¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: February 21, 2023
¶4 S22G0303. BOWMAN v. THE STATE.
¶5 BOGGS, Chief Justice.
¶6 In February 2014, a Paulding County grand jury indicted
¶7Logan Adam Bowman for crimes against his daughter. At the next
¶8term of court, Bowman properly invoked his right to a speedy trial
¶9pursuant to the applicable speedy trial statute, OCGA § 17-7-170.
¶10More than five years later, the State still had not brought him to
¶11trial before 12 citizens sworn by the court or the court clerk to “well
¶12and truly try the issue formed upon this bill of indictment . . . and a
¶13true verdict give according to the evidence,” OCGA § 15-12-139, so
¶14Bowman filed a motion for discharge and acquittal on speedy trial
¶15grounds, which the trial court granted. The State appealed, and in
¶16State v. Bowman, 361 Ga. App. 465 (863 SE2d 180) (2021), the Court
¶17of Appeals reversed, holding that a “trial” by an unsworn group of citizens satisfies the requirements of OCGA § 17-7-170. We granted
¶18Bowman’s petition for certiorari and now reverse the Court of
¶19Appeals’ judgment. 1
¶20 1. On August 30, 2013, the Paulding County Sheriff’s Office
¶21arrested Bowman on suspicion of child molestation and incest.
¶22Almost six months later, on February 17, 2014 – during the January
¶232014 term of the Paulding County Superior Court – the grand jury
¶24indicted Bowman on one count of aggravated child molestation, six
¶25 1 The trial court granted Bowman’s motion for discharge and acquittal on both statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds. See OCGA § 17-7- 170 (b) (“If the defendant is not tried when the demand for speedy trial is made or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided that at both court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant, the defendant shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment or accusation. . . .”); U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a) (“In criminal cases, the defendant shall have a . . . speedy trial by an impartial jury; and the jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts.”). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order granting the motion, rejecting both Bowman’s statutory and constitutional claims. In light of our conclusion that the trial court correctly granted Bowman’s motion under the applicable speedy trial statute, we need not separately address the Court of Appeals’ treatment of Bowman’s constitutional claims. See State v. Bell, 274 Ga. 719, 720 (559 SE2d 477) (2002) (concluding that the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim was moot once this Court held that he was entitled to discharge and acquittal under the applicable speedy trial statute).
¶26 2 counts of child molestation, and two counts of incest. On September
¶2718, during the July 2014 term, Bowman filed a Demand for Speedy
¶28Trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 and an Assertion of
¶29Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial. 2
¶30 Later during the July 2014 term, starting on December 1, the
¶31trial court held a proceeding at which the parties selected 12 citizens
¶32from among those summoned for jury service to try Bowman’s case.
¶33However, neither the court nor the court clerk administered the jury
¶34oath required by OCGA § 15-12-139, which says:
¶35 In all criminal cases, the following oath shall be administered to the trial jury: “You shall well and truly try the issue formed upon this bill of indictment (or accusation) between the State of Georgia and (name of accused), who is charged with (here state the crime or offense), and a true verdict give according to the evidence. So help you God.” The judge or clerk shall administer the oath to the jurors.
¶36Instead, on the morning of December 2, the court gave preliminary
¶37instructions, the parties made opening statements, and the State
¶38 2 The Paulding County Superior Court has two regular terms of court each year, one starting the second Monday in January, and the other starting the second Monday in July. See OCGA § 15-6-3 (31.1). 3 called its first witness. On December 3, the State rested, and
¶39Bowman called the first of two witnesses. Bowman himself did not
¶40testify. On December 4, the parties made closing arguments, the
¶41court gave a jury charge, and before noon, the 12 citizens retired to
¶42deliberate.
¶43 On December 5, after deliberating for more than a day, the
¶44unsworn group of 12 citizens purported to return verdicts acquitting
¶45Bowman on seven of the nine counts of the indictment and finding
¶46him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of one count each of child
¶47molestation and incest. On December 30, the court held a sentencing
¶48hearing and sentenced Bowman to a total term of 50 years in prison
¶49with the first 15 years to be served in confinement and the
¶50remainder to be served on probation. Bowman filed a timely motion
¶51for new trial.
