Shepherd v. Wellman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 72 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[Sanctions may be awarded against an attorney who “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927 . We construe “vexatiously multiplying proceedings” to include conduct where “an attorney knows or reasonably should know that a claim pursued is frivolous, or that his or her litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct the litigation of non-frivolous claims.” Jones v. Cont’l Corp., 789 F.2d 1225 , 1232 (6th Cir.1986). We have also held that § 1927 sanctions are appropriate where “an attorney has engaged in some sort of conduct that, from an objective standpoint, ‘falls short of the obligations owed by the member of the bar to the court and which, as a result, causes additional expense to the opposing party.’ ” Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1049 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir.1987)). Simple inadvertence and negligence are not grounds for imposing § 1927 sanctions. See Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 298 (6th Cir.1997).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Parrott v. Corley · 254 F. Supp. 2d 629 - Bowens v. Aftermath Entertainment

2. “[P]arents cannot appear pro se on behalf of their minor children because a minor's personal cause of action is her own and does not belong to her parent or representative.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. D. C.-B. v. Brooks (In re Brooks) · Cavanaugh ex rel. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School District

3. “We begin with the complaint itself. We cannot say that either the original complaint or the first amended complaint placed Wellman on notice that he was being sued as an individual. If anything, the complaint suggests that Wellman was being sued in his official capacity. The amended complaint alleges that “Defendant Commissioner Billy Wellman at the time of the shooting of Gary Shepherd had overall charge of and supervisorial [sic] responsibility over the Kentucky State Police and was responsible for the training and supervision of officers in it.” The complaint goes on to allege that the “murder” of Gary Shepherd “was clearly committed under color of state law.” In the complaint, the plaintiffs also allege that Wellman “had supervisorial [sic] responsibility” over the KSP Special Response Team and was “charged with legal responsibility for the adequacy or inadequacy of its training and supervision.” Indeed, the plaintiffs’ request for monetary damages is the only indication that they might be suing Wellman in his individual capacity. Although Moore recognizes that the request for monetary damages is one factor that might place an individual on notice that he is being sued in his individual capacity, we do not read that case as holding that a request for money damages is alone sufficient to place a state official on notice that he is being sued in his individual capacity. To so hold would be inappropriate, because the rest of the complaint so strongly suggests an official cap”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 242 F. Supp. 2d 497 - United States Ex Rel. Diop v. Wayne County Community College District