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant baldly claims that the
trial court erred when it failed “to provide the jury with an immediate and
complete limiting instruction as to the purpose of the evidence of [a] prior
sexual encounter at Six Flags [], and the limiting instruction provided in the
jury charge was defective.” Id.
Our review of the record confirms that Appellant did not object to the
lack of a limiting instruction at the time the Commonwealth introduced the
evidence concerning the prior sexual encounter between Appellant and A.R.
at Six Flags. See N.T. Trial, 9/21/21, at 20, 40, 42. We do note, however,
that a limiting instruction was discussed by the trial court and both parties
during a discussion regarding evidence of prior bad acts. See id. at 13.
Further, the record reflects that Appellant did not raise an objection to the
trial court’s final charge to the jury. See N.T. Trial, 9/22/22, at 210-11.
Accordingly, because Appellant failed to first raise the issue before the trial
court, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Wallace, 289 A.3d at 908.3
____________________________________________
3 Even if Appellant had adequately preserved this issue before the trial court
and not raised it for the first time on appeal, this issue is nonetheless waived
on appeal. It is well settled that “[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will
not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Commonwealth v.
Westlake, 295 A.3d 1281, 1286 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2023). In his brief, Appellant
alleges that the trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding the evidence of
a sexual encounter between Appellant and A.R. at Six Flags was defective, but
at no point does Appellant elaborate as to how or why the instruction was
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as it
pertains to several of his convictions for IDSI. Specifically, Appellant argues
that “the evidence was insufficient to sustain [Appellant’s] convictions for ten
counts of [IDSI] where there was only testimony to support, at most, five to
seven counts.” Appellant’s Brief at 18.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are
governed by the following standard:
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict
when it establishes each material element of the crime charged
and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable
doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in
contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human
experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient
as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim, the court
is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
In applying the above test, we may not reweigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for the fact-finder.
Commonwealth v. James, 297 A.3d 755, 764 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations
omitted). Importantly, it is well settled that in cases addressing sexually-
based offenses, the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant, if believed
____________________________________________
defective. See Appellant’s Brief at 17-18. Based on Appellant’s failure to
develop this issue, we find that this issue would be waived on that basis. See
Westlake,
295 A.3d at 1286 n.8.
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by the finder of fact, is sufficient to warrant a conviction. Commonwealth
v. Diaz, 152 A.3d 1040, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2016).
The Crimes Code defines IDSI, in relevant part, as deviate sexual
intercourse with a complainant who is less than thirteen years of age. 18
Pa.C.S. § 3123(b). Deviate sexual intercourse is defined by the Crimes Code
as follows:
Sexual intercourse per os or per anus between human beings and
any form of sexual intercourse with an animal. The term also
includes penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of
another person with a foreign object for any purpose other than
good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3101. This Court has determined that evidence of oral contact
between a defendant’s genitalia and the victim’s mouth is sufficient to warrant
a conviction of IDSI. Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 194 (Pa.
Super. 2007). Likewise, evidence that a defendant had oral contact with the
victim’s genitalia is sufficient to prove IDSI.
Id.
In the instant appeal, Appellant contends that A.R. testified,
at best, to only five to seven incidents of IDSI. The only incidents
with any specificity that even approached the elements for IDSI
were in a trailer at Baker Road, at a house on Mill Road, in []
Appellant’s car at Six Flags (which no elements of the crime
occurred [in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania]), and in []
Appellant’s truck behind a mushroom plant. Besides these
incidents, [A.R.] offered no further details or evidence of other
sexual abuse.
Appellant’s Brief at 18-19.
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The Commonwealth counters by arguing that a “thorough review of the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, does
not show that the evidence was so weak and inconclusive that a reasonable
factfinder could not be satisfied as to the guilt of [Appellant] beyond a
reasonable doubt. Commonwealth’s Brief at 54-55.
