Volume 314 — North Carolina Reports

1. Contracts 27.1 — contract to convey stock in family business — evidence of contract sufficient. There was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to forty-eight percent of the stock in a Kentucky Fried Chicken business based on an oral contract with his wife where plaintiff had owned a tire business in Weaverville and defendant had worked in a Kentucky Fried Chicken business in Hendersonville; plaintiff had begun operating his tire business during the day and the Kentucky Fried Chicken business at night after his wife became ill; defendant requested that plaintiff come to Hendersonville and run the Kentucky Fried Chicken business after defendant's sister-in-law was no longer with the business; plaintiff did not want to give up his tire business; defendant told plaintiff that the business belonged to them both, that they would share everything they did, and that plaintiff would be a part of the business just as she was; plaintiff then worked eleven to twelve hour days seven days a week in the Kentucky Fried Chicken business, handling social security, unemployment and time sheets while defendant took care of the banking and the bills; plaintiff and defendant discussed how to use money left after bills; and defendant testified in a deposition that plaintiff was not paid a regular salary until they incorporated and that before then they had both simply taken money from the banking account as needed. The business was operated in an informal manner and it would not be unreasonable for the jury to find that defendant had agreed that, if plaintiff would devote his full time to the operation of the business, the business would be operated as a joint enterprise and they would share equally in its assets.<page_number>Page 2</page_number> 2. Contracts 4.1 — oral contract between husband and wife to convey stock in business — consideration There was consideration for an oral contract between plaintiff husband and defendant wife to split the shares of an incorporated Kentucky Fried Chicken business equally, and the court correctly instructed the jury on consideration, where there were mutual promises to accept division of shares and to continue to operate the business as before, followed by the transfer of jointly owned property to the newly formed corporation. While there was conflicting evidence on whether the parties agreed to and in fact established plaintiffs partial ownership interest both before and after incorporation, and while the jury may have concluded that plaintiff joined the business solely because he was the husband of an ill wife, conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. Furthermore, plaintiffs services before incorporation of the business could provide consideration because those services were based on expectations that his contributions would be rewarded by sharing the business equally. G.S. <cross_reference>1A-1</cross_reference>, Rule 51. 3. Limitation of Actions 4.6 — breach of contract to issue stock — accrual of action The Court of Appeals erred by ruling that plaintiffs action was barred by the statute of limitations where plaintiff joined his wife in the operation of a Kentucky Fried Chicken business which was later incorporated; the business was operated in an informal manner before and after incorporation, the board of directors never met and stock was never issued; the agreement was to have an equal number of shares issued to plaintiff and defendant; and there was no time limit for its performance. The statute of limitations began to run on the date the contract was breached, not the first date performance was possible; since there was no evidence that defendant refused to issue stock in the corporation prior to April of 1979 when defendant assumed exclusive control over the corporation and its assets, the statute of limitations began to run at that time and plaintiff was within its three year period. G.S. <cross_reference>1-52</cross_reference>(1). 