Com. v. Branthafer, A.

J-S03012-24

                                   

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ALLEN BRANTHAFER                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1745 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 12, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-31-CR-0000265-2000

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

OPINION BY OLSON, J.:                                    FILED: APRIL 5, 2024

       Appellant, Allen Branthafer, appeals from the December 12, 2022 order

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County that dismissed

his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.1 We affirm.

____________________________________________


1 Appellant’s notice of appeal purports to appeal from the December 12, 2022

order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. A copy of an order dismissing
Appellant’s petition, which was attached as an exhibit to the notice of appeal,
was timestamped as having been filed on December 6, 2022. The December
6, 2022 order, however, is not part of the certified record. Instead, the
certified record includes an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition that
was filed on December 12, 2022.

Our review reveals that, on December 6, 2022, the PCRA court filed a
memorandum opinion detailing its reasons for dismissing Appellant’s petition.
At the conclusion of the opinion, the PCRA court stated, “For the Reasons set
forth, an order dismissing [Appellant’s] second-amended PCRA petition will
be entered.” PCRA Court Opinion, 12/6/22, at 22 (emphasis added). The
PCRA court docket contains an entry confirming that a memorandum opinion
was filed on December 6, 2022. See PCRA Court Docket at 51 (December 6,
2022 entry). Absent from this docket entry is a notation that an order
J-S03012-24



       On February 16, 2002, a jury convicted Appellant of second-degree

murder, criminal conspiracy, burglary, robbery, and two counts of theft by

unlawful taking.2     Verdict Slip, 2/16/02; see also N.T., 2/13/02, at 840.3

Appellant’s convictions stemmed from an incident that occurred on April 17,

2000, whereby Appellant shot and killed the victim at his hunting cabin in

Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania. Prior to the shooting, Appellant and two

accomplices,     Tommy      Duvall    (“Duvall”)   and   Chris   Muckle   (“Muckle”),
____________________________________________


dismissing the petition was filed in conjunction with the December 6, 2022
opinion. Id.

On December 12, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing
Appellant’s petition. PCRA Court Order, 12/12/22. The entry of this order is
confirmed by a review of the PCRA court docket, although we note that the
entry was incorrectly described as “order denying post-sentence motion.”
PCRA Court Docket at 51 (December 12, 2022 entry) (extraneous
capitalization omitted).

Because the December 6, 2022 order dismissing Appellant’s petition is not
part of the certified record, we deem Appellant’s appeal to lie from the
December 12, 2022 order dismissing his petition. See Commonwealth v.
Preston, 

 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc) (stating that, “under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, any document which is not part of
the officially certified record is deemed non-existent - a deficiency which
cannot be remedied merely by including copies of the missing documents in a
brief or in the reproduced record”), appeal denied, 

 (Pa. 2007).
The caption has been corrected accordingly.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 903(a)(1),          3502(a), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 3921(a)
(2 counts), respectively.

3 We note that Appellant’s trial took place from February 13, 2002, to February

16, 2002. Each volume of the notes of testimony from trial, however, is dated
February 13, 2002, and the notes of testimony are continuously paginated for
all four days of trial. As such, we refer to the notes of testimony by the date
February 13, 2002.


                                           -2-
J-S03012-24



burglarized a nearby home and stole several guns and a cross-bow. In fleeing

the nearby home out of fear of getting caught, Appellant and the two

accomplices came upon the victim’s hunting cabin where the victim’s truck

was parked. While the accomplices were attempting to steal the truck to use

as a get-away vehicle, the victim confronted the men. During the interaction

between the victim and the two accomplices, Appellant appeared and shot the

victim four times. After hiding the victim’s body under a canoe behind the

hunting cabin, the three individuals fled in the victim’s truck.     The three

individuals were apprehended shortly thereafter. See generally, PCRA Court

Opinion, 12/6/22, at 2-9.

       On May 20, 2002, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for his

second-degree murder conviction.4 Sentencing Order, 5/20/02. On August

17, 2004, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and our

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on

December 22, 2004. Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 

, 1699

MDA 2003 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 17, 2004) (non-precedential decision),

appeal denied, 

 (Pa. 2004).          Appellant did not seek further

discretionary review by the Supreme Court of the United States. As such,

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final March 22, 2005, upon

expiration of the time for seeking discretionary review with the Supreme Court

____________________________________________


4 Appellant was also ordered to pay the costs of prosecution ($1,200.75), as

well as restitution in the amount of $12,915.30. Sentencing Order, 5/20/02.


                                           -3-
J-S03012-24



of the United States. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (stating, “A petition for a

writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is

subject to discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely when

it is filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying

discretionary review.”); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “a

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the

review”).

       On March 15, 2005, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first.

PCRA counsel was subsequently appointed to represent Appellant, and filed

an amended petition on August 15, 2006.5 After conducting multiple hearings

related to Appellant’s petition, the PCRA court denied the petition on

September 28, 2011. On December 24, 2012, this Court affirmed the PCRA

court order denying Appellant’s petition,6 and our Supreme Court denied

____________________________________________


5 For ease of identification in discussions infra, Appellant’s PCRA counsel
associated with the 2005 PCRA petition is identified as “initial-PCRA counsel.”

6 In affirming the PCRA court order denying Appellant’s petition, this Court
held that Appellant’s issue – that “the PCRA court erred in applying the
Strickland[ v. Washington, 

 (1984)] performance/prejudice test
for ineffective assistance of counsel, rather than the per se ineffective
assistance of counsel rule found in United States v. Cronic, [

(1984)]” – was waived for failure to raise the issue before the PCRA court or
in his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). Branthafer, 

,

, 1878 MDA 2011, at 4.


                                           -4-
J-S03012-24



Appellant’s    petition    for   allowance     of   appeal    on   June   27,   2013.

Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 

, 

, 1878 MDA

2011 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 24, 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal

denied, 

 (Pa. 2013).

       On February 1, 2014, Appellant filed pro se a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of

Pennsylvania, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of initial-PCRA counsel

and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Branthafer v. Glunt, 

, at *4 (M.D.Pa. filed Sept. 22, 2015) (unpublished memorandum),

appeal denied, 15-3571 (3rd Cir. filed Mar. 24, 2016).             On September 22,

2015, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

denied Appellant’s petition and dismissed the case. Branthafer, 

, at *1.

       On July 26, 2018, Appellant filed pro se the instant PCRA, his second.

Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition on July 31, 2019.

Thereafter, Appellant retained PCRA counsel, and new PCRA counsel filed a

second amended petition on July 28, 2021.7 The PCRA court conducted an




____________________________________________


7 On June 6, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a motion requesting that his privately

retained counsel be appointed to represent him.              The PCRA court granted
Appellant’s request on June 9, 2022.


                                           -5-
J-S03012-24



evidentiary hearing on January 5, 2022. On December 12, 2022, the PCRA

court dismissed Appellant’s petition. This appeal followed.8

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       [1.]   Is the limitation period under 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9545(b)
              non-jurisdictional?

       [2.]   If the PCRA time-limitation is “jurisdictional,” is the
              time-limitation, as applied to [Appellant], unconstitutional?

       [3.]   Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] first
              claim was untimely?

       [4.]   Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] fourth
              claim was untimely?

       [5.]   If McCoy[ v. Louisiana, 

 (2018)] did not
              announce a new constitutional rule, did the [PCRA] court err
              in finding that [Appellant’s] fifth claim was untimely?

       [6.]   Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] first
              claim lacked merit?

       [7.]   Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] second
              claim lacked merit?

       [8.]   Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that [Appellant’s] third
              claim lacked merit?

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (extraneous capitalization omitted).9

                              Jurisdictional Argument

____________________________________________


8 Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925. In its 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court explained
that the PCRA court judge who entered the December 12, 2022 dismissal order
retired on December 31, 2022. The PCRA court adopted the retired jurist’s
December 6, 2022 opinion that accompanied the order dismissing the petition.
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/13/23.

