concurrence">Finney, Justice,

concurring:

I agree the circuit court properly denied petitioner’s application for postconviction relief (PCR) but write separately because I disagree with the majority opinion’s methodology.

Petitioner’s first PCR application was disposed of prior to our decision in Brown v. State, 306 S.C. 381, 412 S.E. (2d) 399 (1991). After Brownwas decided, petitioner filed this action claiming Brownwas a change in the law entitling him to maintain a successive PCR application. Since I believe Brownwas wrongly decided, I would simply overrule it. This decision renders moot the change in the law issue.

The general rule is that while there is no obligation to inform a guilty plea defendant of the collateral consequences of his plea, once one undertakes to give such advice, and that advice'is a basis for the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, it must be correct. E.g., Hinson v. State, 297 S.C. 456, 377 S.E. (2d) 338 (1989). Brownrepresents an unwarranted deviation from this rule in that it holds misadvice from the trial judge at a plea proceeding automatically invalidates the plea, without regard to whether that misadvice or misstatement in any way influenced the defendant’s decision to plead. In my opinion, Brownshould be overruled and the denial of petitioner’s successive PCR application affirmed.

Citation profile

Relationships

How this case has been treated — in progress