¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: June 30, 2022
¶4 S22A0305. SAMS v. THE STATE.
¶5 BETHEL, Justice.
¶6 In 2015, a Peach County jury found Tevin Sams guilty of the
¶7malice murder of eight-year-old Jai’mel Anderson, the aggravated
¶8assault of six-year-old J. A., and other offenses. The charges arose
¶9out of an incident in which shots were fired through an apartment
¶10door into a room occupied by the two boys. Following the denial of
¶11his motion for new trial, Sams challenges the sufficiency of the
¶12evidence supporting his convictions and argues that the trial court
¶13erred by allowing the State to admit evidence pursuant to OCGA §
¶1424-4-404 (b) that Sams shot at someone else in 2014. We affirm. 1
¶15 1The crimes occurred on January 6, 2015. On March 6, 2015, a Peach County grand jury indicted Sams, Dennis Eason, Antonio Garvin, Jeremy Jackson, and Kristian Wipfel for the following counts: making terroristic threats against Dejad Williams (Count 1), malice murder of Jai’mel Anderson 1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following. 2 Sams,
¶16Antonio Garvin, Jeremy Jackson, Dennis Eason, Jr., and Kristian
¶17Wipfel were acquainted with one another. All five men were together
¶18on January 6, 2015.
¶19 At trial, Garvin testified to the following. On the night of the
¶20shootings, Garvin, Sams, Jackson, Eason, and Wipfel met at
¶21Jackson’s apartment in Macon. While they were gathered there,
¶22(Count 2), felony murder of Jai’mel, predicated on aggravated assault (Count 3), aggravated assault of J. A. (Count 4), and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 5 and 6). Garvin and Jackson both pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault. Their cases are not part of this appeal. Sams, Eason, and Wipfel were tried together. At their jury trial held from October 31 to November 9, 2016, Sams was found not guilty of Count 1 and guilty of Counts 2 through 6. Eason and Wipfel were found guilty of all counts, except Wipfel was found not guilty as to Count 1; their cases are not part of this appeal. On November 10, the trial court sentenced Sams to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 2; a term of 20 years on Count 4, to be served concurrently with Count 2; a term of five years on Count 5, to be served consecutively to Count 2; and a term of five years on Count 6, to be served consecutively to Count 5. The trial court purported to merge Count 3 with Count 2, but Count 3 was actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). Sams filed a motion for a new trial on December 6, 2016, which he later amended through new counsel. The trial court denied the motion, as amended, on August 26, 2020. Sams filed a timely notice of appeal. This case was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2021 and was submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 Because this case requires an assessment of whether an assumed error
¶23by the trial court was harmless, we lay out the evidence in some detail and not only in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts. See Strong v. State, 309 Ga. 295, 295 n.2 (845 SE2d 653) (2020). 2 Eason talked about a dispute he had with a man named Dejad
¶24Williams, saying “Dejad owed him money” and that “he ran off with
¶25some of his marijuana.” The five men decided to travel together to
¶26Fort Valley to find Williams. The decision to travel to Fort Valley
¶27was a “spur of the moment type deal,” and Eason wanted to go to
¶28Fort Valley “to get his product or his money back from [Williams].”
¶29 Katelyn Grandison, Sams’s girlfriend at the time, testified that
¶30before traveling to Williams’s apartment, Sams got a gun at the
¶31apartment that the two of them shared and told her that he was
¶32going to get some marijuana and “see a transaction.” Grandison
¶33asked Sams if he was going to drive his car and believed he
¶34responded that “they followed him there, or that they were already
¶35outside.” When asked who “they” were, Grandison said she assumed
¶36Sams was referring to Wipfel and Eason.
¶37 Garvin testified that Sams and Wipfel rode with Garvin in his
¶38car, and Eason rode with Jackson in Jackson’s car to Fort Valley.
¶39The two cars went all the way to the back of the Indian Oaks
¶40apartment complex where Williams lived and then turned back
¶41 3 around. Then, the two cars headed “back over to the church parking
¶42lot,” and Garvin followed Jackson’s car. Before the two cars got to
¶43the church, the five men saw Williams outside of the “A apartment
¶44complex” with a gun.
