Roe v. Baker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “If all 12 members of the jury find by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances, as I have defined them, are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors, then you must return such finding to the Court. I instruct you, as a matter of law, that if you make such finding, then you have no choice and must make a recommendation to the Court that the sentence of death be imposed on the Defendant [ ]. On the other hand, if after considering all of the evidence raised at trial which is relevant to the issues before you, the testimony, other evidence, and the arguments of counsel, you cannot unanimously agree that the State of Ohio proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances, as I have defined them, outweigh the mitigating factors, then you’ll return your recommendation reflecting your decision. In this event, you will then proceed to determine which of the three possible life imprisonment sentences to impose....”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hartman v. Bagley · 296 F. Supp. 2d 784 - Taylor v. Mitchell

2. “The issue on collateral review in the federal courts is whether a defendant’s federal constitutional rights were violated by the instruction. We addressed this same issue in Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 339-40 (6th Cir.1998), and held that such a unanimity instruction as to a sentencing recommendation of death did not violate the Constitution. Again in Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 876 (6th Cir.2000), we observed the same. Just as in Coe and Scott, the instructions at issue do not require unanimity as to a specific mitigating factor, which would violate Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 376 , 108 S.Ct. 1860 , 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988), but only as to the overall weighing process, which is permissible. Further, as we observed in Scott, both this Circuit and the Supreme Court “[have] chastised such instructions as encouraging deadlock and undermining the strong governmental interest in unanimous verdicts.” Scott, 209 F.3d at 877 (citing Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381-84 , 119 S.Ct. 2090 , 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) and Coe, 161 F.3d at 339-40 ). Accordingly, this assignment is without merit.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Davie v. Mitchell

3. “Now each of you must decide the case for yourself, but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of this case with your fellow jurors. Now do not hesitate to change an opinion if you later find that that opinion or that position is wrong. However, you should not surrender honest convictions in order to be congenial or in order to reach a verdict solely based upon the opinion of the other jurors. [Y]our verdict must be a unanimous verdict. All 12 of the jurors must agree unanimously on the appropriate verdict. Once you have made such a finding, again you would notify my bailiff with respect to that. All 12 jurors have to sign the verdict form.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 604 F. Supp. 2d 1003 - Sheppard v. Bagley