Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 318 F.3d 387 - Vasquez v. Parrott

Vasquez v. Parrott’s Empirical Analysis

318 F.3d 387 · 2003

Citation profile

31
cited by 31 later decisions
1
states following
March 2019
most recently cited

17 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Slack v. McDaniel · McCleskey v. Zant · Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal · Harris v. Champion · Pratt v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “two petitions are not 'successive' under § 2244 merely because they are both brought by the same prisoner. Rather, to be considered 'successive,' a prisoner’s second petition must, in a broad sense, represent a second attack by federal habeas petition on the same conviction.” 318 F.3d at 390 . The prisoner's first petition did not count because”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. (2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless— (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfin- der would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “By definition, a prisoner challenging the administration of his sentence will not be relying on newly discovered evidence to show that a “reasonable factfinder would [not] have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” Likewise, a petitioner ... will also be unable to show that his claim “relies on a new rule of constitutional law,” because the due process principles governing challenges to the procedures used to strip a prisoner of good-time credits are well-established.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.