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315 Ga. 395

882 S.E.2d 238

Harvey v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided December 20, 2022

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2022-12-20

Relies on von Thomas v. State · Brooks v. State · Cook v. State

Decided 2022-12-20

¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia

¶3 Decided: December 20, 2022

¶4 S22A1083. HARVEY v. THE STATE.

¶5 ELLINGTON, Justice.

¶6 Holly Harvey appeals from an order of the trial court denying

¶7her motion for an out-of-time appeal, denying her motion to modify

¶8her sentences, and dismissing her motion to withdraw her guilty

¶9pleas. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court

¶10properly dismissed her motion to withdraw her guilty pleas because

¶11it was untimely filed. Because her motion for an out-of-time appeal

¶12and motion to modify her sentences also should have been

¶13dismissed, we vacate that part of the trial court’s order denying

¶14these motions and remand to the trial court with direction.

¶15 This is the second time this case has been before this Court.

¶16See Harvey v. State, 312 Ga. 263 (862 SE2d 120) (2021) (“Harvey I”).

¶17Pertinent to this appeal, the record shows that Harvey was indicted by a Fayette County grand jury in September 2004 for two counts of

¶18malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count of armed

¶19robbery in connection with the August 2, 2004, stabbing deaths of

¶20her grandparents. She entered negotiated guilty pleas to two counts

¶21of malice murder on April 14, 2005, and was sentenced the same day

¶22to two consecutive life sentences. Seven years later, Harvey filed a

¶23pro se motion for an out-of-time appeal in which she argued that her

¶24plea counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of

¶25counsel and that she was entitled to withdraw her guilty pleas

¶26because counsel’s ineffectiveness frustrated her ability to seek

¶27review of her pleas. After she amended her motion for an out-of-time

¶28appeal multiple times, the trial court denied the motion on February

¶2919, 2021, a decision we affirmed in Harvey I.

¶30 In January 2022, Harvey returned to the trial court, where she

¶31filed the motions at issue in this appeal: for an out-of-time appeal,

¶32to withdraw her April 2005 guilty pleas, and to modify her

¶33sentences. She amended the motion to modify her sentence and

¶34motion to withdraw her guilty pleas on February 10, 2022, and on

¶35 2 February 14 and 15, 2022, the trial court entered orders in which it

¶36denied both the motion for out-of-time appeal and motion to modify

¶37her sentences and dismissed as untimely under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f)

¶38the motion to withdraw her guilty pleas. Harvey challenges the trial

¶39court’s decision as to each of these motions in this appeal.1

¶40 1. Harvey contends the trial court erred by denying her motion

¶41for an out-of-time appeal. We agree, because the trial court should

¶42have dismissed the motion rather than consider its merits.

¶43 In Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (870 SE2d 758) (2022), this Court

¶44eliminated the judicially created out-of-time-appeal procedure,

¶45holding that a trial court is “without jurisdiction to decide [a] motion

¶46for out-of-time appeal” on the merits because there “is no legal

¶47authority for motions for out-of-time appeal in trial courts.” Id. at

¶48506 (5). We also directed in Cook that “pending and future motions

¶49for out-of-time appeals in trial courts should be dismissed, and trial

¶50court orders that have decided such motions on the merits … should

¶51 1 Harvey filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s order. The appeal was docketed to the August 2022 term in this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 3 be vacated if direct review of the case remains pending or if the case

¶52is otherwise not final.” Id. at 505 (4). Accordingly, that part of the

¶53trial court’s order denying Harvey’s motion for an out-of-time appeal

¶54is vacated and remanded to the trial court for the entry of an order

¶55dismissing the motion.2

¶56 Citing our decision in Cook, Harvey also argues that this Court

¶57should recall the remittitur in Harvey I and remand that case to the

¶58trial court with direction that the motion be dismissed because the

¶59trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider her first motion for out-of-

¶60time appeal on its merits. As previously stated, however, our holding

¶61 2 Even if Harvey’s motion for out-of-time appeal was not subject to dismissal under Cook, the claims she raises in the motion would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. “Res judicata precludes re-litigation of claims where the cause of action and the parties or their privies are identical and the claim was previously adjudicated on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Citation omitted.) Cooper v. State, 306 Ga. 164, 165 (829 SE2d 365) (2019). The record in this case demonstrates that each of the grounds on which Harvey bases her claims for a second out-of-time appeal were either raised or could have been raised in her first motion for an out-of-time appeal, and the denial of those claims became final when affirmed in Harvey I. See, e.g., Cooper, 306 Ga. at 165 (holding that under the doctrine of res judicata, the previous denial of a motion for out-of-time appeal bars a new motion for an out-of-time appeal); Beasley v. State, 298 Ga. 49, 50 (779 SE2d 301) (2015) (“[T]he doctrine of res judicata precludes not only re-litigation of claims that were actually adjudicated in the prior cause of action, but those which could have been adjudicated therein.”). Any attempted re-litigation of these claims would, therefore, be barred. 4 in Cook applies only to cases that were on “direct review or otherwise