¶52 More than four years later, at a status conference on March 7,
¶532019, Bowman requested the appointment of conflict counsel, and
¶54the court granted his request. Conflict counsel filed an amended
¶55motion for new trial arguing, among other things, that the complete
¶56 4 failure to administer the jury oath was a structural error that
¶57required setting aside the verdicts, Bowman’s judgment of
¶58conviction, and his sentence. At a hearing, the State informed the
¶59court that it had investigated the matter and determined that the
¶60jury oath was never administered to the 12 citizens who purported
¶61to decide Bowman’s case. The court entered a consent order setting
¶62aside the verdicts, Bowman’s judgment of conviction, and his
¶63sentence and reinstating his case to active status on the court’s trial
¶64calendar.
¶65 On November 27, 2019, through new counsel, Bowman filed a
¶66motion for discharge and acquittal on statutory and constitutional
¶67speedy trial grounds. On the same day, the State filed a motion
¶68seeking a declaratory order that the December 2014 proceeding
¶69“constitute[d] a trial” for the purpose of satisfying Bowman’s
¶70Demand for Speedy Trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 and the
¶71speedy trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
¶72Constitution and the Georgia Constitution. The court held an
¶73evidentiary hearing at which Bowman presented evidence that
¶74 5 juries were impaneled and qualified to hear cases at the July 2014
¶75term of court, the January 2015 term of court, and the nine
¶76succeeding terms of court since then. On March 30, 2020, the court
¶77entered an order granting Bowman’s motion for discharge and
¶78acquittal, relying on this Court’s decisions in Slaughter v. State, 100
¶79Ga. 323 (28 SE 159) (1897), and Spencer v. State, 281 Ga. 533 (640
¶80SE2d 267) (2007). Two days later, the court ordered Bowman’s
¶81immediate release after more than six-and-a-half years in custody.
¶82 The State appealed, and on October 5, 2021, the Court of
¶83Appeals issued an opinion reversing the trial court’s order granting
¶84Bowman’s motion for discharge and acquittal. The Court of Appeals
¶85acknowledged that Bowman properly invoked his right under OCGA
¶86§ 17-7-170 to be tried no later than the January 2015 term of court.
¶87See Bowman, 361 Ga. App. at 466. However, citing dictionary
¶88definitions of the word “trial,” the Court of Appeals held that
¶89“Bowman was ‘tried’ or placed on ‘trial’ within the plain meaning” of
¶90OCGA § 17-7-170 at the December 2014 proceeding. Id. at 472. The
¶91Court of Appeals also rejected Bowman’s speedy trial claim based on
¶92 6 the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the
¶93Georgia Constitution. See id. at 473-475.
¶94 We granted Bowman’s petition for certiorari and posed the
¶95following question:
¶96 Was [Bowman] deprived of his statutory or constitutional right to a speedy trial where the trial he received was held before a jury that had not sworn the oath required by OCGA § 15-12-139?
¶97The case was orally argued in this Court on September 20, 2022.
¶98 2. The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of the
¶99words “trial” and “tried” in OCGA § 17-7-170. Subsection (a) of
¶100OCGA § 17-7-170 says:
¶101 Any defendant against whom a true bill of indictment or an accusation is filed with the clerk for an offense not affecting the defendant’s life may enter a demand for speedy trial at the court term at which the indictment or accusation is filed or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter . . . .
¶102Subsection (b) then says:
¶103 If the defendant is not tried when the demand for speedy trial is made or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided that at both court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant, the
¶104 7 defendant shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment . . . . 3
¶105 In interpreting statutes, we “presume that the General
¶106Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v.
¶107Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citation and
¶108punctuation omitted).
¶109 [A]nd so, we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would. The common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is their context. For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law – constitutional, statutory, and common law alike – that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question.
¶110Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (774 SE2d 688) (2015)
¶111(citations and punctuation omitted). Thus, “[w]e construe statutes
¶112in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of
¶113a general and uniform system of jurisprudence.” In the Interest of
¶114 3The remaining subsections of the statute specify when a demand for speedy trial expires, how the statute applies when a jury returns a verdict but the judgment is reversed on appeal, how the statute applies when a case ends in a mistrial, and how the statute applies when the defendant files a special plea of incompetency to stand trial or the court conducts a trial on the competency of the defendant. See OCGA § 17-7-170 (c) - (f). 8 M. D. H., 300 Ga. 46, 53 (793 SE2d 49) (2016) (citation and
¶115punctuation omitted).
