¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: October 4, 2022
¶4 S22A0764. JACKSON v. THE STATE.
¶5 MCMILLIAN, Justice.
¶6 Following a jury trial in September 2018, Curtis Jackson was
¶7convicted of malice murder in connection with the shooting death of
¶8Vernard Mays. 1 On appeal, Jackson asserts that the trial court erred
¶9 Mays was killed on October 27, 2015. On April 12, 2016, a Bibb County 1
¶10grand jury jointly indicted Jackson; Jadarien Flowers; Michael Hardy, Jr.; Drayson McDonald; and Addonis Rhodes for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 2), violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (“Gang Act”) (Count 3), and felony murder predicated on violation of the Gang Act (Count 4). Prior to trial, Flowers, Hardy, and McDonald entered negotiated guilty pleas to aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of Count 2, with the remaining counts to be nolle prossed following their truthful testimony against Jackson and Rhodes; Hardy also entered a guilty plea to Count 3. At a joint jury trial held from September 11 to 18, 2018, a jury found Jackson and Rhodes guilty of all four counts. The trial court sentenced Jackson to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder; the remaining counts were either merged for sentencing purposes or vacated by operation of law. Rhodes’s conviction is not at issue in this appeal. Jackson timely filed a motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel on November 19, 2019. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial on January 28, 2022. Jackson timely appealed. The case was docketed to the April 2022 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. (1) in failing to instruct the jury that it must find corroboration for
¶11an accomplice’s testimony and (2) in failing to excuse Juror Number
¶1222 for cause. Because we conclude that the trial court did not commit
¶13any reversible error, we affirm.
¶14 The evidence produced at trial showed that on the afternoon of
¶15October 27, 2015, a car accident occurred near Second and Ell Street
¶16in Macon, outside the house where Mays lived with his mother,
¶17Contessa Jones. Mays, who did not know any of the people involved,
¶18helped render aid until EMTs arrived. Devonte Hollingshed, one of
¶19the passengers injured in the accident, was a member of the “Crips”
¶20street gang and had a gun with him in the car at the time of the
¶21accident. While Hollingshed was transported to the hospital by
¶22ambulance, another passenger, Tymario Williams, hid the gun in
¶23the bushes outside Jones’s home because he was not sure whether
¶24the gun was stolen. Marquis Simmons, Williams’s cousin, heard
¶25about the accident and went to the scene to retrieve the gun.
¶26Simmons later told police officers where the gun was stored in his
¶27bedroom.
¶28 2 Not knowing that Simmons had already retrieved the gun,
¶29Jackson, also a Crips member, went to Jones’s house to locate the
¶30gun along with Flowers (a fellow Crips member), Rhodes (a member
¶31of the “10-12” street gang), and McDonald (a 10-12 member). Two
¶32men nearby told Jackson that they had seen someone from Jones’s
¶33house take the gun out of the bushes, so Jackson knocked on Jones’s
¶34front door. Jackson became frustrated when someone inside Jones’s
¶35house kept asking who was there but would not open the door.
¶36 The group then met up with Hardy, dropped Jackson’s car off
¶37at a gym, and returned to Jones’s house in Hardy’s car. McDonald,
¶38Flowers, Rhodes, and Hardy each had a gun with them; Jackson did
¶39not. Jackson directed Hardy to park in an alley near Jones’s house.
¶40According to Flowers, Jackson was “[s]till kind of frustrated” that he
¶41could not find the gun. When no one answered the front door, they
¶42went to the back door. Mays opened the back door, and Jackson
¶43asked him about the gun. Mays responded, “I don’t know what you’re
¶44talking about.” Jackson then said, “[W]ell, if something happens you
¶45can’t say I didn’t say nothing.” As soon as Mays began to say,
¶46 3 “[W]ell,” a gunshot rang out.
¶47 Flowers testified that Rhodes, who was carrying a .40-caliber
¶48handgun, was the first to shoot, and then he, Hardy, and McDonald
¶49also fired shots as they ran away. Flowers saw that Mays had been
¶50shot before Mays went back inside the house. Everyone but Jackson
¶51returned to Hardy’s car. As they drove away, Rhodes told them that
¶52he “unloaded his whole clip and he knew he hit [Mays].” The next
¶53day, Rhodes told Flowers that he shot Mays because Jackson “gave
¶54him a look.”
