¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: February 7, 2023
¶4 S22A1316. RUCKER v. THE STATE.
¶5 LAGRUA, Justice.
¶6 Appellant Anthony Tyrone Rucker, Jr. was convicted of malice
¶7murder and other crimes in connection with a January 28, 2014
¶8home invasion and armed robbery in Fulton County, which resulted
¶9in the death of Tommy Lee Finch, Jr. and serious injuries to Zaccarie
¶10Printup. 1 On appeal, Rucker contends that the trial court erred in
¶11 In March 2016, Rucker was indicted by a Fulton County grand jury on 1
¶12charges of participation in criminal street gang activity, malice murder, five counts of felony murder, two counts of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery, burglary in the first degree, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. In September 2017, a jury found Rucker guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Rucker to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole on the malice murder count and concurrent life sentences without the possibility of parole for each armed robbery count, plus an additional 45 years on the aggravated battery, burglary, participation in criminal street gang activity, and possession of a firearm counts. The felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law. On October 2, 2017, Rucker filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel on April 22, 2019. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Rucker’s motion for new trial on failing to instruct the jury on accomplice corroboration and in
¶13denying Rucker’s motion to dismiss the case on constitutional
¶14speedy trial grounds. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
¶15Rucker’s convictions.
¶16 The evidence presented at Rucker’s trial showed that, on the
¶17evening of January 28, 2014, Finch and his wife, Patricia Finch,
¶18were at their home in Southwest Atlanta. Patricia was known
¶19around the neighborhood as the “Candy Lady” because she sold
¶20candy and soda out of her house to neighborhood children, as well as
¶21“loose cigarettes” to “older customers.” Patricia testified that she
¶22generally operated her candy business from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.
¶23each day, but that business had been slow on January 28 because it
¶24was snowing “pretty heavy” and “getting a little slippery.” Around
¶257:00 p.m., a customer came to the Finches’ house whom Patricia did
¶26not recognize. This young man—whom Patricia identified at trial
¶27as Rucker—was short, with his hair styled in “little twists” or a
¶28May 6, 2022. Rucker filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court on June 1, 2022, and the case was docketed to the August 2022 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 “little [A]fro,” and was wearing a red and blue jacket and “sweating
¶29real bad” down his face to his neck. Patricia testified that she
¶30“couldn’t understand why he was sweating like that” because he had
¶31just come from outside where it was snowing. She asked Rucker
¶32why he was sweating, but he did not respond. Rucker was
¶33accompanied by an unidentified young man who stayed at the top of
¶34the Finches’ driveway and did not come inside the house.
¶35 According to Patricia, Rucker told her that he wanted to buy
¶36“[a] Snicker bar and a cigarette.” Patricia kept the candy on a candy
¶37stand right outside her bedroom door and the cigarettes and soda
¶38“[r]ight by” her bed. As Patricia led Rucker to her bedroom, she
¶39observed Rucker “looking all around.” She testified that he “was
¶40looking in her bedroom. He was looking at everything. He was
¶41looking in the kitchen. He was—he was just strange. He was just—
¶42it just didn’t seem right. I never had a child come in and do that.”
¶43Patricia let Rucker select candy from the candy stand, and she sat
¶44on the edge of her bed and asked him “what he was doing out here
¶45in the cold like that.” Rucker told her that he wanted to buy a
¶46 3 cigarette, so Patricia handed him one. Rucker then paid for the
¶47items and left the house. Patricia was worried after that because
¶48Rucker had been “sweating so bad” and “his demeanor, the way he
¶49was acting” was “odd.”
¶50 Printup, the Finches’ adult son, Mia Stewart, Printup’s fiancée,
¶51and their young daughter also lived at the Finches’ house. Printup
¶52owned a disc jockey (D.J.) service and was supposed to D.J. for a
¶53party on the night of January 28, but the party was cancelled
¶54because of the snow. Printup had already set up for the party earlier
¶55in the evening, and he returned home around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. after
¶56breaking everything down. When Printup returned, he unloaded his
¶57equipment—two speakers and a 32-inch television—into the
¶58bedroom he shared with Mia and their daughter, and then he played
¶59video games for the rest of the evening on a PlayStation connected
¶60to a wall-mounted television in his bedroom.