Preliminarily, we note that the Commonwealth initially charged
Appellant with thirty-six counts of IDSI; however, the Commonwealth only
elected to proceed with ten counts of IDSI at trial. During trial, the jury heard
testimony from the victim, A.R. A.R. testified regarding four sexual
encounters with Appellant at his residence on Mill Road. Specifically, A.R.
testified that Appellant asked her to perform oral sex in the living room of the
residence. N.T. Trial, 9/21/21, at 21-22. A.R. then testified that Appellant
performed oral sex on her in the laundry room of the residence and in a side
lawn. Id. at 24-25; 33. The jury heard further testimony from A.R. about an
encounter taking place between Appellant and A.R. in Appellant’s basement,
in which Appellant digitally penetrated A.R.’s anus. Id. at 29-31. A.R. also
testified that Appellant performed oral sex on her in her bedroom in a trailer
on Baker Road. Id. at 36-37. At the close of its direct-examination, the
Commonwealth elicited the following testimony:
Q: Now, I’m going to ask you, told us about a number of different
types of things that [Appellant] did to you and I’m going to try
and go through those. Okay? You told us that there were times
that he performed oral sex on you; is that right?
A: Yes.
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Q: And in that time period when you were between the ages of 9
and 12, about how often was that specific thing happening, him
performing oral sex on you?
A: Are you asking how many times?
Q: How many times or how often?
A: Just about every chance that he got when I would see him and
my mom wasn’t around, that was just something that we did as a
normal thing.
Q: Do you have any idea how many times that happened?
A: Too many for me to remember.
Q: Would you say it was more or less than 20 times?
A: At least 20 or more.
Id. at 44-45.
Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the
Commonwealth has met its burden of establishing Appellant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt as to ten counts of IDSI. See James, 297 A.3d at 764;
Diaz,
152 A.3d at 1047. The record specifically reflects that A.R. testified in
detail regarding five sexual encounters with Appellant at either his residence
or A.R.’s family’s trailer. A.R. testified more generally to other incidents, and
also told the jury that sexual encounters between herself and Appellant
occurred in excess of twenty times. This testimony permitted the jury to
reasonably infer that Appellant committed IDSI ten times. See James,
297
A.3d at 764. Accordingly, we find that the Commonwealth met its burden of
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed IDSI ten
times; therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
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SVP Designation
Appellant next raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying his SVP designation. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
designating him as an SVP because there was “no factual basis to make that
determination when [Appellant] had over ten years of non-detection, and
there was only evidence of his abuse against a single victim.” Appellant’s Brief
at 20.
In reviewing an SVP designation, we must determine whether the
Commonwealth presented clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
meets the statutory definition of an SVP. Commonwealth v. Hollingshead,
111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa. Super. 2015). “As with any sufficiency of the evidence
claim, we view all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth [as verdict winner].”
Id. (citation
omitted).
To prove a defendant is an SVP, the Commonwealth must first establish
that the defendant was convicted of a sexually violent offense. Then the
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant has “a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes [them] likely to engage in predatory sexually
violent offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.12. The statute defines “mental
abnormality” as “[a] congenital or acquired condition of a person that affects
the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes
that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes
the person a menace to the health and safety of other persons.” Id. The
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defendant’s conduct must be “predatory,” which the statute defines as “[a]n
act directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has been
instituted, established, maintained, or promoted, in whole or in part, in order
to facilitate or support victimization.” Id.; Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74
A.3d 1034, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also Commonwealth v. Geiter,
929 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa. Super. 2007).
In determining whether an individual meets the definition of an SVP, the
SOAB evaluates the following factors:
(1) Facts of the current offense, including:
(i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.
(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary
to achieve the offense.
(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.
(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.
(v) Age of the victim.
(vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual
cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime.
(vii) The mental capacity of the victim.
(2) Prior offense history, including:
(i) The individual’s prior criminal record.
(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.
(iii) Whether the individual participated in available
programs for sexual offenders.
(3) Characteristics of the individual, including:
(i) Age.
(ii) Use of illegal drugs.
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(iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental
abnormality.
(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the
individual’s conduct.
(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment
field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(b).
