¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: September 6, 2023
¶4 S23A0699. KUHLMAN v. THE STATE.
¶5 ELLINGTON, Justice.
¶6 After the Georgia Board of Public Safety (“the Board”) denied
¶7Rick Allen Kuhlman’s application for relief from the prohibition on
¶8the possession of firearms by convicted felons in OCGA § 16-11-131,
¶9Kuhlman sued the State of Georgia in the Superior Court of Fulton
¶10County, seeking a declaratory judgment “that he qualifies for relief”
¶11from that prohibition pursuant to subsection (d) of the statute. His
¶12complaint, as amended, also included claims that the statute, as
¶13applied to him, violated his right to bear arms under the Second
¶14Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
¶15I, Paragraph VIII of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. The superior
¶16court granted summary judgment to the State on all claims. In its
¶17order, the court ruled that Kuhlman’s statutory claim was barred by sovereign immunity, that he could not maintain his federal
¶18constitutional claim, and that OCGA § 16-11-131 did not violate the
¶19state constitution. Nevertheless, the superior court went on to rule
¶20in the alternative on the merits of Kuhlman’s statutory claim, but it
¶21failed to reach the merits of his federal constitutional claim. For the
¶22reasons set forth below, we reverse the portion of the superior court’s
¶23judgment that is based on sovereign immunity, we affirm the court’s
¶24alternative ruling on the merits of Kuhlman’s statutory claim, we
¶25vacate the portion of the judgment that relates to Kuhlman’s
¶26constitutional claims, and we remand the case to the superior court
¶27for reconsideration of Kuhlman’s constitutional claims consistent
¶28with this opinion.
¶29 1. In 2011, Kuhlman pled guilty in federal court to one count of
¶30health care fraud under 18 USC § 1347. In 2014, he was sentenced
¶31to 30 months in prison followed by three years of extended
¶32supervision that was terminated early in February 2019. In 2021,
¶33Kuhlman applied to the Board for relief pursuant to subsection (d)
¶34of OCGA § 16-11-131. Under that subsection, a person who has been
¶35 2 convicted of a “felony pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade
¶36practices, or restraint of trade” may apply to the Board for “relief
¶37from the disabilities imposed by this Code section.” OCGA § 16-11-
¶38131 (d). 1 See also Ferguson v. Perry, 292 Ga. 666, 673 (2) (c) (740
¶39SE2d 598) (2013) (recognizing that “when a citizen is precluded by
¶40law from possessing firearms as a consequence of his felony
¶41conviction, he suffers a ‘disability imposed by law,’” that “the
¶42Georgia statutes that prohibit convicted felons . . . from possessing
¶43firearms . . . are disabilities imposed by state law,” and that “in
¶44OCGA § 16-11-131 the General Assembly described statutory
¶45prohibitions against possessing firearms in just these terms”). The
¶46 1 More fully, the relevant part of OCGA § 16-11-131 (d) provides:
¶47 A person who has been convicted under federal or state law of a felony pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade shall, upon presenting to the Board of Public Safety proof, and it being established from said proof, submitted by the applicant to the satisfaction of the Board of Public Safety that the circumstances regarding the conviction and the applicant’s record and reputation are such that the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms by the person would not present a threat to the safety of the citizens of Georgia and that the granting of the relief sought would not be contrary to the public interest, be granted relief from the disabilities imposed by this Code section. 3 Board denied Kuhlman’s application, “determin[ing] that [his]
¶48application for [relief from] [d]isabilities pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-
¶49131 does not qualify for the relief sought.”
¶50 A week later, Kuhlman filed his action for declaratory relief,
¶51seeking a declaration that his “conviction pertained to antitrust
¶52violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade and therefore
¶53qualifies for relief under OCGA § 16-11-131 (d).” The superior court
¶54denied the State’s motion to dismiss Kuhlman’s complaint, and
¶55Kuhlman amended his complaint to also seek declarations that
¶56“OCGA § 16-11-131 is unconstitutional as applied to him to the
¶57extent it prohibits his possession of firearms,” under both the Second
¶58Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
¶59I, Paragraph VIII of the Georgia Constitution of 1983.