¶61 Around 10:30 p.m., Mia put their daughter to sleep in her bed,
¶62and Mia also got into bed and went to sleep. About 30 minutes later,
¶63Printup—who was still awake playing video games—heard “heavy
¶64 4 footsteps walking up the ramp” to the front porch of the house.
¶65According to Printup, he “could tell there w[ere] two people, because
¶66the first footsteps came up first, and then the second one followed
¶67it.” Printup heard a knock at the door, and since everyone else in
¶68the house was in bed, he went to answer the door. 2 Printup asked
¶69who it was and what they wanted, and the people at the door
¶70responded, “cigarettes and a drink.” Printup then opened the door.
¶71 According to Printup, “[b]y the time [he] could get the door
¶72halfway open, a gunshot flew across [his] face. [He] couldn’t even
¶73get the door opened up quick enough.” Printup testified that he tried
¶74to close the door, but “it slammed on a gun.” Two men—both armed
¶75with handguns—then “pushed the door in and just started
¶76shooting.”3 Printup testified that the men told him, “[Y]ou’re going
¶77to die today,” and one of them “shot [Printup] in the back.” Printup
¶78 2 Printup testified that the late hour of this visit did not alarm him because he “never thought something would happen to a Candy Lady.” He just assumed if someone was coming to see the Candy Lady, “it was some honest person coming to the door.” 3 Law enforcement located a .32-caliber shell casing in the Finches’ living
¶79room and a .45-caliber shell casing in the doorway of the Finches’ bedroom. There were also two “indentions” in the wall of the living room caused by gunshots. 5 also felt a “sting” on his left side. One of the men was around his
¶80size—5’9” or 5’10”—and the other was shorter than him. Printup
¶81started tussling with the shorter of the two men, and then the
¶82shorter man broke free and ran towards the Finches’ bedroom.
¶83Printup managed to crawl out of the front door into the snow and
¶84laid his head on the concrete to get “elevation to [his] neck” because
¶85he “was losing breath.”
¶86 Patricia testified that, around 11:00 p.m., she woke up to
¶87gunshots, “a lot of shots.” She testified that the Finches did not keep
¶88firearms in the house because she is “scared of guns.” Patricia could
¶89hear Printup asking for help, and then, a “young man c[a]me in [her]
¶90room” and stood near the doorway. Patricia said the young man—
¶91whom she identified at trial as Rucker—was the same man from
¶92earlier in the evening and was wearing the same red and blue jacket.
¶93Rucker was also wearing a mask, but he had it pulled up, exposing
¶94most of his face and his eyes. Patricia testified that she was “so
¶95upset that he could come back and do this to me.”
¶96 According to Patricia, Rucker pointed a gold and black
¶97 6 handgun at her. Finch jumped out of bed, and when he did, Rucker
¶98shot him. Patricia was “screaming, saying please don’t kill him.”
¶99Rucker directed Finch to lay on the floor, and Finch begged Rucker
¶100not to kill his wife. Patricia continued screaming, and she “could see
¶101where [Rucker] had shot [Finch] on his stomach,” and there was “a
¶102lot of blood” and “[a] big hole.” Patricia begged Rucker not to kill
¶103them, and Rucker told her to “shut up” and “lie down on the floor.”
¶104Patricia testified that, when she heard Rucker’s voice, she knew it
¶105was the young man from “earlier in the day”—the one who “had on
¶106the red-and-blue jacket.” Rucker then reached into the television
¶107stand in the Finches’ bedroom and “grabbed the Snickers bars, he
¶108snatched the cable box, and the T.V. off the stand.” Rucker left the
¶109room, and Patricia could hear Mia screaming. Rucker came back
¶110into the Finches’ bedroom and told Patricia to give him their cell
¶111phones. Patricia gave Rucker two cell phones. Patricia testified that
¶112another young man was with Rucker that night, and she heard him
¶113tell Rucker, “[L]et’s go, let’s go.”
¶114 Mia testified that she woke up to gunshots around 11:00 p.m.,
¶115 7 and when she heard “the commotion” outside of her bedroom, she
¶116immediately closed and locked the bedroom door, told her daughter
¶117to “stay quiet,” covered her daughter’s head with a blanket, and
¶118crouched behind the bedroom door on the floor. While Mia was
¶119crouched on the floor, someone kicked in the door, and a young
¶120man—whom Mia identified at trial as Rucker—entered the room,
¶121wearing a red and blue jacket and a mask pulled up above his eyes.
