¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: February 21, 2023
¶4 S22A1166. NORRIS v. THE STATE.
¶5 BOGGS, Chief Justice.
¶6 Appellant Jaquest Deeric Norris challenges his 2018
¶7convictions for felony murder and cruelty to children in the first
¶8degree in connection with the beating death of a child, eight-month-
¶9old Monte Jones.1 Appellant contends that the evidence was legally
¶10 1The crimes occurred on November 9, 2015. On February 26, 2016, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, three counts of felony murder, one count of cruelty to children in the first degree for causing blunt force trauma to the head, one count of cruelty to children in the first degree for causing blunt force trauma to the leg, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and aggravated sexual battery. At a trial from February 26 to March 1, 2018, the jury found him guilty of three counts of felony murder, cruelty to children in the first degree for causing blunt force trauma to the head, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault. The jury acquitted Appellant of malice murder and the other count of cruelty to children in the first degree, and the aggravated sexual battery count was dead docketed. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison without parole for felony murder predicated on aggravated battery and a concurrent twenty-year sentence for cruelty to children in the first degree. The trial court merged aggravated assault with aggravated battery, merged aggravated battery with felony murder, and vacated the remaining felony murder counts. insufficient to support his convictions. Appellant also contends that
¶11trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by
¶12failing to impeach one of the State’s expert witnesses, Dr. Deborah
¶13Young, with evidence that Monte had two healed fractures in his left
¶14leg after Dr. Young testified that she recalled Monte having only
¶15recent fractures. Because we conclude that the evidence was legally
¶16sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions, and because Appellant
¶17fails to show prejudice from any alleged deficiency in trial counsel’s
¶18 This Court dismissed Appellant’s first appeal on October 19, 2021, because Appellant had not followed the interlocutory appeal procedures, which were required because the dead-docketed count remained pending in the trial court. See Seals v. State, 311 Ga. 739 (860 SE2d 419) (2021). Also on October 19, 2021, the State filed, and the trial court granted, a motion to nolle pros the dead-docketed count. On November 9, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to vacate and reenter the orders denying the motion for new trial and granting the motion to nolle pros the dead-docketed count, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. On November 12, 2021, the trial court vacated both orders and then reentered the order denying the motion for new trial. However, the trial court did not reenter the order granting the motion to nolle pros the dead-docketed count until November 16, 2021. An appeal was docketed for a second time with this Court, but we dismissed that appeal on May 17, 2022, as the order denying the motion for new trial was not legally valid because it was entered while the dead-docketed count remained pending. See Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 466 (796 SE2d 261) (2017); Pounds v. State, 309 Ga. 376, 380 (846 SE2d 48) (2020). On June 13, 2022, the trial court vacated its order denying the motion for a new trial and reentered the order on June 14, 2022. The case was docketed in this Court to the August 2022 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
¶19 2 actions, we affirm.
¶20 1. Although the Attorney General raises a question regarding
¶21the Court’s jurisdiction to hear this appeal, we have previously
¶22decided that issue. In dismissing Appellant’s second appeal, this
¶23Court’s order stated that “[i]f, upon the return of remittitur, the trial
¶24court enters an order denying the appellant’s motion for new trial,
¶25the judgment of conviction will stand, and the previously filed notice
¶26of appeal will ripen.” Order at 2, Norris v. State, Case No. S22A0797
¶27(May 17, 2022). Under the law-of-the-case rule, the Court’s prior
¶28determination is binding here. See OCGA § 9-11-60 (h).
¶29 2. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
¶30evidence presented at trial showed the following. In early October
¶312015, Appellant began staying at his mother’s home in the Deerfield
¶32Garden Apartments in Fulton County with his two children and five
¶33siblings. His mother lived downstairs from the home of Jasmine
¶34Jones and her three children, including Monte. Shortly after his
¶35arrival, Appellant and Jasmine struck up a relationship, and
¶36Appellant and his children occasionally began staying overnight at
¶37 3 Jasmine’s apartment.
¶38 On the night of November 8, 2015, Tracie Bryant, who lived in
¶39the unit across the hall from Jasmine, took her daughter to
¶40Jasmine’s apartment and stayed there for 30 to 40 minutes. During
¶41the visit, Monte laughed and did not appear to be in any pain. At
¶42around 7:00 a.m. on the morning of November 9, Appellant went to
¶43Jasmine’s apartment and fell asleep in bed with her and Monte. At
¶44around 8:00 a.m., Appellant woke to the sound of Jasmine panicking
¶45about an eviction notice that she found on her door. Appellant went
¶46downstairs to talk with his mother about the notice, then returned
¶47to Jasmine’s apartment and went back to sleep. At around 10:00
¶48a.m., Jasmine awakened Appellant to tell him she was going to work
¶49and leaving her children with him. Appellant fell back asleep in the
¶50bed with Monte, and Jasmine went to her job at a CVS Pharmacy
¶51about 18 miles away. CVS computer logs and surveillance footage
¶52confirmed that Jasmine started work at 10:21 a.m. and took a lunch
¶53break between 12:40 and 1:15 p.m.