9 For ease of disposition, Appellant’s issues have been reorganized.




                                           -6-
J-S03012-24



       It is a well-settled principle that if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither

the PCRA court nor this Court has jurisdiction over the petition and cannot

address the substantive claims. Commonwealth v. Reid, 

,

1143 (Pa. 2020), citing Commonwealth v. Chester, 

 (Pa.

2006).      Recognizing this well-settled principle, Appellant’s first issue,

nonetheless, alleges that the one-year time-bar pertaining to the filing of

PCRA petitions, as set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1),10 is not jurisdictional

in nature. Appellant’s Brief at 71-73. Appellant asserts that our Supreme

Court’s “decisional law declaring the PCRA deadlines[, set forth in Section

9545(b)(1),] as jurisdictional was erroneously decided and that the

time-provision[ of one year] was intended to be a statute of limitations.” Id.

at 71. Appellant argues that “[t]he time-bar was never originally intended to

serve as a jurisdictional hurdle” as evidenced by the fact that Section

9545(b)(1) never utilizes the word “jurisdiction.”      Id. at 71-72.     Rather,

Appellant contends our Supreme Court’s “holdings to the contrary have

resulted in what should have been unnecessary attempts to escape the

Gordian [K]not[11] of its own creation in rare circumstances.” Id. at 72.
____________________________________________


10 Section 9545(b)(1) states that a PCRA petition, “including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment
becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves” one of
the three enumerated exceptions, as discussed in greater detail infra. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

11 The cutting of the Gordian Knot is an Ancient Greek legend associated with

Alexander the Great[, while he was] in Gordium[,] Phrygia [(an ancient city



                                           -7-
J-S03012-24



       Alternately, Appellant’s second issue asserts that, if Pennsylvania courts

continue to apply Section 9545(b)(1) as a jurisdictional rule, then Section

9545(b)(1) is unconstitutional. Id. at 73-79. Appellant contends that the

jurisdictional nature of the time limitation violates his due process rights and

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, i.e., imprisonment, under

the Pennsylvania and United States constitutions.      Id. at 73.   Specifically,

Appellant asserts that the time limitation “deprives [him] of an enforcement

mechanism for his due process right to effective PCRA counsel.” Id. at 78-79

(asserting that, the jurisdictional time-bar prevents him from raising an

ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel claim in a timely petition). Appellant contends

that because the time limitations prevent him from presenting a “timely

petition,” he is deprived of his freedom of movement and freedom from

punishment as an innocent man, which constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment. Id. at 76-77.

       In the seminal case, Commonwealth v. Peterkin, our Supreme Court,

for the first time, declared that the PCRA one-year time-bar under Section

____________________________________________


located in modern-day Turkey)], regarding a complex knot that tied an oxcart.
Reputedly, whoever could untie [the knot] would be destined to rule all of
Asia. In 333 [B.C.,] Alexander [the Great] was challenged to untie the knot.
Instead of untangling it laboriously as expected, he dramatically cut through
it with his sword, thus exercising another form of mental genius. It is thus
used as a metaphor for a seemingly intractable problem which is solved by
exercising an unexpectedly direct, novel, rule-bending, decisive, and simple
approach that removes the perceived constraints.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gordian_Knot (last visited Feb. 27, 2024).


                                           -8-
J-S03012-24



9545(b)(1) was jurisdictional in nature. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 

, 641 (Pa. 1998); see also Reid, 235 A.3d at 1167. The Peterkin

Court further rejected the argument that the jurisdictional nature of the

one-year time-bar was unconstitutional, finding no due process violation, as

the time for filing a petition is reasonable, and no ex post facto violation

existed because the time limitation “is procedural in nature and does not fall

within the categories of retrospective laws prohibited by the ex post facto

clause.”   Peterkin, 772 A.2d at 642-643, n.8 (stating, the PCRA time

limitation “strikes a reasonable balance between society's need for finality in

criminal cases and the convicted person's need to demonstrate that there has

been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his[, or her,] conviction”).

For more than two decades, Pennsylvania courts have steadfastly held to the

view that the PCRA one-year time-bar was jurisdictional in nature and

constitutionally sound. See Reid, 235 A.3d at 1167 (collecting cases that

have held to the principles that the PCRA time limitation is jurisdictional in

nature and constitutional).

      Recently, our Supreme Court, in Reid, supra, roundly rejected a call

for “fine-tuning” the precedent first announced in Peterkin. Reid, 235 A.3d

at 1168 (rejecting the argument that a court’s inability to afford a petitioner

relief based on lack of jurisdiction means the PCRA failed to afford sufficient

due process and the statute is, therefore, constitutionally infirm). Finding “no

present need” to abandon decades-old PCRA jurisprudence, the Reid Court

further remarked that the doctrine of stare decisis required continued

                                     -9-
J-S03012-24



adherence to the well-enshrined principle first set forth in Peterkin.12 Id. at

1169. Thus, bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court, we continue to

adhere to the principle that the PCRA time limitation is jurisdictional in nature.

See Reid, 235 A.3d at 1159 (stating, “[i]t is elementary that unless the United

States Supreme Court reverses a decision of [our Supreme Court], or [our

Supreme Court] overrules its prior decision, the law emanating from the

decision remains law” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)).

       Regarding Appellant’s second issue that the jurisdictional time limitation

of the PCRA violates his due process rights and right against cruel and unusual

punishment, we find this argument to be of no avail. To reiterate, Appellant’s

constitutional challenge rests on the argument that the jurisdictional time-bar

prevents him from asserting an ineffectiveness claim involving initial-PCRA

counsel. Appellant’s Brief at 78. After careful review, we believe the statutory




____________________________________________


12 As described by the Reid Court, the doctrine of stare decisis ensures
“evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
foster[s] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribute[s] to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Reid, 235 A.2d at 1168 (citation
and original brackets omitted).

The Reid Court further explained that because the precedent set forth in
Peterkin – the PCRA one-year time-bar is jurisdictional in nature – rests on
statutory interpretation, verses constitutional construction, the doctrine of
stare decisis holds “greater sanctity” since the legislature is free to amend a
statute if it so disagrees with a court’s interpretation. Id. at 1168-1169
(noting that, “[a] statutory construction, once made and followed, should
never be altered upon the changed views of new personnel of the court”).


                                          - 10 -
J-S03012-24



structure and judicial construction of the PCRA both diminish and refute the

due process claims raised by Appellant.

      As discussed supra, the Peterkin Court set forth the well-settled

principle that the PCRA jurisdictional time limitation is constitutionally sound

and does not violate, inter alia, a petitioner’s due process rights. Peterkin,

722 A.2d at 643, n.8.      As the Peterkin Court explained, “[b]ecause the

one-year period within which petitions normally must be filed is sufficiently

generous to prepare even the most difficult case, and because the exceptions

to this filing period encompass government misconduct, [newly-discovered

facts], and constitutional changes,” the PCRA jurisdictional time-bar is both

reasonable and constitutional. Id. at 643 (noting, “[t]he purpose of law is not

to provide convicted criminals with the means to escape well-deserved

sanctions, but to provide a reasonable opportunity for those who have been

wrongly convicted to demonstrate the injustice of their conviction”). The PCRA

time limitation “strikes a reasonable balance between society's need for

finality in criminal cases and the convicted person's need to demonstrate that

there has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his[, or her,]

conviction.” Id.

      Moreover, our Supreme Court recently held, in Commonwealth v.

Bradley, 

 (Pa. 2021), that a petitioner may raise an ineffective

assistance of initial-PCRA counsel claim at the first opportunity to do so, either

via new PCRA counsel or pro se, even if raised for the first time on appeal.