¶122Mia testified that Rucker pointed a gold handgun at her head and
¶123asked her, “what works,” referring to the electronics in the bedroom.
¶124Mia did not respond, and Rucker tried to grab the television off the
¶125wall, but could not “get it down.” He also tried to grab Printup’s
¶126speakers, but could not “pick that up,” so “he ended up taking the
¶127TV”—the 32 inch television Printup used for his D.J. services.
¶128Rucker also took the cell phone out of Mia’s hand—a black Samsung
¶129phone with a pink case—and left. Mia remained in the bedroom for
¶130about 15 or 20 minutes to make sure Rucker was gone. Mia then
¶131ran outside of the house, screaming, and she saw Printup “bleeding
¶132in the snow.” Mia ran inside to grab a pillow and blanket for
¶133 8 Printup, and she covered him while she ran next door for help.4
¶134 According to Patricia, she and Finch also stayed in their
¶135bedroom for about 15 minutes after the shootings to make sure the
¶136intruders were gone, and then, they jumped up and ran into the
¶137living room, looking for Printup. Patricia testified that, even though
¶138Finch was “bleeding so bad,” he still “ran to the door screaming
¶139where is his child.” The Finches found Printup in the front yard,
¶140and Finch and his uncle—who also lived with the Finches—picked
¶141up Printup and carried him into the living room. Patricia testified
¶142that the only phone they had access to was Finch’s uncle’s phone—
¶143since the others had been stolen—and they called 911.
¶144 Fire rescue arrived about 30 minutes later—close to
¶145midnight—because the roads were difficult to traverse due to snow.
¶146The police and emergency personnel eventually arrived, as well, and
¶147 4 Patrick Pinson, the Finches’ next door neighbor, testified that he “was awakened by Mia bamming at the door” around 11:00 p.m. Pinson stated that, when he opened the door, Mia was “[f]rantic, scared, and crying” and “couldn’t get her words together.” Pinson got dressed and went to the Finches’ house with Mia to assist her.
¶148 9 Finch and Printup were transported to the hospital. Printup
¶149sustained gunshot wounds to his back and left side and remained in
¶150the hospital for approximately two weeks, where he “had to learn
¶151how to walk again.” Finch, who was placed in a medically-induced
¶152coma shortly after his admission, sustained a gunshot wound to the
¶153abdomen and underwent numerous operations over the next few
¶154months. On May 10, 2014, Finch died from complications from the
¶155gunshot wound, including sepsis and respiratory distress.
¶156 On February 5, 2014, Detective Paul Vignola with the Atlanta
¶157Police Department interviewed Patricia, Mia, and Printup at the
¶158hospital. Detective Vignola showed Patricia a photographic lineup
¶159of several juveniles, including one potential person of interest, based
¶160on the limited descriptions of the shooter the police had been given;
¶161however, Patricia was unable to identify anyone. At that time, Mia
¶162told Detective Vignola that she believed her cell phone was still
¶163active and being used after it was stolen. 5 Detective Vignola then
¶164 5 Printup testified that he tried calling Mia’s phone number while he was in the hospital, and an unidentified woman answered the call. 10 secured a court order for Mia’s phone number to search for activity
¶165on the phone on or after January 28, 2014. Before Detective Vignola
¶166was able to review the corresponding call logs, Finch passed away,
¶167and the case was reassigned to Atlanta Police Detective Cedric
¶168Smith in the homicide unit.
¶169 Detective Smith testified that, after he took over the
¶170investigation, he was able to review Mia’s cell phone records from
¶171January 28 to February 9, 2014, and he linked one of the phone
¶172numbers to Tamecia James. James—who dated Rucker for a few
¶173months in 2011—testified that, a day or two after the January 28
¶174incident, she asked Rucker if he had a cell phone she could use and
¶175“switch her service to” because her old phone had a cracked screen.
¶176Rucker told James he would “meet [her] with a phone soon.” On
¶177February 6, 2014, James met Rucker at the Westlake MARTA
¶178station to pick up the new cell phone. According to James, the cell
¶179phone—a black Samsung phone with a pink case—had a picture of
¶180a girl on the screen whom James did not recognize. After obtaining
¶181the phone from Rucker, James tried to call her existing cell phone
¶182 11 number from the new phone. James’s old phone started ringing, and
¶183at that point, she “realized that the [new] phone was still on.” James
¶184testified that she was “trying to figure out” why Rucker would “give
¶185[her] a phone with the service still on it,” so she contacted Rucker to
¶186tell him that the phone was “still on.” Rucker told her not to use it
¶187until it “got turned off.”