Here, the trial court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to
support Appellant’s designation as an SVP. See Trial Ct. Op. at 29-31. In
reaching that conclusion, the trial court explained:
Based on Dr. Mapes’ report and testimony, there are ample
reasons to declare Appellant an SVP. Appellant committed
multiple enumerated offenses over an extended period,
approximately more than three (3) years. He committed various
sexual offenses, and the offenses were against a single minor [for]
whom he acted as a caregiver [] at times. Additionally, there was
an approximately thirty-six (36) year difference in ages between
[A.R.] and Appellant. As opined by Dr. Mapes, Appellant squarely
meets the criteria to be diagnosed with pedophilic disorder under
the DSM-5[.]
…
As for predatory behavior, [the trial court placed] great emphasis
on the fact Appellant, as a former state trooper, committed these
offenses and continued to commit them for over three (3) years
and attempted to blame [A.R.] for his actions when confronted.
Dr. Mapes opined:
From the totality of information, it was my opinion that the
sexual relationship started at an early onset in their
relationship. And then at one point, he was trying to
convince [J.R.] to allow [A.R.] to move to Texas with him,
so he could adopt her. Again, the totality of information
showed him getting [too] close to [A.R.] and repetitively
offending. And based upon that, it was my opinion that the
instant offense meets the predatory behavior criteria.
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[N.T. SVP Hr’g, 8/3/22, at 22.]
Despite Appellant offering his own expert, Dr. [] Lorah’s testimony
did not refute the facts, report, and diagnosis as attested by Dr.
Mapes. Appellant and his expert would have [the trial court]
accept there “are no facts to support the finding of SVP” because
his offenses against a single victim were not detected for ten (10)
years. The fact Appellant committed the offenses for over three
(3) years against a minor [for] whom he was entrusted to care []
did not affect Dr. Lorah’s expert opinion in evaluating the statutory
standards, despite such behavior matching the statutory definition
of predatory. Appellant’s contention is utterly without merit and
is rebutted by Dr. Mapes’ report, testimony and the law
surrounding SVP determinations.
Dr. Mapes specifically testified to Appellant’s mental abnormality
or personality disorder [as] follows:
…
At the time, he was over 16. He was more than five years
older than [A.R.] The offenses occurred over a three to four
year period of time for more than six months. [A.R. was]
under age. . . . [S]he was between the ages of nine and 12
when the offending occurred. As a result of his sexual
interest with [A.R.], he has been incarcerated, which will
affect multiple areas of his life. Accordingly, he meets DSM-
5 criteria for the diagnosis of pedophilic disorder.
N.T. SVP Hr’g at 16-17.
Dr. Mapes further testified to Appellant’s risk of re-offending. “An
adult male who commits multiple offenses against an underage
victim over approximately a three to four year period of time is
considered higher risk for reoffending.” [Id. at 19.] “One who
suffers from pedophilic disorder and who commits multiple
offenses over [a] three to four year period of time is much more
likely to reoffend [than] as someone who does not suffer from that
disorder.” Id. at 20-21.
Id. (some citations omitted and formatting altered).
Based on our review of the record and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, we agree with the trial court that the
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SOAB report contains clear and convincing evidence that Appellant has mental
abnormalities and disorders that make him likely to engage in predatory
sexually violent offenses. See Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 189-90.
Therefore, we conclude that Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his designation as an SVP is meritless and no relief is due.
Evidentiary Issues at the SVP Hearing
Next, Appellant contends that the trial court “erred in overruling []
Appellant’s objections to the Commonwealth’s line of hypothetical questioning
of Dr. [Christopher P.] Lorah[, PhD,] after the Commonwealth conceived of
hypotheticals and then attributed them to another expert without any basis.”
Appellant’s Brief at 22 (emphasis added). Although Appellant acknowledges
that he referred to Dr. Mapes, rather than Dr. Lorah, in his Rule 1925(b)
statement, he argues that it was a mistake. Further, he asserts that the trial
court “recognize[d] the minor error and acknowledge[d] that [] Appellant
most likely intended ‘Dr. Lorah.’ For this reason, this issue is not waived.”