¶60 In its order granting the State’s motion for summary judgment,
¶61the superior court ruled that “[s]overeign immunity bars
¶62[Kuhlman’s] claim for a declaration as to the nature of his
¶63conviction”; that “[e]ven if not barred by sovereign immunity,
¶64[Kuhlman] is not entitled to a declaration that his conviction
¶65 4 qualifies for relief pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-131 (d)”; that
¶66Kuhlman’s “federal claim cannot be maintained because the State of
¶67Georgia is not a person for purposes of 42 USC § 1983”; and that
¶68“OCGA § 16-11-131 does not violate the Georgia Constitution.” This
¶69Court granted Kuhlman’s application for discretionary appeal to
¶70consider whether the superior court erred when it ruled that,
¶71because “[f]ederal constitutional claims, whether in federal or state
¶72courts, are necessarily brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983” and a
¶73state is not a “person” subject to suit under that statute, Kuhlman
¶74“cannot maintain his federal constitutional claim against the State
¶75of Georgia.”
¶76 2. We turn first to Kuhlman’s contention that the superior
¶77court erred by ruling that sovereign immunity barred his statutory
¶78claim. 2 Article I, Section II, Paragraph V (b) (1) of the Georgia
¶79 2 Although our order granting Kuhlman’s application for discretionary
¶80appeal identified only one specific claim of error with which we were “particularly concerned,” we did not direct the parties to file briefs on that issue only and, therefore, “we have not limited the scope of the discretionary review more narrowly than the enumeration of errors in the application.” Zekser v. Zekser, 293 Ga. 366, 369 (2) n.13 (744 SE2d 698) (2013) (“When we do limit the
¶81 5 Constitution of 1983 waives sovereign immunity for certain actions
¶82seeking declaratory relief for alleged “acts” of state boards (as well
¶83as many other types of governmental entities, officials, and
¶84employees) that are “outside the scope of lawful authority or in
¶85violation of the laws or the Constitution of this state or the
¶86Constitution of the United States.” 3 In this case, Kuhlman claims
¶87scope of review more narrowly, we do so explicitly.”). We first address sovereign immunity because its applicability “is a threshold determination, and, if it does apply, a court lacks jurisdiction over the case and, concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the merits of a claim that is barred.” McConnell v. Dept. of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 19 (805 SE2d 79) (2017). See also Polo Golf & Country Club Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Cunard, 306 Ga. 788, 790 (1) (a) (833 SE2d 505) (2019) (“Sovereign immunity . . . must be ruled upon prior to the case moving forward on the more substantive matters.” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, the superior court properly addressed sovereign immunity first and then proceeded to make an alternative ruling on the merits of Kuhlman’s statutory claim. See Department of Labor v. McConnell, 305 Ga. 812 (828 SE2d 352) (2019) (affirming the Court of Appeals’ holdings on remand that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on sovereign immunity grounds but that the trial court correctly ruled in the alternative that the complaint failed to state a claim). 3 In full, subparagraph (b) (1) provides:
¶88 Sovereign immunity is hereby waived for actions in the superior court seeking declaratory relief from acts of the state or any agency, authority, branch, board, bureau, commission, department, office, or public corporation of this state or officer or employee thereof or any county, consolidated government, or municipality of this state or officer or employee thereof outside the scope of lawful authority or in violation of the laws or the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States. Sovereign immunity is further waived so that a court awarding
¶89 6 that the Board’s “act” of denying his application for relief under
¶90OCGA § 16-11-131 (d) was “in violation of” the following: the laws of
¶91this State – OCGA § 16-11-131 (d); the Constitution of this State –
¶92Article I, Section I, Paragraph VIII; and the Constitution of the
¶93United States – the Second Amendment. The first of these claims
¶94seeks a declaration that the Board’s decision that Kuhlman failed to
¶95qualify for relief was contrary to the law, specifically that his felony
¶96conviction pertained to “antitrust violations, unfair trade practices,
¶97or restraint of trade” and consequently qualifies for relief under
¶98OCGA § 16-11-131 (d).4 For this reason, Kuhlman’s statutory claim
¶99 declaratory relief pursuant to this Paragraph may, only after awarding declaratory relief, enjoin such acts to enforce its judgment. Such waiver of sovereign immunity under this Paragraph shall apply to past, current, and prospective acts which occur on or after January 1, 2021. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V (b) (1). Subparagraph V (b) (2) of Article I, Section II specifies that actions covered by this subparagraph and based on acts of the State, state boards, or several other types of state entities, officers, or employees “shall be brought exclusively against the state and in the name of the State of Georgia.” 4 We recognize that such a declaration, standing alone, would not entitle
¶100Kuhlman to relief under the statute. The Board still would have to be satisfied from proof submitted by Kuhlman that under the circumstances, his “acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms . . . would not present a threat to the safety of the citizens of Georgia and that the granting of the relief sought would not be contrary to the public interest.”