¶188 According to James, about a week after she advised Rucker
¶189that the new cell phone still had service, she received a call from a
¶190detective on the new phone. James testified that, as soon as the
¶191detective identified himself, she hung up on him. Then, in late May
¶1922014, another detective—Detective Smith—contacted James “on her
¶193old cell phone” and asked her how she got the other phone—i.e., the
¶194cell phone Rucker had given her. James told Detective Smith that
¶195“Uno”—Rucker’s nickname—had given her the phone, and Detective
¶196Smith advised her that her old cell phone number had shown up on
¶197the call log for that phone. After the phone call with Detective
¶198Smith, James contacted Rucker, who told her to “throw the phone
¶199away.” James testified that this raised suspicions for her that “he
¶200 12 probably did something to get the phone,” so she “got rid” of the
¶201phone.
¶202 Based upon Detective Smith’s conversation with James and the
¶203corresponding phone records, he was able to determine that James
¶204received Mia’s cell phone from Rucker. Detective Smith searched
¶205through social media, looking for people with the nickname “Uno.”
¶206Detective Smith located two men with this nickname—Rucker and
¶207another man named Anthony Repress. Detective Smith then
¶208prepared two photographic lineups—each containing photographs of
¶209Rucker, Repress, and four other men—with a different photograph
¶210of Rucker and of Repress in each lineup.
¶211 On June 2, 2014, Detective Smith went to the Finches’ house
¶212to show Patricia and Mia the photographic lineups. Detective Smith
¶213separated the two women, with Patricia in the living room and Mia
¶214in the kitchen, and showed them the lineups. According to Detective
¶215Smith, Patricia was able to identify Rucker in “[s]econds.” She held
¶216the photograph and “became very emotional.” Detective Smith
¶217testified that Patricia looked through all of the photographs and “she
¶218 13 said this is the person that came into the house”—identifying
¶219Rucker’s photograph. Patricia testified that, as soon as Detective
¶220Smith flipped over Rucker’s picture, she “knew he was the one who
¶221shot [her] husband.” Patricia identified Rucker again at trial,
¶222stating she knew he shot her husband and son on January 28, 2014,
¶223because she saw “the young man’s face,” “his mouth,” and “his
¶224teeth.” Patricia said, “[She] was sure. She was positive.”
¶225 After Detective Smith showed the photographic lineup to
¶226Patricia, she left the living room and went into her bedroom.
¶227Detective Smith then showed the other photographic lineup to Mia.
¶228Mia also quickly identified Rucker, pointing “to him with her finger.”
¶229Mia testified that, when she viewed the photographic lineup, she
¶230was able to identify Rucker “immediately,” stating, “[T]hat’s him. I
¶231know a hundred percent that’s him.” Mia also identified Rucker at
¶232trial as the man she identified in the photograph, who “put a gun to
¶233her head.”
¶234 When the police later secured Rucker’s cell phone, they
¶235obtained a search warrant to “dump the content of the phone” and
¶236 14 discovered personal photographs from Patricia’s and Mia’s stolen
¶237cell phones in Rucker’s phone contents, which—according to the
¶238police—likely occurred when Rucker downloaded material from the
¶239stolen phones onto a common device. Additionally, the police
¶240discovered photographs, text messages, and social media postings
¶241on Rucker’s cell phone indicating that Rucker was likely affiliated
¶242with the “Sex Money Murder” set of the East Coast Bloods gang.
¶243Detective Mark Belknap, an Atlanta Police Department detective
¶244with the Criminal Intelligence Unit—a sub-unit of the Gang Unit—
¶245testified as an expert at trial and stated that he believed Rucker was
¶246a member of the “Sex Money Murder” gang based on Rucker’s
¶247tattoos; photographs on his cell phone and social media accounts
¶248depicting hand signals, gang apparel, marked money, and
¶249handguns; and text messages between Rucker and other contacts
¶250with “gang identifiers.” Several of those text messages referenced
¶251Rucker’s involvement in the home invasion and shootings at the
¶252Finches’ home on January 28, 2014. Detective Belknap also talked
¶253to several gang members who knew Rucker and confirmed he was
¶254 15 affiliated with the gang. Rucker was ultimately arrested for these
¶255crimes on November 6, 2015.
