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315 Ga. 31

880 S.E.2d 199

Moten v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided October 25, 2022

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2022-10-25

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently June 2023

1 state decisions

Relies on Malcolm v. State · Hegedus v. Hegedus · 174 Ga. App. 634 - Whitton v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2022-10-25

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¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia

¶3 Decided: October 25, 2022

¶4 S22A1214. MOTEN v. THE STATE.

¶5 COLVIN, Justice.

¶6 Victor Keyshawn Moten was convicted of malice murder and

¶7related offenses in connection with the shooting death of Juan Diaz

¶8Mendez.1 On appeal, Moten contends that the trial court erred by

¶9 1Mendez was shot on December 17, 2015 and died from the gunshot wound three days later. On April 4, 2016, an Atkinson County grand jury indicted Moten, along with Khalil Darnell Daniels, Rashad Marquis Flowers, and Marshawn Rashad Jones, for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on armed robbery (Count 2), criminal attempt to commit armed robbery (Count 3), three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 4, 7, and 9), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 5 and 6), and one count of aggravated battery (Count 8). A joint jury trial was held from November 30 to December 2, 2016. Moten was found guilty of all counts. He was sentenced to serve life in prison for malice murder (Count 1), 20 years in prison concurrent for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery (Count 3), and five years in prison consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). Counts 5 through 9 merged for sentencing. The trial court purported to merge Count 2, but that count was actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcom v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371- 372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). On December 19, 2016, Moten’s trial counsel timely filed a motion for new trial. On May 22, 2022, the trial court denied Moten’s motion for new trial. Moten filed a timely notice of appeal. The case refusing to allow him to amend his motion for new trial to add a

¶10timely claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We agree.

¶11Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order denying Moten’s

¶12motion for new trial and remand this case to the trial court for

¶13proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶14 On December 19, 2016, Moten’s trial counsel timely filed a

¶15boilerplate motion for new trial, contending that the verdict was

¶16“contrary to the principle of fairness and equity,” “against the

¶17principles of law and due process of justice,” and “against the

¶18evidence presented at trial.” Moten was then appointed appellate

¶19counsel. On December 9, 2021, the trial court issued a scheduling

¶20order, setting a hearing date for the motion for new trial and

¶21requiring all amended motions be filed before February 24, 2022.

¶22The trial court subsequently issued an amended order modifying the

¶23deadline for filing amended motions to March 30, 2022. Moten did

¶24not file an amended motion for new trial prior to that date.

¶25was docketed to the August 2022 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

¶26 2 On May 2, 2022, at the beginning of the hearing on Moten’s

¶27motion for new trial, counsel presented to the trial court and the

¶28State an amended motion for new trial that raised, for the first time,

¶29a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. When questioned

¶30by the trial court on whether the amended motion had been timely

¶31filed in accordance with the scheduling order, counsel responded “I

¶32thought this was sent in from our legal assistant . . . I haven’t had

¶33access to my public defender email, which is why I did not send it in

¶34. . . and I apologize for that.” The trial court informed counsel that,

¶35because she did not meet the deadline set out in the scheduling

¶36order, she would “need to contain [her]self to the motion that’s been

¶37filed of record.” As a result, Moten was unable to argue or fully

¶38present his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court

¶39subsequently entered an order denying Moten’s original motion for

¶40new trial. Moten argues that the trial court’s refusal to allow him

¶41to amend his motion for new trial is counter to existing law and

¶42deprived him of a meaningful appeal. We agree.

¶43 Pursuant to OCGA § 5-5-40 (b), a defendant may amend a

¶44 3 timely filed motion for new trial “any time on or before the ruling

¶45thereon.” Further, OCGA § 5-5-40 (d) provides that “[t]he grounds

¶46of the motion need not be approved by the court.” Thus, as both this

¶47Court and the Court of Appeals have explained, the plain language

¶48of OCGA § 5-5-40 allows a defendant to amend a timely filed motion

¶49for new trial at any point prior to the court’s ruling, even if the

¶50defendant wishes to amend his motion at or after the motion

¶51hearing. See Hegedus v. Hegedus, 255 Ga. 44, 45 (1) (335 SE2d 284)

¶52(1985) (construing OCGA § 5-5-40 (b) to permit amendments to a

¶53motion for new trial “until the trial court’s final disposition”). See

¶54also Whipkey v. State, 353 Ga. App. 592, 593 (838 SE2d 907) (2020)

¶55(“The trial court erred by issuing a scheduling order which was in

¶56direct conflict with [the defendant’s] statutory right to amend his

¶57motion for new trial at any time prior to the trial court’s ruling on

¶58the motion.”); Allen v. State, 353 Ga. App. 442, 442 (838 SE2d 106)

¶59(2020) (holding that the defendant “was entitled to amend his

¶60motion for new trial . . . until the trial court filed its final order”);

¶61Whitton v. State, 174 Ga. App. 634, 636 (331 SE2d 10) (1985) (“[T]he

¶62 4 motion for new trial, as amended before a ruling was obtained, was

¶63properly before the court for hearing, and the trial court erred in

¶64dismissing the motion without ruling on the grounds enumerated

¶65therein.”).

¶66 Here, Moten timely filed a motion for new trial and attempted

¶67to amend it prior to the start of the hearing on the same. Because

¶68OCGA § 5-5-40 (b) permits movants to amend a motion for new trial

¶69at any time before the trial court’s final ruling, the trial court erred

¶70in refusing to consider the ineffectiveness claim Moten sought to add

¶71to his motion for new trial. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s

¶72order denying the motion for new trial and remand the case so that

¶73Moten may amend his motion for new trial.

¶74 Judgment vacated, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.

¶75 5

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