¶55 Hardy testified that after their group confronted Mays about
¶56the gun, Mays went back inside and was closing the door when
¶57Jackson “looked at [Rhodes] some kind of way . . . like just like
¶58shoot.” Jackson then ducked behind a truck, and Rhodes fired a shot.
¶59Rhodes then ran off, and McDonald and Flowers started shooting
¶60while they ran backwards. At that point, Hardy started shooting as
¶61well. Everyone but Jackson, who was “nowhere to be found,” ran
¶62back to Hardy’s car and sped away. Hardy dropped the other three
¶63men off at a friend’s house and then went to a park and threw his
¶64 4 gun away. Jackson called him later that night, but he did not
¶65answer. 2
¶66 Mays’s uncle, known as “J-Bone,” testified that he was also a
¶67Crips member and that on the night of the shooting he received a
¶68message from Jackson around 8:30 p.m., stating, “Your people in the
¶69house on the south side got my guns, and I’m telling you because
¶70you’re my homie. I knocked on the door and they were talking
¶71through the door.” He did not know that Jackson was referring to
¶72Mays until he got a call from his sister that Mays had been shot.
¶73 Jones testified that around 7:00 p.m. that evening, a man
¶74knocked loudly on her door, demanding that she open the door. The
¶75man would not tell her who he was or what he wanted. Jones was
¶76home alone at the time and refused to open the door. She then heard
¶77the man talking to someone else in the yard, cursing and saying,
¶78 2 McDonald also testified pursuant to his plea agreement. According to McDonald, the conversation between Jackson and Mays seemed normal at first, but then there were multiple gunshots. McDonald ran back to the car, and Hardy, Rhodes, and Flowers followed. Everyone was “hyped up about shooting,” and Hardy said, “I just let the whole clip run.” He saw Rhodes fire first, followed by Hardy.
¶79 5 “I’m not going to be talking to this lady through no door.” She saw
¶80about five men outside, but only one on the porch. They eventually
¶81stopped knocking and left. When Mays arrived home later that
¶82evening, the knocking began again. The person knocking again
¶83refused to respond to their inquiries. After a time, the knocking
¶84stopped, and Jones went to her bedroom. While in her room, she
¶85heard Mays open the back door and a man say that he was coming
¶86to get something. Mays told the man, “We ain’t got none of that.”
¶87The man then said, “I know your uncle.” Mays told him, “We don’t
¶88have it.” Then there was a pause and a gunshot. Mays ran into her
¶89bedroom and said, “They shot me, Mama.” When she looked out the
¶90back door, it looked like someone was coming up the steps, so she
¶91locked her bedroom door, and she and Mays hid beside her bed while
¶92she called 911. She heard several more gunshots as they hid. She
¶93also heard the sound of crunching glass and someone say, “We got
¶94to finish him off.” Mays died in her arms before law enforcement
¶95officers arrived. In the days after Mays’s death, Jones saw a
¶96Facebook post by Rhodes, wherein he referenced killing: “Now’s it’s
¶97 6 like [Lucifer] the only person that understands my pain, he
¶98understands that black hole in my soul . . . he understands why I
¶99kill, he understands why I rob.”
¶100 Law enforcement officers observed multiple gunshot holes in
¶101and around Jones’s house and recovered ten shell casings – three
¶102.40-caliber casings, six .380-caliber casings, and one 9mm casing –
¶103and five projectiles – four .40-caliber projectiles and one .380-caliber
¶104projectile. Lieutenant Cedric Penson testified as an expert in gang
¶105crimes and explained that a higher ranking gang member, such as
¶106Jackson in this situation, would not normally carry a weapon
¶107because he would have risen to the point where he did not have to
¶108take that risk anymore. And because of Jackson’s influence and
¶109control over the others, there would have been repercussions if they
¶110had not gone along with Jackson. An autopsy revealed that Mays
¶111died as a result of a bullet that traveled through his upper thighs,
¶112severing his left femoral vein, before lodging in his upper left thigh.