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401. In so holding, however, our Supreme Court did

                                     - 11 -
J-S03012-24



not overrule the well-established principle that a claim of ineffective assistance

of   initial-PCRA    counsel    does    not    automatically   overcome   the   PCRA

jurisdictional one-year time-bar.13 Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Yarris,

 (Pa. 1999) (stating, “an untimely petition will not be

addressed simply because it is couched in terms of ineffectiveness”);

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 

 (Pa. 1999) (stating that,

“the fact that some of [a petitioner’s] claims are couched in terms of

ineffectiveness[] will [not] save [a] petition from application of [S]ection

9545”); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 

 (Pa. 2000) (finding

that, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not overcome the

jurisdictional time-bar, and a petitioner is still required to plead and prove one

of the enumerated exceptions provided in Section 9545(b)(1)(i – iii) based on

the ineffectiveness claim); Commonwealth v. Miller, 

, at

*3 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 29, 2023) (non-precedential decision) (analyzing

Miller’s ineffectiveness claim within the legal framework of the PCRA’s

established exceptions to the jurisdictional time-bar rather than as a claim

that automatically overcame the jurisdictional time-bar).           Thus, Bradley
____________________________________________


13 Bradley’s PCRA petition was timely filed pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1),
thus making the invocation of one of the three enumerated exceptions set
forth therein unnecessary. As such, in reaching its holding, the Bradley Court
did not explicitly address a circumstance involving an untimely PCRA petition,
which is the situation in the case sub judice. Notwithstanding, as the Peterkin
Court recognized, the permissible filing period of the PCRA may be extended
where governmental interference, newly-discovered facts, or constitutional
developments are present. These exceptions offer reasonable opportunities
to challenge wrongful convictions outside the one-year limitation.


                                          - 12 -
J-S03012-24



expanded the opportunities afforded a petitioner to raise ineffectiveness

claims, albeit still requiring that the petitioner satisfy the jurisdictional

one-year time-bar requirement.

      Finding no case law, and Appellant has not cited any, that overruled the

constitutional validity of the PCRA jurisdictional one-year time-bar, we

continue to adhere to the principle that the PCRA time limitation is

constitutionally   sound   and,   therefore,    does   not   violate   Appellant’s

constitutional rights. See Reid, 235 A.3d at 1159.

                            Timeliness Exceptions

      Appellant’s third, fourth, and fifth issues challenge the trial court’s order

dismissing his petition on the ground that Appellant failed to plead and prove

one of the timeliness exceptions enumerated in Section 9545(b)(1), as

discussed infra. Appellant’s Brief at 35-42, 60-70. In addressing Appellant’s

issues, we are mindful of our well-settled standard and scope of review of an

order denying a PCRA petition.      Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s

dismissal of a petition is limited to an examination of “whether the PCRA

court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Miller, 

 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no

support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson,

 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great

deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those

findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding.”

                                      - 13 -
J-S03012-24



Commonwealth v. Hickman, 

 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation

omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Henkel, 

 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc),

appeal denied, 

 (Pa. 2014).

      If a PCRA petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the claims

and cannot grant relief.      Reid, 235 A.3d at 1143 (stating, “[w]ithout

jurisdiction, [courts] simply do not have legal authority to address the

substantive claims” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)).         As

discussed supra, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on March 22,

2005. Appellant filed pro se his current PCRA petition on July 26, 2018, more

than 12 years after the deadline for filing a timely PCRA petition. Therefore,

Appellant’s current PCRA petition is patently untimely.

      If a PCRA petition is untimely, the jurisdictional time-bar can only be

overcome if the petitioner alleges and proves one of the three statutory

exceptions, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Commonwealth v.

Spotz, 

 (Pa. 2017). The three narrow statutory exceptions

to the one-year time-bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government

officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly[-]discovered facts; and (3)

an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 

 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i - iii).

A petition invoking an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar must be filed




                                     - 14 -
J-S03012-24



within one year of the date that the claim could have been presented. 14 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (effective Dec. 24, 2018). If a petitioner fails to invoke

a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar, courts are without jurisdiction to

review the petition and provide relief. Spotz, 

.

       Upon conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court made the

following findings of fact:

       1.     Governor Walker, Jr. [(“Walker”)] was the principal witness
              called by [Appellant] at [the PCRA evidentiary] hearing.

       2.     [Walker] is 45 [years old], and resides in Huntingdon
              County.

       3.     [Walker] acknowledged that he has an extensive criminal
              history including a conviction for robbery.

       4.     [Walker] also testified that since 2012, when he was last
              released from jail, he has not been [involved in any criminal
              activity], has worked steadily at a good job, and is married
              with children.

       5.     [Walker] testified he grew up in [Mount] Union,
              Pennsylvania with [Appellant, Duvall, Muckle,] and Jason
              Taylor [(“Taylor”)].

       6.     [Walker] always called [Appellant] “Shorty”, and said he
              considers [Taylor] his cousin since they were raised
              together.


____________________________________________


14 We note that effective December 24, 2018, the time-period in which to file

a petition invoking one of the three exceptions was extended from 60 days to
one year. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). This amendment applies to claims
arising one year prior to the effective date of the amendment, i.e., December
24, 2017, or later. Act. 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 3. Because
Appellant filed his instant PCRA petition on July 26, 2018, this amendment
applies, and Appellant had one year in which to file a petition that validly
invoked any of the exceptions to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar.


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J-S03012-24


     7.    [Walker] recalled meeting his cousin, [Taylor,] at [a Mount]
           Union [gas station convenience store] in April[ 2000,] to
           return a [video game consol].

     8.    [Walker] explained that Taylor [] stayed with him a few days
           during a period of time[, prior to April 2000,] when Taylor
           and his girlfriend[,] Audra McCracken [(“McCracken”),]
           were fighting.

     9.    The couple [reconciled,] and Taylor [] called [Walker] and
           told him that [they] would be in the vicinity of Mount Union
           and that he wanted to retrieve his [video game consol].

     10.   [Walker] told [Taylor] to meet him at the [convenience]
           store since [Walker] had a reason to go there.

     11.   Walker testified his reason for going to the [convenience]
           store was to consummate a drug [transaction] with
           [Muckle].

     12.   Muckle[] paged [Walker] from the pay [tele]phone near the
           entrance to the [convenience] store.

     13.   [Walker] got a ride to [the convenience store, where he]
           saw Taylor and McCracken.

     14.   [Walker] also [] saw [Duvall] inside the [convenience] store.

     15.   [Walker] did not see [Appellant either] inside or outside of
           [the convenience store].

     16.   [Muckle] was standing by the pay [tele]phone.

     17.   According to Walker, he and Muckle walked across the street
           to Muckle's apartment to [complete] the [drug transaction.]

     18.   At the apartment, [Walker] recalled seeing Muckle's
           girlfriend [] and her kids.

     19.   [Walker] did not see [Appellant in the apartment] but also
           said he did not search the apartment.

     20.   [Walker] speculated, however, that had [Appellant] been [in
           the apartment,] he would have appeared at the sound of
           [Walker’s] voice.




                                   - 16 -
J-S03012-24


     21.   In his testimony, [Walker] was clear that his time at [the
           convenience store] and in [Muckle’s] apartment was very
           short.

     22.   [At the time, Walker] was wearing an ankle bracelet [as part
           of his] state parole and had to [return] home.

     23.   At the apartment, he said, “I just came in real quick, [did]
           what I had to do, and left[.”]

     24.   [Walker] acknowledged receiving a letter from [Appellant].

     25.   [Walker] responded immediately to [Appellant’s] letter.

     26.   In his letter, [Walker] posed a series of questions as to how
           he could help.

     27.   [Walker] reached out[] to [Appellant’s mother] who told him
           about the website she started.

     28.   [Walker] went to the [web]site[,] prepared an affidavit[,]
           and sent it to [Appellant].

     29.   [Taylor and McCracken] testified at the PCRA [evidentiary]
           hearing.

     30.   [Taylor] testified that like [Walker,] he had an extensive
           criminal history that included a conviction for burglary.

     31.   [Taylor] related that he grew up with [Appellant] and that
           [Appellant] was one of his best friends.

     32.   [In] April 2000, [Taylor] and [McCracken] broke up [] but[,]
           eventually[,] they got back together.

