Wellington v. Moore’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Demetrius Eugene Berry v. Warden Ferrell · 785 F. Supp. 2d 1299 - Ballard v. McNeil

2. ““Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13 , 120 S.Ct. at 1523 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The “contrary to” clause “suggests that the state court’s decision must be substantially different” from the controlling legal precedent. Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir.2001), ce rt. denied, 535 U.S. 1104 , 122 S.Ct. 2310 , 152 L.Edüd 1065 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 , 120 S.Ct. at 1519 ). A state court’s decision that applies the correct legal rule would not fit within the “contrary to” clause even if the federal court might have reached a different result relying on the same law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-06 , 120 S.Ct. at 1519-20 (O’Connor, J., concurring). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 414 , 120 S.Ct. at 1523 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In deciding this issue, the federal court should consider whether the state court’s application of the law was objectively unreasonable and should not apply the subjective “all reasonable jur”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Demetrius Eugene Berry v. Warden Ferrell · 386 F. Supp. 2d 1231 - Pinckney v. Crosby

3. “A state court conducts an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner’s case .... [or] unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cedric Jones v. James McDonough · Riley v. Florida Department of Corrections