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2024 PA Super 87
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ANGELA MARIE HATCH : No. 553 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered April 14, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-07-CR-0001115-2022
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: APRIL 26, 2024
The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting a petition for writ
of habeas corpus filed by Appellee, Angela Marie Hatch. We reverse.
The habeas court summarized the factual history of this matter as
follows:
Officer Joshua Wilson was working for the City of Altoona
Police Department on Sunday, June 12, 2022. He responded to
the area of 2001 1st Ave. in Altoona, where a white female was
allegedly on a porch screaming. The caller identified the actor as
Angela Hatch.
Upon arrival the officer located Angela Hatch on the front
porch of that residence. When the officers pulled up to the front
porch, initially the defendant was sitting calmly in a chair on the
end of the porch and advised them that she was yelling for two
elderly females walking across the street to stop because she saw
a speeding vehicle coming.
The residence door was open, but its screen door was
closed. The officer, believing the call had come from inside the
residence, opened the screen door to make an effort to have
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someone step outside or let him in. As he opened the screen door,
the defendant came running across the porch and slammed the
screen door on his right shoulder. She pushed the officer, saying
that he had no right to go into her residence without a search
warrant. At that point he began to handle her physically and
advised her she was being detained. The Commonwealth did not
produce the officer at the hearing in regard to the Petition for
Habeas Corpus to testify as to the defendant’s demeanor at that
time, whether it appeared that as she came across the porch and
contacted the officer attempting to enter her house she was
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly trying to hurt him, or
whether she was trying to prevent him from going into her
residence without permission and without a search warrant.
The officer pushed Ms. Hatch face first against the screen
door and got her left arm behind her back. As he was trying to
control her right hand she pushed off the wall and got her right
arm free and swung it at the left side of his face, colliding with the
left side of his face and giving him a little scratch on his face. She
knocked his glasses off. At that time, he lifted her off the ground
and placed her on her stomach and, helped by Officer Lucas,
placed her in custody.
The officer had to force her hand behind her back to get her
into custody. The officers sat her up, and during that time, after
their actions forcing her to her stomach, she was screaming,
saying that she had firearms in the house and was going to kill
the officers.
The officer admitted there were no exigent circumstances
that would permit him to enter the house without a warrant.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/23, at 2-4.
Hatch was charged with one count each of aggravated assault of an
enumerated person, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and two counts of
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terroristic threats.1 A preliminary hearing was held on June 22, 2022, and
Officer Wilson offered testimony. Thereafter, all charges were bound for trial.
Hatch filed an omnibus pretrial motion, which included a habeas motion
challenging the prima facie evidence supporting the criminal charges. A
hearing was held on January 11, 2023, and the parties submitted the matter
to the habeas court on the June 22, 2022 preliminary hearing transcript, with
no additional evidence having been presented.
On April 14, 2023, the habeas court entered an order granting Hatch’s
habeas motion regarding the aggravated assault charge. The Commonwealth
filed this timely appeal.2
The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in
granting the habeas corpus motion as to the charge of aggravated assault.
See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 4. The Commonwealth asserts that it presented
a prima facie case establishing each element of aggravated assault and
therefore met its burden of proof. See id. at 9-16. Specifically, the
Commonwealth contends the testimony offered by Officer Wilson established
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3), 5104, 5503(a)(2), and 2706(a)(1),
respectively.
2 The Commonwealth has certified, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 311(d), the trial court’s order granting habeas relief as to the
aggravated assault charge substantially handicaps the prosecution of this
case. Commonwealth’s Brief at 1. Therefore, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d),
this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal from the trial court’s
interlocutory order, even though the order did not terminate the prosecution.
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that he was acting in his official capacity and Hatch’s actions and statements,
taken together, establish an attempt to cause bodily injury to the officer. See
id. In addition, the Commonwealth observes that any possible justification
defense Hatch has should be left for a jury’s consideration. See id. at 16. In
summary, the Commonwealth argues that the evidence offered at the
preliminary hearing met the necessary burden and requires the charge of
aggravated assault to proceed to trial. We agree.
We begin by observing that “[w]here a criminal defendant seeks to
challenge the sufficiency of evidence presented [by the Commonwealth] at his
preliminary hearing, he may do so by filing a writ of habeas corpus with the
court of common pleas.” Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 146
(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “In such instances, the habeas court acts
in the capacity of a reviewing court to assess whether a prima facie case was
presented at the preliminary hearing, that is, whether sufficient evidence
exists to require the defendant to be brought to trial.”
Id. at 146-47 (citation
omitted).
A prima facie case consists of evidence, read in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, that sufficiently establishes both
the commission of a crime and that the accused is probably the
perpetrator of that crime. The Commonwealth need not prove the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the
Commonwealth must show sufficient probable cause that the
defendant committed the offense, and the evidence should be
such that if presented at trial, and accepted as true, the judge
would be warranted in allowing the case to go to the jury.
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Commonwealth v. Keller, 823 A.2d 1004, 1010 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted).
“[T]he evidentiary sufficiency, or lack thereof, of the Commonwealth’s
prima facie case for a charged crime is a question of law as to which an
appellate court’s review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d
505, 513 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted). “Indeed, the trial court is afforded no
discretion in ascertaining whether, as a matter of law and in light of the facts
presented to it, the Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial, prima facie burden
to make out the elements of a charged crime.”
Id.
Section 2702(a)(3) of our Crimes Code provides that a person is guilty
of aggravated assault against a police officer, a felony of the second degree,
if he “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to
any of the officers, agents, employees or other persons enumerated in
subsection (c), in the performance of duty[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3).
“Bodily injury” is defined as “impairment of physical condition or substantial
pain.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.