     33.   [Taylor] said [that] April 17, 2000[,] was [his and
           McCracken’s] anniversary[,] and they went to Lewistown[,
           Pennsylvania,] to get her ring fixed.

     34.   “It was our anniversary," [Taylor] said.

     35.   [Taylor] testified that he and [McCracken] have remained in
           constant contact for the past 22 years since they have a
           [child together] that is now 23 [years old].

     36.   On the return trip to Huntingdon [County on April 17, 2000,
           Taylor and McCracken] stopped at the Mount Union
           [convenience store] so he could retrieve his [video game
           consol] from his cousin[, Walker].

                                   - 17 -
J-S03012-24


     37.   [Taylor] testified that [Walker] suggested [the convenience
           store] as the place to meet for the exchange.

     38.   At [the convenience store, Taylor] said, [McCracken,] who
           was driving[ the couple’s vehicle,] parked in front of the
           entrance to the [convenience] store.

     39.   [Taylor] testified he saw [Duvall] and [Muckle] standing in
           front of the [convenience] store.

     40.   [Duvall] came over to the          [vehicle]     and   engaged
           [McCracken] in conversation.

     41.   Oddly, Taylor testified he got his [video game consol] but
           could not recall seeing [Walker].

     42.   [Taylor] testified he did not see [Appellant].

     43.   At the trial of this case, [Taylor's] testimony was[,] in most
           respects[,] in accord with his PCRA [evidentiary hearing]
           testimony.

     44.   There was[,] however[,] a [single] significant difference
           [between Taylor’s trial testimony and the testimony
           presented at the PCRA evidentiary hearing].

     45.   At trial, [Taylor] told the jury that he and [McCracken] were
           at [the convenience store] because “I had to get my [video
           game consol] from my cousin[.”]

     46.   In short, [Appellant] did not identify [Walker] as his cousin
           [during his testimony at trial].

     47.   [Taylor] testified that sometime before Christmas in
           [December] 2017[,] he ran into [Appellant’s] sister [at a bar
           in] Mount Union[.]

     48.   [Appellant’s sister] asked if [Taylor] had seen the website
           her mother created in 2017[.]

     49.   Taylor [] told [Appellant’s sister] he had not seen the
           website but would check it out.

     50.   [Taylor visited the website], and testified the ball started
           rolling and resulted in [his] affidavit dated December 17,
           2017.




                                   - 18 -
J-S03012-24


     51.   [McCracken] testified at the PCRA [evidentiary] hearing and
           corroborated[,] in most relevant respects[,] the testimony
           of [Taylor.]

     52.   [McCracken] reported [that] she lived in Huntingdon County
           her [entire] life and has an associate's degree.

     53.   [McCracken] confirmed that [Taylor] is the father of [their]
           23-year-old [child].

     54.   [McCracken] related that she knew [Appellant] through
           [Taylor].

     55.   [McCracken] repeated her trial testimony that she could not
           recall seeing[ Appellant, Muckle, or Walker] that April
           evening at [the convenience store].

     56.   [McCracken] said she and [Taylor] were at [the convenience
           store] that night “no more than ten minutes” and that during
           that time she had a conversation with [Duvall].

     57.   [Appellant’s] mother      was     a   witness   at   the   PCRA
           [evidentiary] hearing.

     58.   [Appellant’s mother] testified that since the trial she[,] as
           well as [Appellant’s] father and his [two] sisters[,] have
           tried to help [Appellant] prove his innocence.

     59.   [Appellant’s mother] testified that [Appellant,] his sisters[,]
           and [Taylor] grew up together.

     60.   [Appellant’s mother] indicated that         in 1997[,] she[,
           Appellant,] and her [] daughters            moved to York,
           [Pennsylvania].

     61.   [Appellant’s sister, who testified at the PCRA evidentiary
           hearing,] subsequently moved back [to Mount Union].

     62.   [Appellant’s mother stated] her daughters[] continued the
           relationship with [Taylor] after the trial albeit not as much.

     63.   [Appellant’s mother] testified [that, in 2017,] she paid to
           have a website created.

     64.   The name of the [web]site was “Free Shorty[.”]




                                    - 19 -
J-S03012-24


     65.   The purpose of the [web]site, [Appellant’s mother] said,
           was to locate anybody that had [] evidence or may have
           seen something.

     66.   [Appellant’s mother] indicated they were looking for
           witnesses that may have been at [the convenience store on
           the evening of the incident].

     67.   [Appellant’s mother] said[ Appellant] drafted specific
           questions for [Taylor] since he was there that night and
           [Appellant] did not know the extent of what he knew.

     68.   [Appellant’s mother] considered the website a success since
           they were able to obtain affidavits from [Taylor] and
           [Walker].

     69.   [Appellant’s mother] said she knew [Walker] since “[they]
           were all friends growing up[.”]

     70.   [Appellant] testified at [the] PCRA [evidentiary] hearing.

     71.   [Appellant explained] that his highest level of education was
           ninth grade but that he obtained his [general educational
           diploma while] in jail, and he has taken college courses.

     72.   [Appellant] acknowledged that he grew up in Mount Union
           with [Taylor] and [Walker].

     73.   [Appellant] testified that he and his sisters and mother
           moved to York in 1997.

     74.   [Appellant stated that] his family [was] his only resource[]
           to develop leads and to investigate his case.

     75.   [Appellant] said that he figured [the convenience store] was
           the best place to find witnesses who might have seen Duvall
           and Muckle getting in the car to leave that night.

     76.   So, [Appellant] said, the main focus of his investigation was
           to find people who had been at [the convenience store on
           the night of the incident].

     77.   Since [Appellant] knew his friend [Taylor] had been there,
           he testified he had his family looking for him[,] as well as
           others who testified at trial.




                                   - 20 -
J-S03012-24


      78.   [Appellant] testified that his sister[,] who had moved back
            to Mount Union[,] bumped into [Taylor] during [the]
            Christmas [holiday season in] 2017.

      79.   [Appellant] said [his sister] told Taylor to check out the
            website that had questions for him.

      80.   [Taylor] followed the directions and[,] ultimately[,]
            produced the affidavit that is [Appellant’s] Exhibit 3.

      81.   [Appellant] testified he never [knew Walker was] at [the
            convenience store on the evening of the incident] before
            receiving Taylor's affidavit.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/6/22, at 10-15 (extraneous capitalization and record

citations omitted).

      Here, Appellant argues that until Taylor came forward and identified his

“cousin,” who he met at a convenience store on the evening of the incident,

as Walker, Appellant could not have known that Walker was the “cousin”

“identified in the [police investigatory notes detailing an interview with

McCracken] (which he did not have access to during trial) and [] who Taylor

vaguely referred to in passing at trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 37.     Appellant

asserts that Taylor’s affidavit identifying his “cousin” as Walker, led Appellant

to the discovery of Walker and offered Appellant his first opportunity to obtain

an affidavit from Walker. Id. at 35, 37-38. Appellant contends that Walker’s

affidavit constitutes a newly-discovered fact, namely a witness who could

testify that Appellant “was not present [in] Muckle’s apartment or [at] the

[convenience store on the evening of the incident] as claimed by Muckle,

Duvall, and [Duvall’s sister] at trial.” Id. at 35.




                                      - 21 -
J-S03012-24



      To invoke the newly-discovered facts exception, a petitioner must plead

and prove facts that were unknown to the petitioner despite the exercise of

due diligence. Reid, 235 A.3d at 1144, citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

“Due diligence does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but

merely a showing the party [] put forth reasonable effort to obtain the

information upon which a claim is based.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 

 (Pa. 2016) (citation and original quotation marks omitted).        The

petitioner must offer “evidence that he exercised due diligence in obtaining

facts upon which his claim was based.” 

, citing Commonwealth v.