¶62not yet final” when the opinion issued. Harvey’s first motion for an

¶63out-of-time appeal was denied by the trial court in February 2021,

¶64and that denial was affirmed by this Court on August 10, 2021,

¶65before Cook was decided. The denial of Harvey’s initial motion for

¶66an out-of-time appeal became final before Cook was issued and was

¶67unaffected by that decision. Accordingly, there is no basis for this

¶68Court to recall the remittitur in Harvey I.

¶69 2. Harvey asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing the

¶70motion to withdraw her guilty pleas. Because the motion was

¶71untimely filed, the trial court properly dismissed this motion.

¶72 Under Georgia law, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be

¶73filed within the same term of court as the sentence entered on the

¶74guilty plea. See Schoicket v. State, 312 Ga. 825, 827 (1) (865 SE2d

¶75170) (2021); Brooks v. State, 301 Ga. 748, 751 (2) (804 SE2d 1) (2017).

¶76As we recognized in Schoicket, “[t]his well-established rule is merely

¶77the application of a bedrock common-law principle that applies

¶78equally to other criminal motions and in civil cases.” 312 Ga. at 827.

¶79 5 And, if a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea after expiration

¶80of the term of court in which the sentence was imposed, the

¶81defendant “must pursue such relief through habeas corpus

¶82proceedings.” Id. Harvey’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas was

¶83filed in the Fayette County Superior Court more than 16 years after

¶84her 2005 sentencing by that court. It was, therefore, untimely, and

¶85the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion on its

¶86merits. Accordingly, it was properly dismissed.

¶87 We reject Harvey’s suggestion that we should recognize a

¶88defendant’s right to file an otherwise untimely motion to withdraw

¶89a guilty plea because, she asserts, habeas corpus is a constitutionally

¶90inadequate remedy. As we did in Schoicket, we decline the invitation

¶91to “invent additional remedies that might further complicate our

¶92post-conviction jurisprudence.” 312 Ga. at 826. The General

¶93Assembly has enacted habeas statutes balancing the competing

¶94interests of a defendant’s constitutional rights and ensuring finality

¶95of judgments, and this Court “lack[s] the authority to substitute our

¶96policy preferences for those of the General Assembly and thereby

¶97 6 allow a defendant to skirt the legislatively established process.” See

¶98id. at 827-831.

¶99 3. Finally, Harvey asserts the trial court abused its discretion

¶100by denying her motion to modify her sentences under OCGA § 17-

¶10110-1 (f). But the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion

¶102on its merits, and the motion should have been dismissed.

¶103 OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) grants a sentencing court “the jurisdiction,

¶104power and authority” to modify or vacate a sentence it previously

¶105entered, but this authority is limited. “The sentencing court

¶106generally has jurisdiction to modify or vacate such a sentence only

¶107for one year following the imposition of the sentence[,]” von Thomas

¶108v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 571 (2) (748 SE2d 446) (2013), or “within 120

¶109days after receipt by the sentencing court of the remittitur upon

¶110affirmance of the judgment after direct appeal, whichever is later.”

¶111OCGA § 17-10-1 (f). Here, because Harvey did not appeal from her

¶112guilty pleas and sentences and filed her motion to modify her

¶113sentences more than a year after the sentences were imposed, the

¶114 7 trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion on its merits. 3

¶115Accordingly, we vacate that part of the trial court’s order denying

¶116Harvey’s motion to modify her sentences, and we remand the case

¶117to the trial court with direction that the motion be dismissed.

¶118 Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.

¶119 3 Although a sentencing court has jurisdiction to vacate a void sentence at any time, see von Thomas, 293 Ga. at 571 (2), Harvey does not claim that her two life sentences for the malice murders of her grandparents were not authorized. See OCGA § 16-5-1 (e) (1) (authorizing sentences of death, life imprisonment without parole, or imprisonment for life for any person convicted of the offense of murder). 8

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