4. Corporations 16 — action to enforce oral contract to issue stock — not subscription The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that an agreement that plaintiff and defendant would share equally the stock of a Kentucky Fried Chicken business was a stock subscription which was unenforceable under G.S. 55-43 because it was not in writing. This was not an action to enforce plaintiffs promise to take shares; rather plaintiffs action was an attempt to enforce defendant's promise or contract to issue shares to plaintiff. 5. Corporations 4.1 — agreement to share stock equally — not a shareholder's agreement The Court of Appeals erred by considering an agreement that plaintiff and defendant would share equally the shares of a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant as a shareholder's agreement which was unenforceable under G.S. 55-73(b) because it was not in writing. G.S. 55-73 was not plaintiffs exclusive legal remedy, and plaintiff properly chose an alternate legal remedy based on defendant's oral contract to convey an interest in the corporation.<page_number>Page 3</page_number> 6. Declaratory Judgments 1 — declaratory judgment to enforce oral agreement to issue stock — written agreement not required In an action in which plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that he was the owner of forty-eight percent of the stock and half the assets of a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, the Court of Appeals erred by determining that a declaratory judgment was not appropriate because there was no written instrument to interpret and because such a judgment was not available to determine issues of fact alone. A written agreement is not a requirement under G.S. <cross_reference>1-256</cross_reference> where a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty. G.S. <cross_reference>1-253</cross_reference> et seq., G.S. <cross_reference>1-254</cross_reference>, G.S. <cross_reference>1-255</cross_reference>, G.S. <cross_reference>1-261</cross_reference>. 7. Contracts 26 — contract between husband and wife to issue stock in corporation equally — evidence of investments and purchasing equipment relevant In an action in which plaintiff sought forty-eight percent of the stock in a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant operated by his wife, testimony concerning circumstances surrounding the parties' investment of money prior to incorporation and the source of funds used to purchase equipment for the business was relevant because it tended to establish that an agreement between the parties was entered into and as the basis for determining that such an agreement was supported by adequate consideration. 8. Corporation 18 — agreement to issue stock equally — failure to instruct on requirement for gift — no error The trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the requirement of delivery to consummate a gift where plaintiffs action for forty-eight percent of the stock in a Kentucky Fried Chicken business operated by his wife was premised on a contract supported by consideration, defendant's answer did not raise the theory, and defendant did not request a special instruction. G.S. <cross_reference>1A-1</cross_reference>, Rule 51 (b), Rule 21 of the North Carolina General Rules of Practice for Superior and District Courts. 9. Appeal and Error 31.1 — instruction on implied contract — no objection at trial Defendant was barred from assigning error to the court's instruction on implied contract where she did not object to the instruction at trial. Rule 10 (b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 10. Trial 5 — lunch and recess — early resumption without defense counsel — no error Defendant did not show prejudice where the court recessed for lunch until 2:15 p.m. but began its charge at 2:00 without defense counsel. Defense counsel returned just after 2:00 p.m. when the court was beginning the introductory parts of its charge, and defendant did not call the matter to the attention of the court or ask for curative instructions.