¶101 7 is a claim that the Board’s act of denying his application was “in
¶102violation of the laws . . . of this state,” and that claim therefore comes
¶103within the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity in Article I,
¶104Section II, Paragraph V (b) (1).5 Accordingly, the portion of the
¶105superior court’s judgment based on sovereign immunity must be
¶106reversed.
¶107 3. Having made the necessary threshold determination that
¶108sovereign immunity does not bar Kuhlman’s statutory claim, we
¶109OCGA § 16-11-131 (d). But if Kuhlman’s first request for declaratory relief were granted, it would show that he has satisfied one of the criteria for obtaining relief from the Board under the operative statutory provision. 5 No party disputes, and we agree, that the federal and state
¶110constitutional violations Kuhlman alleges come within this constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity. As the superior court recognized in that regard, “the above waiver of immunity applies to [Kuhlman’s] request for declarations that OCGA § 16-11-131 is unconstitutional under both the United States and Georgia Constitutions.” And because Kuhlman’s statutory claim also comes within the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity, we need not decide in this case whether, or the extent to which, sovereign immunity is waived under Article I, Section II, Paragraph V (b) (1) of the Georgia Constitution when an action includes some claims that meet the conditions set out in that subparagraph and others that do not. Cf. State v. SASS Group, LLC, 315 Ga. 893, 904 (II) (d) (885 SE2d 761) (2023) (holding that “if a lawsuit is filed against the State pursuant to Paragraph V and that suit includes an independent claim against another party not specified in that paragraph’s waiver provision, then the entire lawsuit must be dismissed”). 8 next consider the superior court’s ruling on the merits of that claim.6
¶111In the absence of any Georgia case law construing OCGA § 16-11-
¶112131 (d), the superior court looked to federal case law interpreting a
¶113broader exclusion from the federal statutory law that prohibits
¶114felons from possessing firearms. Kuhlman argues only that his
¶115conviction for health care fraud meets the test used in federal case
¶116law for determining whether a crime comes within the federal
¶117exclusion.
