J-A26006-23
2024 PA Super 103
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
TYREE T. SEENEY : No. 1236 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered May 10, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-09-CR-0004326-2022
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 21, 2024
The Commonwealth appeals from the May 10, 2023 Order entered in
the Bucks Court of Common Pleas that granted Appellee Tyree Seeney’s
motion to suppress a statement that he made to a Warwick Township
constable. After careful review, we affirm.
A.
We glean the following factual and procedural history from the
suppression court opinion and the certified record. On July 19, 2022, the
Commonwealth charged Mr. Seeney with Criminal Attempt-Possession of a
Prohibited Firearm and two counts of Materially False Written Statement-
Purchase, Delivery, or Transfer of Firearm as a result of Mr. Seeney’s alleged
attempt to purchase a firearm illegally. 1
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a) and 6111(g)(4)(ii), respectively.
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On August 29, 2022, Constable Alan Sigafoos transported Mr. Seeney
from the Bucks County Correctional Facility to the District Court in Warwick
Township for his preliminary hearing. Constable Sigafoos is the elected
constable for Warwick Township in Bucks County. As a constable, his
employer is the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency and part
of his duties include transporting inmates and serving warrants. Also,
Constable Sigafoos is a retired police officer in Newtown Township and is
currently a part-time police officer in Penndel Borough.
On the day of Mr. Seeney’s preliminary hearing, Constable Sigafoos and
his partner, Constable Jon Forest, transported Mr. Seeney and another inmate
from the county prison’s holding cell to the courthouse using a vehicle
equipped with a cage. Mr. Seeney was shackled and handcuffed from when
he left the prison until he returned. While at the courthouse, Mr. Seeney
waited for his preliminary hearing in what Constable Sigafoos “call[ed] a
conference room, but it’s a holding area where the constable is maintaining
watch over the defendant.” N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 4/28/2023, at 13.
While in the holding area, Constable Sigafoos asked Mr. Seeney why he
had a sling on his arm. Mr. Seeney responded that he had been shot while
working as a security guard and that he had shot back. Constable Sigafoos
then asked Mr. Seeney what brought him to court. Mr. Seeney responded
that he attempted to purchase a firearm at a certain store called Tanner’s.
Constable Sigafoos then asked why Mr. Seeney had not completed the
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purchase of the firearm and Mr. Seeney responded that he was not allowed to
purchase a firearm. Constable Sigafoos then commented that Mr. Seeney’s
employer would have done “a clearance on [him],” and Mr. Seeney responded
that “something is messed up.” Id. at 17.
Constable Sigafoos did not initially tell anyone else about Mr. Seeney’s
admission that he was ineligible to purchase a firearm, but attempted to do
so anyway. However, Detective Corporal Paul Fox was waiting outside of the
conference room and overheard part of this conversation, specifically the
mention of Tanner’s, which piqued his interest. He called Constable Sigafoos
the next day to ascertain the details of that conversation and Constable
Sigafoos informed him.
Before trial, Mr. Seeney filed a motion to suppress “any and all
incriminating statements” made to Constable Sigafoos and overheard by
Detective Corporal Fox, alleging that Constable Sigafoos failed to give Mr.
Seeney his Miranda warnings before questioning him. Motion to Suppress,
4/21/2023, at 1-2. At the suppression hearing, Constable Sigafoos and
Detective Corporal Fox testified in accordance with the above facts. On cross-
examination, Constable Sigafoos also testified that it is normal for him to ask
defendants why they are in court, but that he “always say[s] allegedly.” N.T.
Hr’g at 34.
The suppression court granted the motion to suppress, finding that
Constable Sigafoos’ questions “place[d Mr. Seeney] in a position where any
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response could be incriminating[.]” Suppression Ct. Op., 7/7/23, at 5. The
Commonwealth then filed a timely appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). 2 Both
the Commonwealth and the suppression court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
B.
The Commonwealth raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the suppression court err[] in granting suppression of
statements made by [Mr. Seeney] to Constable Sigafoos where,
even assuming he was a law enforcement officer, his words,
actions, and the surrounding circumstances were such that he
would not have reasonably known his statements were likely to
elicit an incriminating response?
