¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: December 20, 2022
¶4 S22A0857. TABOR v. THE STATE. S22A0986. SPEAR v. THE STATE.
¶5 LAGRUA, Justice.
¶6 Appellants Tyree Tabor and Donny Spear were tried together
¶7and convicted of malice murder and other offenses in connection
¶8with the shooting death of Nicholas Miller. 1 Although the two co-
¶9 1 Miller was shot on October 31, 2016, and he died following complications from his injuries on December 1, 2016. On June 16, 2017, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Vincent Evans, Jeremecia Holley, Spear, and Tabor for the following counts: participation of street gang activity (Count 1—Evans, Spear, and Tabor); malice murder of Miller (Count 2—Evans, Spear, and Tabor); felony murder of Miller, predicated on criminal attempt to commit armed robbery (Count 3—Evans, Spear, and Tabor); felony murder of Miller, predicated on criminal attempt to purchase marijuana (Count 4—Evans, Spear, and Tabor); felony murder of Miller, predicated on aggravated assault (Count 5—Evans, Spear, and Tabor); felony murder of Miller, 2016, predicated on possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer (Count 6—Spear); criminal attempt to commit armed robbery (Count 7—Evans, Spear, and Tabor); criminal attempt to purchase marijuana (Count 8—Evans, Spear, and Tabor); aggravated assault of Miller (Count 9—Evans, Spear, and Tabor); aggravated battery of Mar’Keil Leonard (Count 10—Evans, Spear, and Tabor); possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 11—Evans, Spear, and Tabor); possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer defendants raise different contentions on appeal, their appeals have
¶10been consolidated for purposes of issuing an opinion. Tabor contends
¶11that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective
¶12assistance. Spear contends that his trial counsel provided
¶13constitutionally ineffective assistance and that the trial court
¶14abused its discretion by denying his motion for severance. For the
¶15reasons explained below, we affirm the convictions in both cases.
¶16(Count 12—Spear); possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute (Count 13—Spear); possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute (Count 14— Spear); possession of hydrocodone (Count 15—Spear); possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 16—Spear); possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer (Count 17—Spear); possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute (Count 18—Holley); possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 19—Holley); and possession of marijuana—less than one ounce (Count 20—Holley). Spear and Tabor were jointly tried from January 27 to February 4, 2020. On February 3, the trial court granted a directed verdict of acquittal on Count 1, and Spear pled guilty to Counts 13 through 17. On February 4, a jury found Spear and Tabor guilty of the remaining counts. As to Spear, the trial court vacated the four counts of felony murder, merged the aggravated assault count into the malice murder count, and sentenced him to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole, plus sixty years to serve consecutively. As to Tabor, the trial court vacated the three counts of felony murder, merged the aggravated assault count with the malice murder count, and sentenced him to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole, plus fifty-five years to serve consecutively. Spear and Tabor filed timely motions for new trial, which they amended through new counsel. After holding evidentiary hearings on the motions for new trial, the trial court denied the motions in November and December 2021. Spear and Tabor filed timely notices of appeal, and their cases were docketed to this Court’s August 2022 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
¶17 2 The evidence presented at trial shows that on the evening of
¶18October 31, 2016, officers responded to a shooting at an apartment
¶19complex located at 1425 Joseph E. Boone Boulevard. Upon their
¶20arrival, officers discovered Miller unresponsive, lying face down on
¶21the sidewalk suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. He was
¶22transported to the hospital, but he never regained consciousness and
¶23died a month later on December 1. The medical examiner
¶24determined that Miller’s cause of death was complications from a
¶25gunshot wound to the torso. From the parking lot of the apartment
¶26complex, the police recovered a Smith and Wesson 9mm handgun,
¶27one 9mm shell casing, eight 7.62mm shell casings, six 5.7mm shell
¶28casings, and six .223-caliber shell casings.
¶29 Around the same time, Mar’Keil Leonard called Fulton County
¶30911 and told the operator that he had been shot. During his call to
¶31911, someone in the background asked, “Who shot you?” and
¶32Leonard responded, “Tyriq.” 2 When the police arrived at Leonard’s
¶33location, they impounded his car—which had multiple bullet holes—
¶34 2 Leonard later identified Tabor as “Tyriq.”