Breakiron, 

 (Pa. 2001). The question of whether a petitioner,

based upon the circumstances of a particular case, would have been unable

to discover the newly-discovered fact notwithstanding the exercise of due

diligence is a question that requires fact-finding, and the PCRA court, as the

fact-finder, should determine whether a petitioner demonstrated this

requirement of the exception. Commonwealth v. Bennet, 

 (Pa. 2007).

      “[T]he newly[-]discovered fact[s] exception[, however,] does not

require any merits analysis of the underlying claim, and application of the

time-bar exception[,] therefore[,] does not necessitate proof of the elements

of a claim of after-discovered evidence.” Commonwealth v. Small, 

, 1286 (Pa. 2020) (original quotation marks omitted) (noting that, the

newly-discovered facts exception to the jurisdictional time-bar is distinct from

an after-discovered evidence claim, which is a substantive basis for relief

                                     - 22 -
J-S03012-24



pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iv)); see also Commonwealth v.

Fears, 

, 1189 (Pa. 2021) (stating, an analysis pertaining to

whether a petitioner has sufficiently pleaded and proven the newly-discovered

facts exception to the jurisdictional time-bar prohibits a merits analysis of the

underlying claim). For purposes of the newly-discovered facts exception, a

determination      that   the    facts   were      unknown    to    the   petitioner    is

circumstance-dependent          and   requires     an   analysis   of   the   petitioner’s

knowledge. Small, 238 A.3d at 1283.

       In concluding that Walker’s affidavit did not validly invoke the

newly-discovered facts exception to the jurisdictional time-bar, the PCRA court

stated,

       [Appellant] argues that the testimony of [Walker] at the PCRA
       [evidentiary] hearing fulfills the two evidentiary burdens he must
       satisfy [to invoke the newly-discovered facts exception, and,
       ultimately,] in order to obtain relief on [his after-discovered
       evidence claim.15]

____________________________________________


15 To receive a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, a petitioner (or

a defendant, depending upon the procedural posture of the case) must satisfy
a four-part test requiring:

       the    petitioner    [(or    defendant)]      to   demonstrate      the
       [after-discovered] evidence: (1) could not have been obtained
       prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable
       diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will
       not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4)
       would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.

Commonwealth v. Small, 

 (Pa. 2018), citing
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 

 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S.



                                          - 23 -
J-S03012-24


       First, he posits that the claim is timely[, pursuant to the
       newly-discovered facts exception,] since he did not know that his
       longtime friend [Walker] had been at [at the convenience store]
       on April 17, 2000[,] until he received [Taylor’s] affidavit[.]

       ...

       The question then is did [Appellant] satisfactorily explain why the
       newly[-]discovered fact[] could not have been discovered earlier.
       [Appellant] knew [Taylor] had been in the [convenience store]
       parking lot that evening. [Taylor] knew [Walker] had been there
       as well.    [Walker] knew he had been briefly in [Muckle’s]
       apartment. The three [individuals] grew up together. They were
       close friends. [Appellant’s] family knew them. And yet, it was a
       chance meeting in 2017[,] in a local bar[,] between Taylor and
       [Appellant’s] sister, that led to [Appellant’s] learning of Walker's
       presence in the parking lot [of the convenience store] and
       [Muckle’s] apartment. We note that when [Appellant] learned
       from [Taylor’s] affidavit about [Walker] he had no difficulty
       getting an address for [Walker] and writing him a letter. On this
       point, we point out that Taylor's girlfriend[, McCracken,] testified
       at trial and gave the address in Huntingdon [County] where she,
       [Taylor,] and their [child] lived.

       Our conclusion is that [Appellant] did not satisfactorily explain at
       [the PCRA evidentiary] hearing why the newly[-]discovered fact[]
       could not have been discovered earlier.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/6/22, at 15-16.

       Inherent in an analysis of whether a petitioner has pleaded and proven

the newly-discovered facts exception, is first a determination of whether “the

____________________________________________


1198 (2009).

It is common for a petitioner seeking relief based upon a claim of
after-discovered evidence to rely on the same evidence or facts to invoke the
newly-discovered facts exception when the PCRA petition is filed more than
one year after final judgment. Cox, 

. Here, Appellant relies
on Walker’s affidavit to invoke the newly-discovered facts exception, as well
as to establish his claim for relief based upon after-discovered evidence.


                                          - 24 -
J-S03012-24



facts upon which [the petitioner’s] claim is predicated,” are new facts that

were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained through

due diligence.   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).         Here, Appellant’s claim

that he is innocent and entitled to a new trial rests upon the fact that he was

not present during the invasion of the house containing the guns and

cross-bow and later at the hunting cabin where a murder took place. Appellant

asked the PCRA court to infer this fact from newly-gathered locational

information, including PCRA evidentiary hearing testimony and affidavits from

previously untapped sources, which purported to show that Appellant was not

in the presence of the other accomplices, either in Muckle’s apartment or at

the convenience store on the evening of the incident. See Appellant’s Brief

at   35   (stating,   the    after-discovered    evidence   of   Walker’s   affidavit

“demonstrate[s] that [Appellant] was not present at Muckle’s apartment or

[at the convenience store on the night of the incident]”). Appellant insists

that Walker’s affidavit and PCRA evidentiary hearing testimony, which

suggested that Appellant was not present at Muckle’s apartment or the

convenience store on the evening of the incident, are new “facts” that trigger

the timeliness exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Id. at 35-42. But this

cannot be the case.         Appellant’s location on the evening of the incident,

namely that he was not present at Muckle’s apartment, the convenience store,

the house with the guns and cross-bow, or the hunting cabin, has been a fact

steadfastly maintained by Appellant throughout his legal journey and a fact

that has always been known by Appellant. See e.g., N.T., 5/15/06, at 65

                                        - 25 -
J-S03012-24



(stating, at the evidentiary hearing on his first PCRA petition, that his alibi was

that “I [(Appellant)] was at home” in York, Pennsylvania, on the evening of

the incident); see also Appellant’s Brief at 61 (stating, Appellant “has always

maintained his innocence”).      Moreover, Appellant’s absence from Muckle’s

apartment and the convenience store has no independent probative value in

this case other than to shed light on the likelihood that Appellant may, or may

not, have joined the individuals from those locations to commit the crime

proven at trial. Pennsylvania case law is unmistakably clear that only new

facts, not newly-uncovered information pertinent to previously known facts,

trigger the timeliness exception pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1)(ii).

      Appellant’s own whereabouts on the evening of the incident were always

known to him, as it cannot seriously be asserted that Appellant did not know

his physical location on the night in question. Appellant maintains that he was

at home in York, Pennsylvania, on the evening of the incident and, therefore,

could not have been present at, inter alia, Muckle’s apartment and the

convenience store in Mount Union. It follows, then, that Appellant has always

known that he was not at Muckle’s apartment and the convenience store in

Mount Union on that night. Walker’s affidavit, and subsequent testimony at

the PCRA evidentiary hearing, do not constitute newly-discovered facts, for

purpose of the newly-discovered facts exception pursuant to Section

9545(b)(1)(ii) but, rather, are newly-discovered or newly-willing sources that

confirm or support a previously known fact, namely, as Appellant has

consistently maintained, that he was not present in Mount Union on the

                                      - 26 -
J-S03012-24



evening of the incident.16 See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 

     (Pa.   2008)    (stating,    “the      focus     of     the   exception   is    on   the

newly[-]discovered facts, not a newly[-]discovered or newly[-]willing source

for previously known facts” (citation, original quotation marks, and original

brackets omitted)); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 

   (Pa.    2008)      (holding     that,    affidavits,    alleging      two   key

Commonwealth witnesses perjured themselves at trial (a claim maintained by

Abu-Jamal and, thus “known” to him), did not constitute newly-discovered

facts, for purpose of the timeliness exception, because the only “new” fact

was that two new witnesses provided affidavits and testimony to support the

previously known fact of perjured testimony); Small, 238 A.3d at 1287

(finding that, a co-defendant’s testimony at a subsequent PCRA evidentiary

hearing that was “materially consistent with his trial testimony” offered during

Small’s joint trial with co-defendant did not constitute an “unknown” fact for

purpose of the newly-discovered facts exception but, rather, was a

newly-discovered source of a previously known fact, namely the contents of

the co-defendant’s testimony). Therefore, we discern no error in the PCRA

court’s   determination      that     Appellant        failed    to   properly    invoke     the

newly-discovered facts exception.