1. Appeal and Error 6.8; Rules of Civil Procedure 56.7 — denial of summary judgment — no review after trial on merits The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable during appeal from a final judgment rendered in 11 trial on the merits. 2. Adverse Possession 25.2 — continuous possession of property — insufficient evidence The trial court's finding that "defendants and their predecessor in possession, each individually, actually possessed the tract in dispute continuously and without interruption in a hostile and exclusive fashion openly and notoriously" was unsupported by the evidence where the only evidence of adverse possession by defendants was testimony by the male defendant that he walked the boundaries he claims in 1973 and that his son built a rifle range in the area, but such acts are more in the nature of trespasses than acts of dominion indicating ownership, and where the evidence showed no act of possession by defendants' predecessor other than one instance of timber cutting in 1965. 3. Adverse Possession 6 — tacking possession insufficient evidence The trial court's findings that defendants and their predecessors were in privity as to "possession and use" of the disputed land and that "use of the<page_number>Page 285</page_number> defendants' predecessor lapped with that of the defendant and extended for a period of greater than seven years" were unsupported by the evidence where defendants purchased their land in 1973 and the evidence showed only that defendants' predecessors cut timber from the disputed area in 1965 but there was no evidence of possession of such area by defendants' predecessors between 1966 and 1973.

1. Rape and Allied Offenses 4.1 — first degree sexual offense against nine-year-old boy — other acts admissible In a prosecution for committing a first degree sexual offense against a nine-year-old boy, there was no error in admitting testimony concerning sexual acts other than the crime charged where the testimony clearly tended to prove that the defendant engaged in a scheme whereby he took sexual advantage of the availability and susceptibility of his young nephews each time they were left in his custody. 2. Rape and Allied Offenses 6; Criminal Law 95.1 — first degree sexual offense against nine-year-old boy — testimony of other acts — no limiting instruction In a prosecution for a first degree sexual offense with a nine-year-old boy where testimony of other sexual acts was admitted to show a common scheme or plan, there was no error in failing to give a limiting instruction because defendant failed to request the instruction or to object to the instructions given. N.C. Rules of App. Procedure 10(b)(2). 3. Rape and Allied Offenses 4.1 — first degree sexual offense — testimony of another act excluded after similar testimony admitted — no error In a prosecution for a first degree sexual offense against a nine-year-old boy, there was no prejudice where the court permitted testimony of other similar sexual offenses, then interrupted testimony of another similar offense and instructed the jury that it was not to consider that testimony. 4. Criminal Law 95.1 — objection sustained and motion to strike allowed — no error in not instructing jury to disregard testimony The trial court did not err in a prosecution for a first degree sexual offense against a nine-year-old boy by not instructing the jury ex mero motu to disregard testimony to which it had sustained an objection and allowed a motion to strike. 5. Constitutional Law 30; Criminal Law 87 — first degree sexual offense — testimony of codefendant pursuant to plea bargain — no written notice The trial court did not err in a prosecution for a first degree sexual offense against a nine-year-old boy by permitting a codefendant to testify pursuant to a plea arrangement without the written notice required by G.S.(c). The remedy for a violation of this requirement is a recess; here, court ordered a ten minute recess even though defendant neither objected requested a recess.<page_number>Page 302</page_number> 6. Rape 4.1; Criminal Law 87 — degree sexual offense — testimony not too vague or indefinite In a prosecution for a first degree sexual offense against a nine-year-old, testimony by a codefendant who was allowed to plead guilty to a lesser was not so vague and indefinite that it should have been excluded. 7. Criminal Law 158.2 — judge leaving courtroom during closing arguments — not in record — arguments not recorded — no error In a prosecution for a first degree sexual offense against a nine-year-old, defendant's contention that the trial judge erred by leaving the courtroom closing arguments was not properly before the court where there was in the record to show that the judge did in fact leave the courtroom,; the arguments were not recorded, the Court could not say that transpired which harmed defendant, and the arguments of counsel presumed proper.

1. Criminal Law 138.42 — sentencing — necessity for finding non-statutory mitigating factor Although failure to find a statutory mitigating factor supported by uncontradicted, and manifestly credible evidence is reversible error, a judge's consideration of a non-statutory factor which is (1) requested by, (2) proven by uncontradicted, substantial and manifestly credible, and (3) mitigating in effect is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion the sentencing judge under G.S. 15A-1340.4(a), and his failure to find a non-statutory mitigating factor will not be disturbed on appeal absent a of abuse of discretion. 2. Criminal Law 138.42 — defendant's aid to victim — failure to find as mitigating factor In sentencing defendant for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find as a non-statutory mitigating factor that defendant rendered aid to his victim where defendant's testimony unequivocally showed that defendant's decision to take the victim to a medical facility was motivated by a purely selfish concern about the effect of her possible death on his ultimate punishment and that remorse played little role in his decision to aid the victim.<page_number>Page 320</page_number>