¶35 3 and recovered his .223-caliber gun, along with 29 .223-caliber
¶36cartridges; Leonard was transported to the hospital.
¶37 At trial, Leonard testified that on the evening of October 31, he
¶38spoke to Tabor regarding a potential marijuana sale. Tabor was
¶39going to connect a marijuana buyer to Leonard, Leonard would sell
¶40the buyer a pound of marijuana for an agreed-upon price, and Tabor
¶41would receive a portion of Leonard’s profit, “like a referral fee.”
¶42Leonard and Tabor agreed to meet at the apartment complex on
¶43Joseph E. Boone Boulevard, and Leonard sent a text message to his
¶44cousin to let him know where he was going. 3 During Leonard’s drive
¶45to the apartment complex, he saw Miller, who decided to accompany
¶46him.
¶47 When Leonard and Miller arrived at the apartment complex,
¶48they got out of Leonard’s car, Tabor and Spear got out of Tabor’s car,
¶49and the four men greeted each other. 4 Miller smoked a cigarette near
¶50 3The text message stated, “Aye im finna go serve [T]yriq dem on da hill apartment behind chapel…just to keep u updated.” Leonard testified that “serve” meant to sell drugs. 4 Leonard testified that he had known Tabor for approximately five years
¶51 4 the front of Leonard’s car, and Tabor sat on the back of Leonard’s
¶52car. Leonard stood next to his open driver-side door with his hands
¶53on top of the door; the car’s engine continued running.
¶54 Leonard and Spear smoked a “blunt” and chatted about the
¶55marijuana. Spear asked Leonard about the marijuana’s price, which
¶56confused Leonard because the price was previously agreed-upon.
¶57Leonard then presented a different type of marijuana to Spear, and
¶58they smoked another “blunt.” Spear kept “moving” during the
¶59conversation, and Leonard asked Tabor, “What’s up with your boy?”
¶60Leonard later told Detective Jamael Logan of the Atlanta Police
¶61Department that Tabor and Spear had handguns in their
¶62waistbands and Spear “kept fudging and playing with [his]
¶63handgun[.]” 5
¶64 Leonard testified that he then sat in his driver’s seat, opened
¶65the passenger door from the inside, and told Miller, “Hey, come on,
¶66and knew of Spear because Leonard had previously purchased marijuana from Spear. 5 Detective Logan interviewed Leonard at the hospital, and the interview
¶67was audio-recorded and portions of the interview were played at trial.
¶68 5 let’s go, because they playing.” Leonard testified that he did this
¶69because Spear “kept asking questions,” so he thought Spear did not
¶70want to purchase the marijuana. Leonard later told an investigator
¶71that Leonard told him that Spear “appeared [to be] looking around
¶72as if he knew something was about to take place, that he was
¶73stalling.”
¶74 Leonard testified that after he asked Miller to get into his car,
¶75Miller began walking toward the car, but then “turned around and
¶76just took off [running].” Then, an unknown man, whom Leonard
¶77later identified as Evans, walked out from behind Leonard’s car,
¶78stood next to Spear, pointed what “looked like a shotgun” at
¶79Leonard, and stated, “If you move, I’m going to shoot you.” Leonard
¶80“slapped [his] car in drive [and] took off,” and he saw that shots were
¶81being fired at him when he looked in his rearview mirror. Leonard
¶82testified that he drove a short distance to his grandmother’s house,
¶83realized that he had been shot multiple times, and called 911.
¶84Although Leonard initially told Detective Logan that Evans, Tabor,
¶85and Spear all shot at him while he was driving away, at trial,
¶86 6 Leonard denied that Tabor shot at him.
¶87 When Leonard spoke with Detective Logan at the hospital, he
¶88identified Tabor and Spear by their nicknames only, and he could
¶89not identify Evans by any name. However, he provided a physical
¶90description of all three men. Leonard later provided Detective Logan
¶91with social-media photographs of the three men he believed were
¶92involved with the shooting. Law enforcement officers eventually
¶93determined that the three men were Tabor, Spear, and Evans and
¶94developed photographic lineups of the men containing photographs
¶95different from the ones Leonard provided. From these photographic
¶96lineups, Leonard identified Tabor, Spear, and Evans as the men who
¶97shot at him, and police issued arrest warrants for them.