____________________________________________


16 The crux of Walker’s affidavit, and PCRA evidentiary hearing testimony, was

that Appellant was not at Muckle’s apartment or at the convenience store on
the evening of the incident. See Appellant’s Exhibit 6; see also N.T., 1/5/22,
at 124-125, 135, 140-141.


                                            - 27 -
J-S03012-24



                  After-Recognized Constitutional Right

      Appellant’s next issue challenges the PCRA court’s dismissal of his

petition on the ground that he failed to invoke the after-recognized

constitutional right exception pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).

Appellant’s Brief at 60-66. Appellant contends that the Supreme Court of the

United States decision in McCoy, supra, “announced a new constitutional rule

that warrants retroactive application.” Id. at 62. Appellant further asserts

that the new constitutional rule announced in McCoy is a “substantive ruling”

that “applies retroactively despite the Supreme Court [of the United States]

not uttering the magic words concerning retroactivity.”         Id. at 64-65.

Appellant argues that “where the ruling is a new constitutional rule and [is a]

substantive [rule], the Supreme Court [of the United States] need not

explicitly state that the ruling applies retroactively to cases on collateral

review for the holding in the case to so apply.” Id. at 65-66 (asserting, “where

a new constitutional rule is substantive, a state court must give it retroactive

effect”).

      To invoke the after-recognized constitutional right exception pursuant

to Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), a petitioner must plead and prove that (1) “the

right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme

Court of the United States or [our Supreme Court] after the time provided in

[Section 9545]”; and (2) “the right has been held by that court to apply

retroactively.” Reid, 235 A.3d at 1154 (citation and original quotation marks

omitted). Importantly, the court announcing the new constitutional right must

                                     - 28 -
J-S03012-24



have ruled that the right applied retroactively prior to the filing of a petition

for collateral review. Id. at 1154, 1161 (stating that, by use of the words

“has been held” and “that court” in Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), “the legislature

clearly intended that the right was already recognized [as applicable with

retroactive   force]   at   the   time    the     petition   was   filed”);   see   also

Commonwealth v. Washington, 

 (Pa. 2016) (Dougherty,

J. concurring) (stating, the “safety valve for vindication of new and retroactive

rights is logically limited to pronouncements from the two courts of last resort

that can recognize new rights and makes clear that the court of last resort

announcing the new right should also issue the holding on the retroactivity of

the new right”). In other words, to invoke the after-recognized constitutional

right exception in the case sub judice, Appellant must establish that the

Supreme Court of the United States announced a new constitutional right in

McCoy, and that the Supreme Court of the United States held that the new

constitutional right applied retroactively to cases on collateral appeal wherein

the judgment became final before the new pronouncement.

      In McCoy, the High Court held that “[t]he Sixth Amendment guarantees

a defendant the right to choose the objective of his[, or her,] defense and to

insist that his[, or her,] counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when

counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant

the best chance to avoid the death penalty.” McCoy, 584 U.S. at 414, 417.

The McCoy Court explained that, while a “lawyer’s province is trial

management,” the defendant-client retains the right “to plead guilty, waive

                                         - 29 -
J-S03012-24



the right to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an appeal.” Id.

Within the category of rights reserved for the defendant-client is the

“[a]utonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to assert

innocence[.]” Id. at 414-415, 422. “With individual liberty – and, in capital

cases, life – at stake, it is the defendant’s prerogative, not counsel’s to decide

on the objective of his[, or her,] defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining

mercy at the sentencing stage, or to maintain his[, or her,] innocence, leaving

it to the State to prove his[, or her,] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at

417-418. “Thus, when a [defendant-]client makes it plain that the objective

of ‘his[, or her,] defence’ is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts

and pursue an acquittal, his[, or her,] lawyer must abide by that objective and

may not override it by conceding guilt.” Id. at 415, 423.

       Here, Appellant asserts that McCoy announced a new constitutional rule

pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.17

Appellant’s Brief at 60 (contending that, the new constitutional rule announced

in McCoy implicates “a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to ‘client

autonomy’”).       The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution

guarantees that

       In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
       speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
       district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
____________________________________________


17Because Appellant does not assert a violation of his right to counsel as
guaranteed by Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, we limit
our analysis of Appellant’s timeliness argument to the federal constitution.


                                          - 30 -
J-S03012-24


      district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
      informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
      confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
      process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
      Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).

      In order to satisfy the after-recognized constitutional right under Section

9545(b)(1)(iii), Appellant, in the case sub judice, needed to demonstrate that

the client-autonomy right discussed in McCoy was (1) a new constitutional

right, and (2) that the Supreme Court of the United States, in reaching its

conclusion, held that the new constitutional right was to be applied

retrospectively. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Although Appellant asserts

that the McCoy Court “held for the first time that defendants have the right

to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt,” (see Appellant’s Brief at

60 (emphasis added)), we cannot agree with Appellant’s assertion. Rather,

defendants, such as Appellant, have enjoyed the right to, inter alia, assistance

of counsel since the ratification of the United States Bill of Rights in 1791, as

made appliable to states through the ratification of the Fourteenth

Amendment in 1868. Instead of expanding the list of rights enumerated in

the Sixth Amendment, the McCoy Court refined and further defined the roles

of counsel and a defendant-client within the context of the Sixth Amendment,

thereby clarifying the concept of client-autonomy. Embodied within the Sixth

Amendment is the fundamental right that “a defendant must be allowed to

make his[, or her,] own choices about the proper way to protect his[, or her,]




                                     - 31 -
J-S03012-24



own liberty.”    See McCoy, 584 U.S. at 427.                As such, the right to

client-autonomy has existed since the inception of the Sixth Amendment.

      As further support that McCoy did not announce a new constitutional

right is the fact that the High Court began its discussion by noting it previously

held, in Florida v. Nixon, 

 (2004), that when a defendant-client

is informed by counsel of a proposed guilt-phase concession strategy believed

to be in the best interest of the defendant-client and the defendant-client

neither consents nor objects, counsel may proceed with the strategy without

fear of committing per se ineffectiveness.       Nixon, 

(stating that, “certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial

rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a

surrogate”). Thus, in 2004, when the Nixon decision was handed down, the

High Court already recognized the right of client-autonomy embodied within

the Sixth Amendment.         Therefore, McCoy did not announce a new

constitutional right, as required to establish the after-recognized constitutional

right exception to the PCRA jurisdictional time-bar. See Commonwealth v.

Gonzalez, 

, 

, at *4 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 16,

2020)   (non-precedential    decision)   (stating,   “[a]    defendant’s   ‘secured

autonomy’ under the Sixth Amendment is not a ‘new’ constitutional right[;]

McCoy simply applied a defendant's well-rooted Sixth Amendment right to

autonomy to a new set of circumstances” (citation omitted)); appeal denied,

 (Pa. 2021), cert. denied, 

 (2021); see also

Commonwealth v. Furman, 

, 

, at *4

                                     - 32 -
J-S03012-24



(Pa. Super. filed Jun. 29, 2021) (non-precedential decision) (stating, McCoy

“does not create a new constitutional right”); Commonwealth v. Weiss, 

 (Pa. 2013) (recognizing that, “only a criminal defendant has

the authority to concede criminal liability”).18

       Moreover, assuming, arguendo, that McCoy did announce a new

constitutional right, which it did not, Appellant fails to establish that the

Supreme Court of the United States expressly recognized that the decision

applied retroactively on collateral review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii);

see also Appellant’s Brief at 62 (conceding that, the rule announced in McCoy

merely “warrants retroactive application”).        Instead, Appellant asserts that

“McCoy announced a substantive rule” and, as such, the Supreme Court of

the United States did not need to “explicitly state that the ruling applies

retroactively to cases on collateral review for the holding in the case to so

apply.” Appellant’s Brief at 65-67. We cannot agree that McCoy announced

a “substantive rule.”