2. Did the suppression court err[] in granting suppression of
statements made by [Mr. Seeney] to Constable Sigafoos as a
constable is not a law enforcement officer and not subject to the
prophylactic rules set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436
(1966)?
Commonwealth’s Br. at 4 (reordered for ease of disposition).
C.
Our standard of review for suppression determinations is well settled.
We review the grant of a suppression motion to determine “whether the record
supports the trial court’s factual findings and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266
A.3d 1117, 1122-23 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (citation omitted). We defer
to the suppression court’s factual findings if they are supported by the record.
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2 Rule 311(d) provides that “the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of
right from an order that does not end the entire case where the
Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate
or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
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Commonwealth v. Batista, 219 A.3d 1199, 1206 (Pa. Super. 2019). We,
however, give no such deference to the suppression court’s legal conclusions
and, instead, review them de novo.
Id. An appellate court can affirm a valid
judgment for any reason supported by the record. Commonwealth v.
Hamlett,
234 A.3d 486, 488 (Pa. 2020).
“Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the
Commonwealth's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant's
rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-48 (Pa. 2012)
(citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).
It is well-settled that when a defendant is subject to a custodial
interrogation, the Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officers
provide a defendant with his Miranda warnings. U.S. CONST. amend. V;
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). See also Commonwealth
v. Mannion,
725 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 1999) (applying Miranda).
The Commonwealth raises two issues on appeal. First, whether
Constable Sigafoos “interrogated” Mr. Seeney and second, whether an
interrogation by a constable rather than a law enforcement officer triggers the
requirement that the constable provide the Miranda warnings to a defendant.
We find that the trial court correctly found that Constable Sigafoos
“interrogated” Mr. Seeney and second, that in light of the coercive
environment that Constable Sigafoos created under governmental authority
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when he questioned Mr. Seeney, Mr. Seeney was entitled to the protections
of the Miranda warnings before Constable Sigafoos interrogated him.
D.
The suppression court, when determining whether an encounter
qualifies as a custodial interrogation, should consider objectively the totality
of the circumstances and the impression those circumstances have on the
defendant:
[t]he standard for determining whether an encounter with
the police is deemed “custodial” or police have initiated a
custodial interrogation is an objective one based on a
totality of the circumstances, with due consideration given
to the reasonable impression conveyed to the person
interrogated. Custodial interrogation has been defined as
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way.”
“Interrogation” is police conduct “calculated to, expected to,
or likely to evoke admission.”
Mannion, 725 A.2d at 200 (internal citations omitted).
We emphasize that this determination “does not depend upon the
subjective intent of the law enforcement officer interrogator.”
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 888 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation
omitted). Rather, to determine if a law enforcement officer should have
known that questioning was reasonably likely to produce an incriminating
response, we consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interaction with a focus on the suspect’s perception and the police officer’s
knowledge. Commonwealth v. Briggs,
12 A.3d 291, 323 (Pa. 2011).
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The Commonwealth argues that several factors weigh against finding
that Constable Sigafoos interrogated Mr. Seeney. Specifically, it emphasizes
that Constable Sigafoos always had conversations with the inmates that he
transported, always asks questions with the word “allegedly,” had no
knowledge of why Appellant was in custody, and did not tell anyone about the
statement until Detective Corporal Fox called him. Commonwealth’s Br. at
21-22. This argument is not persuasive.
First, contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument, Constable Sigafoos’
subjective intent when asking Mr. Seeney questions is irrelevant. Gonzalez,
979 A.2d at 888. In particular, it is irrelevant that Constable Sigafoos did not
know the basis for the prosecution of Mr. Seeney, that Constable Sigafoos
always asked the questions about the prosecution when transporting inmates
and did not tell anyone that Mr. Seeney admitted that he attempted to
purchase a firearm when he was ineligible to do so. Rather, the focus is on
whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Constable
Sigafoos was subjecting Mr. Seeney to an interrogation.