¶45 Garvin then testified that when the two cars arrived at the
¶46church parking lot, everyone got out of the cars and started “asking
¶47questions.” That is when they found out that Eason had been texting
¶48Williams. Eason and Williams had been “going back and forth” over
¶49text, and “it went to another level, basically.”
¶50 Williams testified that at first he thought his cousin (who also
¶51lived in the Indian Oaks apartment complex) was sending him the
¶52text messages. After receiving multiple text messages, Williams
¶53went to his cousin’s apartment at 1:17 a.m. but then returned to his
¶54apartment. Williams then received more threatening texts when he
¶55was back at his apartment. At 1:37 a.m., Eason sent Williams a text
¶56saying, “[n]***a we here, and my b***h know where you stay. We
¶57will kick yo door in with them kids in there n***a.”
¶58 Garvin testified that Eason used Garvin’s phone to send the
¶59 4 text messages to Williams. When the men got out of the cars, Garvin
¶60saw that Eason and Sams each had a gun, “but you wouldn’t be able
¶61to tell if it was on them because of what they were wearing.” Eason
¶62was wearing “like a bubble jacket,” and Sams was wearing a “onesie”
¶63which Garvin described as like “an inmate jumpsuit.”
¶64 Garvin testified that after all five men talked in the church
¶65parking lot, Eason and Sams still had their guns, and Eason, Sams,
¶66and Wipfel all walked “over through the apartment breezeway.”
¶67Then Garvin saw Eason walk back towards the cars and heard
¶68gunshots as Eason was walking back. The two cars then traveled
¶69back to Jackson’s apartment. Wipfel told Garvin that Sams shot first
¶70through the door and that while Sams was shooting, Wipfel “came
¶71back and . . . started shooting.” Garvin testified that the gun that
¶72Wipfel had was Eason’s gun. Sams also told Garvin that he and
¶73Wipfel shot into the doorway of the apartment.
¶74 Jackson, Garvin’s cousin, testified to the following. He first saw
¶75Eason with a gun when Garvin, Wipfel, and Eason came to his
¶76apartment on New Year’s Eve. Eason’s gun was “silver and black.”
¶77 5 The first time Jackson heard about an altercation between Eason
¶78and “some other guy” was at Jackson’s apartment after he went to
¶79Zaxby’s in Macon with Garvin and Eason on the night of the
¶80shootings. The group decided to travel to Fort Valley after Eason
¶81discussed his dispute with Williams, and Jackson thought that “it
¶82was just going to be like a fight or something like that.”
¶83 Jackson further testified that Eason got in his car and that he
¶84drove to Fort Valley. Eason directed him where to go when they
¶85arrived in Fort Valley. When they arrived at the apartment complex,
¶86Jackson drove through the entrance and into the complex, then
¶87turned around and came out of the complex. While he was driving
¶88out, Jackson testified that Eason said, “that’s him over there.” They
¶89then drove around to the side of the complex and parked “by a shed
¶90or a dumpster or something like that.” Garvin was driving another
¶91car with Wipfel and Sams in it, and when both cars parked, Wipfel
¶92and Sams got out of the car and Eason went to talk to them. After
¶93talking, Eason went back to the car, and Wipfel and Sams went
¶94through “a little opening of the gate or something” towards the
¶95 6 apartment complex door. Wipfel and Sams then walked back down
¶96towards the cars, and then went back towards the apartment
¶97complex again. Jackson said he “heard shots” when Wipfel and Sams
¶98“went back up” towards the apartment complex. Then they came
¶99back towards the cars, and Wipfel got in Garvin’s car and Sams got
¶100in Jackson’s car. After that, Eason said, “go, go drive,” and the five
¶101men left to go back to Macon.
¶102 Jackson testified that when he heard shots, Eason was sitting
¶103next to him in his car, Garvin was in his car, and Wipfel and Sams
¶104were not there with them in the cars. Jackson testified that Sams
¶105had a jacket on when he got back in Jackson’s car. Jackson
¶106suggested that Sams was covering a gun inside his jacket, but
¶107Jackson did not see Sams’s gun until the men got back to Jackson’s
¶108apartment in Macon.