¶54 At around 2:40 p.m., Appellant brought an unresponsive Monte
¶55 4 downstairs and told Daeshonn Norris, Appellant’s sister, that Monte
¶56had drowned. Although Appellant asked that she not call 911,
¶57Daeshonn called 911 at 2:42 p.m. and told the operator that her
¶58brother said Monte had swallowed water and was not breathing. The
¶59911 operator walked Daeshonn and Appellant through performing
¶60CPR on Monte. Appellant then called Jasmine at work and told her
¶61that Monte had drowned. Emergency services responded to the
¶62scene and took Monte to Children’s Hughes Spalding Hospital. At
¶63the hospital, Monte was intubated to assist with breathing and,
¶64after undergoing a physical examination and a chest x-ray,
¶65transferred to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit at Scottish Rite
¶66Hospital for further treatment. At Scottish Rite, Monte underwent
¶67a CT scan and further x-rays, which revealed skull fractures, rib
¶68fractures, two fractures in his left leg, a fracture in his right leg, a
¶69fracture in his right wrist, and brain swelling. Two days later, on
¶70November 11, Monte was pronounced brain dead and his life support
¶71withdrawn.
¶72 On November 29, Appellant was taken into custody. He waived
¶73 5 his rights under Miranda 2 and gave a video-recorded interview in
¶74which he stated that, after waking up around 1:00 p.m., he
¶75discovered Monte on the bed beside him with a diaper full of feces.
¶76While attempting to clean Monte in the bathtub, Appellant left the
¶77bathroom briefly after hearing a loud noise in the other room, which
¶78turned out to be the other children kicking a door. Appellant claimed
¶79that, upon his return to the bathroom, he found Monte face down in
¶80the tub and that Monte spit up water when Appellant picked him
¶81up.
¶82 At trial, multiple experts opined that Monte’s injuries stemmed
¶83from blunt force trauma rather than drowning. Dr. Deborah Young,
¶84a pediatric emergency room physician who treated Monte at Hughes
¶85Spalding, testified that Monte’s injuries looked like nonaccidental
¶86trauma, based on a physical examination and chest x-ray. Dr. Young
¶87also testified that after reviewing the CT scan and x-rays performed
¶88on Monte at Scottish Rite, she recalled only recent—less than two-
¶89week-old—fractures among his injuries. Likewise, Dr. Tamika
¶90 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). 6 Bryant, a child abuse pediatrician who examined Monte at Scottish
¶91Rite, testified that Monte had skull fractures and brain swelling
¶92resulting from blunt force trauma.
¶93 Dr. Michael Heninger, the medical examiner who performed an
¶94autopsy on Monte, opined that Monte’s cause of death was blunt
¶95force trauma to the head. In addition, Dr. Heninger testified to the
¶96presence of other injuries indicative of blunt force trauma but that
¶97did not contribute to the cause of death, including rib fractures and
¶98a fractured left tibia and fibula. Dr. Heninger concluded that the leg
¶99fractures and some of the rib fractures occurred at the same time as
¶100the blunt force trauma to the head. However, Dr. Heninger also
¶101noted that some of the rib fractures had signs of healing, meaning
¶102they were older than two weeks, and that Monte had a number of
¶103old, healed scars on his lower back and buttocks that were unusual
¶104for a child of his age. Dr. Heninger testified that injuries as severe
¶105as Monte’s head injuries would normally cause immediate
¶106symptoms and would have caused Monte to stop functioning
¶107immediately.
¶108 7 Jasmine testified that Monte was acting normally when she
¶109left for work. Appellant elected not to testify in his own defense, but
¶110the State played the video recording and entered into evidence a
¶111transcript of his November 29 interview. The defense theory was
¶112that Jasmine was abusive and caused Monte’s injuries before she
¶113left for work. At trial, the defense did not call any witnesses or
¶114introduce into evidence any exhibits. At a motion-for-new-trial
¶115hearing, trial counsel testified, and appellate counsel entered one
¶116exhibit into evidence, a page of Monte’s medical records describing
¶117two healed fractures in his left leg.
¶118 3. Appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient
¶119to support his convictions either as a matter of constitutional due
¶120process under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61
¶121LE2d 560) (1979), or because the circumstantial evidence presented
¶122at trial did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of his
¶123guilt as required by OCGA § 24-14-6. We disagree.
¶124 The proper standard of review for sufficiency of evidence as a
¶125matter of constitutional due process is whether any rational trier of
¶126 8 fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
¶127doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. This Court views the evidence
¶128in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the
¶129jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.”
¶130Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013) (cleaned up).
