Brooks v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 6 district · 42 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “the instrument must be (1) designed as 'anything used or designed to be used in destroying, defeating, or injuring an enemy, or as an instrument of ... combat'; (2) under the circumstances of the case, immediately useable to inflict serious or deadly harm ...; or (3) actually used in a way likely to inflict that sort of harm.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. United States v. Bell · United States v. Butler

2. “One aspect of context is the “relationship [of the statute under consideration] to earlier and subsequent legislation ” Wynn [v. State], 313 Md. [533,] 539, 546 A.2d [465,] 468 [ (1988) ] (quoting Kaczorowski [v. Mayor of Baltimore], 309 Md. [505,] 515, 525 A.2d [628,] 632-633 [ (1987) ]). On the statute books when Chapter 457, Acts of 1927, was enacted, [creating section 488,] was the predecessor to Article 27, § 36. In 1927, that provision was Article 27, § 42, and it read thus: Every person who shall wear or carry any pistol, dirk-knife, bowie knife, slung shot, billy, sand club, metal knuckles, razor, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind whatsoever (pen knives excepted) concealed upon or about his person, and every person who shall wear or carry any such weapon openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any person in any unlawful manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. This statute gives us an indication of what sort of implements the legislature believed to be dangerous or deadly weapons. It is apparent that the term encompasses only those devices that are inherently dangerous or deadly or that may be used with dangerous or deadly effect. See Walker v. State, 53 Md.App. 171, 204 , 452 A.2d 1234 , 1251 (1982), cert. denied, 296 Md. 63 (1983). As in the case of § 488, we have held that an unloaded pistol is covered. Wallace v. Warden, 226 Md. 670 , 174 A.2d 435 (1961). So is a starter’s pistol. Jackson [v. State ], 231 Md. 591 , 191 A.2d 432 [ (1963) ].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Handy v. Maryland

3. “There need be no new trial, however. When the jury convicted [the defendant] of armed robbery, it necessarily convicted him of simple robbery as well. We shall further direct that the judgment in the trial court be vacated, that a verdict of guilty of robbery be entered, and that [the defendant] then be sentenced on the robbery conviction. E.g., United States v. Dickinson, 706 F.2d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1983) (when there is insufficient evidence to convict of a greater offense, appellate court may reverse conviction and enter judgment on a lesser-included offense); Dickenson v. Israel, 482 F.Supp. 1223, 1225-1226 (E.D.Wis.1980), aff'd, 644 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.1981) (same); State v. Grant, 177 Conn. 140, 147-149 , 411 A.2d 917, 920-921 (1979) (same); see Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 246-247 , 106 S.Ct. 1032, 1038 , 89 L.Ed.2d 187, 197 (1986) (defendant’s jeopardy-barred conviction may be cured by reducing it to a conviction of a lesser-included offense which is not jeopardy-barred).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Hobby v. State