¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: April 18, 2023
¶4 S23A0340. MARTIN v. THE STATE.
¶5 BOGGS, Chief Justice.
¶6 Appellant Anthony Jerry Martin challenges his 2015
¶7convictions for felony murder and a firearm offense in connection
¶8with the shooting death of Marlon Underwood. Appellant’s sole
¶9enumeration of error is that the evidence presented at trial was
¶10legally insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of
¶11constitutional due process and Georgia statutory law. However, as
¶12explained below, when properly viewed in the light most favorable
¶13to the jury’s verdicts, the evidence was sufficient to support
¶14Appellant’s convictions. Accordingly, we affirm. 1
¶15 Underwood was killed on October 4, 2015. On July 5, 2017, a Chatham 1
¶16County grand jury indicted Appellant and a co-defendant, Mylek Anthony Bigham, for malice murder, three counts of felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault with intent to rob, possession of a 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
¶17evidence at trial showed the following. On October 3, 2015, at
¶18around 6:00 p.m., Appellant used his cell phone to take three
¶19photographs of himself wearing a brightly colored shirt with a
¶20distinctive pattern. Later that evening, Appellant saved
¶21Underwood’s cell phone number in his cell phone under the name
¶22firearm by a convicted felon, and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. At a trial from March 5 to 9, 2018, the jury acquitted Bigham of all charges. The jury also acquitted Appellant of malice murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, felony murder based on the felonin-possession charge, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon but found him guilty of the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder based on aggravated assault with intent to rob and a consecutive term of five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of felony murder. The court also erroneously sentenced Appellant for felony murder based on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault with intent to rob, and the other two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended with new counsel on August 24, 2022. On September 13, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. On October 3, 2022, the court entered an order resentencing Appellant, this time not as a recidivist, to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder based on aggravated assault with intent to rob and a term of five years consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The court vacated the other felony murder count on which the jury found Appellant guilty, merged the count of aggravated assault with intent to rob and the two other counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and otherwise denied Appellant’s motion for new trial. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2022 and submitted for decision on the briefs.
¶23 2 “Lick,” a slang term for the target of a robbery. The next day,
¶24between 5:11 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., Appellant exchanged a series of
¶25text messages and cell phone calls with Underwood in which he
¶26arranged to meet Underwood at a gas station and convenience store
¶27in Savannah, ostensibly to buy marijuana. Underwood said that he
¶28was driving a “red jeep,” and Appellant said that he was in a black
¶29Altima.
¶30 At 7:12 p.m., Underwood backed his red SUV into a parking
¶31space near the entrance to the convenience store beside a white
¶32Honda. Underwood opened the front driver-side door but remained
¶33in the SUV with the lights on and the engine running. Appellant and
¶34another man approached, and Underwood produced a digital scale
¶35and several grapefruit-sized baggies of marijuana. A struggle over
¶36the marijuana ensued in which two of the baggies fell under the
¶37white Honda, at least one baggie was torn open and marijuana was
¶38strewn into the parking lot, and Appellant dropped his cell phone.
¶39Surveillance video from inside and outside the convenience store
¶40captured part of the struggle as the three men moved from between
¶41 3 the SUV and the white Honda towards the store window and then
¶42the entrance to the store. In the video, Appellant is wearing the
¶43same brightly colored shirt with the distinctive pattern that he had
¶44on when he took the three photographs of himself on his cell phone
¶45a little more than 24 hours earlier.
¶46 At 7:13 p.m., the man with Appellant fired a .22-caliber pistol
¶47at Underwood, striking him once in the left side of the chest and
¶48hitting the rear driver-side door of the SUV. Appellant and the man
¶49with him then fled the scene as Underwood stumbled through the
¶50parking lot to the door of the convenience store, dropped his cell
¶51phone, and collapsed. Responding officers arrived within a minute
¶52or two of the shooting, and Underwood was taken to a nearby
¶53hospital, where he died from the gunshot wound to his chest. No
¶54firearms were found at the scene or otherwise.
¶55 At trial, Appellant elected not to testify in his own defense and
¶56called no witnesses. His defense theory was that the police did not
¶57do a thorough investigation, that the evidence failed to show that he
¶58was present at the shooting, and that even if the evidence showed
¶59 4 that he was present, it did not show what his role in the incident
¶60was.
¶61 2. Appellant’s sole enumeration of error is that the evidence
¶62was insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of
¶63constitutional due process and OCGA § 24-14-6. We disagree.
¶64 The proper standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence as
¶65a matter of constitutional due process is whether any rational trier
¶66of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
¶67doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61
¶68LE2d 560) (1979). This Court views the evidence in the “light most
¶69favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury’s assessment of
¶70the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Hayes v. State, 292 Ga.
¶71506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013) (citation omitted).
¶72 Appellant’s cell phone, which was recovered at the scene of the
¶73shooting, contained several self-taken photographs, or “selfies,” of
¶74Appellant wearing a brightly colored shirt with a distinctive pattern
¶75a little more than 24 hours before the shooting, and the surveillance
¶76video showed a man wearing the same shirt and another man
¶77 5 struggling with Underwood moments before the shooting, although
¶78it did not capture the actual shooting. Data from Appellant’s and
¶79Underwood’s cell phones showed that they were communicating in
¶80the time leading up to the shooting, including through text messages
¶81referring to an upcoming meeting. The day before the shooting,
¶82Appellant saved Underwood’s cell phone number in his cell phone
¶83under the name “Lick,” a term that law enforcement officers testified
¶84was a slang term for the target of a robbery. And responding officers,
¶85who arrived within a minute or two of the shooting, found a digital
¶86scale and a large amount of marijuana at the scene. Viewed in the
¶87light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, this evidence was
¶88sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to authorize a
¶89rational trier of fact to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable
¶90doubt as a party to the crimes of felony murder and possession of a
¶91firearm during the commission of a felony. See Jackson, 433 U.S. at
¶92319. See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (defining parties to a crime).
¶93 Appellant’s reliance on OCGA § 24-14-6 is unavailing. That
¶94statute says that “[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial
¶95 6 evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the
¶96hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable
¶97hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” “The
¶98reasonableness of an alternative hypothesis raised by a defendant is
¶99a question principally for the jury.” See Cochran v. State, 305 Ga.
¶100827, 829 (828 SE2d 338) (2019).
¶101 Appellant claims that the evidence against him was wholly
¶102circumstantial and puts forward the alternative hypothesis that
¶103Underwood was armed, the aggressor, and the one attempting a
¶104robbery. But even assuming (without deciding) that the case against
¶105Appellant was wholly circumstantial, the jury was authorized to
¶106reject Appellant’s alternative hypothesis as unreasonable based on
¶107the evidence, which showed that no firearms were found at the
¶108scene, and that Appellant arranged the meeting and saved
¶109Underwood’s cell phone number in his cell phone under the name
¶110“Lick.” Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
¶111evidence as a matter of constitutional due process and Georgia
¶112statutory law fails.
¶113 7 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶114 8