Id. at 22 n.8.
The Commonwealth responds that Appellant has waived this issue
because his Rule 1925(b) statement identified a claim concerning
“hypothetical questioning of Dr. [Bruce] Mapes[, PhD,] not Dr. Lorah.”
Commonwealth’s Brief at 65 (emphasis in original).
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court does note that “Appellant
objected to the Commonwealth’s line of questioning of Dr. Lorah, not Dr.
Mapes.” Trial Ct. Op. at 34. The court further noted that Appellant ordered
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the SVP hearing transcript on September 30, 2022, and received it on
November 23, 2022, while filing his Rule 1925(b) statement on October 25,
2022. Id. n.15. Critically, “Appellant did not seek to amend his statement of
errors or seek an extension of time to file with aid of the transcript.” Id.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require appellants to,
when ordered by the trial court, file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal which identifies “each error that the appellant intends to assert
with sufficient detail to identify the issue raised for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(ii). Failure to do so could result in waiver. Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(vii). “[A]n appellant’s concise statement must identify the errors
with sufficient specificity for the trial court to identify and address the issues
the appellant wishes to raise on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Arnold, 284
A.3d 1262, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). Waiver is not required,
however, in cases in which our ability to effectuate meaningful appellate
review is not hindered. Commonwealth v. Landis,
277 A.3d 1172, 1182
(Pa. Super. 2022).
In the instant case, it is clear from the record that Appellant identified
the incorrect witness in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Despite Appellant’s
failure to correct his Rule 1925(b) statement, in this instance, we find that our
ability to effectuate meaningful appellate review has not been hindered;
therefore, we will not deem this issue to be waived and we shall proceed to
review this issue on the merits. See id.
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As noted above, Appellant’s issue surrounds the Commonwealth’s cross-
examination of Dr. Lorah. Specifically, Appellant contends that “the
Commonwealth framed hypotheticals as if another non-testifying, non-present
expert[, Dr. Hanson,4] was to ask the hypotheticals. Although the questions
were cloaked as expert opinion, they were just mere assertions by the
Commonwealth[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 22. Our standard of review is abuse
of discretion. DiStefano, 265 A.3d at 297.
This Court has held:
[I]t is well-settled that the Commonwealth may ask
an expert a hypothetical question so long as there is evidence of
record supporting the hypothetical. [A]n expert may give
an opinion in response to a hypothetical, provided the set of facts
assumed in the hypothetical is eventually supported by competent
evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom.
Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 957-58 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(citations omitted; some formatting altered).
The trial court reached the following conclusion:
A thorough and careful review of the record shows Appellant’s
claim fails. . . . [T]he Commonwealth did not conceive
hypotheticals and attribute them to another, non-testifying
expert. Rather, as permitted by the rules of evidence, on cross-examination, the Commonwealth probed Appellant’s expert and
his knowledge of information forming the basis of his opinion.
Appellant’s expert acknowledged on record the Static-99R
individualized risk assessment helped form the basis of his
opinion. Dr. Lorah credited Dr. Hanson as the author of the Static-
99R and many supporting articles cited in his own report
concerning the case at bar. Appellant further conceded
____________________________________________
4 Dr. Hanson’s first name does not appear in the record.
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Pennsylvania law does not require individualized risk assessments
such as the Static-99R.
Even if the questions posed by the Commonwealth are considered
“hypotheticals attributed to another expert,” they are not “without
any basis,” as Appellant asserts in his Statement of Errors. Dr.
Lorah explicitly stated on record his opinion differs from Dr.
Mapes’ opinion based on his personal decision to perform and
score the Static-99R, even if not required under Pennsylvania law.