Moreover:
The Commonwealth need not establish that the victim actually
suffered bodily injury; rather, it is sufficient to support a
conviction if the Commonwealth establishes an attempt to inflict
bodily injury. This intent may be shown by circumstances which
reasonably suggest that a defendant intended to cause injury.
...
… To show an “attempt” to inflict bodily injury, it must be shown
that the actor had a specific intent to cause bodily injury[.] A
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person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an
offense if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result[.]
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 636 A.2d 1195, 1196 (Pa. Super. 1994)
(citations omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Marti, 779 A.2d 1177 (Pa. Super. 2001), this
Court opined:
Although dictum, in [Commonwealth v. Wertelet, 696 A.2d 206
(Pa. Super. 1997),] we recognized “logically speaking, a simple
assault committed against a police officer in the performance of
his duties would satisfy the elements of § 2702(a)(3).” Wertelet,
696 A.2d at 212 fn.8. The only differences between assaults under
§ 2701(a)(1) and § 2702(a)(3) are that the latter applies when
the assault is committed upon one of the persons enumerated in
§ 2702(c) in the performance of their duties and the latter does
not allow for a mens rea of recklessness. Consequently, for
purposes of defining the bodily injury component of these
provisions, whether the assault is characterized as “simple” or
“aggravated” has no bearing on our interpretation. Calling a
simple assault upon a police officer aggravated merely reflects the
legislature’s intent to punish this assault more severely than one
committed upon a layperson, which is accomplished by grading
the offense as a felony of the second degree rather than a
misdemeanor of the second degree.
Marti, 779 A.2d at 1182-83 (footnote omitted).
Here, the habeas court offered the following reasoning in support of its
determination that the Commonwealth did not present a prima facie case of
aggravated assault against an enumerated person:
The testimony at [the] preliminary hearing was that the
officer opened the screen door of the defendant’s house. As he
opened the screen door, the defendant came running across the
porch and slammed the screen door on his right shoulder. She
pushed the officer, saying that he had no right to go into her
residence without a search warrant. After the officer pushed the
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defendant face first into the door, her arm came back and
connected to his face. His glasses flew off and he received a
scratch.
The court finds from this testimony that the defendant acted
to prevent the officer from going into her house when he opened
the screen door. She pushed him, saying that he had no right to
go into her residence. His testimony was that he did not have a
search warrant and there were no exigent circumstances which
would permit him to go into her house.
We further find that her action that resulted in the scratch
to the officer’s face was a reaction to being pushed face first into
the door. We do not find that the Commonwealth has produced
evidence that the defendant intentionally attempted to cause or
intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to the police
officer.
Trial Court Opinion and Order, 4/14/23, at 4.
Our review of the certified record reflects that Officer Wilson offered
detailed testimony at the preliminary hearing concerning the incident. See
N.T. (Preliminary Hearing), 6/22/22, at 2-11 (unnumbered). Officer Wilson
gave the following synopsis of events as he arrived on the scene following
dispatch:
We were originally called for an anonymous caller reporting that
a white female was on their porch screaming. They identified the
actor was to be an Angela Hatch. Upon arrival, we located Angela
on the front porch of that 2001 1st [A]venue address. We briefly
made contact with her based on the dispatch I believe that the
caller was inside the residence reporting on Angela. Upon arrival
I found that the residence door was open, it was just simply
blocked by a screen door, I heard light muffled speaking inside.
That speaking ended up determined to be a TV but I believed the
caller was inside, so I just briefly made contact with Angela and I
opened the screen just to make an effort to call in to have anyone
step outside with us or permit me in. And then as I opened the
screen door Mrs. Hatch came running across the porch and
slammed the screen door on to my right shoulder on my
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person. And at that point, she was overly aggressive she
pushed me saying I had no right to go into her residence without
a search warrant even though I didn’t make an effort to go into
the house I just opened the screen door. And at the point, I
advised her she was being detained.
Id. at 3 (unnumbered) (emphasis added). Officer Wilson offered the following
additional testimony concerning how the incident escalated as Hatch was
being detained:
After she slammed the door on my right shoulder, I advised she
was being detained. I pushed her face first or front first against
the same screen door and got her left arm behind her back. As I
was trying to get control of her right hand, she pushed of the wall
and created a little bit of space that she was able to get her right
arm free and she swung it at the left side of my face. She collided
with the left side of my face. I had a little scratch here and she
knocked the glasses off.
Id. The officer further testified, “She struck me with her right hand in the left
temple area. I had a, her jewelry is what caused most of the injury. I had a
scratch on my temple and she knocked my glasses off.” Id. at 10
(unnumbered). Officer Wilson also explained that after Hatch was detained
and he was searching for his glasses, “Mrs. Hatch was screaming, saying she
had small (inaudible) firearms in the house and she was going to kill myself
and Officer Lucas.”3 Id. at 4.
The evidence presented by the Commonwealth established a prima facie
case of aggravated assault of an enumerated person. Hatch’s behavior,
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3 Officer Lucas was also at the scene. See N.T. (Preliminary Hearing), 6/22/22,
at 4 (unnumbered).
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particularly her “overly aggressive” conduct, reasonably suggests that she
intended to cause bodily injury. The testimony of Officer Wilson provided
sufficient probable cause that Hatch attempt to inflict bodily injury; credibility
determinations, and Hatch’s contention of another motive for her actions, are
for the trier of fact. Therefore, there is probable cause to believe that Hatch
attempted to cause or intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to an
officer in the performance of his duty. Consequently, it is our determination
that the habeas court erred in reaching a contrary conclusion.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
FILED: 4/26/2024
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