¶118 When interpreting a Georgia statute, federal court decisions
¶119construing a federal statute or rule have persuasive value only to
¶120the extent that the language and context of the Georgia statute at
¶121issue are materially similar to the federal statute or rule. See
¶122 6 The superior court properly made an alternative ruling on the merits
¶123of Kuhlman’s statutory claim before addressing his constitutional claims, and we similarly reach the statutory issue before the constitutional claims. See Cottrell v. Smith, 299 Ga. 517, 520 (I) (A) (788 SE2d 772) (2016) (stating that “a trial court should first resolve other questions regarding a statute before addressing an issue of constitutionality,” and adding that “it is well-settled that this Court will not decide a constitutional question if the decision in the appeal can be made upon other grounds”). See also State v. Randall, 315 Ga. 198, 200 (1) (880 SE2d 134) (2022) (“[I]nquiry into the constitutionality of a statute generally should not be made by the trial courts if a decision on the merits can be reached without doing so.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 9 General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan, 313 Ga. 811, 821 (2) (c) (874 SE2d
¶12452) (2022) (“[W]here the language of a Georgia statute deviates from
¶125the federal rules [of evidence], the persuasive value of the authority
¶126interpreting and applying the federal rules is diminished.”); Stubbs
¶127v. Hall, 308 Ga. 354, 358 (3) (a) (840 SE2d 407) (2020) (“In
¶128construing a Georgia statute that closely tracks federal statutory
¶129law, we may look to federal court decisions and commentary
¶130interpreting the federal statute as persuasive authority.” (citation
¶131and punctuation omitted)); Community & Southern Bank v. Lovell,
¶132302 Ga. 375, 377 (2) n.6 (807 SE2d 444) (2017) (“[A]lthough there
¶133are some differences between the state and federal provisions, those
¶134differences are not material to the question presented here. We may,
¶135therefore, look for guidance in decisions of the federal courts.”). See
¶136also Buckner-Webb v. State, 314 Ga. 823, 834 (878 SE2d 481) (2022)
¶137(Pinson, J., concurring) (“[W]hen we need to figure out the meaning
¶138of Georgia law, decisions of federal courts . . . are helpful ‘only to the
¶139extent that [those] decisions actually were guided by the same
¶140language, history, and context’ of the Georgia law in question. When
¶141 10 we rely on such federal decisions without making sure the relevant
¶142text and context match up, we risk giving an ‘interpretation’ of
¶143Georgia law that is arbitrary, wrong, or both.” (quoting Elliott v.
¶144State, 305 Ga. 179, 188 (II) (C) (824 SE2d 265) (2019))).
¶145 The federal statute that contains language similar to OCGA §
¶14616-11-131 (d) was part of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and, as
¶147originally enacted, excluded the following from the felonies that
¶148disqualified convicted persons from acquiring or possessing
¶149firearms: “Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust
¶150violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other
¶151similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices as
¶152the Secretary [of the Treasury] may by regulation designate.” Pub.
¶153L. No. 90-618, § 921 (a) (20) (A), 82 Stat. 1213, 1216 (1968). See also
¶154Reyes v. Sessions, 342 FSupp.3d 141, 143 (I) (D.D.C. 2018)
¶155(recounting and explaining the history of that provision).
¶156“Ultimately, the Secretary never designated any ‘similar offenses’ as
¶157excluded, and in 1986 Congress eliminated from the definition the
¶158phrase, ‘as the Secretary may by regulation designate[.]’” Reyes, 342
¶159 11 FSupp.3d at 143 (I). Thus, since 1986, the federal statute has
¶160excluded those “Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust
¶161violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other
¶162similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices[.]”
¶16318 USC § 921. Georgia has never enacted the federal “similar
¶164offenses” or “business practices” exclusion. Instead, the General
¶165Assembly in 1983 adopted only part of the language in the federal
¶166statute so as to exclude only those felonies “pertaining to antitrust
¶167violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade,” and did not
¶168add “similar offenses” or other proscribed “business practices.” Ga.
¶169L. 1983, p. 945, § 1.
¶170 Very few federal courts have construed the language of the
¶171similar federal statute, and every United States Court of Appeals
¶172that has done so since the 1986 amendment has not considered in
¶173isolation the language shared by the Georgia statute, but has
¶174invariably construed the “similar offenses”/“business practices”
¶175 12 exclusion that is absent from the Georgia statute.7 See United States
¶176v. Miller, 678 F3d 649, 651-653 (2) (8th Cir. 2012); United States v.
¶177Coleman, 609 F3d 699, 703-706 (II) (A) (5th Cir. 2010); United States
¶178v. Schultz, 586 F3d 526, 529-530 (II) (A) (1) (7th Cir. 2009); United
¶179States v. Stanko, 491 F3d 408, 413-419 (II) (8th Cir. 2007). See also
¶180Reyes, 342 FSupp.3d at 149-151 (II) (A) (reviewing the analysis in
¶181these federal circuits). Those circuits examine the elements and
¶182sometimes the purpose of the offense at issue to determine whether
¶183it is similar to the enumerated offenses in that it is a commercial
¶184offense that addresses economic harm to competition or consumers.
