Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

193 federal appellate · 12 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 436 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[T]he separate steps were integrated parts of a single scheme. Transitory phases of an arrangement frequently are disregarded under these sections of the revenue acts [i. e., the liquidation and reorganization provisions] where they add nothing of substance to the completed affair. [Citations omitted.] Here they were no more than intermediate procedural devices utilized to enable the new corporation to acquire all the assets of the old one pursuant to a single reorganization plan.””

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Davant v. Commissioner · Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

2. “When describing the kind of change in corporate structure that permits exemption from these taxes, section 203 does not disregard the necessity of continuity of interests under modified corporate forms. Such is the purpose of the word “reorganization” in section 203(b)(3) of the act. 26 U.S.C.A. § 934 (b)(3), where a corporation exchanges its property “solely for stock or securities.” Such also is the nature of the “merger or consolidation” described in subdivision (h)(1)(A) where a corporation acquires a majority of the stock of another, and such is the nature of the “reorganization” described in subdivision (h)(1)(B) of section 203, 26 U.S.C.A. § 934 (h)(1)(B), where a corporation transfers assets to another corporation, and the transferor, or its stockholders, immediately thereafter are in control of the transferee. The words “A recapitalization,” in subdivision (h)(1)(C) of section 203, 26 U.S.C.A. § 934 (h)(1)(C), and “A mere change in * * * form * * * of organization, however effected,” in subdivision (h)(1)(D) of section 203, 26 U.S.C.A. § 934 (h)(1)(D), involve the same idea. When subdivision (h)(1)(A) included in its definition of “merger or consolidation” the “acquisition by one corporation of * * * substantially all the properties of another,” it did this so that the receipt of property by the corporation surviving the merger might serve to effect a reorganization as does an acquisition of stock. Each transaction presupposed a continuance of interest on the part of”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Heverly v. Commissioner · Arden S. Heverly and Sophia S. Heverly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

3. ““From the Pinellas case, Pinellas, Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 287 U.S. 462 , 53 S.Ct. 257 , 77 L.Ed. 428 , to the LeTulle case, LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 , 60 S.Ct. 313 , 84 L. Ed. 355 , it has been recognized that a transaction may not qualify as a ‘reorganization’ under the various revenue acts though the literal language of the statute is satisfied. See Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation (3d Series), p. 91 et seq. The Pinellas case introduced the continuity of interest theory to eliminate those transactions which had ‘no real semblance to a merger or consolidation’ (287 U.S. page 470, 53 S.Ct. [257] 77 L.Ed. 428 ) and to avoid a construction which ‘would make evasion of taxation very easy.’ * * * ””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Roebling v. Commissioner · McDonald's Restaurants of Illinois, Inc. v. Commissioner