¶256 1. On appeal, Rucker contends that the trial court erred in
¶257failing to instruct the jury on accomplice corroboration because
¶258James was an accomplice to the crimes. See OCGA § 24-14-8.6 The
¶259trial court did not charge the jury on corroborating an accomplice’s
¶260testimony, but instead, instructed the jury that: “The testimony of a
¶261single witness, if believed, is sufficient to establish a fact. Generally,
¶262there is no legal requirement for corroboration of a witness provided
¶263you find the evidence to be sufficient.” However, Rucker did not
¶264request an accomplice corroboration instruction or object to the trial
¶265court’s failure to give this instruction after the jury was charged.
¶266“[T]hus any appellate review of the trial court’s instructions is for
¶267plain error only.” Palencia v. State, 313 Ga. 625, 628 (872 SE2d 681)
¶268 6 OCGA § 24-14-8 provides that: The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact. However, in certain cases, including prosecutions for treason, prosecutions for perjury, and felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient. Nevertheless, corroborating circumstances may dispense with the necessity for the testimony of a second witness, except in prosecutions for treason. 16 (2022).
¶269 To establish plain error in regard to jury instructions, Rucker
¶270must satisfy the following four prongs:
¶271 First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of deviation from a legal rule—that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
¶272Palencia, 313 Ga. at 628 (quoting State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2)
¶273(a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011)). “Satisfying all four prongs of this
¶274standard is difficult, as it should be.” Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33 (2) (a).
¶275 Rucker asserts that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury
¶276on accomplice corroboration was obvious error because the following
¶277evidence demonstrated that James was an accomplice to the crime:
¶278(1) James was Rucker’s former girlfriend; (2) she asked him to
¶279 17 procure her a cell phone; (3) she accepted a cell phone from Rucker
¶280that she suspected had been stolen; (4) she avoided phone calls from
¶281the police and then advised Rucker that the police had attempted to
¶282contact her; (5) she threw the cell phone away when Rucker told her
¶283to do so; and (6) she referred to Rucker by his purported gang
¶284nickname, “Uno.” Rucker contends that this evidence of James’s
¶285close association with him, in addition to her actions to help conceal
¶286the crime after it occurred, are sufficient to establish her as a party
¶287to the crime and show her connection to it. And, Rucker further
¶288argues that, because he was directly linked to the crime through the
¶289testimony of James, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the
¶290jury on accomplice corroboration.
¶291 “A jury instruction on the need for accomplice corroboration
¶292should be given if there is slight evidence to support the charge.”
¶293Thornton v. State, 307 Ga. 121, 125 (2) (c) (834 SE2d 814) (2019)
¶294(citation and punctuation omitted). “An accomplice is someone who
¶295shares a common criminal intent with the actual perpetrator of a
¶296crime.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). Assuming for the
¶297 18 sake of argument that “slight evidence,” id., was presented of
¶298accomplice corroboration such that the trial court clearly erred in
¶299not giving this charge—thereby satisfying the second prong of the
¶300plain error test—we conclude that Rucker has not met the third
¶301prong of the plain error test, “as he fail[ed] to establish that omitting
¶302the instruction probably affected the outcome of his trial.” Lyman
¶303v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 318 (2) (800 SE2d 333) (2017). See also Kelly,
¶304290 Ga. at 34 (2) (b) (holding that “the omission of the instruction
¶305did not affect the outcome of the proceedings”). The evidence
¶306presented by the State in this case was substantial and included two
¶307eyewitness identifications of Rucker as the perpetrator, as well as
¶308incriminating text messages from Rucker’s cell phone to his gang-
¶309affiliated contacts, acknowledging that he participated in the
¶310January 28, 2014 home invasion and shootings.
¶311 In light of the other evidence presented against Rucker at trial,
¶312Rucker “has not met his burden of affirmatively showing that the
¶313failure to give an accomplice corroboration instruction probably
¶314affected the outcome of his trial.” Lyman, 301 Ga. at 320-321 (2).
¶315 19 Accordingly, even if there was clear and obvious error, “there is no
¶316likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different
¶317had the instruction in question been given, and, for this reason [],
¶318there is no plain error.” Kelly, 290 Ga. at 34 (2) (b).