¶98 On December 14, law enforcement officers were surveilling
¶99Spear and watched him and co-defendant Jermecia Holley leave
¶100their apartment; Spear was carrying a black backpack. After they
¶101drove away, the police conducted a traffic stop, and Spear was
¶102arrested on an outstanding arrest warrant. The police recovered
¶103Spear’s backpack, which contained a stolen handgun, marijuana,
¶104 7 hydrocodone, and cocaine.
¶105 Detective Logan interviewed Spear, who identified Leonard as
¶106the man he met the night of Miller’s shooting; Spear also identified
¶107himself in one of the photographs that Leonard had previously
¶108provided to Detective Logan. While Spear was in jail, he called
¶109Holley and admitted he had been with Tabor at the apartment
¶110complex, but stated he was not involved in the shooting. Spear also
¶111admitted to possession of the backpack and its contents, and he told
¶112Holley that there were other guns, including “a glock and a gold
¶113gun,” and drugs at the apartment that needed to be moved. Based
¶114on this information, law enforcement obtained a search warrant and
¶115recovered drugs and three handguns from the apartment, but the
¶116two guns referenced in Spear’s phone call to Holley were not
¶117recovered.
¶118 One month later, on January 16, 2017, around 2:30 a.m., the
¶119police were dispatched to a Bank of America in Sandy Springs in
¶120reference to ATM tampering. Upon their arrival, the police pursued
¶121several suspects into an adjacent construction site and arrested
¶122 8 three people, one of whom was Tabor.
¶123 Several hours later, around 6:30 a.m., the superintendent of
¶124the construction site found a Ruger 9mm handgun near a pile of
¶125construction debris and turned the weapon over to police. Ballistics
¶126testing revealed that the 9mm shell casing found at the apartment
¶127complex on October 31, 2016, was fired from the Ruger 9mm
¶128handgun recovered from the construction site—and not the Smith
¶129and Wesson 9mm handgun found at the scene. Further ballistics
¶130testing revealed that the eight 7.62mm shell casings were fired from
¶131one gun, the six 5.7mm shell casings were fired from another gun,
¶132the six .223-caliber shell casings were fired from yet another gun,
¶133and that none of the shell casings were fired from Leonard’s gun.
¶134 Case No. S22A0857. Tabor v. The State:
¶135 1. Tabor contends that his trial counsel provided
¶136constitutionally ineffective assistance in multiple ways. To prevail
¶137on these claims, Tabor must demonstrate both that his trial
¶138counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that he was
¶139prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Bates v. State, 313 Ga.
¶140 9 57, 62 (2) (867 SE2d 140) (2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
¶141466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). To
¶142establish deficient performance, Tabor must show that trial counsel
¶143performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way,
¶144considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing
¶145professional norms. See id. Establishing deficient performance
¶146 is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and [Tabor] bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. To carry this burden, he must show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not. In particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.
¶147Vann v. State, 311 Ga. 301, 303 (2) (857 SE2d 677) (2021) (citations
¶148and punctuation omitted). And, “in the absence of evidence to the
¶149contrary, counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus
¶150insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”
¶151Holland v. State, 314 Ga. 181, 190 (3) (875 SE2d 800) (2022) (citation
¶152and punctuation omitted).
¶153 10 To establish prejudice, Tabor must prove that there is a
¶154reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s deficiency, the
¶155result of the trial would have been different. See Bates, 313 Ga. at
¶15662 (2). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
¶157undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citation and punctuation
¶158omitted). “And, this burden is a heavy one.” Id. at 62-63 (2) (citation
¶159and punctuation omitted). “If an appellant fails to meet his or her
¶160burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing
¶161court does not have to examine the other prong.” Id. at 63 (2)
¶162(citation and punctuation omitted). “This Court accepts a trial
¶163court’s factual findings and credibility determinations on an
¶164ineffectiveness claim unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply
¶165legal principles to the facts de novo.” Powell v. State, 309 Ga. 523,
¶166526-27 (2) (847 SE2d 338) (2020).
¶167 Tabor contends that his trial counsel provided constitutionally
¶168ineffective assistance by failing to (i) adequately consult with Tabor,
¶169(ii) subpoena witnesses, (iii) interview law enforcement witnesses,
¶170and (iv) interview the medical examiner or any member of his staff.
