J-S13009-24
2024 PA Super 97
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN ALEXANDER SNYDER :
:
Appellant : No. 891 WDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 6, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-62-CR-0000425-2019
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: May 14, 2024
Appellant, John Alexander Snyder, appeals from the May 3, 2023, order
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County dismissing
Appellant’s petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. After review, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Appellant was
convicted by a jury of Aggravated Assault, Strangulation, Simple Assault,
Terroristic Threats, and Hindering Apprehension and Prosecution.1 Appellant’s
aggregate sentence was for a minimum period of 129 months to a maximum
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Aggravated Assault, (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1), First Degree Felony);
Strangulation (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(a)(1), Second Degree Felony); Simple
Assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1), Second Degree Misdemeanor); Terroristic
Threats (18 Pa. C.S.A. § 270b(a)(1), First Degree Misdemeanor); and
Hindering Apprehension and Prosecution (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5105(a)(1), First
Degree Misdemeanor).
J-S13009-24
period of 258 months. Appellant’s trial counsel, Alan Conn, Esq., represented
Appellant through sentencing and then was permitted to withdraw. See Tr.
Ct. Order, 9/19/21. The trial court appointed Bernard Hessley, Esq., to
represent Appellant with respect to any post sentence motion and appeal. No
post sentence motion was filed by Appellant through his new counsel, but a
timely notice of appeal and Rule 1925(b) statement were filed. This Court
affirmed the judgment of sentence on July 8, 2022. Commonwealth v.
Snyder, 2022 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1556, 1267 WDA 2021 (July 8, 2022).
On November 29, 2022, the Defendant filed a Petition for Post-
Conviction Collateral Relief. The trial court appointed Joan M. Fairchild, Esq.,
as Appellant’s PCRA counsel. Tr. Ct. Order, 12/21/22. After several time
extensions, Attorney Fairchild filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw Appearance
with Turner/Finley 2 Letter on April 12, 2023. The same day, the trial court
filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 907 and an order
granting PCRA counsel the right to withdraw. The trial court dismissed the
PCRA petition and filed a supplemental opinion. Tr. Ct. Op. 5/3/23.3
Appellant filed pro se motions for an extension of time to file an appeal
and for new counsel to be appointed. The trial court denied Appellant’s request
for an extension of time stating that it does not have the authority to do so.
____________________________________________
2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley,
550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).
3 This Opinion was incorrectly identified as an Opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) but rather was intended to supplement the opinion in support of the
dismissal of the PCRA petition.
-2-
J-S13009-24
Tr. Ct. Order, 5/30/23 (citing Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157,
160 (Pa. Super. 2019)). The trial court also denied Appellant’s motion for the
appointment of new counsel stating that where a Turner/Finley letter has
been accepted by the court and counsel has been permitted to withdraw, the
court shall not appoint new counsel. Tr. Ct. Order, 5/31/23 (citing
Commonwealth v. Maple,
559 A.2d 953, 956 (Pa. Super 1989)).
On June 14, 2023, Appellant filed a pro se “Request for Time
Enlargement of 30 Days” with this Court. By order filed on June 30, 2023, this
Court denied Appellant’s request but added, “Nothing herein prevents
Petitioner from seeking permission in the court of common pleas to appeal
nunc pro tunc from the May 3, 2023 order dismissing his PCRA petition.”
On July 3, 2023, Appellant filed a second PCRA petition along with other
various pro se filings. The trial court construed the filings to be a request
seeking permission to appeal the court's May 3, 2023, order dismissing the
first PCRA petition nunc pro tunc. The court granted Appellant permission to
file the appeal within thirty days. On August 2, 2023, Appellant filed a timely
pro se notice of appeal from the trial court's May 3, 2023, order dismissing
the first PCRA petition.
On August 3, 2023, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a Rule
1925(b) concise statement within twenty-one days. The trial court’s order
complied with the requirements of Rule 1925(b)(3). On August 14, 2023,
Appellant requested an extension of time to complete his concise statement.
Specifically, Appellant stated,
-3-
J-S13009-24
A 1925B must be in full detail and due to the lack of the Twenty-one (21) Days, it will not allow me to properly produce the matter
in its full Request as stated by the Received order.
Pro Se Motion for Enlargement of Time, 8/14/23.
On August 15, 2023, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion, thereby
giving Appellant until September 25, 2023—more than thirty days’ additional
time—to prepare his concise statement. Inexplicably, although Appellant was
properly ordered to file a 1925(b) concise statement, requested an extension
of time to file the statement, and then was granted an extension of time, he
did not do so.
Despite Appellant failing to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement, the
trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on September 28, 2023, stating that
any issue Appellant intends to raise on appeal should be waived. Tr. Ct. Op.
at 5. This appeal followed. Appellant filed his pro se brief with the Superior
Court on February 6, 2024, raising three issues:
Did PCRA counsel render ineffective assistance when she failed to
amend Appellant's PCRA and thoroughly review Appellant's case
file and identify any claims of merit including but not limited to;
(B) Ineffectiveness of trial and direct appeal counsel for failing to
protect Appellant's appellate rights/interests by failing to
challenge the sufficiency and weight of the evidence before the
trial court.