¶131 Further, “[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence,
¶132the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of
¶133guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that
¶134of the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. The evidence presented
¶135at trial “need not exclude every conceivable inference or
¶136hypothesis—only those that are reasonable.” Merritt v. State, 285
¶137Ga. 778, 779 (683 SE2d 855) (2009). “[W]hether an alternative
¶138hypothesis raised by the defendant is reasonable is a question
¶139committed principally to the jury, and . . . we will not disturb [a
¶140jury’s] finding unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.” Long v.
¶141State, 309 Ga. 721, 726 (848 SE2d 91) (2020) (cleaned up).
¶142 Here, there was sufficient evidence as a matter of
¶143constitutional due process to support Appellant’s convictions for
¶144 9 felony murder and cruelty to children in the first degree. Tracie
¶145Bryant testified that Monte laughed and played the night of
¶146November 8, and Jasmine testified that Monte was acting normally
¶147when she left for work. Further, despite Appellant spending the
¶148night at Jasmine’s apartment, waking up several times, leaving the
¶149apartment at one point and returning, and sleeping in the same bed
¶150as Monte, Appellant never mentioned noticing anything unusual
¶151about Monte before Jasmine left for work. After Jasmine left for
¶152work, computer logs and surveillance footage showed her working at
¶153a CVS 18 miles from her home, with only a 35-minute lunch break,
¶154until Appellant called her that afternoon to claim that Monte had
¶155drowned. Appellant has never disputed that he had sole
¶156responsibility for Monte from the time that Jasmine left for work
¶157until he brought Monte downstairs to Daeshonn for help (though
¶158Appellant asked his sister not to call 911), at which point Monte had
¶159suffered the blunt force trauma to the head that led to his death.
¶160 Although Appellant argues that he told a consistent story that
¶161should be credited over Jasmine’s inconsistent testimony and
¶162 10 supports the reasonable hypothesis that Jasmine caused Monte’s
¶163injuries, the jury was authorized to weigh the credibility of
¶164Appellant and Jasmine in light of the evidence and exclude that
¶165alternative hypothesis. Because the jury’s finding was not
¶166“insupportable as a matter of law,” Long, 309 Ga. at 726, the
¶167evidence also was sufficient under OCGA § 24-14-6 for a rational
¶168trier of fact to have found Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable
¶169doubt of felony murder and cruelty to children in the first degree.
¶170 4. Appellant next contends that trial counsel provided
¶171ineffective assistance by not impeaching Dr. Young with the
¶172evidence of two healed leg fractures potentially predating
¶173Appellant’s arrival in Georgia. Because Appellant cannot show
¶174Strickland prejudice, we disagree.
¶175 To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
¶176Appellant must show both that “his counsel’s performance was
¶177professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.”
¶178Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (873 SE2d 132) (2022) (citing
¶179Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d
¶180 11 674) (1984)). To prove that his lawyer’s performance was
¶181professionally deficient, an appellant “must demonstrate that the
¶182lawyer performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way,
¶183considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing
¶184professional norms.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 182-183 (787 SE2d
¶185221) (2016). To prove prejudice, Appellant must show “a reasonable
¶186probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
¶187of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 183. A
¶188reasonable probability is one that is “sufficient to undermine
¶189confidence in the [trial’s] outcome.” Neal v. State, 313 Ga. 746, 751
¶190(873 SE2d 209) (2022). If an appellant “fails to make a sufficient
¶191showing on one part of the Strickland test, we need not address the
¶192other part.” Washington, 313 Ga. at 773.
¶193 Pretermitting whether trial counsel acted deficiently in failing
¶194to impeach Dr. Young with evidence of the healed leg fractures,
¶195Appellant fails to show the required prejudice. Dr. Heninger
¶196testified extensively as to the type, extent, and timing of Monte’s
¶197injuries, including newer fractures in Monte’s left leg. Dr. Heninger
¶198 12 also testified to older injuries, namely rib fractures and unusual
¶199scars on Monte’s back and buttocks, both of which predated
¶200November 9. However, Dr. Heninger concluded that blunt force
¶201trauma to the head caused Monte’s death. Thus, evidence that
¶202Appellant did not cause any of the injuries to Monte’s legs would not
¶203necessarily disprove that Appellant caused Monte’s death. Indeed,
¶204the jury did acquit Appellant of cruelty to children in the first degree
¶205by causing blunt force trauma to the leg. Additionally, although
¶206Appellant argues that leg fractures older than two weeks would
¶207support the broader theory that Jasmine abused Monte, Appellant
¶208arrived in Georgia in early October, more than two weeks prior to
¶209November 9, and had the opportunity to cause the leg fractures. The
¶210mere assertion that Jasmine caused Monte’s healed leg fractures is
¶211therefore not “sufficient to undermine confidence in the [trial’s]
¶212outcome.” Neal, 313 Ga. at 751. Appellant’s claim of ineffective
¶213assistance of counsel also fails.
¶214 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶215 13