¶185See Reyes, 342 FSupp.3d at 148 (II). Under that analysis, it is not
¶186necessary to examine whether the offense at issue “pertain[s] to
¶187antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade”
¶188separately from whether the offense is a “similar” one that “relat[es]
¶189to the regulation of business practices.” See, e.g., id. at 151 (II) (A)
¶190n.6 (“[A] separate examination of whether [appellant’s] securities
¶191 7 One United States Court of Appeals considered the federal statute prior
¶192to the 1986 amendment. See United States v. Meldish, 722 F2d 26, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1983). 13 offenses are ‘unfair trade practices’ is unnecessary.”). Under Georgia
¶193law, however, not only is such a separate examination of the former
¶194necessary, any consideration of whether the offense at issue is
¶195similar or generally related to regulation of business practices is
¶196simply not relevant at any point in an analysis of the pertinent
¶197exclusion in OCGA § 16-11-131 (d). Yet Kuhlman does not
¶198acknowledge any difference between the federal and state statutes,
¶199nor does he attempt a separate examination of whether the health
¶200care fraud for which he was convicted pertains specifically to
¶201antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade.
¶202 Kuhlman makes no argument that his healthcare fraud
¶203conviction is an offense that pertains to any of these three specific
¶204categories. Instead, he only applies the federal courts’ test for 18
¶205USC § 921, and contends that his crime was a “commercial crime[ ]”
¶206that violated a statute “designed to prevent an adverse economic
¶207effect on competition or consumers.” Reyes, 342 FSupp.3d at 148 (II)
¶208(quoting Coleman, 609 F3d at 708 (II) (B); punctuation omitted). But
¶209as we just explained above, that federal test is directed at
¶210 14 determining whether an offense is a “similar offense[ ] relating to
¶211the regulation of business practices,” not whether the offense falls
¶212within one of the three categories specified by our statute. So even
¶213if his conviction met that test, that would not show whether his
¶214conviction falls within one of the three specific categories set out in
¶215our statute. Absent any argument that his conviction falls within
¶216any of those specific categories in the Georgia statute, Kuhlman may
¶217not receive his requested declaratory relief on this claim.
¶218Accordingly, the superior court’s alternative ruling that rejected
¶219Kuhlman’s statutory claim on the merits must be affirmed.
¶220 4. Because Kuhlman has not prevailed on his statutory claim,
¶221we must proceed to his constitutional claims. Although the superior
¶222court did rule on the merits of Kuhlman’s state constitutional claim,
¶223the court erred in concluding that it could not reach the merits of
¶224Kuhlman’s federal constitutional claim.
¶225 Kuhlman contends that the superior court erred because it
¶226effectively ruled that 42 USC § 1983 preempts all state-law
¶227remedies for violations of the United States Constitution. Indeed,
¶228 15 that does appear to be the import of the superior court’s ruling that
¶229“[f]ederal constitutional claims, whether in federal or state courts,
¶230are necessarily brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983.”
¶231 But the State has conceded in its appellate brief, as well as in
¶232oral argument, that “§ 1983 does not preclude state causes of action
¶233for violations of federal constitution[al] rights.” (Emphasis omitted.)
¶234And the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that “the
¶235§ 1983 remedy is, in all events, supplementary to any remedy any
¶236State might have.” Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion County v.
¶237Talevski, 599 U. S. ___, ___ (II) (B) (1) (143 SCt 1444, 1453, 216 LE2d
¶238183) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Zinermon v.
¶239Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 124 (110 SCt 975, 108 LE2d 100) (1990)
¶240(explaining that section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of civil
¶241rights where state law is inadequate or not available in practice).
