313 Pa. Super. 332 - Praisner v. Stocker’s Empirical Analysis
1983
Citation profile
193 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 193 later decisions — most recently December 2011 · most notably 411 Pa. Super. 347 - Bash v. Bell Telephone Co. (1992), 388 Pa. Super. 400 - Field v. Philadelphia Electric Co. (1989)
193 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. · Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory · Stump v. Sparkman · Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. · Pugar v. Greco
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 193 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“However, the general rule is not without exceptions. Where the dismissal of one count or several counts of a multi-count complaint has the effect of precluding the plaintiff from pursuing the merits of separate and distinct causes of action, the order sustaining preliminary objections is then final, not interlocutory, with respect to those causes of action dismissed. The plaintiff is “out of court” with respect thereto. This is to be distinguished from the situation in which separate counts have been used to state alternate theories to support recovery on the same cause of action. In such cases, the dismissal of one count does not prevent the plaintiff from proceeding to a determination of the underlying cause of action.”
8 later decisions quote this exact passage“As a general rule, an order dismissing some but not all counts of a multi-count complaint is interlocutory and not appeal-able. [[Image here]] However, the general rule is not without exceptions. Certain orders which have not put a litigant literally “out of court” or completely terminated the litigation have nevertheless been held to possess sufficient aspects of finality to be appealable immediately because the effect of the order has been to preclude the litigant from asserting the cause of action alleged. [[Image here]] Where separate and distinct causes of action have been joined under permissive joinder standards of Pa.R.C.P. 1020(a) or Pa.R.C.P. 1044(a), the appealability of a judgment entered on one or more but not all counts must be distinguished from the situation in which separate counts have been used to slate alternate theories for recovery on the same cause of action. In the former situation the [order] has terminated litigation upon a separate and distinct cause of action. In the latter, an order dismissing or entering judgment on one or more but not all counts of a complaint is interlocutory, for the plaintiff can, nevertheless, proceed to a determination on the underlying cause of action. * * * [I]t is procedurally preferable to delay appellate review until the entire action has been determined.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage“[t]he finality of an order is a judicial conclusion which can be reached only after an examination of its ramifications.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.