Presents newly discovered exculpatory evidence revealing that
Brady/Giglio material was withheld from the defense in violation
of Pa. R. Crim. P. 573 regarding a deal between the prosecution
and their witness Michael Whipple; (B) Newly discovered
exculpatory evidence revealing a conflict of interest existed
between Appellant and direct appeal counsel Bernard Hessley as
well as District Attorney Robert C. Green.
-4-
J-S13009-24
Did the PCRA court commit error and/or abuse its discretion in
dismissing appellant's first PCRA without hearing relying solely
upon PCRA counsel's Turner/Finley letter; and for denying
appellant's motion for appointment of new PCRA counsel again
relying upon counsel's Turner/Finley letter.
Appellant’s Br. at 2.
This Court has emphasized that Rule 1925(b) “is a crucial component of
the appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify and focus on
those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Commonwealth v.
Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)
(issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). “[A]ny issue not raised
in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived for appellate review.”
Bonnett,
239 A.3d at 1106 (citing Commonwealth v. Lord,
719 A.2d 306,
309 (Pa. 1998)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in
the Statement ... are waived.”). Although Appellant is proceeding pro se,
under Pennsylvania law, pro se defendants are subject to the same rules of
procedure as are represented defendants. See Commonwealth v. Williams,
896 A.2d 523, 534 (Pa. 2006).
Appellant asserts that he raised his issues at the earliest opportunity to
do so, which is all that is required in this circumstance pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), and its progeny.
Appellant’s Br. at 10; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2-3. Appellant is correct that
Bradley governs this case, however, Appellant failed to comply with the
requirements of Bradley.
-5-
J-S13009-24
In that case, our Supreme Court dealt with a situation where PCRA
counsel is alleged to be ineffective. In certain circumstances, if the analysis of
PCRA counsel's effectiveness is left in the hands of the allegedly ineffective
PCRA attorney, counsel must evaluate his own ineffectiveness, threatening his
livelihood and professional reputation. Bradley, 261 A.3d at 398. Requiring
counsel to do so creates an inherent conflict of interest, and the Court has
acknowledged that “counsel cannot argue his or her own ineffectiveness.” Id.
(citing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 329 n.52 (Pa. 2011)).
However, forcing the petitioner to raise these claims in a second or subsequent
PCRA petition in light of the one-year jurisdictional time limitation meant that,
as a practical matter, most petitioners would be prevented from presenting a
claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Id. at 391. Thus, the Court held:
Specifically, we find that a review paradigm allowing a petitioner
to raise claims of PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness at the first
opportunity when represented by new counsel, even if on appeal,
while not an ideal solution, accommodates these vital interests.
Fully cognizant of the difficulties discussed above associated with
requiring PCRA counsel himself, or a pro se petitioner, to raise
claims of PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness, we hold that a PCRA
petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after
obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA
counsel's ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if
on appeal.
Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401 (emphasis added).
A similar situation arose in Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989
(Pa. 2022). There, an appellant who raised claims of his PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness did so for the first time in a corrected 1925(b) statement.
Id.
-6-
J-S13009-24
at 1002. The Commonwealth argued that the appellant improperly raised the
claim in his 1925(b) statement and thus the issues were not preserved. The
Court held:
Parrish adequately raised and preserved his layered claim of the
ineffective assistance of trial and initial PCRA counsel by raising it
at the first opportunity to do so, specifically in his Corrected
1925(b) Statement and in his brief filed with this Court in this
appeal.
Id.
In the instant case, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition and his
PCRA counsel was permitted to withdraw. Appellant, proceeding pro se, now
sets forth claims of his PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. Pursuant to Bradley,
those claims must have been raised at the first opportunity to do so. Appellant
was ordered to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, which would have been his first
opportunity to raise his claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, but he
instead raised them for the for the first time on appeal. Thus, he failed to
properly preserve his issues on appeal.
In Appellant’s reply brief, he cites as analogous this Court’s recent
decision in Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 309 A.3d 152 (Pa. Super. 2024),
where we granted relief vacating the PCRA court’s order and remanded for
further proceedings. In that case, after the appellant’s PCRA petition was
dismissed, the appellant filed a notice of appeal, and his appointed counsel
filed a 1925(b) statement.
Id. at 154. The appellant hired new counsel who
filed a supplemental 1925(b) statement which challenged previous PCRA
counsel’s effectiveness. The Commonwealth argued that the appellant failed
-7-
J-S13009-24
to develop those issues in his brief. Id. at 155. We agreed that the claims
were not developed, but remanded because:
Nonetheless, since we find the requisite allegations in the certified
record, we shall not punish Appellant for counsel's failure to
appreciate the nuances of this developing area of the law.
Specifically, in the supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement, present
counsel detailed the underlying claims sufficiently to convince us
that they have arguable merit, the potential for prejudice, and
present material issues of fact that the PCRA court will be required
to resolve in order to rule upon whether they entitle Appellant to
relief.
Id. at 156.
Lawrence is inapplicable to the instant matter because the issue there
was not that the appellant failed to raise his claims at the earliest opportunity
to do so, but that he did not fully develop those claims. More importantly, the
appellant in that case preserved his claims by filing a 1925(b) statement,
which Appellant here did not. Accordingly, all of Appellant’s claims on appeal
have been waived by his failure to file a 1925(b) statement.
Order affirmed.
DATE: 05/14/2024
-8-