¶109 Williams testified that he was taking care of his girlfriend’s
¶110children, Jai’mel and J. A., who slept at his apartment every night
¶111on an air mattress in the living room. Williams testified that he was
¶112in his bedroom when the shots were fired and that he crawled to the
¶113 7 living room to retrieve Jai’mel and J. A. from the air mattress where
¶114they were sleeping. Williams grabbed J. A. off the mattress first.
¶115Williams then grabbed the air mattress and began pulling it to get
¶116Jai’mel. He could feel that it had gone flat, and he realized Jai’mel
¶117had been shot. It was later determined that – although J. A. had not
¶118been struck by a bullet – Jai’mel had been shot twice, once in the leg
¶119and once in his upper abdomen, which killed him. Williams called
¶120911 and police officers arrived shortly thereafter. Shell casings from
¶121a .40-caliber Glock pistol were found at the crime scene. The police
¶122later determined that 16 rounds were fired through Williams’s door.
¶123 At trial, Sams testified that he was with Wipfel, Eason,
¶124Jackson, and Garvin on the night of the murder and that he traveled
¶125with them to Fort Valley. After arriving at the Indian Oaks
¶126apartments and parking at the church, Sams stated that all five men
¶127exited the vehicles. Thereafter, according to Sams, Wipfel and Eason
¶128went to the apartments while he, Jackson, and Garvin got back into
¶129the cars. Sams further claimed that after hearing gunshots, he saw
¶130Wipfel and Eason run back to the cars, and that at that moment he
¶131 8 saw Eason with a gun for the first time. Additionally, Sams testified
¶132that, at one time, he owned a .40-caliber Glock.
¶133 2. Sams contends that the evidence presented at trial was
¶134insufficient to support his convictions. Specifically, Sams argues
¶135that there was no evidence that he was a party to the crimes and
¶136that the State’s only evidence that was alleged to link Sams to the
¶137crimes was uncorroborated accomplice testimony. 3
¶138 When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of
¶139constitutional due process, the proper standard of review is whether
¶140a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond
¶141a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III)
¶142(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). This Court views the evidence
¶143in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the
¶144 3 Sams also argues that there was no plan to commit a crime and that even if there was a plan, he was not part of it. See Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 733 (2) (a) (864 SE2d 85) (2021) (evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction as a party to the crime of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in case where defendant was present with co-defendants for the planning of the robbery and followed co-defendants in codefendant’s truck to the area near the victim’s house while giving directions). We understand this aspect of his argument as another means of asserting the legal argument that he was not a party to the crimes. 9 jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.”
¶145(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506
¶146(739 SE2d 313) (2013).
¶147 As a matter of Georgia law, OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) provides that
¶148 [a] person is concerned in the commission of a crime only if he: (1) Directly commits the crime; (2) Intentionally causes some other person to commit the crime under such circumstances that the other person is not guilty of any crime either in fact or because of legal incapacity; (3) Intentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime; or (4) Intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime.
¶149Moreover, “[w]hile proof of a shared criminal intent with the actual
¶150perpetrator is necessary to establish that one is a party to the crime,
¶151shared criminal intent may be inferred from the person’s conduct
¶152before, during, and after the crime.” (Citation and punctuation
¶153omitted.) Bowen v. State, 299 Ga. 875, 877 (1) (792 SE2d 691) (2016);
¶154see also Powell v. State, 307 Ga. 96, 99 (1) (834 SE2d 822) (2019)
¶155(“Conviction as a party to a crime requires proof that the defendant
¶156shared a common criminal intent with the principal perpetrator of
¶157the crime, which may be inferred from presence, companionship,
¶158 10 and conduct before, during, and after the offense.” (Citations and
¶159punctuation omitted.)).