       “[S]ubstantive rules are those that decriminalize conduct or prohibit

punishment against a class of persons.” Washington, 

; see

____________________________________________


18 Moreover, our research has not revealed, nor has Appellant cited to, any

federal case declaring that McCoy announced a new constitutional right. See
Appellant’s Brief at 63 citing Smith v. Stein, 

, 233 (4th Cir.
2020), cert. denied, 

 (2021). Our review of Smith reveals that
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to resolve the issue of whether
McCoy announced a new constitutional right because, regardless, the decision
announced in McCoy does not retroactively apply on collateral review. Smith,
982 F.3d at 234-235.


                                          - 33 -
J-S03012-24



also Reid, 235 A.3d at 1162 (defining “substantive rules” as “rules forbidding

criminal punishment of certain primary conduct, as well as rules prohibiting a

certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their

status or offense”).      Conversely, “rules that regulate only the manner of

determining the defendant's culpability are procedural.” Washington, 

 (citation omitted); see also Reid, 235 A.3d at 1162 (defining

“procedural rules” as rules “designed to enhance the accuracy of a conviction

or sentence by regulating the manner of determining the defendant's

culpability” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)).         “Procedural

rules” “do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does

not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted

with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise.”

Reid, 235 A.3d at 1162 (citation omitted).

       When a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States results
       in a “new rule,” that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending
       on direct review. However, “under [Teague v. Lane, 

 (1989)], a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure does
       not apply, as a general matter, to convictions that were final when
       the new rule was announced. There are, however, “two categories
       of rules” that are exempt from Teague's “general retroactivity
       bar,” which a defendant may invoke notwithstanding the finality
       of his or her judgment of sentence. First, new substantive rules
       generally apply retroactively.[19] Second, a much narrower class

____________________________________________


19 Although our Supreme Court characterized “new substantive rules” as
forming an exception to the general retroactivity bar, the Supreme Court of
the United States recognizes that “substantive rules are more accurately
characterized as not subject to the bar.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 

, 198 (2016) (citation, original quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted).


                                          - 34 -
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       of “watershed rules of criminal procedure” also apply
       retroactively. The High Court has described such “watershed”
       rules as those that implicate the fundamental fairness and
       accuracy of the criminal proceeding.[20]

Commonwealth v. Olson, 

, 868 (Pa. 2019) (citations, original

brackets, and some original quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 

 (2020).

       Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing the

“watershed exception” reiterated that the exception was narrowly tailored

from its inception and that the High Court in 

 “stated that it

was ‘unlikely’ that additional watershed rules would ‘emerge.’” Edwards v.

Vannoy, 

, 1557 (2021).               Since the pronouncement of the

“watershed exception” in 

 the Supreme Court of the United

States has never found a new “watershed” rule of criminal procedure.21 

____________________________________________


20  A “watershed rule of criminal procedure” is a rule “without which the
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.” Schriro v.
Summerlin, 

 (2004) (citation omitted; emphasis in
original); see also Teague, 

 (stating, a ”watershed rule” is a
rule that “requires the observance of those [criminal] procedures that are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” (citation, original quotation marks,
and ellipsis omitted)). To qualify as a “watershed rule,” “a new rule must itself
constitute a previously unrecognized bedrock procedural element that is
essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Whorton v. Bockting, 

 (2007) (citations and original quotation marks omitted).

21 “As to watershed rules, to date, the Supreme Court of the United States has

discerned only one, arising out of the sweeping changes to the criminal justice
system brought about by the conferral of the right to counsel upon indigent
defendants charged with felonies in Gideon v. Wainwright, 

,

, 

 (1963).” Washington, 

; see
also Edwards, 141 S.Ct. at 1557 (stating, the High Court “has identified only



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J-S03012-24



Rather, the Edwards Court described the “watershed exception” as a

“theoretical exception that never actually applies in practice[,] offer[ing] false

hope to defendants, distort[ing] the law, mislead[ing] judges, and wast[ing]

the resources of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts.” Id. at 1560. As

such, the Edwards Court stated that the “watershed exception is moribund

[and] must be regarded as retaining no vitality.” Id. In other words, “no new

rules of criminal procedure can satisfy the watershed exception.” Id. at 1559.

       In the case sub judice, assuming arguendo that McCoy announced a

new constitutional rule, that rule – recognizing a defendant’s right to choose

the objective of his or her defense and to insist that his or her counsel refrain

from admitting guilt, even when counsel's experienced-based view is that

confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death

penalty – is not a substantive rule.           On its face, the McCoy rule neither

decriminalizes certain actions nor prohibits punishment against a certain class

of people.     Rather, the McCoy rule pertains to the manner in which a

defendant’s culpability is determined – i.e., counsel cannot concede guilt



____________________________________________


one pre-Teague procedural rule as watershed: the right to counsel recognized
in the Court’s landmark decision in Gideon[, supra.]”).

The High Court in Gideon, supra, held that the right to assistance of counsel,
enumerated in the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution, and made
applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants who are being subject to
criminal prosecution by the state. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-345.


                                          - 36 -
J-S03012-24



when a defendant objects to counsel’s strategy.             Therefore, the rule

announced in McCoy is a “procedural rule.”

      Assuming further, for purpose of discussion, that McCoy set forth a new

rule (or concept) of criminal procedure, the pronouncement in Edwards,

supra, precludes a determination that the rule constitutes a “watershed rule”

that applies retroactively. As such, the rule announced in McCoy cannot be

held, on the strength of its own significance, to apply retroactively on collateral

review where the judgment of sentence has become final. See Edwards, 141

S.Ct. at 1560; see also Gonzalez, 

, 

, at *5

(holding that, the rule announced in McCoy does not apply retroactively on

collateral review); Commonwealth v. Strum, 

, 

, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 9, 2021) (non-precedential decision)

(recognizing that, neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor our

Supreme Court “has held the McCoy decision applies retroactively to cases

on collateral review”).

      Therefore, we discern no error in the PCRA court’s determination that

Appellant failed to invoke the after-recognized constitutional right exception

to the jurisdictional time-bar.

               Initial-PCRA Counsel Ineffectiveness Claim

      In his fifth issue, Appellant challenges the PCRA court’s order dismissing

his petition on the ground that initial-PCRA counsel, who represented

Appellant on his first PCRA petition filed in March 2005, was ineffective for

failing to assert a violation of Appellant’s client-autonomy right during

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J-S03012-24



collateral review. Appellant’s Brief at 66-70. Appellant contends that, if the

decision in McCoy does not constitute a newly-recognized constitutional right

(in other words, the right to client-autonomy existed pre-McCoy), then

initial-PCRA counsel failed to raise trial counsel’s violation of Appellant’s

constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in his 2005 PCRA petition. 

Appellant contends that initial-PCRA counsel “couched [the McCoy] claim in

terms of ineffective assistance of [trial] counsel.” Id. at 67. Appellant argues

that initial-PCRA counsel should have “converted” the ineffectiveness of trial

counsel claim Appellant raised in his 2005 pro se PCRA petition into a violation

of Appellant’s constitutional rights claim (vis-à-vis a claim asserting a violation

of client-autonomy) pursuant to McCoy. Id. at 68. If initial-PCRA counsel

had raised the McCoy claim solely as a violation of constitutional rights claim,

Appellant contends “there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error,

the outcome of the [2005] PCRA proceedings would have been different.” Id.

at 67.