1. Indictment and Warrant 6.2 — probable cause for issuance of arrest warrant Information an officer presented to a magistrate was sufficient to probable cause for the issuance of warrants for defendant's arrest it included a statement made by a codefendant in the presence of the officer's that "If I did what you say, [defendant] was with me when I did it," and it also included a photograph of defendant and a composite of the prepared by the victim the morning of the crimes. Therefore, made by defendant and items seized from his car were not obtained a result of an illegal arrest. 2. Searches and Seizures 13 — warrantless search by consent Evidence seized during a warrantless search is admissible if the State that the defendant freely and voluntarily, without coercion, duress, or fraud, consented to the search. In determining whether consent is free and voluntary, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances which were at the time of the search. 3. Searches and Seizures 14 — consent to search — cooperation made known to district attorney An officer's statements to defendant that his cooperation would be made to the district attorney were not such an inducement as to render involuntary consent to a search of his automobile where the record not reveal the slightest hint that defendant was led to believe that he expect any easier or preferred treatment in exchange for his consent to search, and where defendant certainly knew, as a result of his age and experience police practices and procedures, that the district attorney would made aware of his cooperation as a matter of routine practice. 4. Criminal Law 75.2 — waivers of counsel — statements by officer — cooperation made known to district attorney An officer's statements to defendant that his cooperation would be made to the district attorney were not such an inducement as to render involuntary oral and written waivers of counsel. 5. Criminal Law 75.11 — assertion of right to counsel — subsequent confession — initiation of conversation by defendant An officer's delivery of an inventory receipt form to defendant after defendant had invoked his right to counsel did not constitute an "initiation" of conversation with defendant by the officer as that term was used in Edwards v. Arizona, <cross_reference>451 U.S. 477</cross_reference> (1981). Furthermore, the officer's return to the jail the next day after defendant asserted his right to counsel was not an initiation of conversation in violation of Edwards, but was instead a continuation of a conversation by defendant. the prior evening, where the officer handed defendant the inventory receipt and turned to walk away; defendant indicated<page_number>Page 338</page_number> desire to "tell his side of the story" after he had some sleep and a shower; officer told defendant he would return the next morning; and when the officer the next morning, he had a jailer contact defendant and ask him he still desired to speak with the officer. G.S. <cross_reference>15A-223</cross_reference>(b). 6. Criminal Law 75.11 — assertion of right to counsel — voluntariness of subsequent waiver of right Defendant's waiver of counsel and his written statement, made after having invoked his right to counsel, were voluntarily and knowingly under the totality of the circumstances where defendant himself initiated conversation following the assertion of his constitutional rights, defendant readvised of his Miranda rights, defendant expressly waived his rights in writing, and the waiver was not induced by the officers. 7. Rape and Allied Offenses 6.1 — first degree rape — instructions on lesser offenses not required by defendant's statement In a prosecution for first degree rape, defendant's statement that he to penetrate without an erection did not constitute a denial of which required the trial court to instruct on the lesser included offenses attempted first degree rape and assault on a female. 8. Criminal Law 115 — denial by defendant — necessity for instructing on lesser offense Where a defendant denies having committed a complete offense, such as degree murder, but there is evidence as to every element which negates denial, application of State v. Strickland. <cross_reference>307 N.C. 274</cross_reference>, <cross_reference>298 S.E.2d 645</cross_reference>, be proper, and the jury would be correctly charged to find the defendant of first degree murder or not guilty. However, where the defendant only an element of the offense, such as penetration in the crime of first rape, rather than the complete offense, Strickland would be inapplicable it would be incumbent upon the trial judge to place that issue the jury, which would necessarily include an instruction on some lesser offense of first degree rape. 9. Burglary and Unlawful Breakings 7 — first degree burglary — instruction on lesser offenses not required by defendants statement In a prosecution for first degree burglary, defendant's statement to officers not constitute evidence that he did not intend to commit the specified of first degree rape and armed robbery when he entered the victim's home so as to require the trial court to instruct on misdemeanor breaking entering where defendant indicated that he agreed to go to the mobile so that his codefendants could collect some money from his girlfriend; defendant admitted having watched the codefendant enter the mobile home a mask and wielding a "swordlike' knife; defendant admitted that he watched as the codefendant threatened the girl; and in spite of this, entered the mobile home through a window after having failed to entrance through the door.<page_number>Page 339</page_number> 10. Burglary and Unlawful Breakings 6.3 — first degree burglary — felonious intent — instruction in the disjunctive In a prosecution for first degree burglary upon an indictment charging a and entering with an intent to commit first degree rape and armed robbery, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that defendant must intended "to commit rape or robbery with a dangerous weapon, or both" the time of the breaking and entering. 11. Criminal Law 102.9 — jury argument — untruthfulness of defendant's Statement The district attorney's comments during jury argument on the untruthfulness defendant's written statement which had been introduced by State were proper where the record contained other evidence introduced the State to contradict defendant's written statement. 12. Criminal Law 102.9 -jury argument — comment on defendant's "morality and character" Although the district attorney's comment during jury argument that defendant wouldn't even begin to register on a scale of "morality and was inappropriate, such comment did not so exceed the bounds of argument as to require the trial court to sustain defendant's objection where the comment was primarily directed toward defendant's statement and the lack of credibility derived therefrom.