¶160 When a group of individuals join together to plan and commit
¶161a crime, each member of the criminal plan is responsible for the
¶162criminal acts of the others – regardless of whether a particular act
¶163was part of the original plan – as long as such crimes were “naturally
¶164or necessarily done” in the execution or furtherance of the common
¶165purpose. Williams v. State, 276 Ga. 384, 386 (4) (578 SE2d 858)
¶166(2003); see also Menzies v. State, 304 Ga. 156, 160 (II) (816 SE2d
¶167638) (2018). And “all the participants in a plan to rob are criminally
¶168responsible for the act of each committed in the execution of the plan
¶169and which may be said to be a probable consequence of the unlawful
¶170design,” Williams v. State, 304 Ga. 658, 662 (821 SE2d 351) (2018)
¶171(citation and punctuation omitted), a principle we have specifically
¶172held applies to murders committed during the commission of “a
¶173crime that foreseeably [leads] to murder” – such as armed robbery –
¶174perpetrated by a group that shares a common criminal intent. Felts
¶175v. State, 311 Ga. 547, 552 (858 SE2d 708) (2021). See also Moore v.
¶176 11 State, 311 Ga. 506, 509 (858 SE2d 676) (2021).
¶177 In addition, OCGA § 24-14-8 provides in pertinent part:
¶178 The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact. However, in certain cases, including . . . felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient. Nevertheless, corroborating circumstances may dispense with the necessity for the testimony of a second witness[.]
¶179Thus, when the only witness is an accomplice, corroborating
¶180evidence is required to support a guilty verdict. See Edwards v.
¶181State, 299 Ga. 20, 22 (785 SE2d 869) (2016). Whether accomplice
¶182testimony has been sufficiently corroborated is a question for the
¶183jury, and even slight corroborating evidence of a defendant’s
¶184participation in a crime is sufficient. See Raines v. State, 304 Ga.
¶185582, 588 (2) (a) (820 SE2d 679) (2018). “Moreover, the testimony of
¶186one accomplice can be corroborated by the testimony of another
¶187accomplice.” Yarn v. State, 305 Ga. 421, 424 (2) (826 SE2d 1) (2019).
¶188 (a) As summarized above, the evidence presented at trial was
¶189sufficient as a matter of due process to authorize the jury to find that
¶190Sams was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. Sams,
¶191 12 either as the shooter or as a party to the crimes, fired multiple shots
¶192through a door and into a room in Williams’s apartment where
¶193Jai’mel and J. A. were sleeping. Two of the shots struck and killed
¶194Jai’mel, and the shooting constituted an aggravated assault as to J.
¶195A. More specifically, the evidence showed that Sams, Eason, Wipfel,
¶196Jackson, and Garvin traveled together to the scene of the shooting,
¶197that Sams and Eason both had guns at the scene, and that Eason
¶198later gave his gun to Wipfel. An investigator testified that 16 rounds
¶199were fired through Williams’s door. Garvin and Jackson each
¶200testified that they saw Sams at the scene with a gun, and Garvin
¶201testified that Sams and Wipfel told him that they shot through the
¶202door of the apartment. Shell casings from a .40-caliber Glock were
¶203found at the scene of the crime, and Sams testified that at one time
¶204he owned a .40-caliber Glock. This evidence was sufficient as a
¶205matter of due process for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable
¶206doubt that Sams was guilty of malice murder, aggravated assault,
¶207and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. See
¶208Johnson v. State, 302 Ga. 774, 776-777 (2) (809 SE2d 769) (2018)
¶209 13 (evidence sufficient to uphold conviction as party to the crime for
¶210malice murder where appellant traveled with a rifle with others to
¶211the scene of the shooting, shot the victim repeatedly, drove back with
¶212the others to a house to hide, and the weapon was linked to
¶213appellant); Stewart v. State, 299 Ga. 622, 626 (2) (a) (791 SE2d 61)
¶214(2016) (holding evidence was sufficient to support convictions
¶215for aggravated assault of one victim without gun being pointed
¶216directly at that particular victim).
¶217 Additionally, Sams decided to go to Fort Valley to retrieve
¶218Eason’s drugs or money, and Sams armed himself at his apartment
¶219before the group went to Williams’s apartment. Sams also told his
¶220girlfriend that he was going to Fort Valley to obtain marijuana.