The trial court properly analyzed the facts of the situation by concluding
that by asking Mr. Seeney what brought Mr. Seeney to court that day, it is
reasonable to conclude that Mr. Seeney’s response was “likely to evoke
admission” or other incriminating information. This is especially true because
Constable Sigafoos continued to ask Mr. Seeney for details even after learning
from his initial question that Mr. Seeney was in court as a defendant, not as
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a shooting victim. Suppression Ct. Op. at 4-5; Mannion, 725 A.2d at 200
(citation omitted). Cf. Commonwealth v. Chester,
587 A.2d 1367, 1376-
77 (Pa. 1991) (concluding that the constable asking whether defendant’s
attorney wanted him to wear a bullet-proof vest was not interrogation; rather,
it was a yes or no question necessary for security, “not calculated [] to evoke
an admission,” and defendant added incriminating detail unprompted).
In sum, we agree with the trial court’s analysis and findings that
Constable Sigafoos subjected Mr. Seeney to a custodial interrogation and
reject this ground for the Commonwealth’s challenge to the trial court’s
decision to grant the Motion to Suppress.
E.
The Commonwealth next asserts that trial court erred in granting the
Motion to Suppress because constables are not law enforcement officers, and
thus, cannot create a custodial interrogation. In particular, the
Commonwealth argues that because a constable is not a “state employee,”
but rather an independent contractor who does not act for or under the control
of the Commonwealth, the constable cannot create a custodial interrogation.
Commonwealth’s Br. at 12 (citing In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d 985,
986-87 (Pa. 1991)).
The Commonwealth further cites constables’ limited powers to argue
that constables are not law enforcement officers, and also attempts to
distinguish Constable Sigafoos from law enforcement officers by describing his
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“primary purpose” as transportation. Id. at 12, 15, 20. Finally, the
Commonwealth maintains that there is no authority that confers police powers
on constables and contrasts constables to, among other positions, school
police officers. Id. at 16. (citing In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. 2002)
(school police must give Miranda warnings because they have the same
power as municipal police on school property)).
The foundation for the Commonwealth’s argument is that because no
statute explicitly grants to constables governmental authority when
transporting and guarding defendants, the government has not delegated any
authority to a constable and thus, a constable, who is transporting and
guarding a defendant, is no different from a private individual transporting
and guarding a defendant. In other words, an Uber driver transporting a
defendant to court has the same level of government authority as a constable
transporting a defendant to court. We disagree.
The Commonwealth ignores the fact that when the government
delegates to the responsibility to a constable to transport an incarcerated
defendant to court and guard him, the government is also delegating its
authority to control the defendant. The fact that the statutes do not explicitly
provide for such delegation of authority to control an incarcerated defendant
is irrelevant because it is reasonable to infer from the fact that the defendant
is incarcerated, the defendant is shackled, and the constable is guarding the
defendant with a firearm that the government is exercising its authority and
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control over the defendant. The constable is not acting like a private individual
or an Uber driver.
In this case, the suppression court correctly noted that Constable
Sigafoos was responsible not only for transporting Mr. Seeney to his
preliminary hearing, but also for maintaining Mr. Seeney’s detention, which
he did while armed with a firearm. Suppression Ct. Op. at 4. He drove Mr.
Seeney, who was handcuffed and shackled, from the prison to the courthouse
in a vehicle equipped with a cage, and guarded Mr. Seeney as he remained
shackled in a conference room. N.T. Hr’g at 13. Mr. Seeney was not free to
leave during this time, and it was Constable Sigafoos’ responsibility to ensure
that he did not.
Since Constable Sigafoos was responsible for creating and maintaining
the custodial environment at the behest of the government and asserted the
same authority that a law enforcement officer would assert in a similar
situation, we conclude that he was not allowed to question Mr. Seeney without
first providing him Miranda warnings. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Accordingly,
the court correctly suppressed Mr. Seeney’s responses to Constable Sigafoos’
questions.3
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3 Although the suppression court erred in relying on 13 P.S. § 40, a partially
repealed statute, to analyze the constable’s status as a law enforcement
officer, we may affirm its ruling on any basis. Hamlett, 234 A.3d at 488.
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F.
In sum, we conclude that the suppression court properly suppressed Mr.
Seeney’s statements provided to Constable Sigafoos in response to his
questions because Constable Sigafoos, acting with governmental authority,
subjected Mr. Seeney to a custodial interrogation without first giving him
Miranda warnings. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting the suppression
motion.
Order affirmed.
Date: 5/21/2024
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