¶113A GBI firearms examiner identified the bullet recovered from Mays’s
¶114autopsy as a .40-caliber projectile.
¶115 7 Jackson testified in his own defense at trial. According to
¶116Jackson, he was just trying to help Hollingshed find his gun. After
¶117Mays told him that J-Bone was not home and that he did not have
¶118the gun, Jackson thanked Mays and turned to leave. He then heard
¶119three to four gunshots and took cover behind a truck. He saw
¶120someone running down the street, shooting, and believed it was
¶121either Hardy, Flowers, or Rhodes. He wanted to call 911, but his cell
¶122phone battery had died. He admitted that he initially told
¶123responding officers that he did not see the shooters’ faces and did
¶124not identify the other four men until he was interviewed later that
¶125night. He denied knowing that anyone had a gun, denied that they
¶126went to Mays’s house with the intent to shoot him, and denied giving
¶127a signal to shoot Mays. Jackson admitted that he had been
¶128previously convicted of selling cocaine, criminal trespass, and
¶129obstruction of government property, and, on cross-examination, the
¶130State impeached Jackson’s testimony that he had not previously
¶131been accused of shooting at anyone.
¶132 1. Jackson asserts that the trial court erred in failing to
¶133 8 instruct the jury that an accomplice’s testimony must be
¶134corroborated.
¶135 Under Georgia law, “[t]he testimony of a single witness is
¶136generally sufficient to establish a fact.” OCGA § 24-14-8. However,
¶137in “felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the
¶138testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient.” Id. Thus, when
¶139witnesses testify at trial who may be considered accomplices,
¶140corroborating evidence is required to support a guilty verdict. See
¶141Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 22 (1) (785 SE2d 869) (2016).
¶142 Here, the trial court charged the jury, in relevant part:
¶143 The testimony of a single witness, if believed, is sufficient to establish a fact. Generally, there is no legal requirement of corroboration of a witness, provided you find the evidence to be sufficient.
¶144The trial court did not charge the jury on the statutory corroboration
¶145requirement. Jackson concedes that because he neither requested
¶146an accomplice charge nor objected to the single-witness charge as
¶147given, we only review this claim for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-58
¶148(b) (“Failure to object in accordance with subsection (a) of this Code
¶149 9 section shall preclude appellate review of such portion of the jury
¶150charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error
¶151which affects substantial rights of the parties.”); Munn v. State, 313
¶152Ga. 716, 722 (3) (873 SE2d 166) (2022) (“Where a defendant does not
¶153request that the trial court give a jury instruction, . . . this Court
¶154only reviews for plain error.”).
¶155 To establish plain error, Jackson must meet each of the
¶156following four prongs:
¶157 First, there must be an error or defect – some sort of deviation from a legal rule – that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived . . . Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error – discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
¶158Munn, 313 Ga. at 722 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶159 It is well settled that “the failure to give an accomplice-
¶160corroboration charge [is] clear and obvious error where the trial
¶161 10 included purported accomplice testimony but the jury was
¶162instructed that facts could be established based on the testimony of
¶163a single witness.” Palencia v. State, 313 Ga. 625, 628 (872 SE2d 681)
¶164(2022). See also Stanbury v. State, 299 Ga. 125, 129 (2) (786 SE2d
¶165672) (2016) (holding that “the trial court’s failure to provide a jury
¶166charge regarding accomplice corroboration was clear error not
¶167subject to reasonable dispute”). Thus, Jackson is able to meet the
¶168first two prongs of the plain error test.
