¶1dissenting:
¶2I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision. I believe that the trial court’s ruling granting defendant’s petition to rescind the suspension of his driver’s license was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶3Contrary to the majority, I do not read Engelbrecht as applying a bright-line test to determine whether rescission is an appropriate remedy. This court in Engelbrecht held that, “under the facts of this case, defendant made a prima facie case for rescission of summary suspension. We believe that the warning in issue, by materially misstating the consequences of refusal to submit to the requested test, did not comply with the requirements of section 11 — 501.1(c) of the Code.” (Emphasis added.) 225 Ill. App. 3d at 554. This court held that, once the defendant made his prima facie case, the trial court could weigh the evidence to decide whether the prima facie case had been negated. Engelbrecht, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 554-55. We further noted that the defendant had requested that we order the trial court to grant the defendant’s petition to rescind the suspension, but we held that we could not do so “at this stage of the proceeding” because the State was entitled to put on evidence against the petition. Engelbrecht, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 557. We therefore remanded the cause for a hearing on whether the defendant had been properly warned. Engelbrecht, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 557.
¶4Based upon Engelbrecht, I would find that, although the defendant in this case may have made a prima facie case that the warning he received was not objectively accurate, the evidence established that the defendant’s prima facie case had been negated. Here, the inaccuracies in the warning received by defendant did not materially affect the defendant. I note that, in Engelbrecht, the inaccuracies at issue did affect the defendant, but this court nonetheless declined to order the trial court to grant defendant’s petition to rescind without affording the State an opportunity to put on evidence against the defendant’s petition. Consequently, I do not believe that this court intended the decision in Engelbrecht to establish a bright-line test.
¶5In finding that Engelbrecht did not establish a bright-line test, I also disagree with the majority that this court should follow the reasoning of the court in Estrada and should decline to follow the decision in Diestelhorst. I believe a holding requiring a defendant to show that he was prejudiced as a result of inaccurate warnings reflects the intent of the legislature in enacting the implied consent statute (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.1 (West 1998)). In fact, our supreme court has stated that the “implied-consent statute, being remedial in nature, should be liberally construed to accomplish [the] goal [of making the highways safer from drivers impaired by drugs or alcohol].” People v. Wegielnik, 152 111. 2d 418, 425 (1992). A bright-line test is at odds with the liberal construction of the implied consent statute. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s decision.