¶242Where a section 1983 claim has not been alleged or is not viable
¶243because the defendant is the State or a State board and therefore
¶244not a “person” against whom a section 1983 claim will lie, a plaintiff
¶245nevertheless is entitled to seek enforcement of his constitutional
¶246 16 rights to the extent of an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity if
¶247the State has authorized the remedy sought. See State Bd. of Ed. v.
¶248Drury, 263 Ga. 429, 433-434 (2), (3) (437 SE2d 290) (1993) (holding
¶249that where a section 1983 claim was neither alleged nor viable,
¶250plaintiffs in that case had no right to bring an action for damages
¶251that the State had not authorized and for which sovereign immunity
¶252had not been waived, and plaintiffs instead were relegated to a
¶253declaratory judgment action as authorized by the Administrative
¶254Procedures Act).
¶255 In this case, Kuhlman did not mention section 1983 in his
¶256amended complaint, but he expressly sought a declaratory
¶257judgment. Under a plain reading of that complaint, 8 construed in
¶258Kuhlman’s favor as required, the superior court could not have
¶259reasonably concluded that it was brought under section 1983,
¶260especially given that theory of recovery would not have been viable.
¶261 8 The Civil Practice Act provides that, on motion for summary judgment,
¶262although the non-movant “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,” OCGA § 9-11-56 (e), the pleadings nevertheless must be examined, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), (d). 17 See Lynch v. Waters, 256 Ga. 389, 391 (349 SE2d 456) (1986) (on
¶263motion for summary judgment, both “the evidence and pleadings
¶264will be construed in favor of the non-moving party”). To the contrary,
¶265a theory of recovery based on general state law regarding
¶266declaratory judgment actions can be reasonably and fairly drawn
¶267from Kuhlman’s amended complaint. See City of Rome v. Turk, 235
¶268Ga. 223, 225 (1) (219 SE2d 97) (1975) (“Under the Civil Practice Act
¶269a complaint is to be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff
¶270and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn are to be construed
¶271in plaintiff’s favor, and in a motion for summary judgment this same
¶272preference is to be given to the party opposing the motion.” (citation
¶273omitted)).
¶274 OCGA § 9-4-2 created a cause of action for declaratory relief.
¶275See also OCGA § 9-4-3 (referring to “a cause of action for declaratory
¶276relief”); Lathrop v. State, 301 Ga. 408, 431 (III) (B) (801 SE2d 867)
¶277(2017) (observing that the remedy of an “action for declaratory relief”
¶278was not “recognized in Georgia until the enactment of the
¶279Declaratory Judgment Act[, OCGA § 9-4-1 et seq.,] in 1945”). And in
¶280 18 general, declaratory judgment actions that seek review of the
¶281constitutionality of Georgia statutes have been authorized in the
¶282courts of this state, if they are not barred by sovereign immunity or
¶283otherwise unavailable. See Gardei v. Conway, 313 Ga. 132, 138-139
¶284(2) (b) (868 SE2d 775) (2022) (“[A]lthough Georgia does not have a
¶285statutory cause of action like 42 USC § 1983 under which a person
¶286can assert claims under the Georgia Constitution, declaratory
¶287judgment actions for claims asserting the violation of individual
¶288rights are authorized under our State’s Constitution.”); Bd. of
¶289Commrs. of Lowndes County v. Mayor and Council of City of
¶290Valdosta, 309 Ga. 899, 903-904 (2) (b) (848 SE2d 857) (2020)
¶291(collecting cases showing that suits for declaratory and injunctive
¶292relief against state officials in their individual capacities have long
¶293been authorized in Georgia); Women’s Surgical Center, LLC v. Berry,
¶294302 Ga. 349, 350-351 (1) (806 SE2d 606) (2017) (holding that a
¶295declaratory judgment action against state officials was available to
¶296test the validity of an allegedly unconstitutional law because the
¶297plaintiff had standing and was not required to exhaust its
¶298 19 administrative remedies). Now that sovereign immunity no longer
¶299bars properly filed suits against the State seeking declaratory relief
¶300for alleged constitutional violations by “the state or any agency,
¶301authority, branch, board, bureau, commission, department, office, or
¶302public corporation of this state or officer or employee thereof,” an
¶303action against the State for such declaratory relief can be an