¶116 Here, the Court of Appeals erred in failing to give proper
¶117weight to the constitutional background of the applicable speedy
¶118trial statute and this Court’s precedents. The “speedy trial” that
¶119criminal defendants charged with noncapital crimes have the right
¶120to demand under OCGA § 17-7-170 (a) is the same “speedy trial” that
¶121is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
¶122Constitution and the Georgia Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VI
¶123(guaranteeing “right to a speedy . . . trial, by an impartial jury,” in
¶124all criminal prosecutions); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI
¶125(a) (guaranteeing that “[i]n criminal cases, the defendant shall have
¶126a . . . speedy trial by an impartial jury”). See Durham v. State, 9 Ga.
¶127306, 309 (1851) (stating that statutory predecessor to OCGA § 17-7-
¶128170 “was wisely and humanely framed to carry into effect that
¶129provision of the Constitution which declares, that ‘in all criminal
¶130prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
¶131trial’”). OCGA § 17-7-170 provides a mechanism that criminal
¶132 9 defendants may employ to ensure that their constitutionally
¶133guaranteed right to a speedy trial is not violated. See Denny v. State,
¶1346 Ga. 491, 493 (1849) (“This law puts it in the power of the accused
¶135to compel a trial, as early as the second term of the Court after the
¶136bill is found, in cases not capital . . . .”).
¶137 More than 125 years ago, this Court held that administration
¶138of the jury oath now codified at OCGA § 15-12-139 is an
¶139indispensable prerequisite to a legally valid jury trial. See Slaughter
¶140v. State, 100 Ga. 323, 324 (28 SE 159) (1897) (“It is essential to the
¶141legality of any criminal trial that there should be a lawfully
¶142constituted tribunal; and where such tribunal is composed in part of
¶143a jury . . . how can the tribunal be considered as lawfully constituted
¶144unless the jurors actually take this oath, either literally or in
¶145substance?”). We held in Slaughter that because no attempt had
¶146been made to comply with the jury oath statute, “there was no trial
¶147at all, because there was no lawful jury. It was, in effect, no more
¶148than a trial by a mob . . . .” Id. at 324-325. We further explained that
¶149“[w]here . . . the requirements of the statute as to administering an
¶150 10 oath to a jury trying a criminal case have been utterly ignored,”
¶151there is a jurisdictional defect in the proceedings, because “there
¶152must be a lawful tribunal; and where the trial is by jury, it must be
¶153legally constituted, or it will be without authority to pass upon the
¶154issues submitted.” Id. at 326.
¶155 Put differently, the administration of the jury oath is what
¶156turns the 12 citizens selected to hear a criminal case into a jury
¶157invested with the authority to decide whether the accused is guilty
¶158of a crime. Without the oath, there is no jury; and without the jury,
¶159there is no trial. See id. at 329 (“‘A jury is a body of [citizens]
¶160summoned and sworn to decide upon the facts in issue at the trial.
¶161Hence, [citizens] summoned as jurors must also be sworn before they
¶162constitute an organized and competent tribunal to which the issues
¶163in a cause can be submitted for trial.’” (citation omitted)). See also
¶164Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833, 839-840 (134 SCt 2070, 188 LE2d
¶1651112) (2014) (“Jeopardy attaches when a defendant is ‘put to trial,’
¶166and in a jury trial, that is when a jury is empaneled and sworn.”
¶167(citation and some punctuation omitted; emphasis added). A
¶168 11 proceeding conducted before 12 citizens who have not taken the jury
¶169oath is nothing more than an “attempted trial,” Spencer v. State, 281
¶170Ga. 533, 535 (640 SE2d 267) (2007), which does not satisfy the
¶171requirements of OCGA § 17-7-170.
¶172 The Court of Appeals’ holding that the December 2014
¶173proceeding constituted a “trial” at which Bowman was “tried” for
¶174purposes of OCGA § 17-7-170 cannot be squared with this Court’s
¶175decisions in Slaughter and Spencer. Accordingly, we reverse the
¶176judgment of the Court of Appeals.
¶177 Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Pinson, J., disqualified.
¶178 12