¶221Moreover, Sams’s own testimony indicated that he, Eason, Garvin,
¶222Jackson, and Wifpel exited their vehicles in the parking lot of the
¶223church just moments before the shooting and that they all left
¶224together after the shots were fired. This evidence was sufficient to
¶225allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
¶226Sams conspired with Eason, Garvin, Jackson, and Wipfel to confront
¶227 14 Williams and that he intentionally aided, encouraged, and
¶228participated in the attack on Williams that resulted in the death of
¶229Jai’mel and the aggravated assault of J. A. See Shealey v. State, 308
¶230Ga. 847, 848-850 (1) (843 SE2d 864) (2020) (evidence sufficient to
¶231prove that the appellant, who knew of a plan to “shoot up [victim’s]
¶232house,” traveled to victim’s house in a caravan of cars and was in
¶233one of the cars that fled after the shooting, was guilty as a party to
¶234the murder and not merely present at the crime scene even though
¶235appellant did not shoot victim).
¶236 (b) Additionally, Sams contends that the State’s only evidence
¶237that was alleged to link him to the crimes was uncorroborated
¶238accomplice testimony from Garvin and Jackson. This contention also
¶239fails.
¶240 Here, Garvin and Jackson both testified that Sams was at the
¶241scene, that Sams had a gun, and that they saw Sams go toward the
¶242apartment. Garvin and Jackson also testified that they heard
¶243gunshots and then saw Sams go back to the cars after the gunshots.
¶244Garvin also testified that Sams told him he and Wipfel shot through
¶245 15 the door of Williams’s apartment. The testimony from Jackson was
¶246sufficient to corroborate that of Garvin and therefore satisfied the
¶247requirements of OCGA § 24-14-8. See Yarn, 305 Ga. at 424.
¶248Moreover, there was other, non-accomplice evidence corroborating
¶249the accomplices’ testimony. As noted above, Sams’s then-girlfriend,
¶250Grandison, testified that Sams said he was going to Fort Valley with
¶251Wipfel and Eason to get some marijuana and “to see a transaction,”
¶252and that he carried a firearm with him to travel to Fort Valley. And
¶253Sams’s own testimony put him in the company of the other members
¶254of the group before, during, and after the shooting. Accordingly,
¶255there was sufficient evidence corroborating the testimony of Sams’s
¶256accomplices regarding his participation in the crimes.
¶257 3. Sams also contends that the trial court erred by admitting
¶258evidence of his 2014 conviction for aggravated assault under OCGA
¶259§ 24-4-404 (b) for the purposes of demonstrating motive, intent, and
¶260knowledge. However, we need not decide whether the admission of
¶261this evidence was erroneous, because any such error was harmless.
¶262 “The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is
¶263 16 whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the
¶264verdict.” Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 478 (819 SE2d 468) (citation
¶265and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (“Error
¶266shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
¶267evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected[.]”). “‘In
¶268determining whether the error was harmless, we review the record
¶269de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable
¶270jurors to have done so.’” Kirby, 304 Ga. at 478 (819 SE2d 468)
¶271(citation omitted).
¶272 Over objection, the trial court admitted the evidence of Sams’s
¶273prior aggravated assault conviction arising out of a dispute in
¶274January 2014 in which Sams repeatedly shot at and hit a truck
¶275occupied by Matiuwanna Johnson following an argument between
¶276Johnson and others living at their shared home. Johnson and Candy
¶277Clark testified that the dispute occurred when Sams was living with
¶278Johnson, Candy, Ja’Neisha Clark, and Sams’s son, Chevel Sams.
¶279Johnson and Candy had a disagreement about Sams living at the
¶280house because Sams was unemployed and not contributing
¶281 17 financially. After a prolonged argument, Johnson said he “just
¶282wanted to leave” and packed a suitcase and started to leave in his
¶283truck. When Johnson reached the end of the driveway, Sams shot at
¶284Johnson’s truck 15 times. Sergeant Jeffrey Woodard testified that
¶285several bullet holes were “scattered about the truck,” with most of
¶286the bullets striking the back of the truck. Sams pled guilty to
¶287aggravated assault following the 2014 incident, and, in addition to
¶288testimony concerning the circumstances of the crime, the State
¶289presented a certified copy of Sams’s guilty plea in this case.