1. Criminal Law 34.7; Narcotics 3.1 — heroin found in defendant's house on other occasions — admissibility to show guilty knowledge In a prosecution for trafficking in heroin, evidence that police found heroin in or near defendant's house on two occasions other than the one for which defendant was on trial was properly admitted for the purpose of showing defendant's guilty knowledge even though it revealed defendant's commission of other offenses. 2. Criminal Law 34.1; Narcotics 3.1 — other drug offenses — disposition to deal in drugs — disapproval of language in Court of Appeals cases Language in State v. Richardson, <cross_reference>36 N.C. App. 373</cross_reference>, <cross_reference>243 S.E.2d 918</cross_reference>, quoted by the Court of Appeals in this case, to the effect that evidence of other drug offenses is admissible to show "disposition to deal in illicit drugs" is disapproved. 3. Narcotics 3.1 — reputation of house for narcotics — inadmissible hearsay-harmless error In a prosecution for trafficking in heroin, testimony by police officers that defendant's house had a reputation as a place where illegal drugs were bought and sold was inadmissible hearsay, but the admission of such testimony was harmless error where the State offered abundant evidence of defendant's guilt and a different result would not have likely ensued absent such testimony, and where defendant solicited the same evidence on cross-examination. G.S. <cross_reference>15A-1443</cross_reference>.

1. Witnesses 1.2 — competency of child as witness — no abuse of discretion in ruling The trial court's ruling that a five-year-old prosecution witness was competent to testify was the result of a reasoned decision and thus not an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding the child's answers during the voir dire were somewhat vague and self-contradictory, where the child stated at points in her testimony that she knew what it meant to tell the truth and to tell a lie, that it was bad to tell a lie, and that she was going to tell the truth and was not going to tell a lie. 2. Rape and Allied Offenses 5 — sexual offense with child — sufficiency of evidence The State's evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant touched a five-year-old female child's sexual organs with his tongue so as to support his conviction of the sexual offense of cunnilingus on the child. 3. Criminal Law 165 — jury argument — effect of failure to object Failure of defendant to object at trial to the prosecutor's jury argument in a non-capital case waived alleged errors in such argument. 4. Rape and Allied Offenses 6.1 — first degree sexual offense — submission of attempt not required The trial court in a prosecution for the commission of a first degree sexual offense on a child did not err in failing to submit to the jury the offense of attempt to commit a first degree sexual offense, here the State's evidence in the form of the child's testimony, if believed, was positive as to every element of the crime charged, and the only contrary evidence was defendant's mere denial of the charge.

1. Criminal Law 138.42, 161.2 — failure to find non-statutory mitigating factors — prevention of jailbreak — model prisoner — no abuse of discretion — not properly raised on appeal In a prosecution for second degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon, the trial court did not err by not finding as a non-statutory mitigating factor that defendant aided in the prevention of a possible jailbreak. The failure of a trial judge to find a non-statutory mitigating factor, even if the factor is proven by uncontradicted, substantial, manifestly credible evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Defendant did not show that the court's ruling could not have been the result of a reasoned decision; furthermore, an additional assignment of error concerning evidence that defendant was a model prisoner was not presented to the Court of Appeals and was not referred to in the Court of Appeals' dissent. G.S. 15A-1340.4(a), North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure 14(b)(1).<page_number>Page 517</page_number> 2. Criminal Law 138.38 — failure to find mitigating factor — provocation or extenuating relationship — no error In a prosecution for second degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon, the trial court did not err by failing to find as a mitigating factor that the defendant acted under strong provocation or that the relationship between defendant and the victim was otherwise extenuating where defendant's wife informed him that she loved another man and that she desired a separation, defendant and his wife presented contradictory testimony concerning telephone conversations between defendant and his wife's lover which defendant claimed were taunting, defendant broke his wife's jaw after a session with a marriage counselor, defendant became involved in an affair of his own, and defendant shot his wife and a man he mistook for her lover six weeks after the last telephone conversation. The evidence as to the alleged provocation of the telephone calls and of defendant's relationship with his wife was too conflicting to compel a single, rational conclusion. G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(2).