¶171 11 Tabor’s trial counsel did not testify at the motion-for-new trial
¶172hearing. But, Tabor testified that during trial counsel’s nearly five-
¶173month representation of him, trial counsel met with Tabor four to
¶174five times. Tabor admitted that during these meetings, his trial
¶175counsel read the indictment, explained the charges and the potential
¶176maximum sentence, gave him discovery, including the medical
¶177examiner’s report and the forensic report, asked him “how [he]
¶178wanted to go about” defending his case, and explained “what [the
¶179State] offered, . . . what he was going to do [to defend Tabor’s case],
¶180[and] how he was going at the prosecution.” But, Tabor testified that
¶181his trial counsel failed to subpoena or interview any witnesses,
¶182including Ciera Dobbs and Rosalyn Well, and that these women had
¶183possession of his preliminary hearing transcript, which would have
¶184been helpful in impeaching one of the detectives.
¶185 Regarding the alleged failure to adequately consult with Tabor,
¶186“[a]s we have explained, there exists no magic amount of time which
¶187counsel must spend in actual conference with his client,” and Tabor
¶188“does not specifically describe how additional communications with
¶189 12 his lawyer would have enhanced his defense.” Styles v. State, 309
¶190Ga. 463, 472 (5) (a) (847 SE2d 325) (2020) (citation and punctuation
¶191omitted). Further, Appellant has failed to make a proffer showing
¶192what evidence or strategy would have been uncovered through
¶193additional consultation. See id. We also conclude that Spear’s trial
¶194counsel did not perform his duties in an objectively unreasonable
¶195way because he met with Spear four to five times, explained the
¶196indictment and the potential maximum sentence, provided and
¶197discussed discovery, and explained how he planned to defend Spear.
¶198Accordingly, we conclude Appellant has failed to carry his burden of
¶199showing that his trial counsel was deficient in this respect, and this
¶200claim fails.
¶201 Regarding the failure to interview and subpoena witnesses,
¶202Tabor failed to identify or proffer which witnesses from law
¶203enforcement or the medical examiner’s office should have been
¶204interviewed, and how any interviews would have enhanced his
¶205defense. Although Tabor specifically identified Dobbs and Well as
¶206potential witnesses, it appears from Tabor’s testimony that the only
¶207 13 relevant information they possessed was a copy of Tabor’s
¶208preliminary hearing transcript. 6 According to Tabor, possession of
¶209this transcript would have helped his trial counsel impeach
¶210Detective Logan because there were alleged “inconsistencies” in his
¶211testimony at the preliminary hearing and at trial. But, Tabor failed
¶212to identify any prior inconsistent statements made by the detective
¶213and does not contend that his trial counsel was deficient in failing
¶214to impeach the detective. Thus, Tabor has failed to demonstrate that
¶215his counsel performed deficiently in failing to interview and
¶216subpoena witnesses, and these ineffectiveness claims fail.7 See
¶217Lanier v. State, 310 Ga. 520, 526 (3) (b) (852 SE2d 509) (2020) (The
¶218 6 We note that this transcript was filed with the trial court approximately two years prior to trial, and therefore it was not necessary for Tabor’s trial counsel to contact Dobbs and Well to obtain a copy of the transcript. 7 Tabor also enumerates as error that his trial counsel provided
¶219constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to (i) impeach Leonard with unrelated pending charges, (ii) cross-examine Leonard with the fact that he was not prosecuted for crimes related to Miller’s death, (iii) move for a mistrial when the trial judge failed to sua sponte recuse, (iv) move for recusal of the trial judge, and (v) join the State’s motion for mistrial and motion for recusal. However, Tabor’s enumerations are “not supported by argument or citation of authority” and so are abandoned. See Supreme Court Rule 22. See also Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 329 n.7 (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (“It is not the function of this Court to cull the record for a party . . . to form arguments on the appellant’s behalf.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶220 14 appellant failed to show that his trial counsel was deficient where
¶221he “failed to point to evidence tending to show what further
¶222investigation would have revealed or to offer any additional
¶223witnesses to demonstrate that their testimony would have been
¶224relevant and favorable.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶225 Case No. S22A0986. Spear v. The State:
¶226 2. Spear contends that his trial counsel provided
¶227constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to file a timely
¶228motion to bifurcate certain counts.8 We disagree.
