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← 314 U.S. 104 - Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp.

Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

314 U.S. 104 · 1941

Citation profile

778
cited by 778 later decisions
4
cited 4 times by the Supreme Court
17
states following
July 2024
most recently cited

373 federal appellate · 50 district · 76 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 778 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2024 · most notably Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York (1970), Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries (1994)

373 federal appellate · 50 district · 76 state decisions — followed in 17 states

1940194119501960197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedCommercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp. (from Second Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Relies on Anne Sweeney v. William G Errving · The Lottawanna · Schnell v. The Vallescura · Del Vecchio v. Bowers

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 778 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “* * * it [the inference of fact] does no more than require the bailee, if he would avoid the inference, to go forward with evidence sufficient to persuade that the nonexistence of the fact, which would otherwise be inferred, is as probable as its existence. It does not cause the burden of proof to shift, and if the bailee does go forward with evidence enough to raise doubts as to the validity of the inference, which the trier of fact is unable to resolve, the bailor does not sustain the burden of persuasion which upon the whole evidence remains upon him, where it rested at the start.”
    27 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Proof of the sinking of the barge aided petitioner, but did not relieve it from sustaining the burden of persuasion when all the evidence was in. This Court, in the case of private bailments, has given like effect to the rule that the unexplained failure of the bailee to return the bailed goods is prima facie evidence of his breach of duty, . . . and the lower federal courts have applied, correctly we think, the same rule with respect to proof of unseaworthiness by the shipper where the vessel has not assumed the obligation of a common carrier. . . . This is but a particular application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which similarly is an aid to the plaintiff in sustaining the burden of proving breach of the duty of due care but does not avoid the requirement that upon the whole case he must prove the breach by the preponderance of evidence.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““[The carrier] is a bailee intrusted with the shipper’s goods with respect to the care and safe delivery of which the law imposes upon him an extraordinary duty. Discharge of the duty is peculiarly within his control. All the facts and circumstances upon which he may rely to relieve him of that duty are peculiarly within his knowledge and usually unknown to the shipper. In consequence, the law casts upon him the burden of the loss which he cannot explain or, explaining, bring within the exceptional case in which he is relieved from liability.” 4”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.