State v. Sayre’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

49 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “After careful weighing of the policy considerations implicated, we, too, are unwilling to allow a procedure that will permit an inquiry of the sentencing judge’s subjective intent under circumstances like those here present. We hold that under Rule 4-345(b), once sentence has been imposed, there can be no inquiry into intention or inad vertence. The sentence, for Rule 4-345(b) purposes, stands as pronounced. Like any bright line rule, this holding may produce occasional hardship for the State, but will avoid difficult questions of subjective intent and should encourage trial judges to use great care in pronouncing sentence — an obviously desirable practice. It remains only to determine when a sentence has been imposed for purposes of Rule 4-345(b). The rule is silent in this respect, and there seems to be no relevant “legislative” history. We do not believe, however, that the answer turns on questions of when the defendant begins serving his or her sentence or when he or she leaves the custody of a court officer and enters the custody of the executive branch. Ordinarily, sentencing may be considered as the last phase of a criminal trial. When sentence is pronounced or imposed, there is a final judgment for purposes of appeal. See, e.g. Jones v. State, 298 Md. 634, 637 , 471 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1984). The sentencing phase, for purposes of Rule 4-345(b), is at least at an end when the court indicates that the particular case before it is terminated, as by calling, or directing the”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 140 Md. App. 48 - Ridgeway v. State · Brown v. State

2. “[W]hile to permit correction of a slip of the tongue is not necessarily undesirable, to allow a [trial court that] has [ ] made a sentencing decision to change [its] mind in a manner [that is] adverse to the defendant is.... [T]he latter situation carries with it too many possibilities of vindictiveness. Furthermore, it is not always easy to distinguish between a[ ] slip of the tongue and a [ ] change of mind.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 140 Md. App. 48 - Ridgeway v. State · Ridgeway v. State

3. “(a) Illegal sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. (b) Modification or reduction — Time for. The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section (e) of this Rule. The court may not increase a sentence after the sentence has been imposed, except that it may correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 193 Md. App. 469 - Parker v. State · State v. Brown