¶229 (a) On the first day of trial, Spear’s trial counsel orally moved
¶230to bifurcate the felony murder count predicated on possession of a
¶231firearm by a first-offender probationer (Count 6), the predicate
¶232possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer count (Count
¶23312), and a separate possession of a firearm by a first-offender
¶234probationer count (Count 17) on the ground that the evidence
¶235 8 We note that the law governing Spear’s ineffectiveness claims in Divisions 2, 3, and 4 is set out in Division 1.
¶236 15 supporting these counts “place[d] his character in evidence.”9 The
¶237trial court orally denied the motion on the merits and later issued a
¶238written order denying the motion because it was both untimely and
¶239meritless.
¶240 It has long been established that a trial court “[does] not err in
¶241refusing to bifurcate the charge of possession of a firearm by a
¶242first[-]offender probationer” where, as here, “[t]he possession charge
¶243was an underlying felony to a murder count of the indictment.”
¶244George v. State, 276 Ga. 564, 565 (3) (580 SE2d 238) (2003). See also
¶245Cooks v. State, 299 Ga. 787, 789-790 (3) (792 SE2d 389) (2016)
¶246(“[Where] . . . the count charging possession of a firearm by a
¶247convicted felon might serve as the underlying felony supporting a
¶248felony murder conviction, a motion to bifurcate should be denied.”
¶249(citation and punctuation omitted)). Because the trial court was not
¶250required to bifurcate Count 12, Spear has failed to show that his
¶251trial counsel was deficient for failing to timely file such a motion.
¶252 9Counts 6 and 12 arose from Miller’s death, and Count 17 arose from the handgun in Spear’s possession during his arrest.
¶253 16 See Talley v. State, 314 Ga. 153, 165 (3) (d) (875 SE2d 789) (2022)
¶254(no deficient performance in failing to seek bifurcation of a firearm
¶255charge when it was a predicate to a felony murder charge).
¶256 And, to the extent Spear contends that the trial court should
¶257have also bifurcated the felony murder count from the rest of his
¶258trial, this claim also fails. See Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804, 807-808
¶259(3) (764 SE2d 376) (2014) (“Because in this case one of the counts of
¶260felony murder was based on the felon-in-possession firearm charge
¶261(and the indictment also charged malice murder), the trial court did
¶262not err when it denied [the appellant’s] motion to bifurcate” the
¶263felon-in-possession firearm charge and the related felony murder
¶264count from his trial.).Regarding Count 17, evidence of Spear’s status
¶265as a first-offender probationer, as well as the charges for which he
¶266was on probation, was properly admitted through the State’s
¶267presentation of evidence on Counts 6 and 12. Accordingly, Spear has
¶268failed to show that his trial counsel performed deficiently, and this
¶269claim fails. See Koonce v. State, 305 Ga. 671, 676 (2) (d) (827 SE2d
¶270633) (2019) (concluding that trial counsel was not deficient in failing
¶271 17 to object to cumulative evidence).10
¶272 (b) On the second day of trial, Spear’s trial counsel orally moved
¶273to bifurcate Counts 13 through 17, the drug-and-gun charges that
¶274arose from Spear’s arrest, on the basis that the evidence supporting
¶275these charges was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The trial court
¶276took the motion under advisement and later issued a written order
¶277denying the motion because it was both untimely and meritless. To
¶278the extent that Spear contends that his trial counsel provided
¶279constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to timely file this
¶280motion, we conclude that any such ineffectiveness claim has been
¶281waived.