1. Criminal Law 26.5 — judgments for burglary and breaking or entering — failure to raise double jeopardy issue at trial The trial court did not err in entering judgments against defendant for both first degree burglary and breaking or entering where defendant failed to raise the double jeopardy issue at trial and the multiple count indictment against him was valid on its face. 2. Criminal Law 138.24 — aggravating circumstances — age and infirmity of victim — evidence from codefendant's trial The trial court erred in finding the age of the victim and her infirmity as aggravating circumstances on the basis of statements made by prosecutor at a codefendant's sentencing hearing earlier the same day and evidence in the prosecutor's file on the codefendant's case absent a stipulation that such evidence could be considered since reliance on evidence from the trials of others connected with the same offense is improper absent a stipulation. 3. Criminal Law 138.26 — guilty plea — aggravating circumstance based on allegations in indictment Where a defendant pleads guilty to an indictment which contains factual allegations which could be the basis for the finding of an aggravating circumstance and fails to challenge or present any evidence to rebut these factual allegations, they are deemed admitted and may be utilized by the trial court to<page_number>Page 619</page_number> establish the existence of the aggravating factor. Therefore, the trial court could properly find as an aggravating factor that the offense involved the taking of property of great monetary value based on an allegation in the indictment that the property had a value of $3.177.40 where defendant entered a plea of guilty and did not challenge the factual allegations in the indictment. 4. Criminal Law 138.40 — mitigating circumstance — voluntary acknowledgement of wrongdoing — finding not required Defendant failed to establish that he was absolutely entitled to a finding of the statutory mitigating circumstance that he voluntarily acknowledged to law enforcement officials wrongdoing in connection with the offenses prior to arrest or at an early stage of the criminal process. Furthermore, defendant failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find this mitigating circumstance where defendant failed to present any evidence regarding the timing of his confession in relation in the `criminal process."

1. Criminal Law 102.6 — improper jury argument — future to instruct jury to disregard — absence of prejudice If error was committed in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor's jury argument that defense counsel's efforts to interview defendant's estranged wife were "shady" and that defense counsel evaluated the case and knew that it was hopeless, defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced thereby. G.S. 15A 1443(a). 2. Criminal Law 138.38 — mitigating factor — strong provocation or extenuating relationship — finding not required The trial court did not err in failing to find as a mitigating factor for second degree murder that defendant acted under strong provocation or the relationship between defendant and the victim was otherwise extenuating where the trial testimony and an earlier statement by defendant's estranged wife contradicted a statement she gave to defense counsel that deceased previously had pulled a pistol on defendant, had slapped defendant's minor daughter and had tried to run defendant's car off the road, and where defendant's contention that he acted under strong provocation by reason of his belief that deceased was going for a gun was contradicted by his wife's testimony and discounted by his own statement that he did not see a gun. 3. Criminal Law 138.40 — mitigating factor — voluntary acknowledgment of wrongdoing — effect of claim of self-defense The trial court did not err in failing to find as a mitigating factor for second degree murder that defendants at an early stage of the criminal process,<page_number>Page 639</page_number> voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing to a law enforcement officer where defendant admitted after arrest that he killed the victim but denied culpability by contending that the shooting was justified by self-defense. 4. Criminal Law 138.41 — mitigating factor — good reputation in community — finding not required Favorable testimony by defendant's probation officer did not compel the trial court to find as a mitigating factor for second degree murder that defendant had a good reputation in the community in which he lived where there was other evidence that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense, had a record of various assaults and trespasses, was under a restraining order not to go on the property where the killing took place, and lived across the street from his wife and children with his girlfriend.

Constitutional Law 34; Criminal Law 138 — multiple sentencing hearings — finding of new aggravating factor at subsequent hearings — no error The trial court did not err and defendant was not subject to double jeopardy at his second and third sentencing hearings for second degree murder and armed robbery where the court found as an aggravating factor that defendant had a prior criminal conviction but had not found that factor at the first sentencing hearing. Although double jeopardy principles apply to a second sentencing hearing before a jury in a capital case, proceedings under the Fair Sentencing Act do not involve the finding of elemental facts beyond a reasonable doubt in the nature of a guilt or innocence trial; each of the sentencing hearings in this case was a de novo proceeding brought about by the defendant at which the trial court could find aggravating and mitigating factors without regard to the findings in the prior sentencing hearings. G.S. <cross_reference>15A-1334</cross_reference>(b) (1983), G.S. <cross_reference>15A-2000</cross_reference> (1983).