¶290 Before Johnson testified, the trial court gave the jury the
¶291following limiting instruction:
¶292 The State has informed me that the next two witnesses of their case are going to deal with a previous conviction of Mr. Sams. Now, I want to reiterate, this is going to be for a limited purpose, and that’s all you’re going to consider it for. What you cannot consider this evidence of an earlier incident is to make the assumption that, well, you committed one crime, you must have committed the other. That’s not the purpose. You’re not allowed to make that sort of inference. And it only applies to Mr. Sams, not the other two Defendants. So I just want to make sure you understand, the State will identify to you later – they’ll tell you the specific reasons that they’re going to use this. I’ll tell you in my instructions the specific reason that the
¶293 18 State’s is attempting to prove, and then you’ll decide – I’ll give you some more instructions and you will decide whether they’ve done that or not. But you can’t use it for a basic assumption.
¶294 Additionally, at the conclusion of the trial, the trial court gave
¶295the following limiting instruction:
¶296 Sometimes evidence is admitted for a limited purpose or against some parties and not others or for some counts and not others. You may consider such evidence for these limited purposes, only against the party against whom it was offered and only for the counts to which the evidence is limited. It may not be considered for any other purpose.
¶297 You have received in evidence a prior conviction of Defendant Sams. You may consider this evidence only insofar as it may relate to attacking his credibility and the limited purpose described below.
¶298 In order to prove . . . its case in Counts 1-6 against Defendant Sams, the State must show knowledge and intent, and it may show motive. To do so, the State has offered evidence of another crime that Defendant Sams allegedly committed. You are permitted to consider that evidence only insofar as it may relate to those issues and not for any other purpose. You may not infer from such evidence that the defendant is of a character that would commit such crimes.
¶299 Defendant Sams is on trial for the offenses charged in this bill of indictment only and not for any other act, even though such act may incidentally be criminal and may have resulted in conviction.
¶300 19 Before you may consider any other alleged act for the limited purposes stated against Defendant Sams, you must first determine whether it is more likely than not that he committed the other alleged act.
¶301 Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred by
¶302admitting evidence of the 2014 aggravated assault, any such error
¶303was harmless. That is because the central issue in this case was
¶304whether Sams participated in the crimes of which he was convicted
¶305or just happened to be with associates who did. On that issue, the
¶306evidence that he did participate in the crimes was very strong.
¶307 Significant evidence supported Sams’s participation in the
¶308criminal enterprise that led to the shooting at Williams’s apartment.
¶309Sams’s then-girlfriend’s testimony indicated that Sams armed
¶310himself before traveling to Fort Valley. Sams placed himself at the
¶311scene of the murder. Sams’s testimony also put himself in the
¶312company of the other men whose participation before, during, and
¶313after the shooting was not disputed. Garvin and Jackson each
¶314testified that they saw Sams at the scene with a gun, and Garvin
¶315testified that Sams told him that he shot through the door of the
¶316 20 apartment. Additionally, shell casings from a .40-caliber Glock were
¶317found at the scene of the crime, and Sams testified that at one time
¶318he owned a .40-caliber Glock. And the trial court instructed the
¶319jurors on the limited purpose for which they could consider the 2014
¶320incident, to which Sams had pled guilty. See Howell v. State, 307 Ga.
¶321865, 875 (3) (838 SE2d 839) (2020) (considering the trial court’s
¶322instructions on the limited use of other-acts evidence in determining
¶323harmless error, because “[w]e ordinarily presume that jurors follow
¶324their instructions”); Kirby, 304 Ga. at 485 (4) (a) (i) (explaining that
¶325the risk that a jury may convict a defendant not for the offense
¶326charged but for his extrinsic conduct is greater where the extrinsic
¶327conduct was not already the subject of a conviction).
¶328 For these reasons, we conclude it is highly probable that any
¶329error in admitting the other-acts evidence did not contribute to the
¶330verdicts. See Jackson, 306 Ga. at 81 (2) (concluding that the
¶331erroneous admission of evidence of a prior shooting did not
¶332contribute to the jury’s verdicts “given the overall strength of the
¶333other evidence” of guilt); see also Keller v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 503 (5)
¶334 21 (842 SE2d 22) (2020) (determining that evidentiary error was
¶335harmless “in light of the strong evidence of [appellant’s] guilt”).
¶336Thus, this contention fails.
¶337 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶338 22