¶169 However, Jackson’s claim fails on the third prong of this test
¶170because any error did not likely affect the outcome of the proceeding,
¶171given that there was so much corroborating evidence presented at
¶172trial that the jury – if properly instructed – was unlikely to have
¶173returned a different verdict. See Rice v. State, 311 Ga. 620, 624 (1)
¶174(857 SE2d 230) (2021). To satisfy OCGA § 24-14-8 and support a
¶175guilty verdict, an accomplice’s testimony at trial must be
¶176corroborated, and the amount of corroborating evidence need only
¶177be slight. See Goodman v. State, 313 Ga. 762, 767-68 (2) (a) (873
¶178SE2d 150) (2022). Moreover, “[i]t is well settled that an accomplice’s
¶179 11 testimony may be corroborated by the testimony of another
¶180accomplice.” Bedford v. State, 311 Ga. 329, 332 (1) (857 SE2d 708)
¶181(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶182 Here, multiple witnesses, including Jackson, corroborated
¶183that Jackson participated in the crimes, and the State presented
¶184expert testimony that as an elder in the gang, Jackson would have
¶185had the authority to order others to commit the crimes. The
¶186testimony of McDonald, Flowers, and Hardy showed that Jackson
¶187directed the group to return to Jones’s house and park in a nearby
¶188alley and that Jackson then took the lead in asking Mays about the
¶189gun. And both Flowers and Hardy testified that when Mays said
¶190that he did not have the gun, Jackson gave Rhodes a look that meant
¶191Rhodes should shoot Mays. Lieutenant Penson, an expert in gang
¶192crimes, explained that “[t]ypically . . . the elders or the older
¶193individual get somebody like a juvenile or a younger generation to
¶194do the criminal act for them, so, you know, they can all – they can
¶195have the deniability of being involved.” Lieutenant Penson was
¶196familiar with Jackson and knew him to have a significant status
¶197 12 among the younger generation of gang members, including Rhodes
¶198and his co-indictees. In his expert opinion, because of Jackson’s
¶199influence and control over the others, there would have been
¶200repercussions if they had not followed Jackson’s instructions.
¶201 Moreover, Jackson testified at trial and admitted that he rode
¶202to Jones’s house with Hardy, Flowers, Rhodes, and McDonald to
¶203retrieve Hollingshed’s gun and that he was the one who confronted
¶204Mays about the gun. Although Jackson denied knowing that the
¶205other four men were armed and denied going to Jones’s house with
¶206the intent to shoot anyone, the jury was free to disbelieve this
¶207testimony, particularly where Jackson admitted that he initially
¶208lied to the responding police officers and where the State impeached
¶209Jackson’s testimony that he had not previously been accused of
¶210shooting at anyone. See Howard v. State, 308 Ga. 574, 576 (842 SE2d
¶21112) (2020). The State also introduced evidence of Jackson’s text
¶212message to J-Bone from which the jury could infer that Jackson was
¶213warning or threatening J-Bone’s family regarding the return of the
¶214gun.
¶215 13 Thus, even if the jury had been given an accomplice-
¶216corroboration instruction, it likely would have determined that the
¶217testimony of any accomplice was sufficiently corroborated by either
¶218independent evidence or the testimony of another accomplice. See
¶219Bedford, 311 Ga. at 332 (1); Montanez v. State, 311 Ga. 843, 849 (1)
¶220(b) (860 SE2d 551) (2021) (“The necessary corroboration may consist
¶221entirely of circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant’s
¶222conduct before and after the crime was committed may give rise to
¶223an inference that he participated in the crime.”). Accordingly,
¶224Jackson cannot show that the trial court’s failure to give the
¶225accomplice-corroboration charge likely changed the outcome of the
¶226trial. See Payne v. State, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (1) 2022 Ga. LEXIS 213, at
¶227*9 (Case No. S22A0469, decided August 9, 2022) (“Given the number
¶228of witnesses who implicated [Appellant] in the shooting, it is not
¶229likely that the jury convicted him based on the uncorroborated
¶230testimony of a single witness who was an accomplice.”); Rice, 311
¶231Ga. at 624 (1) (because the testimony of a co-defendant and another
¶232potential accomplice could be found mutually corroborating, trial
¶233 14 court’s clear error in not giving an accomplice-corroboration charge
¶234likely did not change the outcome of the trial).
¶235 2. Jackson also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
¶236by initially refusing to excuse Juror Number 22 for cause. We
¶237disagree.