¶319 2. Rucker also contends that the trial court erred in denying
¶320his motion to dismiss the case on constitutional speedy trial
¶321grounds, which was filed on April 13, 2017. After a hearing, the trial
¶322court determined that Rucker’s constitutional speedy-trial right was
¶323not violated and denied his motion to dismiss on June 28, 2017. In
¶324denying the motion, the trial court concluded that 19 months
¶325elapsed between the date of Rucker’s arrest and the issuance of the
¶326order, which met the threshold to require application of the four-
¶327factor balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (92
¶328SCt 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972). See also Doggett v. United States,
¶329505 U.S. 647, 651 (112 SCt 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992). And, after
¶330reviewing and considering each of the Barker-Doggett factors, the
¶331trial court concluded that the State had not violated Rucker’s right
¶332to a speedy trial. The case then proceeded to trial on September 18,
¶333 20 2017. We see no clear error in the trial court’s factual findings nor
¶334any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s weighing of the Barker-
¶335Doggett factors and its conclusion that Rucker’s constitutional right
¶336to a speedy trial was not violated here.
¶337 Courts examining an alleged denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial first must consider whether the interval between the defendant’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation and the trial is sufficiently long so as to be characterized as presumptively prejudicial. If the delay is long enough to invoke the presumption of prejudice, the trial court must balance four factors: (1) whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long, (2) whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay, (3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result. In this context, we must accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Moreover, the trial court’s weighing of each factor and its balancing of all four factors—its ultimate judgment—are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion. As we have discussed, speedy-trial claims require trial courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. This task is committed principally to the discretion of the trial court, and this Court has a limited role in reviewing the trial court’s decision.
¶338Williams v. State, 314 Ga. 671, 677-678 (4) (878 SE2d 553) (2022)
¶339(citations and punctuation omitted).
¶340 21 In this case, the trial court determined that the length of the
¶341delay between the date of Rucker’s November 2015 arrest and the
¶342June 2017 motion to dismiss hearing was 19 months, and thus, it
¶343met the one-year threshold to be deemed “presumptively
¶344prejudicial.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651. Although both parties
¶345concede that the trial court “properly determined that the delay was
¶346presumptively prejudicial,” Williams, 314 Ga. at 678 (4), Rucker
¶347challenges the date on which the trial court started calculating the
¶348delay, as well as the trial court’s weighing of the four factors under
¶349Barker-Doggett and the corresponding conclusions.
¶350 (a) Length of the Delay.
¶351 The trial court concluded that the 19-month delay—“to the
¶352extent that it constitute[d] more than the customary period for
¶353investigation and delay”—weighed against the State, but that “the
¶354mere passage of time” was “not enough, without more, to constitute
¶355a denial of due process.” Neither party contests that the trial court
¶356properly weighed the length of the delay against the State.
¶357 22 However, as noted above, Rucker disputes the trial court’s
¶358calculation as to the length of the delay.
¶359 At the hearing on Rucker’s motion to dismiss, trial counsel
¶360stated in her place that Rucker was interviewed by an Atlanta Police
¶361Department detective about the crimes in June 2014, but counsel
¶362did not specify the exact date or location where this interview
¶363occurred or provide any substantive detail as to what was discussed
¶364during the interview. 7 Rucker asserts that the trial court should
¶365have calculated the length of the delay from the date of Rucker’s
¶366police interview, as opposed to Rucker’s November 2015 arrest date,
¶367and argues that this period of delay was “uncommonly long.” Rucker
¶368also argues that, because he was already being held on other charges
¶369when police interviewed him, his incarceration likely attributed to
¶370the delay in seeking a warrant for his arrest on these charges, which
¶371“exacerbate[d], rather than mitigate[d], the harms of pretrial
¶372detention.”
¶373 7 The only information about the location of this interview was that it occurred during Rucker’s incarceration in DeKalb County on unrelated charges. 23 The trial court found no merit to this argument given that
¶374Rucker was not arrested for these charges after the June 2014
¶375interview, but was irrefutably arrested on November 6, 2015—“the
¶376benchmark for the Barker-Doggett analysis.” We conclude that the
¶377trial court did not err by starting its length-of-delay calculation on
¶378the date of Rucker’s arrest—which, as discussed above, still resulted
¶379in a delay that exceeded the one-year threshold for presumptive
¶380prejudice. See Cash v. State, 307 Ga. 510, 515 (2) (b) (i) (837 SE2d
¶381280) (2019). And “we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
¶382conclusion that the length of the delay” weighed primarily against
¶383the State. See id. at 516 (2) (b) (i).