         In the instant PCRA petition, Appellant couches his McCoy claim within

the confines of an initial-PCRA counsel ineffectiveness claim in an attempt to

circumvent the PCRA jurisdictional time-bar. Although Appellant does not cite

to a specific Section 9545(b)(1) exception, Appellant’s assertion (that

initial-PCRA counsel “effectively abandoned [Appellant] during [his] initial

PCRA appeal [by asserting only] a waived claim”) strikes us as an attempt to




                                      - 38 -
J-S03012-24



invoke     the       newly-discovered     facts        exception   pursuant     to   Section

9545(b)(1)(ii).22 See id. at 69.

        It is well-established that an allegation of ineffectiveness is, typically,

not     sufficient     to    overcome    an     otherwise     untimely    PCRA       petition.

Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 

 (Pa. 2000) (holding

that, an ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel claim layered on top of a claim

involving trial counsel’s ineffectiveness does not satisfy the newly-discovered

facts    exception          to   the   PCRA     jurisdictional     time-bar);   see      also

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 

 (Pa. 2016) (stating that,

couching a petitioner’s claim in terms of ineffectiveness will not save an



____________________________________________


22 Section 9545(b)(1)(i) provides a timeliness exception when a petitioner
establishes that “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in
violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution
or laws of the United States[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i) (emphasis
added). Our Supreme Court previously stated that the term “government
officials” for purposes of the Section 9545(b)(1)(i) timeliness exception does
not include a defendant’s (or petitioner’s) counsel. Commonwealth v.
Wharton, 

 (Pa. 2005). Therefore, Appellant’s claim
asserting ineffectiveness of initial-PCRA counsel fails to invoke an exception
under Section 9545(b)(1)(i).

Similarly, Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim fails to invoke the after-recognized
constitutional right exception pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1)(iii). Appellant
does not cite to a recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States
or our Supreme Court (nor does our research reveal a decision) that sets forth,
inter alia, a newly-recognized constitutional right to effective PCRA counsel,
as is required to invoke the after-recognized constitutional right. Rather, it
has long-been established that Appellant has a rule-based right to effective
PCRA counsel.


                                              - 39 -
J-S03012-24



otherwise untimely petition under any one of the three exceptions enumerated

in Section 9545(b)(1)).

      In 

 our Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception

to the decision announced in Gamboa-Taylor. The Bennett Court held that

where a petitioner’s allegation of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness “emanates

from the complete denial of counsel,” Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) permits that

claim to be considered on its merits despite the claim being raised in an

untimely PCRA petition. Bennet, 

 (stating that, “the analysis

set forth in Gamboa–Taylor and subsequent case law does not apply to

situations when counsel abandons his[, or her,] client for purposes of appeal”).

Several years later, our Supreme Court clarified its holding in 

 stating that nothing in Bennett or Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) supports a

conclusion that a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness based upon allegations

of abandonment presumptively or automatically overcomes the PCRA

jurisdictional time-bar. Commonwealth v. Watts, 

 (Pa.

2011). Rather, in order to qualify for the newly-discovered facts exception, a

petitioner’s “fact” of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness based upon abandonment

must have been unknown to the petitioner and could not have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 

 Additionally, the petitioner must

still file his or her petition invoking the newly-discovered facts exception based




                                     - 40 -
J-S03012-24



on a claim of PCRA counsel abandonment within one year of discovery.23 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

       In determining whether PCRA counsel “completely abandoned” a

petitioner, our Supreme Court has explained that abandonment occurs when

counsel’s actions or inactions have “completely foreclosed [a petitioner] from

obtaining review of the collateral claims set forth in his[, or her,] PCRA

petition.”    Commonwealth v. Parrish, 

, 696 (Pa. 2020)

(citation, original brackets, and original quotation marks omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Rosado, 

 (Pa. 2016). For example, in

Commonwealth v. Peterson, 

 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court

held that PCRA counsel’s untimely filing of Peterson’s first PCRA petition

“constituted ineffectiveness per se [(or abandonment)] as it completely

foreclosed Peterson from obtaining review of the collateral claims set forth in

his first PCRA petition.” Peterson, 

 (stating that, Peterson



____________________________________________


23 Our Supreme Court in Bradley, supra, held that “a PCRA petitioner may,

after a PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro
se, raise claims of PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to
do so, even if on appeal.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401. While the new rule of
law set forth in Bradley, supra, permits a PCRA petitioner to raise an
ineffectiveness claim involving original-PCRA counsel at the first opportunity
to do so, even if on collateral appeal, Bradley does not permit a petitioner
to raise a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness in an untimely subsequent or
serial PCRA petition pursuant to the newly-discovered facts exception or in a
collateral appeal of that subsequent or serial PCRA petition. See id. at 406
(Dougherty, J. concurring). In other words, Bradley did not announce a rule
that allows a petitioner to circumvent the PCRA jurisdictional time-bar.


                                          - 41 -
J-S03012-24



properly   invoked   the    newly-discovered   facts   exception    based   upon

abandonment).

      In the case sub judice, Appellant asserts that initial-PCRA counsel

“should have converted [Appellant’s] claim in his [2005 pro se] PCRA petition[,

asserting] that [trial counsel] was ineffective in conceding [Appellant’s] guilt

without authorization[,] into a client-autonomy claim.” Appellant’s Brief at

68.   In so asserting, Appellant claims that his initial-PCRA counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise a client-autonomy claim in the amended petition

filed on August 15, 2006.

      A review of the record demonstrates that initial-PCRA counsel filed an

amended first PCRA petition in August 2006, that, in addition to incorporating

the 19 issues raised by Appellant in his pro se PCRA petition filed in March

2005, raised two more ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.

Amendment to Pro Se PCRA Petition, 8/15/06, at ¶3; see also Branthafer,

, 

, 1878 MDA 2011, at 3 (stating, initial-PCRA

counsel “filed an amended petition adding [two] issues to the 19 issues raised

by [Appellant]”). Thereafter, Appellant was permitted to represent himself

before the PCRA court, and initial-PCRA counsel remained as stand-by

counsel. Ultimately, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition.

      While   Appellant’s    2005   petition   may     not   have   included   a

client-autonomy claim, initial-PCRA counsel’s action – failure to include a

client-autonomy claim – did not completely foreclose Appellant’s collateral

review by the PCRA court but, rather, simply narrowed the claims presented

                                     - 42 -
J-S03012-24



to the PCRA court. As such, initial-PCRA counsel did not completely abandon

Appellant.24 Therefore, the narrow exception set forth in 

 is

of no avail, and the rule of law set forth in Gamboa-Taylor applies in the

case sub judice. Consequently, Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness involving

initial-PCRA counsel does not overcome the jurisdictional time-bar.25

                                      Conclusion

       In sum, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the dismissal

of Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant’s petition was patently untimely and

did not validly invoke one of the enumerated exceptions to the PCRA

jurisdictional one-year time-bar.         Therefore, the PCRA court was without


____________________________________________


24 Because initial-PCRA counsel did not completely abandon Appellant in the

filing of an amended PCRA petition, Appellant’s assertion that initial-PCRA
counsel was ineffective for failing to “convert” a claim of trial counsel
ineffectiveness into a violation of a constitutional right claim would be
analyzed under the three-prong performance-prejudice test pursuant to
Strickland, supra.

25  Assuming arguendo, that initial-PCRA counsel’s failure to include a
client-autonomy claim in the first PCRA petition constituted complete
abandonment, Appellant would still be required to invoke an exception to the
PCRA jurisdictional time-bar.     Namely, Appellant would be required to
demonstrate that this “fact” of abandonment was unknown and could not be
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Here, after initial-PCRA counsel filed the amended PCRA petition, Appellant
was granted permission to proceed pro se. As such, Appellant, at this point,
would have become aware of or known that a claim of client-autonomy was
not included in the 21 claims presented to the PCRA court. As Appellant’s
instant PCRA petition was filed more than one year after the “discovery” of
this “fact,” Appellant would be unable to invoke an exception to the
jurisdictional time-bar.


                                          - 43 -
J-S03012-24



jurisdiction to address the underlying claims raised by Appellant, and this

Court is without jurisdiction to address those claims on appeal.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.




Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary



Date: 04/05/2024




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