The Commonwealth, on cross-examination, questioned Dr. Lorah
regarding his knowledge of individualized risk assessments such
as the Static-99R and Pennsylvania law. The Commonwealth
specifically asked Dr. Lorah if he is aware the author of the Static-
99R previously testified contrary to what Dr. Lorah put in his
report and then testified to. When questioned further, Dr. Lorah
recognized and acknowledged if the Static-99R guidelines were
adhered to as written by Dr. Hanson, a different result would have
been reached. For Appellant to claim this is improper questioning
flies in the face of the purpose of cross-examination.
Trial Ct. Op. at 37-38.
Based on our review of the record, we can discern no abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court. The record reflects that Appellant’s expert
witness, Dr. Lorah, referenced the Static-99R in his report. N.T. SVP Hr’g at
49.5 On cross-examination, Dr. Lorah testified that based, in part, on the
Static-99R, he believed Appellant to be a low risk for re-offending. Id. at 59.
Dr. Lorah further testified that risk assessments such as the Static-99R are
appropriate and that he felt “obligated to inform the [trial court] of the status
of the literature.” Id. at 62. On this basis, the trial court permitted the
Commonwealth to cross-examine Dr. Lorah using hypotheticals regarding Dr.
____________________________________________
5 As noted by Dr. Lorah, Dr. Mapes also referenced the Static-99R. N.T. SVP
Hr’g at 30-31. Dr. Mapes testified that the Static-99R is an individualized risk
assessment; however, it is not used in Pennsylvania under SORNA. Id. at 31.
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Hanson because he was the author of the report used by Dr. Lorah in his
analysis. Id. at 68-69. Based on this record, we find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion, as the hypotheticals employed by the Commonwealth
had an evidentiary basis in the record. Clemat, 218 A.3d at 957-58.
Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
Discretionary Aspects of Sentence
In his final three issues, Appellant raises challenges to the discretionary
aspects of his sentence. Appellant first contends that the trial court exhibited
bias and ill will toward Appellant when it stated that Appellant was not entitled
to a volume discount for multiple criminal acts. Appellant’s Brief at 29.
Appellant next argues that the trial court’s “sentence double counted the
aggravating factors included in the sentencing guidelines to impose a sentence
that was an upward departure from the aggravated range[,]” of the
sentencing guidelines. Id. Finally, Appellant alleges that the trial court’s
aggregate sentence amounted to a de facto life sentence, and that the trial
court failed to “adequately account for [Appellant’s] mitigating factors and his
advanced age at the time of sentencing.” Id. at 30-31.
“[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle
an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,
991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such
claims, we must determine:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
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allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the
sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted).
“To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an
appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.
Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247,
1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d
1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “A substantial question
exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the
sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific
provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms
which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays,
167 A.3d
793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
Here, the record confirms that Appellant preserved his sentencing claims
in a post-sentence motion, filed a timely notice of appeal, and included the
issues in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellant has also included a Rule
2119(f) statement in his brief. Additionally, we conclude that Appellant has
raised a substantial question for review. See Commonwealth v. Bankes,
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286 A.3d 1302, 1306 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that “the decision to sentence
consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to . . . an excessive level in light
of the criminal conduct” raises a substantial question); Commonwealth v.
Watson,
228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa. Super. 2020) (holding that a claim that a
sentencing court “double counted factors already considered in the sentencing
guidelines raises a substantial question”); Derry, 150 at 995 (Pa. Super.
2016) (holding that sentences which are the product of, inter alia, bias or ill
will, are “necessarily contrary to the fundamental norms of sentence,” thereby
raising a substantial question).
Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence
is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and
(d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:
The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand
the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the
sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines
erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
application of the guidelines would be clearly
unreasonable; or
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(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the
sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the
sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).
In reviewing the record, we consider:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation [(PSI)].
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).
Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253-54 (Pa. Super. 2014) (some
citations omitted and some formatting altered).
“When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the
factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public,
[the] gravity of [the] offense in relation to [the] impact on [the] victim and
[the] community, and [the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”
Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted and formatting altered). Additionally, the trial court “must consider
the sentencing guidelines.”
Id. at 848 (citation omitted). Where a PSI report
exists, this Court will “presume that the sentencing judge was aware of
relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.