¶384 (b) Reasons for the delay.
¶385 In considering the reasons for the delay, the trial court focused
¶386on two phases of the case—the pre-indictment period between
¶387Rucker’s November 6, 2015 arrest and the March 18, 2016
¶388indictment, and the post-indictment period between the indictment
¶389and the June 13, 2017 hearing on Rucker’s motion to dismiss. The
¶390trial court concluded that the four-month pre-indictment delay
¶391 24 weighed neutrally or—at worst—benignly against the State, noting
¶392that there was “no allegation or evidence that the State deliberately
¶393delayed this indictment” to “hamper [Rucker’s] defense,” see Barker,
¶394407 U.S. at 531, and that cases involving criminal gang charges are
¶395complex to prepare and present. The trial court further observed
¶396that, for more complex charges, investigative delay by the State is
¶397acceptable, and the trial court concluded that, to the extent there
¶398was any delay attributable to the State’s preparation of its case in
¶399the pre-indictment stage, it was at most negligent and weighed “as
¶400a relatively benign factor against the State.”
¶401 As for the post-indictment delay, the trial court determined
¶402that the case was not “neglected since indictment” and “proceeded
¶403with ordinary promptness” and that any delay was the “inevitable
¶404delay owing to the human aspects of the practice of law.” The trial
¶405court noted that Rucker had not alleged that “the State deliberately
¶406delayed the case in order to obtain a tactical advantage over Rucker”
¶407and concluded that “the reasons for the post-indictment delay [were]
¶408neutral, weighing neither against the State nor [Rucker,] because
¶409 25 this case ha[d] been prosecuted with that orderly expedition
¶410consistent with due process of law.”
¶411 Rucker argues that the trial court erred in finding that the
¶412delay was neutral or benign because, while it may be generally true
¶413that gang cases are “uncommonly complex” and “require significant
¶414resources to investigate,” such circumstances “did not appear to be
¶415true in this case.” Rucker asserts that with two eyewitness
¶416identifications and statements from Rucker’s former girlfriend that
¶417he had given her a stolen cell phone, there was “likely probable cause
¶418to issue an arrest warrant when the detective first spoke to [Rucker]
¶419in June 2014 and the delay from that point is fairly hard to explain.”
¶420Rucker thus contends that the trial court should have weighed this
¶421factor against the State as neglect and abused its discretion in
¶422weighing this factor neutrally.
¶423 We have already rejected Rucker’s argument that the time for
¶424calculating the length of the delay should have run from the date of
¶425Rucker’s police interview in June 2014. And, even if the State was
¶426negligent in bringing the case to trial once Rucker was arrested, “[a]
¶427 26 more neutral reason such as negligence . . . should be weighted less
¶428heavily” against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. We see no abuse
¶429of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the reason for the
¶430delay weighed neutrally or benignly against the State. See Cash,
¶431307 Ga. at 517 (2) (b) (ii).
¶432 (c) Assertion of the right.
¶433 The trial court weighed Rucker’s delay in asserting his right to
¶434a speedy trial heavily against him. Rucker argues that the trial
¶435court erred in this regard because, although he did not assert his
¶436right to a speedy trial until he filed his motion to dismiss the
¶437indictment on April 13, 2017, he was not served with initial
¶438discovery until March 2016 or witness transcripts until July 2016
¶439and “the time before a defendant has had a chance to view the
¶440evidence should not weigh heavily against him.”
¶441 The accused is not required to demand a speedy trial at the first available opportunity, for the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the demand-waiver approach to the constitutional speedy trial right. Even so, a defendant who fails to assert the right at any point in the trial court will have an extremely difficult time establishing a violation of his or her constitutional right to a speedy
¶442 27 trial. In order to invoke the right, the accused need not file a formal motion, though that is certainly sufficient. Moreover, invocation of the speedy trial right need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge; the accused can begin demanding that the right to a speedy trial be honored as soon as he or she is arrested. The relevant question for purposes of the third Barker-Doggett factor is whether the accused has asserted the right to a speedy trial in due course. This requires a close examination of the procedural history of the case with particular attention to the timing, form, and vigor of the accused’s demands to be tried immediately.
¶443Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 62-63 (2) (b) (iii) (663 SE2d 189) (2008)
¶444(citations and punctuation omitted).