¶238 Under Georgia law, the trial court has broad discretion to
¶239replace a juror with an alternate at any point during the proceedings
¶240where it is shown that the juror is unable to perform his or her duty
¶241or other legal cause exists. See OCGA § 15-12-172; Morrell v. State,
¶242313 Ga. 247, 263 (3) (869 SE2d 447) (2022). “[T]he trial court’s
¶243determination in matters such as this is based on the demeanor and
¶244credibility of the juror in question, which are peculiarly in the trial
¶245court’s province.” State v. Arnold, 280 Ga. 487, 490 n.2 (629 SE2d
¶246807) (2006). We review a trial court’s decision in this regard for an
¶247abuse of discretion. See Cummings v. State, 280 Ga. 831, 835 (6) (632
¶248SE2d 152) (2006).
¶249 After the jury was empaneled, Juror Number 22 asked the
¶250bailiff why she had been selected when she had told the attorneys
¶251 15 that she knew the victim. 3 The following morning, the trial court
¶252questioned Juror Number 22 on the record, and she told the court
¶253that she had gone to school with Mays, explaining, “I don’t think we
¶254ever had any classes together . . . but just like having little
¶255conversations with him.” She responded that she did not know Mays
¶256“outside of school or anything like that.” She also confirmed that she
¶257had honestly responded during voir dire that she could be fair and
¶258impartial in this case. When Jackson’s counsel asked Juror Number
¶25922 why she had “hesitated” when answering the trial court’s
¶260question about being fair and impartial, she responded:
¶261 Well at first I said I didn’t know, but he told me that he needed me to be more specific on if I could do it or not, and I just told him that I could, it’s just I know I’m an emotional person on anything, so it’s just – that was just my issue, it’s not basically as if I’m knowing him or I feel anybody’s wrong, it’s just seeing different stuff, it’s just like – it just makes me emotional, because I remember when he was like that you will see like wounds and gun wounds and all that, like it just automatically makes me
¶262 3 Voir dire was not transcribed by a court reporter. However, it appears from other parts of the record that Juror Number 22 did disclose that she knew the victim. When the trial court announced Juror Number 22’s later question to the bailiff, the prosecutor responded that he had asked the potential juror during voir dire if she could be fair and impartial, to which she had presumably responded yes. 16 emotional about it.
¶263The trial court denied Jackson’s motion to remove her from the jury
¶264at that point, finding “there’s been no bias that’s been proved.”
¶265 After the first day of trial, Juror Number 22 sent an email to
¶266the trial court and the clerk, and the court spoke with her again on
¶267the record. Juror Number 22 explained that she had gone to school
¶268with many of the witnesses who had testified the first day, that she
¶269had dated Flowers’s brother, and that she did not “feel safe having
¶270anything to do with this case.” She responded that she did not feel
¶271she could remain impartial, given the circumstances. The trial court
¶272confirmed that Juror Number 22 had not talked about her concerns
¶273with any of the other jurors and then granted Jackson’s motion to
¶274remove her as a juror; an alternate became the twelfth juror.
¶275 Jackson contends that the trial court erred by failing to remove
¶276Juror Number 22 for cause after his motion even though the record
¶277shows that Juror Number 22 was ultimately excused. 4 In the similar
¶278 4 Jackson mistakenly states in his appellate brief that Juror Number 22 sat on the jury through the conclusion of the trial. 17 situation in which a trial court refused to remove a juror for cause
¶279and the defendant then exercised a peremptory strike on the
¶280challenged juror, we held that the defendant must show harm to
¶281prevail on his claim that the challenged juror should have been
¶282removed for cause. See Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 707 (11) (a) (820
¶283SE2d 640) (2018) (overruling cases which had held that “causing a
¶284defendant to unnecessarily use a peremptory strike on a juror that
¶285should have been excused for cause is per se harmful error”). In that
¶286context, we explained that harm resulting from the denial of a
¶287request to excuse a juror for cause is shown by demonstrating that
¶288one of the challenged jurors who served on the jury was unqualified.
¶289See id. Here, Jackson ultimately obtained the relief that he
¶290requested from the trial court – that the juror be excused for cause.
¶291Thus, Jackson cannot demonstrate any harm from the trial court’s
¶292initial failure to excuse Juror Number 22, and his claim fails. See id.
¶293 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶294 18