¶282 “Claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness must be raised at the
¶283earliest practicable opportunity.” Bedford v. State, 311 Ga. 329, 338
¶284(5) (c) (857 SE2d 708) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶285 10Cf. Cooks v. State, 299 Ga. 787, 789 (3) (792 SE2d 389) (2016) (“[I]n cases where a felon-in-possession firearm charge is unrelated to another count for which the defendant is to be tried, the proceedings should be bifurcated so that the jury will hear and decide the more serious charges before learning about the firearm charge and the defendant’s prior conviction.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶286 18 “That moment is before appeal if the opportunity to do so is
¶287available. The pre-appeal opportunity is available when the
¶288convicted defendant is no longer represented by the attorney who
¶289represented him at trial.” Elkins v. State, 306 Ga. 351, 361 (4) (a)
¶290(830 SE2d 217) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶291 Here, the amended motion for new trial filed by motion-for-
¶292new-trial counsel failed to include an ineffectiveness claim
¶293concerning the motion orally moved for on the second day of trial
¶294seeking to bifurcate Counts 13 through 17 on the ground that the
¶295evidence related to the drug-and-gun charges was irrelevant and
¶296prejudicial, 11 and the order denying the motion for new trial
¶297referenced only trial counsel’s failure to timely file the motion orally
¶298moved for on the first day of trial seeking to bifurcate counts 6, 12,
¶299and 17 on the ground that the evidence “place[d] his character in
¶300evidence.”12 Because Spear “failed to raise this claim at the earliest
¶301 11 The amended motion for new trial referenced only the motion filed on the first day of trial seeking to bifurcate Counts 6, 12, and 17. 12 The trial court’s order actually referenced, “counts 16, 12 and 17,” but
¶302we conclude that the trial court’s inclusion of Count 16, as opposed to Count 6,
¶303 19 practicable moment, he did not preserve it for appellate review,” and
¶304this claim has been waived. Elkins, 306 Ga. at 361 (4) (a) (citation
¶305and punctuation omitted).
¶306 3. Spear contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally
¶307ineffective assistance by withdrawing certain previously-filed
¶308motions. We disagree.
¶309 In February 2018, Spear’s pre-trial counsel filed several
¶310motions, including a motion for immunity based on self-defense, a
¶311motion to suppress physical evidence, a motion to suppress
¶312identification, and a motion to suppress statements. In November
¶3132018, the trial court held a hearing on the motions, and trial counsel
¶314withdrew the motion for immunity, the motion to suppress physical
¶315evidence, the motion to suppress identification, and the motion to
¶316suppress statements.
¶317 (a) The withdrawn motion for immunity. At the motion-for-
¶318new-trial hearing, trial counsel was not questioned about why he
¶319was likely a scrivener’s error.
¶320 20 withdrew the motion for immunity. “[I]n the absence of evidence to
¶321the contrary, counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic and
¶322thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel
¶323claim.” Holland, 314 Ga. at 190 (3) (citation and punctuation
¶324omitted). “It may be reasonable for trial counsel to forgo a pre-trial
¶325immunity motion so as to avoid subjecting his client to pre-trial
¶326cross-examination, or for counsel to elect to demonstrate self-
¶327defense to the jury, rather than to the judge.” Broxton v. State, 306
¶328Ga. 127, 138 (5) (a) (829 SE2d 333) (2019). Here, Spear told both
¶329Detective Logan and Holley that while he was at the apartment
¶330complex with Tabor, he was not involved in the shooting, and Spear
¶331did not contend at trial, at the motion-for-new trial hearing, or in his
¶332brief to this Court that he acted in self-defense. Because Spear has
¶333not established that no competent attorney would have withdrawn
¶334the motion for immunity under the circumstances of this case, he
¶335has not shown that his counsel’s performance was professionally
¶336deficient. Accordingly, this claim fails. See id.
¶337 (b) The withdrawn motions to suppress physical evidence,
¶338 21 identification, and statements. “Where, as here, an appellant claims
¶339that trial counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to
¶340suppress, the [appellant] must make a strong showing that the
¶341damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made
¶342the motion.” Evans v. State, 308 Ga. 582, 586 (3) (842 SE2d 837)
¶343(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Spear makes no such
¶344showing. Rather, he contends only that trial counsel’s withdrawal of
¶345the motions deprived him of the ability to challenge evidence prior
¶346to trial and that trial counsel failed to provide a reasonable
¶347explanation about why he withdrew these motions. Appellant makes
¶348no argument that any physical evidence, identification, or statement
¶349would have been suppressed had trial counsel gone forward with
¶350these motions. Accordingly, because Spear failed to show that the
¶351evidence, identification, or statements would have been suppressed
¶352had trial counsel not withdrawn the motions to suppress, he has not
¶353established that his trial counsel was deficient, and this claim fails.
¶354See Roseboro v. State, 308 Ga. 428, 435 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 706) (2020)
¶355(“[B]ecause [the appellant] has not made a showing that had a
¶356 22 motion been filed, the evidence would have been suppressed, we
¶357agree with the trial court’s conclusion that trial counsel was not
¶358deficient.”).
¶359 4. Spear contends that his trial counsel provided
¶360constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to successfully
¶361argue the motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants.