¶304appropriate method for seeking review of the constitutionality of
¶305Georgia statutes.9 See Knox v. State of Ga., 316 Ga. 426, 427 (888
¶306SE2d 497) (2023) (“An action against the State of Georgia in the
¶307 9 Of course, an action for declaratory judgment must meet other longstanding requirements for such actions. See Sexual Offender Registration Review Bd. v. Berzett, 301 Ga. 391, 392-393 (801 SE2d 821) (2017) (The Declaratory Judgment Act gives superior courts the power to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party only “in ‘cases of actual controversy’ under OCGA § 9-4-2 (a) and ‘in any civil case in which it appears to the court that the ends of justice require that the declaration should be made.’ OCGA § 9-4-2 (b).” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Fulton County v. City of Atlanta, 299 Ga. 676, 677 (791 SE2d 821) (2016) (“[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act, OCGA § 9-4-1 et seq., authorizes declaratory judgments only to resolve actual and justiciable controversies. See OCGA § 9-4-2 (a), (b).”). See also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. V (b) (3) (“Unless otherwise provided herein, this Paragraph shall not affect the power or duty of a court to dismiss any action or deny relief based on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground or other limitation on judicial review, including, but not limited to, administrative exhaustion requirements, ante litem notice requirements, sanctions for frivolous petitions, standing, statutes of limitation and repose, and venue. . . .”). 20 superior court for a declaratory judgment is the appropriate
¶308litigation mechanism for . . . review” of the constitutionality of
¶309statutes. (citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V (b); OCGA
¶310§§ 9-4-2, 9-4-3)); State v. SASS Group, LLC, 315 Ga. 893, 894 (885
¶311SE2d 761) (2023) (“This new waiver allows citizens to sue the State
¶312. . . for declaratory relief.”). Cf. Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 444 (IV) (holding
¶313that suits against the State for declaratory relief from the
¶314enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional laws are barred unless the
¶315State has consented in the constitution itself or the statutory law).
¶316Consequently, a declaratory judgment action was a proper method
¶317for Kuhlman to seek review of the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-
¶31811-131 as applied to him, and the superior court erred when it failed
¶319to construe Kuhlman’s complaint as properly seeking declaratory
¶320relief against the State based on Georgia law rather than on 42 USC
¶321§ 1983. Accordingly, that part of the superior court’s judgment which
¶322rules Kuhlman cannot maintain his federal constitutional claim
¶323must be vacated.
¶324 Kuhlman also contends that the superior court erred by ruling
¶325 21 that his state constitutional claim fails on the merits under our
¶326decision in Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 501, 503 (3) (299 SE2d 707)
¶327(1983). The holding of Landers squarely forecloses that claim, and
¶328Kuhlman asks us to overrule it. We need not address that argument
¶329at this time. Because the superior court rejected the federal
¶330constitutional claim under its section 1983-based theory, it did not
¶331reach the merits of that federal claim. Now that the superior court
¶332will presumably reach the merits of that claim, it is possible that the
¶333court would decide the claim in Kuhlman’s favor, and if that were
¶334the case, it would avoid the need to reach his state constitutional
¶335claim, and his corresponding argument that Landers should be
¶336overruled. Because we generally do not decide constitutional
¶337questions unnecessarily, see Raffensperger v. Jackson, 316 Ga. 383,
¶338399 (888 SE2d 483) (2023) (“Because we have determined that the
¶339Act is unconstitutional on one of the grounds asserted, we need not
¶340address Plaintiffs’ arguments that the trial court erred in ruling that
¶341the Act does not violate their equal protection rights under the
¶342Georgia Constitution.”), we therefore vacate the superior court’s
¶343 22 decision as to the state constitutional claim and leave it to that court
¶344in the first instance to address Kuhlman’s federal and state
¶345constitutional claims on remand. If the court rejects each of those
¶346claims on their merits, they will be reviewable on appeal.
¶347 Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.
¶348 23