¶445 In denying Rucker’s motion to dismiss, the trial court noted
¶446that Rucker waited 17 months to file his constitutional speedy trial
¶447motion, that he did not demand a statutory speedy trial or request
¶448special permission to file an out-of-time statutory speedy trial
¶449demand, and that he was represented by counsel “every step of the
¶450way.” After weighing the “eve-of-trial assertion of the demand for
¶451dismissal (versus a demand for trial), the absence of mitigation, and
¶452the fact that Rucker did not demand a statutory speedy trial,” the
¶453 28 trial court concluded that this factor should weigh heavily against
¶454Rucker.
¶455 We cannot say that the trial court erred in reaching this
¶456determination. Because delay often works to a defendant’s
¶457advantage, “the accused bears some responsibility to invoke the
¶458speedy trial right and put the government on notice that he . . .
¶459would prefer to be tried as soon as possible.” Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 62
¶460(2) (b) (iii). And, “[o]ur cases hold that an extended delay in
¶461asserting the right to a speedy trial should normally be weighed
¶462heavily against the defendant.” State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 529 (2)
¶463(c) (3) (705 SE2d 636) (2011) (emphasis in original). Here, Rucker
¶464waited over a year after he was indicted to assert his right to a
¶465constitutional speedy trial, and he never filed a statutory speed trial
¶466demand, even though he was represented by counsel throughout
¶467these proceedings. See Sosniak v. State, 292 Ga. 35, 42 (3) (734 SE2d
¶468362) (2012) (holding that the trial court did not err in finding an eve-
¶469of-trial demand for dismissal untimely and properly weighed this
¶470factor heavily against the defendant). See also Higgenbottom v.
¶471 29 State, 290 Ga. 198, 202 (1) (C) (719 SE2d 482) (2011) (holding that
¶472the defendant’s failure to file his constitutional speedy trial motion
¶473to dismiss “until over two years following his arrest” and his failure
¶474to “avail himself of his statutory right to a speedy trial” supported
¶475the trial court’s determination to weigh this factor against the
¶476defendant). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court acted
¶477within its discretion in weighing this factor heavily against Rucker.
¶478 (d) Prejudice.
¶479 Finally, the trial court concluded that, although Rucker was
¶480entitled to the presumption of prejudice that arises from a 19-month
¶481delay since arrest, the presumption was overcome in this case. In
¶482reaching this conclusion, the trial court noted that Rucker “failed to
¶483allege actual prejudice in his motion” and further noted that his only
¶484assertion of prejudice—beyond the mere passage of time—was
¶485raised at the motion to dismiss hearing, when trial counsel stated in
¶486her place that one of the State’s witnesses listed in discovery had
¶487difficulty recalling the statement she gave to police around the time
¶488of the incident. The trial court determined that this assertion did
¶489 30 “not amount to much” since the witness’s statement would have
¶490been available to refresh the witness’s recollection or impeach her
¶491testimony at trial. Thus, the trial court weighed this factor only
¶492benignly against the State. However, the trial court ultimately
¶493concluded that, based on “the absence of demonstrable prejudice”
¶494and Rucker’s “own delay in asserting the right,” this factor did not
¶495weigh in Rucker’s favor.
¶496 Rucker asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in
¶497reaching this conclusion because the length of the delay was
¶498presumptively prejudicial. “But the prejudice prong may be weighed
¶499against the defendant even in cases of excessive delay.” Cash, 307
¶500Ga. at 518 (2) (b) (iv) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court
¶501acknowledged “the presumption of prejudice created by the delay,”
¶502id., but determined that Rucker did not demonstrate actual
¶503prejudice and contributed to the delay in waiting to assert the right.
¶504“[I]n attempting to establish that his right to a speedy trial was
¶505violated, [Rucker] cannot rely solely on the presumptive prejudice
¶506from the [19]-month delay.” Williams, 314 Ga. at 680 (4) (d). Thus,
¶507 31 we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing
¶508to weigh this factor in Rucker’s favor.
¶509 “In sum, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
¶510weighing of the [Barker-Doggett] factors or clear error in the factual
¶511findings that supported those determinations.” Cash, 307 Ga. at 520
¶512(2) (b). And we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
¶513conclusion that the 19-month delay in trying Rucker did not violate
¶514Rucker’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.
¶515 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶516 32