Watson,
228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).
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“Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to
impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being
imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. [An a]ppellant is
not entitled to a ‘volume discount’ on his multiple convictions by the imposition
of concurrent sentences.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1216
(Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted and formatting altered).
The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the
sentencing court, which has the opportunity to observe the defendant and all
witnesses firsthand. See Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 536 (Pa.
Super. 2023), appeal granted on other grounds,
306 A.3d 1287, 289 MAL
2023 (Pa. filed Oct. 30, 2023). In conducting appellate review, this Court
“cannot reweigh sentencing factors and impose judgment in place of [the]
sentencing court where [the] lower court was fully aware of all mitigating
factors[.]”
Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s sentencing claims as follows:
The sentencing court is in the best position to determine the
proper penalty for a particular offense. Furthermore, the
sentencing court, in its discretion, may order consecutive
sentences based upon an evaluation of the individual
circumstances of the case. Here, the sentencing court did exactly
that.
The sentencing court did not impose a de facto life sentence. The
sentencing court adequately accounted for Appellant’s mitigating
factors and his advanced age in crafting his sentence and did not
abuse its discretion.
…
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Appellant perpetrated various sexual offenses against a child, who
was left in his care, for over three years. When confronted,
Appellant showed no remorse and accepted no responsibility as
evidenced by Appellant’s own words heard on audio recording
during the trial. Rather, Appellant repeatedly attempted to blame
[A.R.] for his own actions, as indicated by the audio, in the pre-sentence investigation and illuminated in the Commonwealth’s
sentencing memorandum. Never has Appellant accepted
responsibility for his actions.
…
Most importantly, [Appellant] fails to consider and acknowledge
the impact his actions have had on the victim, [A.R.] Appellant
entered [A.R.’s] life after her mother and father were arrested for
possession with intent to deliver narcotics and Appellant was a
state police [trooper] involved in the investigation. Appellant
forged a sexual relationship with [A.R.’s] mother which ultimately
led to Appellant gaining access to [A.R.] It was from this position
of trust that Appellant repeatedly sexually abused his victim for
approximately three years.
Although [A.R.] elected not to speak at Appellant’s sentencing,
she did provide a letter to be read and was present in the
courtroom. From the moment the victim advocate began reading,
[A.R.] was visibly upset but remained in the courtroom
determined to finish the long process Appellant began in private.
Trial Ct. Op. at 47-48.
Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. The record reflects that the
trial court ordered a PSI report, which it reviewed prior to sentencing. See
N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 8/3/22, at 122. Therefore, we presume that the trial
court was fully aware of the mitigating factors and considered them when
imposing Appellant’s sentence. See Watson,
228 A.3d at 936; see also
Kurtz,
294 A.3d at 536. Although Appellant claims that the trial court “gave
undue weight to Appellant’s aggravating factors,” we will not re-weigh the trial
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court’s consideration of the relevant sentencing factors on appeal. See Kurtz,
294 A.3d at 536. Further, as noted previously, it is well settled that
defendants convicted of multiple criminal offenses are not entitled to a volume
discount on their aggregate sentence. See Brown,
249 A.3d at 1216; see
also Commonwealth v. Pisarchuk,
306 A.3d 872, 881 (Pa. Super. 2023).6
For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 3/27/2024
____________________________________________
6 To the extent Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Anderson, 224 A.3d
40 (Pa. Super. 2019) in support of his de facto life sentence claim, we note
that Anderson addresses de facto life sentences in the context of juvenile
murder defendants and is therefore inapplicable to the instant case. See
Anderson,
224 A.3d at 40-41. Just as Appellant is not entitled to a volume
discount for multiple crimes by having an aggregate sentence run
concurrently, he is likewise not entitled to a “seasonal discount because he
committed his crimes in the winter of his life.” Commonwealth v. P.B.B.,
2020 WL 3225518 at *10 n.5 (Pa. Super. filed June 15, 2020) (unpublished
mem.); see Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that we may cite to unpublished
memoranda filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive value).
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