¶362We agree with the State, however, that this claim has been waived.13
¶363 Spear’s amended motion for new trial did not raise any
¶364ineffectiveness claim concerning the motion to sever. And although
¶365there was some questioning about the motion to sever at the motion-
¶366for-new-trial hearing, the trial court’s order did not address any
¶367ineffectiveness claim on that issue. The lack of ruling from the trial
¶368court indicates that the court did not view this claim as having been
¶369raised implicitly, which could have preserved the claim for appellate
¶370review. See Rickman v. State, 304 Ga. 61, 66 (3) (816 SE2d 4) (2018)
¶371(“[A]lthough a trial court may . . . allow a motion for new trial to be
¶372 13 We note that the law governing waiver of an ineffectiveness claim is set out in Division 2 (b).
¶373 23 amended implicitly by treating a claim as if it had been raised in the
¶374motion, the trial court’s failure to address any ineffectiveness claim
¶375in its ruling on the motion for new trial indicates an absence of any
¶376such amendment.”). Accordingly, because Spear “failed to raise this
¶377claim at the earliest practicable moment, he did not preserve it for
¶378appellate review.” Elkins, 306 Ga. at 361 (4) (a) (citation and
¶379punctuation omitted).
¶380 5. Spear contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
¶381denying his motion to sever his trial from that of Tabor because the
¶382trial court “fail[ed] to make any findings in support [of] its order.”
¶383We disagree.
¶384 At the motion-to-sever hearing, Spear’s trial counsel sought
¶385severance from all three of Spear’s co-defendants. However, trial
¶386counsel focused primarily on Evans, arguing that Evans’s presence
¶387at a joint trial would be prejudicial to Spear on Bruton grounds. 14
¶388Although trial counsel made no specific argument concerning Tabor,
¶389 14 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (88 SCt 1620, 20 LE2d 476) (1968).
¶390 24 he did mention that Tabor was in “bench warrant status.” The trial
¶391court inquired about the statements Evans made to law enforcement
¶392and whether Tabor or Holley made any statements.15 The trial court
¶393later issued a written order summarily denying the motion based
¶394upon “the argument of both parties” and the “applicable law.” As
¶395noted above, Spear was tried with Tabor only.
¶396 “A trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a severance in
¶397a joint trial.” Ruff v. State, 314 Ga. 386, 386 (1) (877 SE2d 239)
¶398(2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In ruling on a motion to
¶399sever, a trial court should consider: (1) the likelihood of confusion of
¶400the evidence and law; (2) the possibility that evidence against one
¶401defendant may be considered against the other defendant; and (3)
¶402the presence or absence of antagonistic defenses.” Id. at 386-387 (1)
¶403(citation and punctuation omitted).
¶404 On appeal, he contends only that the trial court erred by failing
¶405to 1) make any factual findings in its order, and 2) reference any law
¶406 15During this inquiry, the State opposed severance, but acknowledged that Evans made some statements that would not be admissible at a joint trial.
¶407 25 in support of its decision. However, a trial court is not required to
¶408make explicit findings with respect to the severance factors when
¶409“[i]t is obvious from the transcript that the trial court properly
¶410considered these factors when denying [the defendant’s] motion to
¶411sever.” Flournoy v. State, 294 Ga. 741, 748 n.5 (5) (755 SE2d 777)
¶412(2014). When, as here, a trial court makes no explicit findings in
¶413ruling on a motion that does not require such findings to be made,
¶414we presume that the trial court implicitly made all the findings in
¶415support of its ruling that the record would allow. See Anthony v.
¶416State, 311 Ga. 293, 297 (3) (857 SE2d 682) (2021). Because the trial
¶417court was not required to make explicit findings with respect to the
¶418severance factors, and it is obvious from the transcript that the trial
¶419court properly considered the appropriate factors when it denied
¶420Spear’s motion to sever, this claim fails. 16
¶421 16Spear also contends that, under State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020), the combined prejudicial effect of his trial counsel’s deficiencies and the trial court’s error affected the outcome of the trial. However, “to establish cumulative error, [Spear] must show that at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial.” Holland, 314 Ga. at 193 (4) (citation and punctuation omitted). Since we have not concluded that Spear’s trial counsel performed deficiently, cumulative error analysis under Lane is not applicable.
¶422 26 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶423 27