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317 S.C. 260

452 S.E.2d 838

Jordan v. Deese

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Decided January 9, 1995

Supreme Court of South Carolina · decided 1995-01-09

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“1. the institution of continuation of original judicial proceedings, either civil or criminal; 2. by or at the instance of the defendant; 3. termination of such proceedings in the plaintiffs favor; 4. malice in instituting such proceedings; 5. want of probable cause; and 6. resulting injury or damage.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 745 F. Supp. 2d 664 - Zimbelman v. Savage

Applies SC 16 § 16-17-430 · SC 17 § 17-22-10

Relies on Gaar v. N. Myrtle Beach Realty Co., Inc. · Jennings v. Clearwater Mfg. Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1995-01-09

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently January 2019

1 federal appellate · 2 district · 7 state decisions

60199520002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Finney, Justice:

¶1 Appellant contends the trial erred in granting respondents summary judgment in this malicious prosecution action. We affirm.

¶2 Appellant was charged with making harassing phone calls to respondent Deese in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-430 (Supp. 1993). Appellant applied for and, with respondents’ consent, was accepted into a Pre-Trial Intervention (PTI) Program. 1 Appellant was required to pay fees, perform community service, and attend meetings and counseling sessions as part of PTI. Appellant successfully completed the program,’ and the criminal charges were dismissed. He then brought this malicious prosecution action.

¶3 There are six elements which must be proven in a malicious prosecution action:

*262 (1) institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either civil or criminal;
(2) by, or at the instance of, the defendants;
(3) termination of such proceedings in plaintiffs favor;
(4) malice in instituting the proceedings;
(5) lack of probable cause; and
(6) resulting injury or damage.

¶4 Gaar v. North Myrtle Beach Realty Co., 287 S.C. 525, 339 S.E. (2d) 887 (Ct. App. 1986).

¶5 Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground dismissal of criminal charges as the result of appellant’s voluntary entry into the PTI Program was not, as a matter of law, a termination of the underlying action in his favor within the meaning of the third element. The trial judge granted the motion and this appeal follows.

¶6 We hold that dismissal of criminal charges as the result of the accused’s voluntary entry into, and successful completion of, a PTI Program is not, as a matter of law, a termination of the action in his favor. Cf, Jennings v. Clearwater Mfg. Co., 171 S.C. 498, 172 S.E. 870 (1934) (voluntary settlement of underlying criminal charge will not support malicious prosecution action). Accordingly, the circuit court’s order is

¶7 Affirmed.

Chandler, C.J., Toal and Waller, JJ., and Curtis G. Shaw, Acting Associate Justice, concur.
1

¶8 See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-22-10 through -170 (1985 and Supp. 1993).

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